

# International Conference 2021 Building a Peaceful Korean Peninsula

June 16(Wed), 2021



Ministry of Unification  
National Institute for  
Unification Education

KOREA **KF**  
FOUNDATION



**DAY 3** June 16(Wed) **International Conference**

Time	Program	
09:20~30	Opening	<b>Opening Remarks</b> - Geun LEE   President of Korea Foundation <b>Welcoming Remarks</b> - Jun Kee BAEK   President of National Institute for Unification Education
<b>Theme:</b> Prospects of Biden administration's policy on North Korea and Seeking Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula		
9:30-11:30	Moderator	Seong-ho SHEEN   Seoul National University, Professor
	Presenters	<a href="#">US-Japan-Korea Coordination on North Korea Policy - Challenges and Opportunity</a> Jonathan Berkshire MILLER   Macdonald Laurier Institute, Director/Senior Fellow <a href="#">Biden's Policy on North Korea: The Practical and Calibrated Approach</a> Richard Tommy SALAZAR MEDINA   Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, sede Ecuador <a href="#">US policy on North Korea: Consistency and Change</a> Jina KIM   Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Research Fellow
		Discussants
<b>Theme:</b> North Korean Denuclearization and Peace and Stability of East Asia		
13:00-15:00	Moderator	Heajeong LEE   Chung-Ang University, Professor
	Presenters	<a href="#">Assessing the Effectiveness of Security Assurances on the DPRK's Nuclear Issue</a> Yi DING   Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Research Associate <a href="#">Korean Unification and North Korea Denuclearization</a> Alaa Fathay Ibrahim MOHAMED   Ainshams University, Assistant Professor <a href="#">DPRK Denuclearization and Peace and Stability of East Asia</a> Wongi CHOE   Korea National Diplomatic Academy, Professor
		Discussants
<b>Theme:</b> Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula and International Cooperation		
15:30-17:30	Moderator	Sang-Yoon MA   Gatholic University of Korea, Professor
	Presenters	<a href="#">De-Nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula: Lessons from South Africa</a> Yarik TURIANSKYI   SAIIA, Deputy Programme Head <a href="#">Effectiveness of International Sanctions Against the DPRK and the FRY</a> Mihajlo VUCIC   IIPE, Research Fellow <a href="#">International Cooperation for the Korean Peace Process</a> Jihwan HWANG   University of Seoul, Professor
		Discussants

※ The program is subject to change.

# International Conference 2021

## Building a Peaceful Korean Peninsula

DAY 3 June 16(Wed), 2021 International Conference



Opening Remarks

**Geun LEE**  
| President of Korea Foundation



Welcoming Remarks

**Jun Kee BAEK**  
| President of National Institute for  
Unification Education



Session 1 Moderator

**Seong-ho SHEEN**  
| Seoul National University  
| Professor



Session 1 Presenters

**Jonathan Berkshire MILLER**  
| Macdonald Laurier Institute  
| Director/Senior Fellow



Session 1 Presenters

**Richard Tommy SALAZAR MEDINA**  
| Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar  
| sede Ecuador



Session 1 Presenters

**Jina KIM**  
| Korea Institute for Defense Analyses  
| Research Fellow



Session 1 Discussants

**Jason Anthony BARTLETT**  
| CNAS  
| Research Assistant



Session 1 Discussants

**Natalia Renee SLAVNEY**  
| The Henry L. Stimson Center and 38 North Program  
| Research Associate



Session 1 Discussants

**Park, Jae Jeok**  
| Hankuk University of Foreign Studies  
| Associate Professor



Session 2 Moderator

**Heajeong Lee**  
| Chung-Ang University  
| Professor



Session 2 Presenters

**Yi DING**  
| Shanghai University of Political Science  
and Law  
| Research Associate



Session 2 Presenters

**Alaa Fathay Ibrahim MOHAMED**  
| Ainshams University  
| Assistant professor

# International Conference 2021

## Building a Peaceful Korean Peninsula



### Session 2 Presenters

**Wongji CHOE**

| Korea National Diplomatic Academy  
| Professor



### Session 2 Discussants

**Inero Valbuena ANCHO**

| Philippine Normal University  
| Assistant Professor



### Session 2 Discussants

**Rafael David SHUSTER**

| Truman Institute  
| Research Fellow



### Session 2 Discussants

**Sung Chul JUNG**

| Myongji University  
| Associate Professor



### Session 3 Moderator

**Sang-Yoon MA**

| Catholic University of Korea  
| Professor



### Session 3 Presenters

**Yarik TURIANSKYI**

| SAIIA  
| Deputy programme head



### Session 3 Presenters

**Mihajlo VUCIC**

| IIPE  
| Research Fellow



### Session 3 Presenters

**Jihwan HWANG**

| University of Seoul  
| Professor



### Session 3 Discussants

**Ildze SKESTERE**

| University of Latvia  
| Lecturer



### Session 3 Moderator

**Cristina VARRIALE**

| RUSI  
| Research Fellow



### Session 3 Discussants

**Soyoung KWON**

| George Mason University Korea  
| Professor



# **DAY 3** International Conference

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## **Session I**

Prospects of Biden administration's policy on North Korea and Seeking Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula





## Presenter 2

**Richard Tommy SALAZAR MEDINA**

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Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, sede Ecuador

Institute for Unification Education  
Emerging Leaders Fellowship 2021

## Biden's Policy on North Korea: The Practical and Calibrated Approach



RICHARD SALAZAR MEDINA  
University of California, Irvine

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**From insults**

**Singapore, June 12, 2018**

**To infatuation...**

**“we fell in love”  
(D. Trump)**



It did not end very well ...

President Trump and the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, in Hanoi. “A proposal to go big” fell short.

In the end, the president took a brief walk with Mr. Kim around the hotel’s pool, shook his hand and then canceled lunch in a glassed pavilion.

In any case, there were important advances for the pacification of the peninsula that cannot be ignored





## Three previous US presidents had failed

- 1. Obama (2008 – 2016)** – Strategic patience
- 2. George Bush (2000 – 2008)** – Six-party talks: USA, Japan, China, Russia, South Korea and North Korea
- 3. Bill Clinton (1992 – 2000)** – Framework agreement to solve the 1993-94 nuclear crisis; Kim Dae Jung South Korean president's sunshine policy; negotiation on Pyongyang's missile program

## Evaluation...

In 2000, at the end of the Clinton administration, Pyongyang had no nuclear weapons.

In 2008, at the end of the Bush administration, it had four to six.

In 2016, at the end of the Obama administration, it numbered around 25.

In 2020, at the end of the Trump administration, it numbered around 45 and probably 60.

*Siegfried S. Hecker, A former director of the Los Alamos Weapons Laboratory in New Mexico*

## Evaluation...



Brad Roberts, Livermore Weapons Laboratory in California:

North has achieved an important new phase – “a heavily armed nuclear state with intercontinental access.”


Kim has tested three new missiles One in 2019 and this year.

Those models have greater accuracy and new maneuver powers, which can help defeat US security forces in the region



Evaluation...

Testing - seismic magnitude in North Korea



Source: USGS



President Biden's Policy

For months now, the Biden administration has been engaged in reviewing the North Korean strategy, often in consultation with South Korea and Japan.

Biden used as example former President Trump's high-profile meetings with Kim Jong-Un to illustrate **what he, as president, would never do.**



## President Biden's Policy...

But, President Biden has not excluded all of Trump's diplomacy.

The White House **says it wants to build on the "Singapore Declaration"**,

- new relationship between the United States and North Korea,
- a permanent peace plan,
- complete denuclearization, and
- a full account of soldiers missing from action in a war.

## President Biden's Policy...

President Biden described his North Korea policy as a **combination of "diplomacy, as well as stern deterrence."**

**Jen Psaki, Press Secretary,**

*our policy will not focus on achieving a grand bargain, nor will it rely on strategic patience."*

*the White House intends to adopt the classic middle ground policy option of a "calibrated, practical approach"—framed between former Presidents Barack Obama's "strategic patience" and Donald Trump's "grand bargain."*

**"We have and will continue to consult with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and other allies and partners at every step along the way."**



*The role of China*

## Conclusions

- North Korea Isn't Giving Up Its Nuclear Arsenal.
- The new approach of the Biden era seems to rule out the "all or nothing" of Donald Trump and the "strategic patience" of Barack Obama,
  - middle way that pursues the diplomatic dialogue in phases and seeks to rekindle conversations that remain frozen after the failure of the 2019 Hanoi summit.
- Main point of disagreement insistent denunciation of the Biden Government on account of the repeated and brutal human rights abuses committed by the North Korean regime (very different from former president Trump)

*Designation of Sung Kim as US delegate to North Korea  
May, 2021*



## Conclusions...

- Differences between the United States and North Korea over how to achieve a nuclear-free Korean peninsula have increased over the years, but remain undisturbed.
- A strong voice argued that the gap could be reduced through continued dialogue, with President Moon, who played the role of mediator and motivator during the Trump administration.
- Even after the summit meeting between Kim and Mr. Trump ended without an agreement, President Moon's government insisted that nuclear was the only viable way to end the menace and establish peace.
- During his last meeting with President Biden this week, President Moon said, one goal would be to "put North Korea back on the path of negotiation".



President Moon was very active in arranging the summit between Trump and Kim, and has continued to encourage dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.



*Tianchi Lake, Monte Paektu, September 20, 2018*

## Presenter 3

Jina KIM

Korea Institute for Defense Analyses,  
Research Fellow



# US policy on North Korea: Consistency and Change

Jina Kim, *Ph.D*  
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

## Diplomatic Engagement: What's old and new?

The policy toward the DPRK may be affected by various factors interacting at international, regional and national levels.

- |  |                                    |
|--|------------------------------------|
| Support the non-proliferation regime           | Strengthen the norm-based approach |
| Prefer a multilateral, pan-government approach | Continue US-China competition      |



## Consistency

- US position moves along the continuum between "all or nothing" and "strategic patience"
- US insists on pre-steps for rewards (not for working-level talks)
- "All" existing agreements are respected



## Support the non-proliferation regime

- **Comprehensive denuclearization**
  - **Control discourse on nuclear arms-control**
  - **CVID = FFVD = FVD**
- Freeze (Geneva Agreement)
  - Nuclear materials to remain inside the North
  - Disarmament to be delayed until providing a light water reactor
- Disenablement (6PT Agreement)
  - 'Shutting-down,' not dismantlement or elimination
  - Applied only to the 'existing program'



## Strengthen a norm-based approach

- **Principled diplomacy**
  - Use of force as the last resort
  - Respond to illegal activities accordingly
- Comprehensive agreement
  - Umbrella agreement with a clear end-state
  - Time-consuming in dealing with complex issues
- Phased agreement
  - Produce multiple documents
  - The end-state is not predictable

## Pursue a pan-government approach

- **Comprehensive policy review**
  - Human rights violation, conventional and nonconventional threat, money-laundering, sponsoring terrorism, etc.
  - Two pillars: deterrence and sanction
- Human rights issues have been addressed at the stage of discussing diplomatic normalization
- Ballistic missile threat was discussed at a separate forum

## Continue to use China's leverage

- **Encouraging China's positive role is tricky in times of growing tension between Washington and Beijing**
  - **Curbing North Korea's provocations between reaching an agreement**
  - **Preventing North Korea's defection after an agreement is reached**
- China's cooperation in passing additional UNSCR in 2016 and 2017
- North Korea's Juche dictates avoiding heavy reliance on China

Scenario	Near-term Interest in Resuming Talks	Seeking a New Equilibrium on the Kp	Worst-case Scenario
background	construction of socialism and economic recovery	resuming talks is not a readily available option	unnecessary escalation of tensions on the Kp
goals	to resume negotiations with the US	to seek a new equilibrium in the military balance	to be recognized as a <i>de facto</i> NWS
strategy	pressuring the South to consult with the US	increasing deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis the allied forces	seeking political compromise for nuclear arms control
likely behavior	avoiding unnecessary tensions & minimizing the size of the win-set	focusing on military modernization & engaging in a tit-for-tat rivalry	speeding up efforts to demonstrate second-strike capabilities
uncertainty	close China-DPRK relations	stability-instability paradox	diminishing marginal utility



	SCENARIO A	SCENARIO B	SCENARIO C
tendency	Risk-averse	opportunistic	Risk-acceptant
outcome	signaling	low-profile provocation	High-profile provocation
cost	low	moderate	high
allied response	offering a way out of the stalemate & developing a concrete denuclearization roadmap for CTR	ensuring the systematic implementation of 4D & enhancing information sharing and interoperability	tightening of strategic trade control & sending a unified message in cooperation with regional countries

## ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS

- The more vulnerable and dependent the DPRK becomes, the more sensitive it becomes to the cost of provocations.
- North Korea will continue to increase its conventional forces with asymmetric capabilities vis-à-vis US allies in a way not to provoke China and Russia
- Considerations for allied response and regional cooperation:
  - Risk elimination through denuclearization
  - Risk management via multiple channels
  - De-escalation through arms control
  - Damage limitation through deterrence and defense



# **DAY 3** International Conference

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## **Session 2**

North Korean Denuclearization and  
Peace and Stability of East Asia

## Presenter 1

Yi DING

Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Research Associate



# **Assessing the Effectiveness of Security Assurances on the DPRK's Nuclear Issue**


by  
Yi DING,  
Shanghai University of Political Science and Law  
June 16, 2021

## **1. Research Question**

- What role did security assurances play in the DPRK's nuclear issue?
- Why security assurances provided are ineffective to dissuade the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons.

## 2. Existing Literatures

Why does a state decide to acquire or give up nuclear weapons?



## 2. Existing Literatures

- This paper tries to add new dimensions based on the security-driving model:  
A state may have other choices to ensure their own security besides self-reliant nuclearization, for example, to seek external security commitment from an ally or from other international security regime. In this perspective, security assurance provided by others can play a role in impacting a state's nuclear behavior.
- Existing literatures paid relatively less attention to the possible value of security assurance in the DPRK's case of nuclear proliferation.



### 3. How can security assurances be effective?

#### Security assurance

- Positive security assurances refer to promise to come to aid of non-nuclear-weapon states in case that they are threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons.
- Negative security assurances are promises not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states

### 3. How can security assurances be effective?

- Credible
  - Publicized
  - Legalized
  - Infused with further commitments
- Tailored to the target's major concern

## 4. Case study

The DPRK’s external security assurances primarily come from four entities

- United Nations
- The Soviet Union
- China
- The United States

Provided by	Source	Type	Credibility	General or tailored	Outcome
United Nations	<i>UNSCR 984</i>	Positive and negative	Publicized but not legalized	General	Low effectiveness
The Soviet Union	<i>1961 USSR-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance</i>	Positive	Legalized and with further commitments	Tailored	Moderately effective
China	<i>1961 Sino-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance</i>	Positive	Legalized but with little further commitments	Tailored	Low effectiveness



Provided by	Source	Type	Credibility	General or tailored	Outcome
The United States	<i>U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994</i>	Primarily negative or unspecified	Publicized but not legalized	Targeted but not tailored to the concern of regime survival	Low effectiveness
	<i>U.S.-DPRK Joint Communique of 2000</i>				
	<i>Joint Statement of Six-Party Talks of 2005</i>				
	<i>Nuclear Posture Review of 2010</i>				
	<i>Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's speech in 2017</i>				
	<i>Joint Statement at the Singapore Summit of 2018</i>				

## 5. Conclusion

- The only moderately effective security assurance was offered by the Soviet Union, but the alliance treaty was nullified after the Soviet collapse.
- Other security assurances offered by the U.N., China and the U.S. are all of low effectiveness, which may help to explain the DPRK's case of nuclear proliferation from one aspect.

## Presenter 2

**Alaa Fathay Ibrahim MOHAMED**

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Ainshams University, Assistant Professor



# KOREAN UNIFICATION AND N. KOREA DENUCLEARIZATION

Alaa F. Elewa  
Ainshams University

*in Arab journals between past  
and present*



# TYPES OF NEWS ABOUT THE KOREAN PENINSULA

*Political, Economic,  
Cultural, International  
& Historical*

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## TYPES OF NEWS ABOUT THE KOREAN PENINSULA

*KKorea was an unknown country to many Arabs, the division of Korea also was a subject that is not familiar to a large number of Arabs. Those are the 5 types of news published about the Korean Peninsula in the Arab newspaper.*

- Political
  - Korean Division & Unification
  - N. Korea Nuclear issue
  - State visit
- Historical
  - Mainly in the period between the 1890s~1960s
  - Introducing basic information (geographical and historical) about the peninsula
  - Russo-Japanese war & Sino-Japanese war
- Economic
  - Centered around N. Korea until the early 90S.
  - Korean workers in Arab countries
  - S. Korea rapid economic development
  - Economic cooperation
- Cultural Events
  - Hosting art exhibitions
  - Participating in international art awards ceremonies
  - Embassy hosted events
- International Events
  - International conferences

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## KOREAN DIVISION & UNIFICATION

*Korean War,  
Ideological War,  
The role of Arab  
countries*

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## KOREAN DIVISION & UNIFICATION

*News about Korean war in the 1950s*

### Main issues that were presented

Most of the news about the Korean peninsula division can be found in the period of the Korean war (1950~1953)

- Historical background about the Korean Peninsula.
- The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- Arab Countries actual Stance
- Expectations about the Arabs' role.



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## KOREAN DIVISION & UNIFICATION

### Historical background about the Korean Peninsula

- Articles started with detailed information about the geographical location of the peninsula
- Mention the Japanese occupation : the Sino-Japanese War & Russo-Japanese War
- Introducing the division

*“the Korean Peninsula was divided into two regions; one that is communist in the north and is considered under the Russian control, and another one in the south that is considered under the American influence. The communists tried to make South Korean to join their lineup, However US saw what Japan saw in the Korean peninsula half a century ago, any enemy controls Korea could be a great danger on it, and that why the current war raged” (Al-risala 1951.04.02)*

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## KOREAN DIVISION & UNIFICATION

### The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union

- The ideological conflict between the South and the North was introduced as an international dispute between the US and the Soviet.
- Russia was introduced as the greatest beneficiary of this war; showing its power and poise in this situation.
- In contrast, the US joining this war was described as a hasty and unwise action.

*“Russia wanted to see the international stance from a war that could be a danger on the peace of the world. (---) and also draw attention to this small eastern piece of land and having a war on it to drain it enemy's force, so it can strengthen its tactical, military, and strategic positions in more important locations such as Iran, Turkey, East Germany, and etc.” (Al-thaqaffa 1955.08.7)*

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## KOREAN DIVISION & UNIFICATION

### Arab Countries actual Stance

- Egypt: refuses to cast votes in the UN Security Council
- Syria: participating in the UN commission to solve the dispute

### Expectations about the Arab role

- Cooperate with other small countries to prevent war and establish world peace
- However, this cooperation is conditioned to a 'Solid Foundation' that must be offered by 'Big Countries'

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## KOREAN UNIFICATION

Korean unification issue was hardly mentioned in the Arab Journals until the 1990s

- Occasionally mentioned in official talks

Egypt & N. Korea's Talks: Hosni Mubarak's official visit to N. Korea in 1990

*"During the talks, the two leaders also discussed N. Korea's call to unify the Korean peninsula peacefully, and Mubarak expressed his hope that the people of the Asian continent will be able to solve the problem without outside interference or international conferences."* (Al-Ahram 1990.04.14)

- An Egyptian study searching the possibilities of a unified Korea

In 1994 after the Korean nuclear program crisis was roused again internationally, a series of articles explaining the situation was published. One of them included the results of a study made by an Egyptian center of strategic studies.

*"Investigations indicate that the North Korean people are ready to struggle with a fierce war against any aggression from the South."* (Al-wafed 1994.04.14)

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## NOTES

- The differentiation between the South and the North can hardly be found until the end of the 80s. (Egypt–South Korea relations started in 1995. What was referred to as Korea mostly meant the North.
- The mentioning of North Korea was more frequent – especially in cultural events– until the mid-90s. (also Kim Il-sung photos were being published as paid ads in the Egyptian journals until his death in 1994 (Al-wafed, 1997.09.03))
- South Korea gained more attention from Arab Journals in the mid-90s, focusing on its economic development and cooperation with the Arab countries.

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# NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROGRAM & DENUCLEARIZATION



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## NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROGRAM

1994 - 1999

- Articles at this time mainly concentrated on criticizing the American stance for escalating the situation with N. Korea.  
*“N. Korea crisis is not a single problem, but it is a part of wider complicated crisis that the USA had to deal with.”*
- The commercial crisis with Japan, the human rights crisis with China, and the military crisis with N. Korea → ‘the US is testing its ability of crisis management to maintain its position the great and only political and military power in the world.’

*“when the US blasted the Korean crisis, it had in mind the Asian trade blocs and the type of relationship that could arise between them.” (Al-wafed, 1994.04.14)*

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## NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROGRAM

1994-1999

- In contrast, N. Korea was praised to take defensive actions against the US's provocations
- Korean nuclear program was described as "deterrent" and "defensive"
- It was compared to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
- Economic sanctions as a solution were questionable and excluded.

### 2 suggested scenarios to end the situation :

1. N. Korea give up its nuclear program – in the condition of China changing its supporting position to N. Korea
2. N. Korea success to get itself a bigger comprehensive deal

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## NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROGRAM

2002-2004

- The N. Korean nuclear issue gained massive attention from the media in the Arab world at the end of 2002, as its situation seemed to be much similar to that in Iraq.
- Speculations that the N. Korea's fate to be the same of Iraq. However, the American stance towards N. Korea was accused to be more flexible and based on fear, rather than the hostility that the US showed towards Iraq. (the reasons for that varied: 9/11, N. Korea's actual possession of nuclear weapons, People of N. Korea supporting its regime)
- Praising the organized strategy and the military power of N. Korea (to fight the common enemy)

*"why don't we do what Korea does and show America the evil eye? ---- N. Korea made its national security plan 50 years ago to be in a war with the United States, and since then it continued its preparations for the fight." (Rose Al-Youssef 2003.02.01)*

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## NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROGRAM

2002-2004

### 4 suggested scenarios to end the situation

1. Direct military confrontation – similar to Iraq. But with low possibilities due to the refusal of neighboring countries.
2. Peace treaty
3. Accepting N. Korea as a state with nuclear weapons
4. The US continues to use the containment strategy with N. Korea though it won't help to reduce tension in the region

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## NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Current

- Criticizing the American stance still dominates the analytical news about N. Korea's issue. However, instead of criticizing its hostility towards N. Korea, the US is being criticized for its failure to achieve an agreement with the Korean part.
- Supporting voices to N. Korea disappeared. N. Korean Leader is being described as 'childish'
- Doubts about the effectiveness of the Economic sanctions
- Speculations that N. Korean issue could lead Japan to go back to the 'Militarization era'

### 2 expected scenarios to the end of the issue

1. Nuclear war
2. Accepting N. Korea as a state with nuclear weapons.

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## NOTES

- N. Korea's nuclear issue was not considered as an issue that Arabs can be involved in to be solved.
- Recently and with the crisis being more intense, North Korea's nuclear program is recognized as a danger to international peace.
- The role of S. Korea, Russia, China, and their stances are rarely mentioned

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# THANK YOU

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Faculty of Al-Alsun  
Ainshams University

## Presenter 3

**Wongi CHOE**

Korea National Diplomatic Academy,  
Professor



## DPRK Denuclearization and Peace and Stability of East Asia

June 16, 2021

Wongi Choe  
(Korea National Diplomatic Academy)

### Disclaimer

- The following presentation is based on my personal views and has nothing to do with the official position of the organization that I work for, Korea National Diplomatic Academy, nor Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea.

## Table of Contents

- I. Current Geo-strategic Developments in the Indo-Pacific
  
- II. Peace Process in the Korean Peninsula and ROK's New Southern Policy

### I. Current Geo-strategic Developments in the Indo-Pacific

- US-China Strategic Competition
- DPRK Nuclear and Missile Threats
- Covid-19 Pandemic and Its Geopolitical Impacts



## US-China Strategic Competition

- Rise of China and its increasingly assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific
  - Changes in the balance of power and weakening strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific (China's GDP increased to about 67% of US GDP in 2019)
  - Revisionist claims and behavior in the South China Sea, and bilateral economic coercions on ROK, Australia, etc
  - Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and expanding geo-economic influence
- US's push back against China: Biden administration's FOIP(free and open Indo-Pacific) Strategy
  - Succeeding Trump administration's perception on China and strategy
  - Building democratic alliance by renewing ties with allies and partner
  - Quad as a central pillar in dealing with China
  - Taking issue with human right abuses in Xinjang, Hong Kong, Tibet
  - Strategic decoupling in high tech areas
  - Quad Summit (March 12, 2021) and "2+2 Meeting" with Japan and ROK (March 16~18, 2021) for renewing Trilateral cooperation among ROK, US, and Japan.
- Increasing uncertainties in the regional security environment

## Increasing DPRK Nuclear and Missile Capabilities and Threats

- Enhancement of DPRK's nuclear and missile capabilities
  - DPRK as de facto nuclear power
- Kim's (voluntary and conditional) commitment to denuclearization in exchange of security guarantees from the US
  - Conditional on quid pro quo from the US
- Showdown of US-DPRK nuclear talks
  - US-DPRK Singapore summit and Singapore Agreement in 2018
  - No deal in Hanoi, 2019 and currently no talks between US and DPRK
- Freeze of inter-Korean relations
  - Three rounds of inter-Korean summit
  - But, Now all gone; no inter-Korean engagement since early 2020
- Biden administration's new DPRK approach
  - "Calibrated and practical approach" that is open to diplomacy with DPRK
  - New strategic engagement with DPRK?

## Covid-19 Pandemic and Intensification of Geopolitical Tensions

- Global Spread of Covid-19 and Geopolitical fallout
  - US-China clashed regarding the origin of the Covid-19 and China's earlier mishandling of information disclosure
  - China's earlier containment of Covid-19 based on draconian control vs US failure of nation-wide spread of Covid-19
  - China taking advantage of the Covid-19 crisis through active 'mask diplomacy' and 'vaccine diplomacy'

## II. ROK's Approaches: Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula and New Southern Policy (NSP)

- Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula
- Balanced Diplomacy Approach in the context of US-China Rivalry
- New Southern Policy (NSP)



## Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula: Three Goals

- **Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Establishment of Permanent Peace**
  - Two track approach of using sanctions/pressure as well as active dialogue/engagement
  - Gradual approach toward denuclearization as opposed to CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization)
- **Development of Sustainable Inter-Korean Relations**
  - Aim for dual progress in nuclear issues as well as in inter-Korean relations
  - Develop inter-Korean Relations as a strong foundation for denuclearization
- **Realization of a 'New Economic Community on the Korean Peninsula' as a foundation for prosperity in the Future**
  - Toward building a single market on the Korean Peninsula to create new growth engines and create an inter-Korean economic community
  - Economic engagement as material incentive for mitigating North's nuclear ambitions

## ROK's "Balanced Diplomacy" Approach in the context of US-China Rivalry

- ROK poised geopolitically "in the middle" between two great powers
  - ROK as the "lynchpin" of the US alliance in the region
  - ROK as the most geographically approximate neighbor to China
- "Balanced Diplomacy" approach
  - ROK-US alliance as the pillar of ROK's security,
  - Strategic cooperation and partnership with China
  - Taking a position of 'strategic ambiguity' on thorny issues
- Increasing pressures on ROK to take a side
  - ROK's limited cooperation with the US on the Indo-Pacific
  - ROK-US Summit (May 21, 2021): "Comprehensive Partnership for a Better Future"

## New Southern Policy (NSP)

- ROK's new regional cooperation strategy initiated by the Moon administration
  - Primary target partners: Southeast Asia and India
- Three goals
  - Economic diversification
  - Diplomatic rebalancing
  - New regional cooperation
- The most successful initiative under Moon presidency
  - Likely outlast the Moon administration

# **DAY 3** International Conference

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## **Session 3**

Peace Process on the Korean  
Peninsula and International  
Cooperation

## Presenter 1

**Yarik TURIANSKYI**

SAIIA, Deputy Programme Head



## De-Nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula: Lessons from South Africa

YARIK TURIANSKYI

16 JUNE 2021

*African perspectives. Global insights.*



## 100 SECONDS TO MIDNIGHT

- 23 January 2020: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists adjusted the Doomsday Clock to 100 seconds to midnight
- Established in 1947, the Doomsday Clock, became a barometer of global nuclear threats
- Less than two months later, WHO declared Covid-19 a global pandemic

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## DPRK DURING COVID

- **October 2020: DPRK unveiled a new two-stage liquid-fueled ballistic missile**
- **January 2021: DPRK unveiled a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, which its state media called "the world's most powerful weapon"**
- **March 2021: DPRK carried out a launch of what it called a "new-type tactical guided projectile", which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead**
- **Kim Jong Un has also pledged to expand DPRK's nuclear arsenal and military potential**

*African perspectives. Global insights.*



## GLOBAL SITUATION


- **Slow nuclear disarmament: from 13 865 in 2019 to 13 400 in 2020**
- **China, the US and Russia continuously modernise their nuclear arsenals**
- **Iran wants to join the ranks of nuclear-armed states**
- **'Haves' and 'Have-Nots'**

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## NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Number of nuclear warheads worldwide as of January 2020



Source: Statista.com

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## GLOBAL SITUATION

- African states are concerned about the NPT. Nuclear weapon states call for non-proliferation but are slow to commit to total nuclear disarmament
- India, Israel and Pakistan remain outside NPT
- 2018: US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
- 2019: Russia withdrew from the 1987 Soviet–US Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)
- 2021: Iran produced 2,4kg of HEU, reaching levels of 60% purity, just below the threshold normally used in bombs

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## **SOUTH AFRICA: NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

- **1989: FW De Klerk appointed a committee to oversee dismantling of SA's nuclear weapons**
- **1991: Signed NPT and IAEA Safeguard agreements**
- **1993: IAEA verified the dismantlement of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme and de Klerk publicly disclosed nuclear programme**
- **1994: ANC came to power and embarked on a campaign of 'nuclear diplomacy'**

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## **LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA**

- **SA started campaigning for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy**
- **1995: Key player in Review and Extension Conference of the NPT**
- **1996: Facilitated the African Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty), which entered into force on 15 July 2009**
- **2017: South Africa pushed for the TPNW (Ban Treaty), which was passed by the UNGA on 7 July 2017 and entered into force on 22 January 2021**

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## LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

- **Negotiation and compromise**
- **Security assurances, conditional ending of sanctions and integration into the reintegrating international community:**
  - FW de Klerk: “...unlikely that Kim Jong Un will dispense with his nuclear weapons unless he is absolutely sure that there will be no threat to his regime”
- **Regime change**
- **Working with IAEA to dismantle nuclear weapons**
- **Signing and ratifying international agreements:**
  - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
  - Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
  - Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

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## NPT REVCON 2021

- **2021 NPT RevCon August 2021: opportunity to review nuclear disarmament**
- **First NPT conference since the entry into force of the TPNW Ban Treaty and the first in the era of COVID-19**
- **Pandemic caused many states reconsider their norms and future direction in a post-pandemic world**
- **This world should be a world free of nuclear weapons, with nuclear energy only used for peaceful, developmental purposes**


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## VISIT SAIIA'S A4D RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY PAGES



Nuclear Power & Governance Frameworks: Egypt, Ghana and South Africa



Nuclear Energy in South Africa



A No-Regret Option? South Africa's Nuclear Future

[saiia.org.za/thematic-area/governance/nuclear-governance/](https://saiia.org.za/thematic-area/governance/nuclear-governance/)

Foreign Policy

### Atoms for Development advocacy campaign

[saiia.org.za/project/atoms-for-development/advocacy-campaign/](https://saiia.org.za/project/atoms-for-development/advocacy-campaign/)

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## THANK YOU

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## Presenter 2

**Mihajlo VUCIC**

IIPE, Research Fellow

# Effectiveness of international sanctions against the DPRK and the FRY

AN OBSTACLE TO THE UNIFICATION PROCESS?

## Criteria for evaluation of a sanctions regime

- ▶ Legitimacy – what is the purpose of a sanctions regime? (arms control, conflict resolution, human rights issues, democratization, counter-terrorism)
- ▶ Legality – accordance with the values and norms of the UN, accordance with domestic laws
- ▶ Effectiveness – who will be targeted? who will profit from the sanctions? Are the sanctions the most adequate policy instrument for the achievement of the aforementioned purposes?

## UN sanctions regime against the DPRK

- ▶ UN Security Council has adopted nine major sanctions resolutions on North Korea in response to the country's nuclear and missile activities since 2006
- ▶ Each resolution condemns North Korea's latest nuclear and ballistic missile activity and calls on North Korea to cease its illicit activity
- ▶ All nine resolutions were unanimously adopted
- ▶ The resolutions give UN member states the authority to interdict and inspect North Korean cargo within their territory, and subsequently seize and dispose of illicit shipments
- ▶ The resolutions also call upon North Korea to rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it acceded to in 1985 but withdrew from in 2003

## The contents of the UN sanctions regime against the DPRK

- ▶ ban on the trade of arms and military equipment, dual-use technologies, vehicles, industrial machinery, and metals;
- ▶ freezing the asset of individuals involved in the country's nuclear program;
- ▶ ban on the import of certain luxury goods;
- ▶ ban on the export of electrical equipment, coal, minerals, seafood and other food and agricultural products, wood, textiles, and stones;
- ▶ cap on North Korean labour exports;
- ▶ cap on imports of oil and refined petroleum products;
- ▶ ban on natural gas imports;
- ▶ restricting the fishing rights;
- ▶ restricting the scientific and technical cooperation with North Korea;
- ▶ prohibiting UN members from opening North Korean bank accounts and banking offices.

## Other sanctions regimes against the DPRK

- ▶ Unilateral sanctions (or restrictive measures) have been installed against the DPRK by the US, EU, Japan, Australia, and South Korea in some instances
- ▶ The motives for these sanctions are various, not only non-proliferation, but also cyber activity („Sony hack“) and human rights abuses, censorship and money laundering
- ▶ Doubtful legality under international law
- ▶ Legitimacy concerns – imposition of one's own values upon the other
- ▶ Effectiveness concerns – common infrastructural projects between two Koreas require sanctions exemptions (inter-Korean railway e.g.)

## Challenges associated with the implementation

- ▶ Enforcement – responsibility lies with member states
- ▶ Negative side effects – proliferation of smuggling and black market activities
- ▶ Watering down of UN sanctions provisions – need to garner the backing of Russia and China
- ▶ Opposite effect – Instead of weakening the sanctioned authorities, sanctions might lead to their further empowerment
- ▶ Inadequateness ? – The DPRK is worried about its security and if the perception of threat persists why would it renounce the nuclear ambitions?
- ▶ Human cost

## Sanctions' purpose through the unification prism

- ▶ What is the main barrier to the unification of the two Koreas – nuclear ambitions or human rights and democracy deficits of the DPRK?
- ▶ The newest and toughest sanctions imposed in 2017 negatively affected the North Korean economy on a macroeconomic level. UN human rights chief Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein said that, "sanctions may be adversely affecting the essential help" that UN agencies and aid groups were providing as a "life-line" for some 13 million vulnerable North Koreans
- ▶ This is a side effect which severely undermines the potential for democratic development of the DPRK

## Sanctions' purpose through the unification prism (II)

- ▶ Promoting human rights in North Korea, whether through sanctions or other means, should be viewed as a fundamental aspect of any unification negotiations
- ▶ The Security Council can lift its sanctions at any time and for any reason. The Security Council sanctions regime was imposed for non-proliferation reasons and does not include human rights criteria either for the imposition or removal of sanctions. The sanctions allow for humanitarian and development aid to continue.
- ▶ North Korea is a totalitarian state that severely restricts virtually all basic rights and freedoms and has long been denounced by international human rights NGO's for committing crimes against humanity against the North Korean people.

## The FRY sanctions case as a potential lesson to learn

- ▶ UN sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were instituted in response to the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the FRY was denounced as supportive of one of the warring sides, therefore contributing to the danger to international peace and security
- ▶ With the exception of the punitive measures against Iraq, introduced in August 1990, the sanctions against FRY, by numerousness and far-reaching effects of their punitive consequences, exceeded everything demonstrated till then in the diplomatic history of the world.

## Negative side effects and ultimate success

- ▶ Sanctions regime lead to an unprecedented economic crisis in the FRY
- ▶ Standards of living fell sharply and the Yugoslav people suffered disproportionately from the sanctions
- ▶ The average family struggled just to meet its basic needs
- ▶ The war in BiH went unabated for three more years after the introduction of sanctions
- ▶ Voters in the FRY continued to choose the ruling party as their favorite on every elections until the end of the decade over other politicians who promised a change of policies that could have led to a lifting of the sanctions.
- ▶ However, finally, the sanctions did appear to have influenced policy-makers in the FRY - Milosevic's willingness to cease supporting the Bosnian Serbs and to negotiate the Dayton Peace Agreement was owed in part to the effects that sanctions had on his country.

## Differences between the DPRK's and the FRY's context in relation to the effectiveness of sanctions

- ▶ The threat to peace and security as the legal basis for the implementation of sanctions is on the one hand the support for civil war, on the other nuclear armaments policy.
- ▶ In the case of FRY, the sanctions were imposed with the uniform backing of great powers, while in the case of DPRK China provides the leeway
- ▶ The "carrot" argument for the compliance with sanctions objectives was much more enticing for FRY than for DPRK (FRY was not officially engaged in the civil wars in former Yugoslavia and its subjects could be easily swayed to accept European integration and NATO partnership in exchange for the control of all territories with Serbian population as the main axis of its foreign and security policy)
- ▶ DPRK, on the contrary, probably has the full support of its subjects for the policy of acquiring nuclear capability and achieving military deference against the United States and its allies which led in the first place to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles program.

## Differences between the DPRK's and the FRY's context in relation to the effectiveness of sanctions (II)

- ▶ From the historical perspective, previous track record of human rights and political culture in these two countries made the FRY much more vulnerable to the internal instabilities provoked by the severance of ties with the rest of the world than the DPRK, which enjoys considerable economic and political stability, and has being insulated from the sanctions protagonists who were its belligerent enemies prior to the sanctions.
- ▶ While the FRY was an active participant in international relations and the initiator of many international legal, political and economic co-operations, economic relations between the DPRK and the majority of the world community were either minimal or non-existing prior the sanctions and it was certainly not an active participant in the liberalized international trade.

## Conclusions

- ▶ For the purpose of the unification process, sanctions regimes against the DPRK might prove an additional obstacle
- ▶ Sanctions rarely achieve stated purposes, and when they do, this comes with substantial side-effects, as is visible from the case of the FRY
- ▶ However, the differences in context between the FRY and the DPRK show that the political, social and economic system of the DPRK is structured as to be much more resistant to the sanctions than the ordinary state, a member of the international community is

## Conclusions (II)

- ▶ The UN sanctions regime against the DPRK is all-encompassing and strict
- ▶ However, it is exposed to numerous challenges
- ▶ The unilateral sanctions regimes pursued by individual countries and organizations lack the legitimacy, are intrinsically illegal under international law and constrain the South Korean government to pursue common projects with the North Korean authorities
- ▶ The focus on nuclear armaments rather than on human rights and the well-being of North Korean citizens fails to remove the main obstacle to the unification – the lack of security and political will to cooperate on the part of the DPRK's leadership

## Policy proposals

- ▶ The Government of the Republic of Korea should seek to move the focus of the UN sanctions regimes towards human rights related issues, rather than nuclear proliferation. This might prove to be beneficial to raise awareness that the idea of the sanctions is the well-being of the North Korean population, and not the US's geopolitical dominance of the region
- ▶ The enforcement of sanctions must be strict, otherwise sanctions should be abandoned completely, since the half-baked measures only cause suffering to the population and create opportunities for illicit profits for the North Korean elite
- ▶ The RoK should seek to influence its allies to at least give it exemptions from unilateral sanctions regime to pursue common projects with the North Korean leadership

## Presenter 3

**Jihwan HWANG**

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University of Seoul, Professor



# International Cooperation for the Korean Peace Process



Prof. Jihwan Hwang

University of Seoul



**Guess what?**



## North Korea's Nuclear Tests

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th
Date	Oct. 9, 2006	May 25, 2009	Feb. 12, 2013	Jan. 6, 2016	Sep. 9, 2016	<b>Sep. 3, 2017</b>
Type	Plutonium	Plutonium	Plutonium or HEU	H-Bomb?	Nuclear warhead?	<b>H-Bomb?</b>
Yield	0.8kt	2~6kt	6~7kt	6kt	10kt	<b>120kt</b>
Earth-quake	3.9	4.5	4.9~5.1	4.9-5.2	5.0~5.3	<b>6.3</b>
UN Sanctions	UNSCR 1718	UNSCR 1874	UNSCR 2094	UNSCR 2270	UNSCR 2321	<b>UNSCR 2375</b>
Nuclear and Missile Capability	1. N. Korea is estimated to possess 100 nuclear weapons by 2020. 2. N. Korea claims that nuclear warheads have been successfully <b>standardized, miniaturized, light-weighted, and diversified</b> fit on rockets.					

## North Korea's Nuclear Tests and International Responses

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th
Date	Oct. 9, 2006	May 25, 2009	Feb. 12, 2013	Jan. 6, 2016	Sep. 9, 2016	<b>Sep. 3, 2017</b>
UN Sanctions	UNSCR 1718	UNSCR 1874	UNSCR 2094	UNSCR 2270	UNSCR 2321	<b>UNSCR 2375</b>
Resolution Date	Oct. 14, 2006	June 12, 2009	March 07, 2013	March 2, 2016	Nov 30, 2016	<b>Sep 11, 2017</b>
To UNSCR	5 days	18 days	23 days	56 days	82 days	<b>8 days</b>



## North Korea's Nuclear Warhead (March 2016)




## The Hydrogen Bomb DPRK claimed on Sep. 3, 2017



### North Korean missile range

Nuclear testing is part of a process that moves Pyongyang closer to miniaturising nuclear warheads to mount on intercontinental ballistic missiles. North Korea has well over 1,000 missiles of various ranges. Below is a comparison of North Korea's ballistic missiles' range and capabilities.

Operational Flight tested In development or untested



\*Range estimated at around 4,500km, if flown on a standard trajectory.  
 Notes: Ranges of KN-08 and KN-14 show minimum estimates from CSIS; Taepodong-2 shows designed range but could travel further with lightened payload.  
 Sources: The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense; National Intelligence Service, South Korea; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Reuters  
 C. Inton, W. Cai, 24/03/2017



## North Korea's Ballistic Missile: ICBM and IRBM



## North Korea's SLBM (북극성)



## North Korea's Claims on H-Bomb Capability

- **The Nuclear Weapons Institute of the DPRK (September 4, 2017)**

“Scientists in the nuclear field of the DPRK successfully carried out **a test of H-bomb for ICBM**.... The H-bomb test was... introduced into **manufacturing H-bomb to be placed at the payload of the ICBM.**”

“The test once again confirmed the reliability of the concentration-type **nuke detonation** control system fully verified through **a nuclear warhead detonation test and test-launches of various ballistic rockets**... It also marked a very significant occasion in attaining the final goal of completing the state nuclear force.”

## North Korea's Claims on Missile Capability

### ■ Rodong Sinmun (Labor Daily) July 5, 2017

“The test-launch was aimed to confirm the tactical and technological specifications and technological features of the newly developed **inter-continental ballistic rocket capable of carrying large-sized heavy nuclear warhead** and to finally verify all technical features of the payload of the rocket during its atmospheric reentry including the heat-resisting features and structural safety of the warhead tip of ICBM made of newly developed domestic carbon compound material, in particular.”

## North Korea's Nuclear Strategy

### ■ Statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman (July 8, 2017)

“On July 4, the DPRK successfully carried out the test-fire of inter-continental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 which stands for **the final gate to completing the state nuclear force.**”

The DPRK makes it clear once again that its development of inter-continental ballistic rocket is an option taken **to defend itself by completely terminating the hostile policy and nuclear war threat of the U.S.** which have lasted for decades over the century.



## North Korea's Nuclear Strategy (Cont.)

“That is because the DPRK's inter-continental ballistic rocket is an unquestionable **nuclear war deterrent which is fundamentally different from the military equipment for aggressive war** developed in strict confidence by the U.S. with the wild ambition to dominate the world by means of surprise attack on other nations.”

“Now that the DPRK's capability to strike the very heart of the U.S. at any given time has been physically proved, the U.S. would find it more difficult to dare attack the DPRK.”

## The North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho in New York (Sep. 2017)

- ▣ The North Korean foreign minister has warned that “This could probably mean **the strongest hydrogen bomb test over the Pacific Ocean**. Regarding which measures to take, I don't really know since it is what Kim Jong Un does.”
- ▣ “Since **the United States declared war on our country**, we will have every right to make counter-measures, including **the right to shoot down United States strategic bombers** even when they are not yet inside the airspace border of our country.

## Understanding North Korea's Mindset

### ■ Face-saving and reference point

- North Koreans are people of great **self-respect**.
- They focus on “**Juche**” (self-reliance) and sovereign rights
- So, they try **to save face** rather than to be bullied.
- It is the North Korean version of **rationality**.
- North Korea makes every efforts to defend its **reference point**, which is a cost price that can be hardly conceded.
- **To save face at its reference point, North Korea often takes greater risks than expected**
- North Korea's strategic and rational calculation at its reference point

15

## North Korea's Nuclear Policy

### 1. Making the U.S. abandon hostile policy toward DPRK

- “It is the U.S. that brought nuclear weapons into the Korean peninsula and threatened us” (Kim Il-Sung 1994).
- “The nuclear issue was produced by U.S. hostility and nuclear threat toward DPRK, not vice versa.”
- “We can live without the diplomatic normalization with the U.S. but cannot live without the nuclear deterrence.”



## North Korea's Nuclear Policy

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### 2. Negotiating with the U.S., not in the multilateral talks.

- The inevitability of bilateral talks with the U.S., given the origin of the nuclear issue (Kim Il-Sung).
- “Six-party talks trampled on its sovereign rights and dignity by its participants joining the UN Security Council sanctions on the North’s satellite launch.”
- “We will neither come back to the six-party talks nor be bound by any agreement of the talks”



## North Korea's Nuclear Policy

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### 3. Securing its position as a nuclear weapon state

- “The essence of nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is U.S. nuclear weapons versus our nuclear weapons”
- “We will not give up nuclear weapons even if US-DPRK relation is diplomatically normalized.”
- “Nuclear disarmament talks among nuclear weapon states including North Korea is the only means to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.”

## Inter-Korean Summit April 27, 2018



## Kim Jong Un's Promise to Denuclearization





## U.S.-DPRK First Summit June 12, 2018



## U.S.-DPRK Second Summit February 28, 2019



## Trump-Kim Meeting June 30, 2019



## Between Denuclearization and Peace Regime

- South Korea cannot accept the North Korean version of the peace treaty, because it intends to weaken the Korean security.
- However, it is necessary to prepare for **a new framework for denuclearizing North Korea and building a peace regime.**
- It is because
  - 1) the Korean War is still technically going on,
  - 2) the armistice established in 1953 does not guarantee peace and security in the region,
  - 3) There will be no progress on denuclearization without a realistic plan for a peace regime.



## Between Denuclearization and Peace Regime (Cont.)

- There is a dilemma between denuclearization and peace regime: Which one should go first?
  
- A new peace initiative should include
  - the change in North Korea's national strategy from "the Parallel line"(Byungjin) to an economy-first policy,
  - its initial steps to denuclearize and the official denuclearization procedure for the eventual dismantlement,
  - security guarantee for North Korea.

## Panmunjom Declaration of April 27

④ South and North Korea confirmed the common goal of realizing, **through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.** South and North Korea shared the view that the measures being initiated by North Korea are very meaningful and crucial for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and agreed to carry out their respective roles and responsibilities in this regard. **South and North Korea agreed to actively seek the support and cooperation of the international community for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.**

## U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement June 12, 2018

1. The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.
2. The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build **a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.**
3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work towards **complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.**

## The Issue of Lifting UN Sanctions

- **UNSCR 2270, 2321, 2375: After 4th-6th nuclear tests**
  - South Korea's shutdown of **Kaesong Industrial Complex**
  - U.S. sanctions : North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2016, and designating North Korea as 'primary money laundering concern.'
  - a possibility for **secondary boycott (sanction)**
  - China and Russia's financial and trade sanctions
  - Sanctions on natural gas, export of textiles.
  - A ban on the refined petroleum products beyond 2 million barrels per year and on crude oil in excess of the amount supplied per year
  - A ban on work authorization
  - The issue of Ballistic Missiles



## Sanctions and International Community's Goal

- **Sanctions as a long-term process**
  - **Short-term:** Punishing North Korea's Provocations
  - **Mid-term:** Changing North Korea's course of action and preparing for denuclearization dialogues
  - **Long-term:** Leading North Korea to a normal state and unification on the Korean peninsula
  
  - Every UNSCR on North Korea has also included the provision of the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, expressing its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

## North Korea vs. International Community

- **Sanction's dilemma**
  - North Korea cannot endure international sanctions forever.
  - However, sanctions will not be able to be strong and steady forever.
  
- **Divergence on sanctions**
  - **The U.S., Japan and South Korea** want sanctions to coerce the North Korean leaders to change its course of action.
  - **China and Russia** do not want sanctions to destabilize the North Korean regime.
  - Unless international community agrees to the goal of sanction, sanctions cannot succeed.

## Nuclear Brinkmanship?

- **A worst-case scenario for the U.S. and South Korea** is also the worst-case scenario for North Korea.
- North Korea does not pursue a terrorist group's suicide bombing with nuclear weapons.
- Rather, North Korea has **a long time horizon: survival and muddling through**
- Its brinkmanship fails if it really used nuclear weapons.
- Its leaders know that it is the end of Kim Jong-un regime.
- Its success of brinkmanship depends on how to use its nuclear weapons strategically: a political, diplomatic and economic use.
- This is why North Korea emphasizes **'nuclear war deterrent'**.

## A Perspective by Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry



“A North Korean ability to reach the U.S. changes every calculus. The fear is not that Mr. Kim would launch a pre-emptive attack on the West Coast. That would be suicidal, and if the North's 33-year-old leader has demonstrated anything in his five years in office, he is all about survival. But if Mr. Kim has the potential ability to strike back, it will shape every decision Mr. Trump and his successors make about defending America's allies in the region.”

## A Preemptive Strike?

- **A worst-case scenario for North Korea** is also the worst-case scenario for the U.S. and South Korea.
- The U.S. may be tempting to strike a North Korean nuclear and missile sites.
- But it may also lead North Korea to strike back at South Korea, Japan and even the U.S. escalating into a new Korean war.
- **North Korea does not need the nuclear second strike capability to strike back.** It has 21,000 artillery pieces, many of them aimed at Seoul, and hundreds more missiles aimed at Tokyo and Guam.
- The result would be **1 million casualties and \$1 trillion in damages.**

## A Worst-Case Scenario: Military Escalation

- ▣ Vipin Narang at MIT said that Pyongyang is “nervous about a **surprise attack**. This is **how war by miscalculation starts**... Yesterday’s flight went further north than any this century, though still in international airspace east of DPRK... Such a flight is exactly how a surprise decapitation or counterforce strike could start.”
- ▣ “So **what we intend as a ‘show of strength’ could easily be mistaken as a prelude to a surprise attack, forcing Kim to go preemptively.**”
- ▣ A limited strike can easily escalate into full-scale war.
- ▣ North Korea’s regime would be destroyed, but the country has the world’s fourth-largest army.
- ▣ It also has thousands of tons of chemical weapons that can reach Seoul, Tokyo and Guam with missiles.

## Other Military/Economic Options: Deterrence, Sanctions and Containment

- **Strengthening conventional and nuclear deterrence**
  - Deterrence by denial: THAAD, MD
  - Deterrence by punishment: Counter-attacking capability
- **More sanctions**
  - stepping up sanctions, bolstering the U.S. naval and air force presence off the Korean Peninsula
  - secret American cyber program to sabotage missile launches.
- **Containment:** limiting an adversary's ability to expand its influence, like the case against the Soviet Union.
- These do not solve the problem; **it is just a way of living with it.**

## Diplomatic Option: Persuading China

- The U.S. and South Korea have insisted that China should pressure more decisively on North Korea.
- China perhaps can be persuaded to put a bit more pressure on North Korea.
- However, China is not going to cut North Korea off.
- **China does not want North Korea to collapse.**
- It fears having a U.S. military ally on its own China-Korea border.
- China supports the denuclearization of North Korea, but does not want it to be destabilized.
- China is a **status-quo power** on the Korean peninsula.



## Diplomatic Option: Negotiation May Be the Least Awful Option

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- Diplomacy may aim at a deal in which DPRK freezes its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for some sanctions relief.
- China has backed this general idea.
- It is also necessary to examine DPRK's reference point.
- However, **it's not clear that this would work.**
- The negotiations would drag on, North Korea might well cheat, and it doesn't solve the problem but may delay the problem indefinitely.
- However, **if the military option seems to be worse**, there is no other option than the diplomacy.
- It is necessary to think about **whether we should give diplomacy a chance.**

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