Emerging Leader Fellowship 2021
Online Peace and Unification Academy

June 14(Mon) - 16(Wed), 2021

Ministry of Unification
National Institute for
Unification Education

Emerging Leader Fellowship 2021
Online Peace and Unification Academy

DAY 1 June 14(Mon) Lecture

9:15-9:18

Opening Remarks

Jun Kee BAEK | President of National Institute for Unification Education

9:18-9:20

Congratulatory Remarks

In-Young LEE | Minister of Unification

9:20-10:20

1. Achieving Peace on the Korean Peninsula: Issues to Address and Obstacles to Overcome

Doug Bandow | CATO Institute, Senior Fellow

10:30-11:30

2. US-North Korean Relations: The Current Dilemma in Historical Perspective

Gregg Brazinsky | George Washington University, Professor

13:00-14:00

3. The Situation on the Korean Peninsula and China's Role Since 2018

Junsheng Wang | Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Professor

14:30-15:30

4. The Universality and Specificity of Unification of the Korean Peninsula

Ji-young Kim | National Institute for Unification Education, Professor

15:30-16:30

5. Understanding the North Korea Nuclear Issue

Toby Dalton | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senior Fellow

17:00-18:00

6. Nuclear Issue and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula from European Perspective

Sangsoo Lee | ISDP, Senior Researcher

※ The program is subject to change.

Ministry of Unification
National Institute for Unification Education

DAY 2 June 15(Tue) Research Presentation Seminar

Time		Program
		Session 1
9:30-11:30	Moderator	TaeEun MIN | KINU, Research Fellow
	Presenters	DPRK and Non-aligned Movement Anna POLENOVA | Center for Korean Studies, Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Research Fellow The United States Congress: Engagement with North Korea Matthew John ABBOTT | Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Director The Historical Causes of the Division of Korea David Paul FIELDS | University of Wisconsin–Madison, Professor
	Discussants	Steven Charles DENNEY | University of Toronto, Postdoctoral Research Fellow Gloria KOO | USC, Associate Director Esther Soojeong IM | National Committee on North Korea/Mercy Corps, Program Officer Konstantin V. IVANOV | Irkutsk State University/Center for Korean Studies, Associate Professor
		Session 2
13:00-15:00	Moderator	Jin-Heon JUNG NIU | Professor
	Presenters	North East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Tianjiao JIANG | Fudan University, Assistant Professor The Economic Intergration in Asia-Pacific Region You-Jun CHEN | Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Professor The Past and Present of Singapore's Non-Aligned DPRK Policy Shawn HO | RSIS, Associate Research Fellow Southeast Asia-North Korea Engagement: Constraints and Opportunities Chiew-Ping HOO | National University of Malaysia, Senior Lecturer The US-North Korea Rapprochement; Avoiding Nuclear Holocaust Waseem ISHAQUE | National University of Modern Languages, Assistant Professor
	Discussants	Rahul MISHRA | University of Malaya, Senior Lecturer Seksan ANANTASIRIKIAT | International Studies Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, Researcher Naoko KUMAGAI | Aoyama Gakuin University, Professor Ewald KONIG | Berliner Korrespondentenbüro, Chief Correspondent Liudmila ZAKHAROVA | Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academic Secretary
		Session 3
15:30-17:30	Moderator	Dong-ho HAN KINU | KINU, Director/Research Fellow
	Presenters	European Track 1.5-Initiatives with North Korea Eric Julian BALLBACH | Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Korea Foundation Fellow Tangible and Intangible Legacies of 70 years of Polish–Korean relations (1948–2018) Levi NICOLAS | Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Associate Professor A 'Geopolitical' EU in the Indo-Pacific: prospects for cooperation on North Korea Zsuzsa Anna FERENCZY | Free University of Brussels, Affiliated Scholar Comparing the peace processes in Ireland and Korea David Hyland MITCHELL | Trinity College Dublin, Assistant Professor
	Discussants	Edward Herbert Kim HOWELL | University of Oxford, Stipendiary Lecturer Francesca FRASSINETI | Italian Institute for International Political Studies, Associate Research Fellow Karosanidze TINATIN | Free University of Tbilisi, Dean/Professor Pedro Lage Reis CORREIA | School of Arts and Humanities, University of Lisbon, Assistant Invited Professor Gabriel Dae-In LUX | Institute of Korean Studies, Free University Berlin, Researcher

※ The program is subject to change.

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Hungary
Zsuzsa Anna FERENCZY
| Free University of Brussels
| Affiliated Scholar

DAY 1 Lecture

Presenter 2

Gregg Brazinsky

George Washington University, Professor

The United States and North Korea since the Korean War

Countries that the U.S. has No Formal Relations With

- Bhutan
- Iran (since 1979)
- Syria (since 2012)
- North Korea (since 1948)

Key U.S. Policies toward North Korea

- Refusal to hold direct talks (until 2017)
- Isolate North Korea militarily, economically, and politically.
  - Trading with the Enemy Act, 1950-2008
  - Arms Export Control Act
  - Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2000 targeting companies that do business with these countries.
  - UN Security Council Resolutions passed in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017 after nuclear tests and missile launches
  - UN agencies restricted in aid they can give North Korea

1950s-1960s

- North Korea benefitted form Communist Bloc Aid and achieved more rapid economic development than South Korea.
- Period of relatively less friction. China put forward Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Communist countries wanted to focus on economic recovery.
- U.S. efforts to prevent subversion in South Korea
- Continuing belief that North Korea was completely a tool of China and the Soviet Union.

Pueblo Incident

- Capture of U.S. Spy ship along with crew members.
- First U.S. Navy ship to surrender without a fight since 1807.
- Crew held in North Korea for eleven months.
- EC-121 shootdown occurred just a year later in 1969

1970s and Detente

- North Korean efforts to hold talks with the United States
- US efforts to seek to stabilize the Korean peninsula with Chinese help.

Why did North Korea seek nuclear weapons?

- Interest in acquiring nuclear weapons goes back to 1960s. May have been inspired by Chinese example.
- Receives new emphasis in the late 1980s due to collapse of support from former patrons. Soviets stopped supplying SCUD missiles.
- Collapse of communist governments in Eastern and Central Europe
- U.S. actions in Grenada, Iraq, and elsewhere

The Agreed Framework

- 1993 DPRK announces withdrawal from NPT.
- June 1994 Jimmy Carter goes to Pyongyang.
- NK allows IAEA inspectors while US agrees to build light water reactors in cooperation with KEDO.
- Difficulty implementing.

The "Axis of Evil"

2002: Discovery that North Korea was secretly enriching uranium.

Six-Party Talks

2006: North Korea carries out first successful nuclear test.

2008: North Korea declares Six-Party Talks Dead

Strategic Patience

- Obama chose not to engage NK even while he normalized relations with Cuba and made a deal with Iran.
- 2012 Leap Day Deal: No uranium enrichment in exchange for economic aid.
- U.S. could afford to wait while NK denuclearizes

The Rocket Man Era

Fire and Fury

Continuing missile launches and nuclear tests (last one in September 2017)

Talk of preemptive strike or "bloody nose" strategy

The Friend Era

2018 Winter Olympics and North Korean "charm offensive."

Trump's status as an outsider

Symbolism vs. Substantive accomplishments

Presenter 3

Junsheng Wang

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Professor

The situation on the Korean Peninsula and China's role Since 2018

Wang Junsheng
National Institute of International Strategy in Chinese Academy of Social Science (NISS CASS)

June 14, 2021

Outline

- I. The situation on the Korean Peninsula since 2018
- II. The Prospect for the Peninsula issue
- III. How to view China's role
- IV. The Significance and Direction of China-ROK Cooperation

I. The situation on the Korean Peninsula since 2018

i. From Confrontation to Summit: Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un Both Showed Sincerity

Trump was faced with huge criticism by meeting with Kim Jong-un, arguing that he ignored the human rights and gave Kim legitimacy.

North Korea have never tested nuclear weapons or ICBM since 2018. North Korea Constitution defined its country as a 'nuclear power', and Kim Jong-un reiterated that 'nuclear weapons are not the bargaining chip'. Since 2018, Kim Jong-un publicly promised the denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, which also needed huge political encourage.

ii. Motivations and Goals Behind the US-DPRK Summits

- **United States: National Security Considerations**

  North Korea had tested hydrogen bomb successfully in September 2017. In November 2017, North Korea successfully launched the Hwasong-15, which was capable of striking the mainland of the US, including its eastern part.

- The reason that North Korea could not be accepted by US as a de facto nuclear power is they doesn't trust the North Korea's regime.

- **As for North Korea,** On April 20, 2018, Kim Jong-un announced that 'North Korea will concentrate on developing economy and improving people's living standard.' Without the improvement of the relation with the US, it's hard for North Korea to achieve its new economic goals smoothly.

- The second goal of North Korea is to lift the sanctions. After the four sanctions imposed in 2017, the White House official announced that 'The sanctions have affected North Korea's 95% trade activities.

iii. North Korea-U.S. relations under Biden administration

- **United States:**
Denuclearization, but excluding domestic politics, focusing more on denuclearization.
- Dialogue resolution: different from "top-down", but "bottom-up".

- Maximum pressure: the pressure on North Korea is even greater. First extradition of North Korean citizens to the United States. Second, The United Nations Human Rights Council's response to the North Korean human rights resolution adopted in Geneva on March 23;

- **For North Korea ,** In March 2021, North Korea conducted cruise missile launches and short-range ballistic missile tests. This is a response to the United States, and it is more restrained.
- At the Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in December 2019 and the Supreme People's Assembly in January 2021, discussions focused on economic construction.

- However, North Korea's economy is relatively difficult. The sanctions blocked 90% of export channels; It has a huge trade deficit with China; North Korea voluntarily closed its border with China due to the new crown epidemic.
- So, North Korea has momentum to improve relations with US trough dialogue.

II. The Prospect for the Peninsula issue

i. U.S.-North Korea direct dialogue is difficult to resolve related issues

- First, the sequence of realization of denuclearization and security guarantee.

- Second, although both the United States and the North Korea were discussing denuclearization for a long time, the two sides still have not reached a consensus about its connotations.

- Only through direct dialogue between the United States and North Korea, these differences can hardly produce optimistic results.
- First, North Korea cannot give up nuclear weapons firstly, for this is about regime security.
- Second, It is impossible for the United States to provide security guarantees for North Korea, or "gradually" lift certain sanctions, due to the United States has a deep-rooted feeling of "deception".
- The difference between the two forms a "dead knot", similar to “hens lay eggs" or “eggs lay hens”. It is difficult to resolve this issue through direct dialogue between the United States and North Korea.

ii. International cooperation is the key to pushing the situation out of the deadlock

• The solution to this dilemma lies in the simultaneous advancement of direct dialogue between the North Korea and the United States and international cooperation. Because the core problems exist between the North Korea and the United States, it is necessary to talk directly between the two countries.

• On the other hand, it emphasizes international cooperation because：1、 The main difference between the United States and North Korea lies in the lack of trust, and international cooperation is beneficial to this ；2、 The peninsula issue is a regional and international issue, involving the US-South Korea alliance, major power relations, and North Korea-South Korea relations, so requires international cooperation.

• During the six-party talks, international cooperation was good, the reason for the failure was that the United States and North Korea lacked sincerity in solving problems. Since 2018, the United States and North Korea have shown a certain degree of sincerity in solving problems, but the quality of international cooperation is very poor.

• Currently, there is an urgent need to promote international cooperation.

III. How to view China's role

i. China's Role:

- First, put forward the solution proposals.
- Second, China can send words between the United States and North Korea.
- Thirdly, China can play the role of "guarantor" at a critical time.

ii. "Dual track system" promotes international cooperation

- To realize this goal, China proposed a "dual track system" in 2015, namely, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the transition of the Korean Peninsula Armistice Agreement into a peace mechanism should be promoted in parallel.

- Two working groups can be established. One is the Four-Party Talks participated by China, the US and two Koreas, which focuses on the building of the peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula.
- The other is the Six-Party Talks participated by China, the US, two Koreas, Russia, and Japan, which focuses on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

iii. China's target

- On the Korean Peninsula, achieve stability and gradually achieve denuclearization;
- At the global strategic level, promote cooperative relations with the United States by solving the Peninsula issue;
- Considering that North Korea and South Korea are important neighbors of China, it is necessary to stabilize bilateral relations with North Korea and South Korea and gradually upgrade them.
- In the long run, actively promote the regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.

- **IV. The Significance and Direction of China-ROK Cooperation**

- In the first place, China and South Korea should strengthen high-level interaction.
- South Korea should cooperate in proposing a common solution to the Korean Peninsula issue.

- Except international cooperation, almost all necessary conditions for resolving peninsular problems have been emerged nowadays, which can even be regarded as the best situation in recent years. We should not miss this opportunity. North Korea and US should continue their direct dialogue and make every step leaves its print. China and South Korea, as well as other related countries, should get rid of the mindset of wait-and-see or competitive attitudes, but to create a sound international cooperation for resolving the Korean peninsula issue in the end.

- Thanks

Presenter 4

Ji-young Kim

National Institute for Unification Education, Professor

Peaceful Unification on the Korean peninsula

The Universality and Specificity of Unification of the Korean Peninsula

National Institute for Unification Education
Professor Jiyoung Kim

Contemporary Issues on the Korean Peninsula

Summits in 2018-2019

New relationships in Biden Administration

2018, -Panmunjum-Dalian-Singapor

US-DPRK Summit in Singapore('18.6.12)

Joint Statement

- Establish new US-DPRK Relations
- build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula
- Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
- Recovering POW/MIA(Prisoner of War/Missing in Action) remains, including the immediate Repatriation of those already identified

2019, Hanoi-Panmunjum-Stockholm

'19.2.27~28 Hanoi US-DPRK summit

6.30 Panmunjum Usand two Korean leaders meeting

10.5 Stockholm working group meeting

Unification Policy of the ROK

ROK's Scheme of unification

National Community Unification Formula

Moon Jae-in's Policy on the Korean Peninsula

Inter-Korean relations in the post Cold War

ROK's Scheme of Unification

- **Provisions in the Constitution**
- - (Article 4) The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy.
- - (Article 66) The President shall have the duty to pursue sincerely the peaceful unification of the homeland.

"National Community Unification Formula"

- the August 15th Liberation Day speech in 1994.
- - Principles of unification: **Self-autonomy, peace and democracy**
- - Envisioned future of a unified Korea: An advanced **democratic** nation that guarantees **freedom, welfare and human dignity**
- - Unification process: **Step-by-step approach** toward building one nation-state

Unification Process on the Korean peninsula

Moon Jae-in's Policy on the Korean Peninsula

Vision

1 Peaceful Coexistence

- Since national security and economic development can never be guaranteed in the absence of peace, peaceful coexistence is both a task and a vision that deserves highest priority.
- Peaceful coexistence by itself is another step towards peaceful unification.

2 Co-prosperity

- The vision of 'co-prosperity' aims to build a Korean Peninsula in which everyone can thrive together by promoting mutually beneficial cooperation between the two Koreas.
- Under 'co-prosperity', the policy aims to extend the range of economic cooperation to the entire Northeast Asia region, to enable mutual and open prosperity with our neighbors.
- Peace and prosperity will be facilitated and achieved through the virtuous circle of peace building and economic development.

Moon Jae-in's Policy on the Korean Peninsula

Three Goals

1 Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Establishment of Permanent Peace

- We will peacefully resolve the nuclear issue by playing a 'driving' role while at the same time riding together with our global partners.
- We aim to substitute the past sixty years of an unstable armistice with a permanent peace regime, to ensure peace in a practical and institutional manner.

2 Development of Sustainable Inter-Korean Relations

- We will inherit and further foster existing inter-Korean agreements, including the July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué, Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, June 15th South-North Joint Declaration, and October 4th Declaration.
- We will resolve internal disagreements in our society regarding unification and the government's North Korea policy and create a national consensus.

3 Realization of a New Economic Community on the Korean Peninsula

- We will build a single market on the Korean Peninsula to create new growth engines and create an inter-Korean economic community of coexistence and co-prosperity.
- We will build a new economic order that will bring peace and prosperity to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia by establishing Three Economic Belts that connect not only the two Koreas, but also neighbors of the Korean Peninsula.

▶ Three Economic Belts

- Pan East Sea Belt : Belt of energy and natural resources
- Pan Yellow Sea Belt : Belt of transportation, logistics, and manufacturing
- DMZ Belt : Belt of environment and tourism

Moon Jae-in's Policy on the Korean Peninsula

Four Strategies

1 Taking a Step-by-Step and Comprehensive Approach

- We will peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, using a step-by-step, two-track approach of sanctions / pressure and dialogue. (nuclear freeze → complete denuclearization)
- While solving the nuclear issue, we will seek to fundamentally eliminate the security threats by establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and facilitating inprovement in relations between North Korea and the international community.

2 Tackling the Issues of Inter-Korean Relations and the North Korean Nuclear Threat Simultaneously

- Resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and improvement of inter-Korean relations are not two separate matters that require a choice or prioritization. Both can see progress simultaneously by complementing each other in a virtuous circle.
- If we reestablish channels for inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation, we will be able to facilitate multilateral talks for the resolution of the nuclear issue.

3 Ensuring Sustainability through Institutionalization

- We will push ahead with a 'National Unification Contract' based on a national consensus to ensure consistency in our North Korea policy
- We will enact inter-Korean agreements into law and conclude a 'New Inter-Korean Basic Agreement' to establish sustainable inter-Korean relations.

4 Laying the Foundation for Peaceful Unification through Mutually Beneficial Cooperation

- We will restore national homogeneity and build an inter-Korean community by expanding various inter-Korean exchanges.
- We aim for unification that naturally occurs as part of the process of promoting the coexistence and co-prosperity of the two Koreas and recovering the Korean national community.

Moon Jae-in's Policy on the Korean Peninsula

Five Principles

1 Korea-led Initiative

As the party directly concerned, we will take the lead in promoting inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, as well as in establishing peace and co-prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

2 Strong Defense

By maintaining a strong security posture based on the solid ROK-US alliance and national defense, we will deter North Korea's provocation and maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula.

3 Mutual Respect

We will realize a Korean community of co-prosperity by promoting mutually beneficial dialogue, exchange, and cooperation based on the spirit of mutual respect.

4 Interaction with the People

We will institutionalize participation of - and interaction with - the National Assembly, local government bodies, civil organizations, and experts to draw a national consensus and agreement on unification issues and our North Korea policy.

5 International Cooperation

We will elicit international cooperation through 'openness'.

Three Principles for Solving Problems on the Korean Peninsula

1. War Inaction

- Formally **ending** the **Korean War**

2. Mutual Security

- Suspending all hostile acts during a dialogue

3. Co-prosperity

Peace-driven economy for the inter-Korean cooperation.

(9.24 President Moon, UN Speech)

International and Domestic Aspects of Unification on the Korean Peninsula

International Aspects (Universality)

Domestic Aspects (Specificity)

Group Discussion

What impact would it have on your country and international society if two Koreas become a unified nation?

Facilitating Peaceful environment -International Aspects

- A unified Korea will facilitate the formation of a Northeast Asia peace community
- - Non nuclear nation, a catalyst for the integration of Northeast Asia.

Strategic Competition between the US and China in East Asia

Mapping Japan's Indo-Pacific investment strategy, China's Maritime Silk Road program
China's Belt and Road Initiative
Mediterranean Sea
East China Sea
South China Sea
21st Century Maritime Silk Road (China)
Indian Ocean
Free and open Indo-Pacific strategy (Japan)
Compiled from information provided by Japanese foreign ministry, Chinese media

The Second Korean War?

The U.S. Department of Defense

"a Second Korean War could produce 200,000-300,000 South Korean and U.S. military casualties within the first 90 days, in addition to hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths"

Hostile identity from the Korean War

1 Figures reflect the higher end of U.S. and South Korean estimates, which range from 500,000 to 600,000 civilian dead and missing, from 294,000 to 406,000 military killed and missing, and from 226,000 to 1,500,000 military wounded.

2 South Korean estimates of civilian dead and missing range from 500,000 to 1,000,000. Official figure of military killed in action is 187,712.

3 Figures are U.S. and South Korean estimates. Official Chinese figures acknowledge 152,400 military killed and missing, 238,000 military wounded.

4 Figures reflect official U.S. tally, which counts 33,741 battlefield killed and missing and 2,827 dead and missing in war zone from other causes. U.S. military deaths outside the war zone were 17,678, bringing the total military dead and missing during the Korean War to 54,246.

5 No UNC member had more than 700 battlefield deaths except Turkey (721).

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East Asian Railway Community Initiative

High-Speed Railway in East Asia

Make DMZ as an Global Peace Zone

Guaranteeing North Korea's security institutional and substantially, the establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula

UNESCO World Heritage

Panmunjom-Gaesong Peace and Cooperation Zone

Mine Clearing

Make DMZ as an Global Peace Zone

Open 'DMZ Peace Road'

- ✓ First DMZ Open since Division
- ✓ Phased disclosure of Goseong, Cheolwon, and Paju

➡ Provide an opportunity to experience History, ecology, and peace in the DMZ
(more than 13,000 people visited)

Make DMZ as an Global Peace Zone

Excavation of Remains in Cheolwon

✓ **'18.9.19** Agreement on South-North Joint Exploration

- '19.4.1 Progress of basic excavation in South zone

✓ Excavation of 43,000 artifacts and 1,600 sets of remains

Make DMZ as an Global Peace Zone

Comprehensive Plan for Peaceful Use of the DMZ

✓ Plan Ecology, History and Culture in the DMZ South-North Joint on Resources (Korean Peninsula's Ecological Axis, Korean War Battlegrounds, Taebongguk historical sites, etc.)

➡ Consultation and promotion of the plan with North Korea later.

International Benefits

New economic opportunity in East Asia and Global area

A new market with a population of 80 million people and offer opportunities for economic growth to Korea and the neighboring countries.

Peace-driven Economy on the Korean Peninsula

Peace-driven Economy?

Clearing uncertainty, enabling investment, Expanding the domestic market, expanding cooperative economic zone

Forming common interests, deepening interdependence, easing military tensions and facilitating denuclearization

Domestic Aspects of Unification (Diversity)

Security Aspects

"Why do we talk Peace?"

Fragile State Index 2018

Burned body by nuclear bomb

Little Boy atomic bomb on Hirosima, Japan in 1945, Burned over 80,000 people.

Economic Aspects

"I need a job"

Slowing Economy in South Korea

- Source: Thomson Reuters Data stream Date: 10/05/2016

N. Korea's mineral resources potentially worth $9.7 tln: report

- The potential value of North Korea's underground mineral resources is estimated at more than 11 quadrillion won (US$9.7 trillion) as of this year, a report by a private think tank showed Sunday.

New Economic Plan on the Korean Peninsula

Social-Cultural Aspects

"You are wrong!"

"I think we are different"

Socio-Cultural Aspect

Divided Society in South Korea

National Aspects

"When can I see you again?"

Separate families

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYjdUeYT49c

2nd Generation Separate Family

If you have to remember only one word from my class, I hope that is going to be "Peace"

Q&A

Presenter 5

Toby Dalton

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senior Fellow

CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Understanding the North Korea Nuclear Issue

Toby Dalton

MAY 10, 2021

Overview

- Context and Analysis
- Overview of Nuclear Developments and Diplomacy
- Current Politics and Constraints
- How to Break the Cycle

- *Caveats*

Is North Korea nuclear issue *sui generis*?

- How useful are models and case comparisons to other states that developed nuclear weapons?
- Motivations
  - Hereditary Marxist/Leninist regime (unusual) but basically dictatorship
  - Dictators fear regime change – domestic threats and foreign adversaries
  - Romania under Ceauşescu – secret nuclear weapons program
- Technology pathway
  - Many states in 1960s/70s were starting nuclear research programs; ~35 of them considered nuclear weapons (including South Korea)
- Select company: only 10 states acquired nuclear weapons
  - Each case unique, difficult to generalize from n=10
  - Larger group of states that considered nuclear weapons but did not proliferate

Why do states seek nuclear weapons?

- Security – protect against external threats, especially ones perceived as existential
  - US nuclear threats in Korean War; US "hostile policy"
  - Desirability of coercive/asymmetric threat capability against bigger powers
- Domestic politics – project "strong" image; domestic constituencies (especially military and scientists); nationalism
  - Nuclear weapons have populist appeal
- Norms – international status, symbol of advanced technology
  - Entry into elite club of possessors, international respect

Scott Sagan, "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb."

How do states decide to seek nuclear weapons?

- Three simplistic approaches, not mutually exclusive and not unidirectional
- Strategic decision – coherent accumulation of necessary capability – fissile material, weapon design, delivery vehicle
  - Political and military apparatus, in addition to technical components
  - Timing and concerns about pre-emption vis-à-vis adversaries
  - Cases: US Manhattan project; Pakistan
- Hedging – purposeful accumulation of enabling capabilities under guise of plausible non-weapons uses, stopping short of actual weapons development
  - Signaling (bargaining?) over conditions of restraint – Saudi example
  - Nuclear energy or isotope production; conventional munitions; space program; sciences (astrophysics, radiochemistry…)
  - Cases: West Germany in 1960s; Iran
- Latency – non-purposive or incidental accumulation of capabilities, longer time-scale, no conditionality
  - Less coherence, but deep technology mastery in key domains
  - Cases: Japan; ROK?

Vipin Narang, Seeking the Bomb: Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation (forthcoming)

What Kind of Case is North Korea?

- Not latency – built weapons!
- What are indictors of hedging or strategic decision?
- Where does diplomacy or other stimuli fit in with North Korean decisions?

- Why important: how to interpret past failures of diplomacy and how to frame future strategy and negotiations
  - Did the 1994 Agreed Framework fail because North Korea had decided to seek nuclear weapons?
  - Or did North Korea decide to seek nuclear weapons because the Agreed Framework failed?

Brief and Selective History I

- 1950s – Soviet support to establish research program, including center at Yongbyon and research reactor
- 1960-70s – Indigenization efforts
  - Reduce reliance on Soviet patronage
  - Plutonium experiments, training, and education in nuclear sciences
- 1980s – early indicators of weapons interest?
  - Built 5 MW reactor at Yongbyon (plutonium production) and started construction on 50 MW reactor
  - Sought Russian sale of 4 RBMK reactors (Chernobyl design) for electricity production
  - Russia demanded NPT accession (1985) and IAEA safeguards agreement
  - 1989/90/91 – Undeclared plutonium reprocessing in violation of NPT and safeguards – no plausible purpose for plutonium other than weapons

Jonathan Pollack, No Exit

Brief and Selective History II

- 1992 – Important changes in security context
  - Soviet Union collapse – end of support to DPRK, plus U.S. removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Korean Peninsula
  - North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearization
  - Implement IAEA safeguards agreement – declaration and IAEA inspections
- 1993/94 – Crisis and threats to proliferate
  - IAEA inspections reveal past undeclared reprocessing; North Korea restricts IAEA access and threatens to leave NPT
  - US threatens sanctions, sent military reinforcements to ROK
  - Death of Kim Il Sung (July 1994)
- 1994 Agreed Framework – Freeze at Yongbyon
  - No reprocessing of existing spent fuel – capped plausible plutonium stockpile at ~ 25kg, sufficient for perhaps 5-6 nuclear weapons
  - In return, international consortium to construct 2 large nuclear power reactors in North Korea, provide fuel oil
- After 1994 – Questionable nuclear and missile activity
  - Problems with Agreed Framework implementation (NK provocations, delays to reactor construction and fuel oil deliveries)
  - North Korean nuclear/missile cooperation with Pakistan – probable beginning of uranium enrichment program
  - *Kumchangni* suspected site and test of Taepodong ballistic missile

Brief and Selective History III

- 2002-5 – Agreed Framework collapse and weapons program resumes
  - 2003 NPT withdrawal; reprocessing of Yongbyon spent fuel
  - 2005 Six Party Talks joint statement – North Korea agrees to return to NPT and US drops sanctions, but implementation stalls
- 2006 – First nuclear explosive test -> UN sanctions; Six Party Talks resume
- 2007/8 – Implementation of agreements – North Korea makes declaration, freezes activity, begins to disable some facilities, in return for energy and financial incentives
  - Delays in US sanctions removals – delays in North Korean implementation
  - Process breaks down over verification of North Korean declaration
- 2009 – End of diplomacy, resumption of frozen weapons activities
  - Missile tests and 2nd nuclear explosive test
  - 2010 provocations against South Korea - poor health of Kim Jong-il and ascendance of Kim Jong-un
- 2011/2 – Enter Kim Jong-un
  - Death of Kim Jong-ii; failed efforts to resume diplomacy
- 2013-17 – Consolidation of weapons program
  - Four more nuclear explosive tests and build out of missile program; induction of nuclear weapons into military operations
- 2018/9 – "Fire and fury" then love letters
  - Singapore summit – agreement to "work toward complete denuclearization of Korean Peninsula"

Evaluating North Korean Decisions

- Agreed Framework and Six Party Talks diplomacy suggests North Korea *might* have been satisfied with a hedging posture and wavered on strategic decision
  - Never fully transparent about extent of weapons activities, including Pakistan link
  - Conditional threats to leave NPT to increase bargaining leverage
  - Diplomacy never fully implemented – by any party – so unclear if inducements would have changed behavior or stopped weapons developments
- Several reasons why nuclear weapons could be desirable
  - Soviet collapse – security rationale, sandwiched between big powers and perceived threat from the success of South Korea
  - Death of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il – for Kim Jong-un, need for rallying symbol to affirm his political legitimacy, despite high opportunity cost of nuclear program
  - Desire for international prestige – a capability few achieved, including ROK, which gives it perceived stature despite relative poverty; belief that it could leverage nuclear status for US recognition, like India

Understanding the Past to see the Future

- Given record of diplomacy and North Korean decisions, how should we understand what diplomacy can yield in the future?
- Opportunity costs of nuclear weapons (development plus sanctions) are incredibly high.
- KJU especially must have made strategic decision after 2009 – hedging not worth the risk, needed to possess nuclear weapons
  - Domestic legitimacy vs. Security
- But what about Singapore and Hanoi summits?
  - Singapore – peace process, US-NK normalization, and denuclearization
  - Hanoi – small deal vs. big deal

Policy Boundaries

- Looking ahead, need to examine prevailing beliefs in US policy circles that bound diplomacy – and preserve the status quo
- Consider also assumptions about North Korea; more difficult to examine North Korean beliefs about the US
- How will these shape Biden administration's policy?
- Looking beyond policy boundaries, to break the status quo what should U.S. policy aim for?

Prevailing Beliefs I

- Imminent collapse theory – eventually, regime integrity will fail (driven by economic privation) and North Korean people will overthrow Kim regime
- Pressure – related to collapse theory, strong U.S. and multilateral sanctions will eventually force Kim to make a strategic choice between nuclear weapons or regime collapse
- Nonproliferation – no public acknowledgment of North Korea as a state with nuclear weapons, so treat as nonproliferation problem
  - Prioritize denuclearization, rather than conflict avoidance

Prevailing Beliefs II

- Doesn't impact U.S. – war on the Korean Peninsula is not a concern for American people.

  If there's going to be a war to stop [Kim Jong Un], it will be over there. If thousands die, they're going to die over there. They're not going to die here.

  - Sen. Lindsey Graham, August 1 2017
- "Free lunch" politics – everyone can be a North Korea hawk in order to look tough, without facing domestic or foreign policy consequences

Other Policy Constraints

- Alliance coordination – unified position with ROK and Japan is hard to sustain, easier for Washington to negotiate directly with Pyongyang (also NK preference)
- China policy – for long time assumed that China was key to forcing NK to disarm; now, some argue for bringing NK into US orbit in competition with China
- Orthodox views on verification – nuclear agreement would have to feature “anytime, anywhere inspections”
- Focus on North Korean human rights abuses, other illicit behaviors

Realistic Assumptions about DPRK

- No theoretically-plausible amount of external pressure will force unilateral disarmament
- Nuclear development trajectory is toward credible retaliatory ICBM force with large/diverse array of low-end coercive options
- Force build out is not yet complete (to desired level of “sufficiency”) – qualitative and quantitative improvements in the pipeline, which could enable more risk-taking
- Proliferation to third countries is growing risk
- Open questions:
  - KJU willingness to implement arsenal constraints unknown – is the Singapore “framework” still viable?
  - Security-oriented steps (re. US “hostile policy”) more important?

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Reading of DC Groupthink

- Washington *mostly* agrees with assumptions about DPRK, despite pathologies
- Growing recognition that nuclear weapons are not going away, DPRK has achieved some level of minimum deterrence
- Plurality of analysts/officials probably support continued pressure strategy, at least to retain leverage in negotiations
  - NGO community increasingly embraces peace-driven / arms control-type approaches
- Fears about alliance and nonproliferation regime impacts of tacit recognition
- Alliance politics – decoupling concern; post-Trump effort to rehab US image
  - US priority on alliance unity incentivizes divergence of ROK and Japanese views
  - Subtext in US alliance considerations is less DPRK and more US-China
  - Complex ROK factors – Moon legacy; Quad; upcoming election
- Domestic support for peace approach is small though growing, but Congress unlikely to help with sanctions relief

What to Expect

- Dangers in sustaining “maximum pressure” policies even as efficacy declines through lack of implementation and enforcement
  - Yet, US policy stasis on nonproliferation framing is difficult to deconstruct
- Biden administration has floated alternative terminology – to “reduce the threat” from DPRK nuclear weapons
  - Old wine in a new bottle vs. new framework?
  - Not Trump, not Obama = “calibrated, practical approach to diplomacy”?
  - Open to diplomacy, but will maintain sanctions pressure and sustain defense posture with ROK
  - Not “step by step” – but “waypoints”? Focused on what?
  - Risk or threat reduction short of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”?
- Bottom Line: Timing and conditions in DC for <u>substantially</u> new policy are not auspicious
  - Default is to strengthen alliance deterrence capabilities and contain DPRK threats
  - Possible willingness to try incremental steps, but seems unlikely to appeal to DPRK

Arms Control as Threat Reduction?

- Shifting the frame from vulnerability to security through mutual threat reduction
- Hierarchy of objectives: prevent conflict, mitigate escalation, slow arms racing, stop outward proliferation...
  - Peace and security is prerequisite for rolling back => disarmament
- Simultaneous pursuit of peace and security and denuclearization requires new logic and modalities
  - Mutually-reinforcing roadmap, not contingent (i.e., nonpro then peace)
- Arms control-type approach to facilitate risk reduction and stability, building security conditions under which DPRK could agree to constrain nuclear capabilities
- Arms control defined as a progressive series of restrictions, limitations and constraints on arms (nuclear and conventional) and associated steps to reduce the risks of conflict and insulate relations against crises and escalation
- Terminology may be problematic for political reasons => threat reduction?

Plausible Benefits

- Address acute, higher probability risks: crisis escalation and proliferation to third countries
- Early arms control-type steps probably at intersection of US, ROK, DPRK, Chinese and Russian interests… if not Japanese
  - Avoid up-front disagreement on mid- or end-state issues where interests diverge
  - Expanded “zone” for compensatory deals, beyond fissile materials
  - Space for two Koreas to build sustainable framework for political, economic, and security relations
- Fits within established terms – “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and Singapore framework – even if there isn’t shared meaning
- Permits ROK/US and DPRK to maintain deterrence; harnesses deterrence to create stability that permits further restraints and reductions

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Implications

- Focus on existing arsenals and posture, not simply fissile material
- New roadmap design to bridge nuclear, conventional, peace, and economic aspects
  - Six lane highway with agreed checkpoints
- Alternate approach to monitoring and compliance assessment
  - Novel tools to deal with a wider range of activity, materials, facilities, and sites
  - Overcoming orthodox views on verification requirements
- Making distinctions between weapons and non-weapons elements
  - Nuclear ballistic missiles vs conventional missiles and SLV program
  - Fissile material (or Tritium) production vs nuclear energy or research

Challenges

- Concerns about trying arms control with DPRK:
  - Reciprocity, implied NWS status, or acceptance of DPRK as nuclear weapon possessor in perpetuity
  - Accepting mutual deterrence with NK attenuates US extended deterrence
  - Collapse of nonproliferation regime; ROK and Japanese proliferation
  - Arms control is big power framework
  - Loaded terminology that invites uninformed political opposition
  - South Korea can't live next to nuclear North
- Complexity vs simple nonproliferation model
  - Inherently asymmetric, involving nuclear and conventional forces, and more
  - Requirement to shape/manage deterrence to sustain progress
  - All sides have to accept hedging, with limited transparency implications
  - Pairing "like for like" values across domains

What Should be Done

- For policy and technical experts:
  - Exploration of “arms control-type” logic and steps, build on nascent scholarship
  - Socialization with official and political audiences, including North Koreans
- Expert discussions:
  - Intersection of “end-state” interests before ideas about future of Korean Peninsula diverge
  - Singapore as a valid/useful framework, and assessment of DPRK views
  - How to construct nested agreements involving various mixes of parties
  - Impact of COVID on negotiating environment
  - Road-test ideas with North Korean counterparts?
- Technical development:
  - Managing deterrence across nuclear and conventional military domains
  - Monitoring and compliance assessment approaches, transparency requirements
  - Outward proliferation monitoring

Presenter 6

Sangsoo Lee

ISDP, Senior Researcher

Nuclear Issue and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula

From European Perspective

Sangsoo Lee
Senior Researcher, ISDP

Institute for Security & Development Policy

EU's Policy toward North Korea

1. Non-Nuclear and Non-Proliferation

2. Human Rights

3. Humanitarian Aid

Institute for Security & Development Policy

What is Sweden doing on Korea?

1. Diplomatic Relations

2. The Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

3. Facilitator Role

4. Humanitarian Aids

Swedish Efforts in Promoting Dialogue

Institute for Security & Development Policy

ISDP Korea Center's Activities

- Multilateral Dialogue
- Inter-Korean Guest Researcher Program
- Visit to two Koreas

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Recommendations: South Korea's Policy

1. Mediation Role
2. Human Rights
3. Humanitarian Aid/Inter-Korean cooperation

Institute for Security & Development Policy

DAY 2

Session I

Presenter 1

Anna POLENOVA

Center for Korean Studies, Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Research Fellow

Anna POLENOVA
Research Fellow [Center for Korean Studies, Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences]
NIU Emerging Leaders Fellowship 2021
DPRK and the
Non-Aligned Movement
Moscow, June 15, 2021

Anna POLENOVA
Research Fellow [Center for Korean Studies, Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences]
NIU Emerging Leaders Fellowship 2021
Presentation Outline
Publication Information
Research Topic
What are we looking for?
Methodology
Sources
Theoretical Significance
Research Substance
Cooperation Cases
Conclusion

Publication Information

"The Korean Peninsula: History and Present Times"

- Published 2020 (Moscow, IFES RAS);
- Dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Korea;
- Collection of articles dedicated to the milestones of the history of two Korean states and the key tendencies of their development.

Research Topic

1. Establishment of the the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 as a milestone in the development of the IR
2. Key values of the NAM transformed allowing the Movement to adapt and to keep a certain place on the international arena
3. DPRK and the NAM have a long history of cooperation and share (to a certain point) their vision of the IR system
4. What is the driving motivation for cooperation and what are the long-term prospects?

What are we looking for?

Does the DPRK-NAM cooperation helps to support an alternative vision of the IR and to create a different influence center?

Methodology

- comparing the core values and global goals proclaimed by both the DPRK and the NAM
- analyzing the cooperation formats/scope and their change over time

Theoretical context:
Discussion on the new design of the world order, new powers in the IR

Sources

1 | The NAM-related sources (Bandung conference and the NAM summits materials, speeches by the NAM states' political leaders etc)

2 | DPRK-related sources (North Korean leaders' speeches, statements by North Korean officials etc)

3 | Theoretical studies

4 | Scientific articles by Russian and foreign scholars

5 | News outlets

Theoretical significance

Redefining the NAM and the DPRK in terms of further decentralization of the IR, assessing the potential of their cooperation in creating alternative IR vision

Research Substance

Research Substance

Research Substance

Pyongyang formed an "inner circle" of partner states

4 of 6 are the NAM states

Cuba, Lao, Syria, Singapore

Real bilateral cooperation is limited, no chance for the DPRK to benefit from Africa's pivot to the East

Strategic significance of remaining ties to the NAM countries

Shared vision

Shared problems

Cooperation Cases

- common take on the UNGA and the UNSC work,
- shared experience of being subject to sanctions

Cooperation Cases

Shifting the focus in the discussion on the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula

Cooperation Cases

Common vision of new design of the world order ("international justice"), including adjustments in the UN work, focus in the South-South cooperation etc.

Conclusion

During the current changes in the IR system there is a niche for an alternative influence center.

DPRK, being a nuclear power (even a rogue one) with a vision and a supportive platform has a chance to promote its perspective of the IR system

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Presenter 2

Matthew John ABBOTT

Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Director

The United States Congress: Engagement with North Korea

Matt Abbott
Director of Government and Diplomatic Programs
Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Congress' Role in Foreign Policy

Source: US House of Representatives

Initial Direct Contact: Rep. Stephen Solarz

Source: New York Times

Rep. Solarz's Trip to North Korea and Meeting with Kim Il Sung

RECORD OF MEETING WITH KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG: Welcome. There is a Korean proverb that beginning is half done. You are the first American politician to visit our country and we feel that you will break the ice.

SOLARZ: Listening to that proverb, I'm reminded of something Winston Churchill said during World War II after the battle of El Alemain: "This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it may, perhaps, be the end of the beginning." I'm looking forward to talking with you about how to improve bilateral relations between the United States and the DPRK and how to create conditions that would facilitate the eventual re-unification of Korea. I would like to ask you a series of questions. I think it is very important for the United States to get a better understanding of your policies and positions, just as it is also important for you to have a better understanding of ours.

(There followed a series of questions)

Source: Wilson Center

Congressional Delegations and Staff Delegations

Source: Senator Lisa Murkowski

Congressional Visits to North Korea in the 1990s

Source: New York Times

Congressional Visits to North Korea Post-2000

Source: China Daily

Engagement with the Permanent Mission of North Korea to the UN

Source: Council on Foreign Relations

The 117th Congress and North Korea

Source: US House of Representatives

Domestic US Politics and Congressional Engagement with North Korea

Source: USIP

Prospects for Future Engagement

Source: USIP

Obstacles to Future Engagement

Source: Senator Marco Rubio

Comparative Relations: Parliamentary Engagement with North Korea

Source: European Parliament

The North Korean Supreme People's Assembly and International Engagement

Source: 38 North

Recommendations for Future Engagement

Source: LA Times

Presenter 3

David Paul FIELDS

University of Wisconsin–Madison, Professor

The Historical Causes of the Division of Korea

What they are and why it matters

David P. Fields

Ministry of Unification
National Institute for
Unification Education

Key Points

1882 Korean-American Treaty

The Growth of Christianity in Korea

How Korean Independence Activists used these things

The 1882 Treaty

Article I:

"If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their *good offices* on being informed of the case to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings"

Syngman Rhee

Ministry of Unification
National Institute for
Unification Education

"It was out of the question to suppose that any other nation with no interest of its own at stake would attempt to do for the Koreans what they were utterly unable to do for themselves."

-Theodore Roosevelt

Growth of Christianity

March First Movement

This man is more fortunate. He has a bayonet stab in his eye. He was taken into one of the mission (Christian) hospitals, where he received treatment. The picture was taken one week after the man received the wound.

"I wish all the Christian people of America would note that all sacrifices which they made in Korea now if this treaty goes through, all that they have made in China, or every missionary that has gone there to set up a church and preach the doctrine of Christianity, . . . are all in jeopardy."

-Senator George Norris (R-NE)

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"We cannot sign this treaty without an utter disregard of our moral and treaty obligations to the Korean people"
-Senator Joseph France (R-MD)

"Having made the treaty which we had made, I think we are under obligations to exercise our friendly offices in preventing the amalgamation or incorporation of Korea with Japan."
-Senator William Borah (R-ID)

Key Points

1882 Korean-American Treaty

The Growth of Christianity in Korea

How Korean independence activists used these two things during World War II

Bing Crosby

Peter Marshall

Chicago Daily

AN AMERICAN PAPER FOR AMERICANS — THE WORLD'S GREATEST

VOLUME CIV.—NO. 109 C — MONDAY, MAY 7, 1945

EXPECT WAR'S
PATTON CAPTU

RED ATTITUDE ON BERLIN IRKS U.S. AND BRITISH

Aim at Communist Regime Suspected

BY ARTHUR SEARS HENNING

SNUB TO KOREA LAID TO SECRET DEAL AT YALTA

BY WILLARD EDWARDS

ENDING THE BEAST; BEWARE THE OFFS

York Times.

LATE CITY EDITION

THREE CENTS

Slashes Allowance
WI by Two-Thirds

of 138 to 128 Cuts Down Funds
0,000—$752,764,850 Supply
for 19 Agencies Passed

B-29'S BATTER PLANE PLANTS AT NAGOYA, OSAKA AND KOBE; TRAP TIGHTENS ON OKINAWA

Marines Seize Large Area On West Coast, Drive South

First Division Squeezes Oroku Pocket and, With Army 7th and 96th, Closes on Main 'Last Ditch' Line—67 Planes Downed

FIRST TRIPLE BLOW

Unescorted 'Superforts' Drop High Explosives on Japan in Daylight

CARRIER STRIKE REPORTED

Tokyo Says Halsey's Planes Attack Kyushu Again—Craft From Okinawa Range North

UP BARS
T POWER
TRUMAN

BIG 5 DEMAND VETO ON FUTURE ISSUES EXCEPT DISCUSSION

They Submit a Voting Formula for the Security Council—'Little 45' Ponder Course

Grew Denies Allies Pledged Korea to Russia at Yalta

> "Are we for the second time this century going to betray the Korean people? Are we going to forsake them and shatter their dream of democracy? Are we going to sell them down the river to communism?"
>
> Rep. Paul Shafer (R-MI)

William Langer (R-ND)

Wayne L. Morse (R-OR)

Why This Matters

A more accurate view of the circumstances

- Displaces the myth of military-driven decision making
- Displaces the Cold War Lens

Combats unhelpful mindsets in US and ROK

- ROK as "free-riding" on American security
- Korea as a "shrimp among whales"

Why This Matters

Should cause humility

- Good motives do not necessarily lead to good outcomes
- This has a bearing on future unification issues

Thank You

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DAY 2

Session 2

Presenter 1

Tianjiao JIANG

Fudan University, Assistant Professor

North East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ)

Dr. Jiang Tianjiao
Fudan University
jiangtj09@outlook.com

US in a New Arms Race with Russia and China

Who can have nuclear weapons?

- The more, the better?
- Scott D. Sagan & Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate*, W. W. Norton & Company, 2012

- *"This book is a lively and genuine dialogue between two leading authorities on an issue of great importance for both scholarship and public policy."*
- - Robert Jervis, Columbia University

- *"This important book clearly and succinctly lays out the opposing views on whether nuclear proliferation makes the world more or less peaceful. . . . I can't think of a better book to recommend on the ABCs of nuclear proliferation."*
- - John J. Mearsheimer, University of Chicago

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)

- Opened for signature: 1 July 1968
- Entered into force: 5 March 1970
- Duration: Indefinite (extended in 1995)
- Depositaries: Russia, UK, and US
- States Parties: 191
- The NPT is a multilateral treaty aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons including three elements: (1) non-proliferation, (2) disarmament, and (3) peaceful use of nuclear energy. These elements constitute a "grand bargain" between the five nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states.
- 1. States without nuclear weapons will not acquire them;
- 2. States with nuclear weapons will pursue disarmament;
- 3. All states can access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, under safeguards.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)

- Provisions
- Nuclear & Non-Nuclear Weapon States
- (Article IX): The Treaty defines nuclear weapon states (NWS) as those that had manufactured and detonated a nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. All the other states are therefore considered non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). The five nuclear weapon states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- Nonproliferation
- (Articles I, II, III): Nuclear weapon states are not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons and not to assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire them. Non-nuclear weapons states are not to receive nuclear weapons from any transferor, and are not to manufacture or acquire them. NNWS must accept the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear materials on their territories or under their control.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)

- Disarmament
- (Articles VI): All Parties must pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

- Peaceful Use
- (Article IV): The Treaty does not affect the right of state parties to develop, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided such activities are in conformity with Articles I and II. All state parties undertake to facilitate, and have a right to participate, in the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)

- **(Article VII) enshrines the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties to assure the absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories (nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties).**
  - **Such regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones help strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security.**

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ)

- Treaty of Tlatelolco — Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
- Treaty of Rarotonga — South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
- Treaty of Bangkok — Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
- Treaty of Pelindaba — African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
- Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

- Mongolia's self-declared nuclear-weapon-free status has been recognized internationally through the adoption of UN General Assembly resolution 55/33S on "Mongolia's international security and nuclear weapon free status."

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ)

- Other treaties that also deal with the denuclearization of certain areas are:
  - Antarctic Treaty
  - Outer Space Treaty — Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
  - Moon Agreement — Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
  - Seabed Treaty — Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof
- The text and status of all the above-mentioned treaties are available on the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Treaty Database.
- http://disarmament.un.org/treaties

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ)

- Basic Elements of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties
- **Duration:** The treaties are to remain in force indefinitely. Yet, each treaty includes a withdrawal option for states-parties. With the exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which simply requires three months' advance notice before a withdrawal can take effect, all the NWFZ treaties require 12 months' advance notice for a state-party to end its treaty obligations.
- **Conditions:** None of the treaties can be subjected to conditions by its non-nuclear-weapon states-parties.
- **Verification:** Each state-party adopts comprehensive safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which verifies that states-parties are not pursuing nuclear weapons illicitly. The Central Asian NWFZ goes a step further in requiring that states in the region adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which provides for expanded monitoring.
- **Territory Covered:** Each zone applies to the entire territories of all of its states-parties. Territory is understood to include all land holdings, internal waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic waters.
  - The Latin American treaty also extends hundreds of kilometers from the states-parties' territories into the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, but the nuclear-weapon states, citing their freedom at sea, assert that this does not apply to their ships and aircraft that might be carrying nuclear weapons. A dispute also exists over the inclusion of the Chagos Archipelago, which includes the U.S. military base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, as part of the proposed African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom recognizes Diego Garcia as being subject to the Pelindaba Treaty.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ)

- **Protocol for Nuclear Weapon States**
- Each treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone includes a protocol for the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the NPT-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-to sign and ratify. These protocols, which are **legally binding**, call upon the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the zones and **not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty states-parties**. Such declarations of non-use of nuclear weapons are referred to as **negative security assurances.**
- However, the nuclear-armed countries have at times signed and ratified a NWFZ protocol and declared conditions reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in certain scenarios against parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
  - The United States signed the protocol for the African nuclear-weapon-free zone in April 1996 with a declaration that it would reserve the right to respond with all options, implying possible use of nuclear weapons, to a chemical or biological weapons attack by a member of the zone.
  - None of the nuclear-weapon states have signed the relevant protocol for the treaty creating a zone in Southeast Asia because of concerns that it conflicts with the right of their ships and aircraft to have freedom of movement in international waters and airspace and problems with the definitions of territory, since includes exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.

The Idea of North East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ)

- To reduce the tension in Korean Peninsula, it was the US DoD first proposed the idea of establishing NWFZ covering this area in 1972.
  - http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/The-Reduction-of-Tension-in-Korea-Vol.-1.pdf
- In 1980s, North Korea, the Soviet Union, and Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) supported the idea of NWFZ respectively in order to limit the deployment of nuclear weapons by the US in this region.
  - It was a tool for US-Soviet Union grand bargain.
- Since the end of Cold War, peace movement organizations and scholars have played important role in promoting the NEA-NWFZ.

Chronology of Proposals on a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

Mar. 1995	John Endicott, et al.	Limited Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (LNWFZ), involving only non-strategic weapons. A Circular Zone with 2000 km radius centered on Panmunjom or an elliptical zone.
1995	Andrew Mack	NWFZ involving the ROK, DPRK, Japan and Taiwan
Mar. 1996	Kumao Kaneko	A Circular Zone with 2000 km radius centered on Panmunjom. Different obligations posed on nuclear weapons state and non-nuclear weapons states.
May 1996	Hiromichi Umebayashi	Three plus Three nations arrangement involving ROK, DPRK and Japan as non-nuclear weapons states and China, Russia and U.S. as nuclear weapons states.
Oct. 1997	John Endicott, et al.	NEA League of Non-Nuclear States, involving the ROK, Japan and Mongolia (and DPRK if possible) as a phase I formation of the LNWFZ.
Jun. 2000	Seongwhun Cheon & Tatsujiro Suzuki	A NWFZ supported by a tri-party treaty among ROK, DPRK and Japan.
Apr. 2004	Hiromichi Umebayashi, et al.	A model NWFZ treaty drafted based upon a Three plus Three nations arrangement.
Spring 2007	J. Enkhsaikhan	An approach to form a zone through relevant non-nuclear constituent states' attaining single state NWF status.
Aug. 2008	DPJ Disarmament Group	A draft treaty proposal based upon a Three plus Three arrangement
Nov. 2008	Jaejung Suh	Multilateralization of 1992 Joint Declaration for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by making protocols to it.
May. 2010	Nautilus Institute	An approach to form a zone by establishing first a NWFZ composed of Japan and ROK.
Nov. 2011	Morton H. Halperin	An approach to conclude a comprehensive agreement among member states of the Six-Party Talks and others on key elements including the establishment of a NEA-NWFZ.
Jan. 2013	Nagasaki University Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition	Proposal: A Comprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

From "2+3" to "3+3" Why it is possible?

- Practical
  - It only covers limited area.
- Innovative
  - It differs from traditional tools like sanctions or coercion.
- Gradual
  - It forms the KJ-NWFZ first.

For Regional Stakeholders

Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking

LI BIN, TONG ZHAO

Critical differences between Chinese and U.S. thinking about nuclear weapons and deterrence result not merely from differing security environments and levels of military strength; they also exist because China and the United States have developed their own nuclear philosophies in implementing their security policies over many years.

Published October 28, 2016

Resources Full Text Brief Print Page Comments (1)

Related Topics East Asia China Defense and Security Foreign Policy Nuclear Weapons

- China
  - Not necessary to redeploy nuclear weapons
  - Aline with "no first use" principle
  - Easing the tensions
  - Other regional players NNWS status reaffirmed
  - The US nuclear umbrella removed
  - Stepping-stone toward regional security and economic cooperation
- Russia
  - Not necessary to redeploy nuclear weapons
  - Aline with the mediator role in 6PTs
  - Easing the tensions
  - The US nuclear umbrella removed
  - Stepping-stone toward regional security and economic cooperation

For Regional Stakeholders

- The US ambivalent thinking
- A creative method to break the (negotiation) deadlock?
  - Obama
  - Trump
- The end of nuclear umbrella toward Japan and South Korea?
  - Obama
  - Trump
- A grand bargain between US, Russia and China on arms control?

For Regional Stakeholders

- Japan
- Aline with the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, anti-nuclear movement and national image
- But the government believe the condition for establishing NEANWFZ is not mature (日本の軍縮・不拡散外交 平成28年3月 http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000145531.pdf)
  - continuing threat from NK missiles and nuclear weapons
  - historical and territorial disputes between CJ and KJ
  - the credibility of US nuclear umbrella

For Regional Stakeholders

- South Korea
- Aline with its NNWS status
- But coupling with Japan's position
  - both are nuclear-threshold countries
  - both facing regional security challenges
  - both are allies of the US
    - nuclear umbrella
    - civilian nuclear cooperation on reprocessing

For Regional Stakeholders

- What North Korea can get from joining the NEA-NWFZ?
  - negative security assurance
  - diplomatic recognition
  - sanctions removed
  - (nuclear) energy supply
  - other regional cooperation
- The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula was adopted between the Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, and the President of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, on April 27, 2018

Why the NEA-NWFZ has not been established or officially discussed yet?

- Trust deficit
  - imbalanced “3+3” structure
  - long-term geopolitical gaming
  - historical and territorial disputes
  - unprecedented regional security mechanism

Presenter 2

You-Jun CHEN

Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Professor

The economic integration in Asia-Pacific Region
----Present situation and Prospect

Prof. & Dr. CHEN You-Jun
Director, Center for Regional Economy
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

Definition of Asia Pacific

The Asia-Pacific region is one of the most populous and most dynamic regions in the world.

According to APEC's definition, the broad "Asia-Pacific region" refers to countries and regions along the Pacific Rim, including EA and NA. In a narrow sense, "Asia Pacific" mainly includes countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN.

The trend of globalization to regionalization

At present, the process of economic globalization is encountering obstacles, and the global economic governance model is developing in-depth to the level of regional economic integration.

The trend of globalization to regionalization

Reason：

1, The "renationalization" at the political dimension,

2, The “clubization” at the economic dimension,

3, The "diversification and de-Westernization" at the cultural and ideological dimension.

Under the influence of factors such as trade protectionism, political domestic priorityism, and technological nationalism in technology, the process of economic globalization has turned to be driven by regional economic integration.

Theory of "three groups"

The United States dominated North American economy;

The highest level of integration of the European Union ;

China, Japan and South Korea are the three powers of East Asia;

three geopolitical plates occupied more than seventy percent of the resources of the world economy (Naoko, M.2002).

East Asia has the lowest degree of economic integration(compared with NA & EU)

The long-term lack of FTA between China, Japan and South Korea has even affected the economic competitiveness of these three countries in the international market.

The development of regional economic integration is the prelude to promoting globalization in a true sense.

RCEP : new achievement of regional economic integration

1, Signature, 15 November 2020

2, 15 countries
population: 2.27 Billion
GDP: 25.8 Trillion USD
Exports: 5.5 Trillion USD (30% of global exports)

3, a big market

4, change of the supply chain

The main features of RCEP :

1, Diversified member countries make.

2, A unique model led by ASEAN.

3, Adhering to the principle of open, flexible and pragmatic cooperation.

Compared with CPTPP

On December 30, 2018, CPTPP entered into force: “high level, high quality"

The RCEP is not as demanding as TPP in terms of access threshold, tariff abolition rate and rule-making. The reason is that the RCEP respects different development stages and models of each country and tries to balance the interests of all parties.

RCEP & TPP

Problems with RCEP:

1,India's withdrawal: Asia-Pacific economic integration lacks an important economic and trade partner;

2, Regional conflicts and trade disputes (Japan-Korea trade friction; deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations, etc.);

3, External factors, especially the influence of the United States;

4,In the context of "covid-19", the global economy shrank and trade protectionism rose.

RCEP Prospect

- The completion of RCEP negotiations will show the world a more inclusive, open and pragmatic cooperation in Asia, and send positive signals against trade protectionism, support of free trade and multilateralism to the world, which are of great significance to the world economy.

Cooperation in the Future Trade and Investment Regime of Asia-Pacific region

1, US foreign policy (new administration)

2, RCEP; TPP; CJK FTA;

3, FTAAP

4, Cooperation in digital economy, new energy and innovation development

Four-pole system（Industry chain/ supply chain）

China： A production and processing center mainly based on China.

ASEAN： Supplemented by ASEAN.

J & K： Japan and South Korea serve as intermediate supply centers for production and processing.

Current Problems in Economic Governance in the Asia-Pacific Region

1,Diverse types of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements("spaghetti bowl effect“)

2,The establishment various forms of bilateral or multilateral cooperation mechanisms("ASEAN+" structure)

3,Different path choices and rules and standards(APEC/TPP/CPTPP/RCEP)

4,The differences in the development level and stage of the member states

Difficulties in advancing the reform of the economic governance system in the Asia-Pacific region:

1. Intensified competition between China and the United States.

2. There are deficiencies in the "ASEAN leadership structure".

3. The uncertainty of China-Japan relations.

Difficulties in advancing the reform of the economic governance system in the Asia-Pacific region:

4. China-India relations have deteriorated, and India refuses to join the regional economic governance framework.

5. The covid-19 has intensified the trend of "de-globalization" thought and technological nationalism.

6. The inherent geopolitical contradictions in the Asia-Pacific region and the impact of regional security crises.

The policies of the new U.S. government

1,Return to CPTPP?

2,Regulate international trade standards in emerging frontier fields (digital economy, green trade);

3,Block East Asian regional economic integration (use regional security issues, build and strengthen alliance systems)

Implementation path

1. In the post-epidemic era, RCEP: predictable economic environment, lower transaction costs, and promote economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.

2. Maintain the leading position of ASEAN, promote the optimization and upgrading of RCEP in an orderly manner, and promote the interactive development of RCEP and CPTPP.

3. China, Japan and South Korea should seek to establish a new generation of trade arrangements that can lead the global economy, build a future-oriented "East Asian Community".

4. China, Japan and South Korea should adopt realist or pragmatic policies, and use flexible and pragmatic means to maximize the signing of process of regional integration.

The focus of promoting the reform of the economic governance system in the Asia-Pacific region:

1, The compatibility and integration of multilateral FTA(prevent CPTPP and RCEP different path effects);

2, Lead the formulation of diversified, open and inclusive emerging FTA rules(reach a high-standard, high-level CJK FTA);

3, Support ASEAN's core position, guides the establishment of an FTAAP that is comprehensive, inclusive, benefits all parties in the region.

Thanks for your attention.

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Presenter 3

Shawn HO

RSIS, Associate Research Fellow

The Past and Present of Singapore's Non-Aligned DPRK Policy

Singapore PM Lee Kuan Yew sending off DPRK Vice-President Kang Ryang Wook at the Singapore airport on 7 July 1968

(Source: National Archives of Singapore)

Shawn HO (Associate Research Fellow, RSIS, Singapore)

15th June 2021

Overview

- Singapore's hosting of the 1st US-DPRK Summit comes to mind when one thinks about Singapore-DPRK relations.
- However, there is actually a much longer history to the bilateral relations that dates back to the 1960s.
- This presentation seeks to explain the reasons why Singapore had pursued bilateral relations with the DPRK soon after becoming an independent country in 1965.
- A key case study is the 1968 visit to Singapore by the then DPRK Vice-President Kang Ryang Wook.

Contents

- **The first section** provides the background of Singapore's priorities after gaining independence in 1965 and how its relations with the DPRK had come about as part of a wider outreach to the Communist bloc.
- **The second section** focuses on the DPRK Vice-President Kang Ryang Wook's 1968 visit to Singapore.
- **The third section** examines the state of Singapore-DPRK relations in the contemporary context.
- **The final section** concludes with a summary of Singapore's longstanding non-alignment policy towards the DPRK.

1st Section – After Independence

- Singapore's foremost concern after separating from Malaysia and gaining independence in 1965 was its survival as a state.
- Singapore aimed to have as many countries recognise its independence as soon as possible.
- It also adopted a non-aligned policy so that it would be not caught in the Cold War rivalry between the Communist and Western blocs.
- While Singapore eventually became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1970, its aspiration to do so had been clear from the time of its independence.

Backdrop of Singapore-DPRK relations

- Singapore-DPRK relations in the 1960s must therefore be viewed in the context of a newly independent Singapore which needed to survive politically and economically.
- Bilateral relations were pursued against the backdrop of superpower rivalry during the Cold War, the establishment of ASEAN, China's reluctance to recognise Singapore and Singapore's outreach to the Communist bloc.
- It was beneficial to Singapore to have trade and diplomatic relations with an Asian Communist state like the DPRK in light of Singapore's non-aligned foreign policy.

ASEAN

- Singapore's pursuit of relations with the DPRK was partially influenced by the establishment of ASEAN.
- On 8 August 1967, ASEAN was established by five staunch anti-communist countries in the region. Singapore, being a founding member of ASEAN, may have given other countries the impression that it was not non-aligned.
- This was an image that Singapore was keen to correct through building up its relations with Communist countries such as the DPRK.
- The visit of DPRK Vice-President Kang Ryang Wook to Singapore meant recognition of Singapore as an independent country.

Singapore's relations with the Communist bloc

- Singapore-DPRK relations did not take place in a vacuum and it was part of a broader strategy by Singapore to build up its links with countries from the Communist bloc to show it was non-aligned.
- It was also done with the objective of securing a greater number of export markets which were vital to the building up of Singapore's nascent economy.
- Despite its outreach to Communist countries, Singapore's leadership and PM Lee Kuan Yew were staunch anti-Communists.

2nd Section – DPRK VP Visit to Singapore

- DPRK Vice-President Kang Ryang Wook's 9-day visit to Singapore was from 29 June to 7 July in 1968.
- This was the first high-level visit from an Asian Communist state to Singapore and it provides insights into Singapore's non-aligned foreign policy thinking at that time.
- Archival materials clearly show that one of the main reasons that Singapore invited this senior DPRK delegation to visit was because Singapore wanted to show that it was non-aligned.
- By making this visit, the DPRK had publicly recognised Singapore as an independent sovereign country and this was politically beneficial to Singapore.

China's foreign policy shift on Singapore

- Singapore's relations with the DPRK were of particular value to Singapore as it signaled to China Singapore's non-alignment and independence.
- This was true at least until the early 1970s when China's attitude toward Singapore underwent a noticeable change.
- This shift in China's recognition of Singapore as an independent state was confirmed in May 1973 during FM Rajaratnam's visit to China where he met with China's head of government Zhou Enlai.
- In Zhou's journal entry of 16 May 1973, he wrote: *'During the meeting, I said the following, "We respect your national sovereignty, for you are not the "Third China" but the Republic of Singapore. The Republic of Singapore is an independent nation with its own sovereignty." I also said, "China hopes to establish diplomatic relations with Singapore in the near future."'*

3rd Section – Contemporary Era

- Over the past four decades, it is fair to say that bilateral relations have remained at a modest level at best.
- In the 1990s, government-to-government exchanges were very limited as the DPRK concentrated more on its domestic issues.
- At the diplomatic level, engagements have largely taken place at the multilateral level at meetings such as the annual ASEAN Regional Forum, supplemented by the rare Ministerial visit to each other's country.
- While there has been the occasional interest by Singaporean businessmen over the decades to invest in the DPRK and Choson Exchange has been providing training for aspiring entrepreneurs from the DPRK, these engagements tend to be few and far between.

Recent Years

- In recent years, following the nuclear and missile tests conducted by the DPRK and the ensuing UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions, Singapore was left with little choice but to take the following actions:
  - remove visa-free entry for DPRK citizens in October 2016
  - suspend all trade with the DPRK in November 2017
  - revoke all work permits held by DPRK citizens in Singapore in March 2018.
- Prior to the suspension of trade, the total trade between two countries had amounted to just S$700,000 (approximately US$493,000) in 2017.
- As a reference for comparison, in 1968, two-way trade between Singapore and the DPRK amounted to US$10 million.

Contemporary Singapore-DPRK Relations

- Singapore remains a trusted neutral country in the DPRK's view. If this were not the case, the DPRK would not have felt comfortable with Singapore hosting the first ever US-DPRK Summit.
- It is also worth pointing out that DPRK Chairman Kim Jong Un did meet Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on June 10, 2018 on the sidelines of the US-DPRK Summit. They 'exchanged views on Singapore-DPRK relations, as well as developments in the DPRK and on the Korean Peninsula'.
- In a letter to Chairman Kim after the 1st US-DPRK Summit, PM Lee wrote in his last sentence that 'I look forward to meeting you again in the near future', indicating an openness to engage more with the DPRK in future.

Singapore's Role

- Given the longstanding bilateral relationship over 46 years and the goodwill built up with the DPRK over the hosting of the 1st US-DPRK Summit, if the need and opportunity arises, Singapore can play a bigger role in engaging the DPRK.
- Singapore can help by offering economic assistance and skills training especially in a post-sanctions DPRK.
- Singapore today remains a neutral, non-aligned country that adopts an equidistant relationship with the major powers.
- Singapore also continues to want to have trade relations with as many countries as possible (including with the DPRK **in future** so long as Singapore adheres to the UNSC resolutions).

Final Section - Conclusion

- Singapore had reached out to the DPRK in the 1960s, as part of its outreach to the Communist bloc, for trade and political reasons.
- Singapore wanted to bolster its non-aligned image, get recognition as an independent state, secure an additional export market, and to signal to China that Singapore was not a Western stooge.
- Singapore wanted to emphasise to other countries that its joining of ASEAN did not mean that it had given up its non-aligned policy.
- DPRK Vice-President Kang visit to Singapore in 1968 was the first high-level visit by an Asian Communist country to Singapore.
- By making this visit, the DPRK had publicly recognised Singapore as an independent sovereign country.

Summary

- Singapore today remains a neutral and non-aligned country that wishes to have strong diplomatic relations with as many countries as possible.
- A fundamental tenet of Singapore's non-aligned and inclusive foreign policy that favours engagement with the DPRK has remained consistent throughout the past few decades.

Presenter 4

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Southeast Asia-North Korea Engagement: Constraints and Opportunities

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The context of Southeast Asia-North Korea relations

- Post-War Communist comradeship
- Cold War Third-World diplomacy: cultural & economic development
- Post-Cold War humanitarian connections
- Between sanctions, trade and financial hubs
- Constraints under the Maximum Pressure campaign

Overview of bilateral relations

Countries	Relations Established	Embassy / Consular (VISA Inquiry)	Communist party link	Non-aligned Movement	Economic pragmatism
Brunei	1999	North Korea Embassy in Jakarta Pusat (Indonesia)	-	√ (1993)	N/A
Burma/Myanmar	1975	Consular links established in 1961 -Embassy North Korea in Yangon - currently no diplomatic or consular representation in DPRK	√ (Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma	√ (1961)	N/A

Countries	Relations Established	Embassy / Consular (VISA Inquiry)	Communist party link	Non-aligned Movement	Economic pragmatism
Cambodia	1964	-Embassy of North Korea in Phnom Penh -Cambodian Embassy in Pyongyang	√ (1964 established with Monarchy led by the King, later PRK abandoned communist ideology in 1991)	√ (1961)	N/A
Indonesia	1964	-North Korean Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia OR authorized DPRK tour operators -Indonesia embassy in Pyongyang	√ (PKI supported Sukarno, exterminated in 1965)	√ (1961)	NK government operated the Pyongyang restaurant in Jakarta (foreign currency)
Laos	1974	-North Korea Embassy in Vientiane -Laos Embassy in Pyongyang	√ (Communist Pathet Laos seized power since 1975)	√ (1964)	N/A
Malaysia	1973	-Embassy of Democratic People's Republic of Korea in KL -Malaysian Embassy in Pyongyang	- KWP was found to be providing assistance to Malayan Communist Party (Korean Archive)	√ (1970) Support DPRK membership	Trade agreement 1979 (declassified) 2001 (classified)

Countries	Relations Established	Embassy / Consular (VISA Inquiry)	Communist party link	Non-aligned Movement	Economic pragmatism
Philippines	2000	-No embassy, no consulate Consular Office, Chinese Embassy in Manila, Chinese Embassy in Manila, The Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Beijing. Also can apply through certain tour agencies. -North Korea has representation North Korea embassy in Bangkok	-	√ (1993)	-Fifth-largest trade partner in 2017 (Jan-June) worth $28.8 million - Third largest trade partner (until Sept 2017) -Main exports to North Korea in 2015 were computers, integrated circuited boards, bananas and women's undergarments - Since Nov 2017 -suspended trade relations
Singapore	1975	-North Korean Embassy in Singapore -Singapore has no diplomatic representation in North Korea. Consular assistance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Duty Office.	-	√ (1970)	Choson Exchange (Singapore-based NGO founded by Singaporean - focused on supporting economic training in NK (economic policy, entrepreneurship and law programs) 2010- Ranked as North Korea's 10th largest trade partner 2016 – 8th largerst trade partner Since Nov 2017 -suspended trade relations

The North Korea connection

Countries	Relations Established	Embassy / Consular (VISA Inquiry)	Communist party link	Non-aligned Movement	Economic pragmatism
Thailand	1975	-North Korean Embassy in Bangkok -No diplomatic or consular representation in Korea	-	√ (1993)	Top 4 trade partner of NK
Vietnam	1950	-North Korean Embassy in Hanoi -Embassy in Pyongyang	√ (party relations since 1950, prior to VN's independence)	√ (1976)	N/A
Timor Leste	?	Uncertain, but with visa-free/visa waiver arrangement	-	-	N/A

North Korea and ASEAN

ASEAN's role in socializing the outlier states:

- Cambodia
- Myanmar
- Vietnam
- China
- North Korea

Inclusive regionalism and the nuclear problem

- The establishment of ASEAN Regional Forum
- ASEAN's coffee table diplomacy

ASEAN in North Korea

- ASEAN Committee in Pyongyang
  - Indonesia
  - Vietnam
  - Malaysia
  - Thailand
  - Laos
- Southeast Asian tour operations in North Korea
- Southeast Asian governmental engagement in North Korea
- Southeast Asian NGOs in North Korea

Conclusion: constraints and opportunities

North Korea's state-sponsored terrorism activities	North Korean illegal financial network, sanctions, & nonproliferation	Prospects of Southeast Asian Governmental and NGO activities in non-weapons sensitive area of cooperation
• Rangoon Bombing 1983 • Assassination of Kim Jong Nam in Kuala Lumpur 2017	• Approval of the first extradition request from the United States of a North Korean national in third country: Mun Chol-myeong in Malaysia (2019-2021) • GLOCOM arms sales • DPRK diplomatic missions as entreprises • Proliferation Security Initiative and Strategic Trade Act in Southeast Asia	• Indonesia sister city projects • ASEAN agriculture and fruit orchard in North Korea • Choson Exchange (Singapore) • MERCY Malaysia

Presenter 5

Waseem ISHAQUE

National University of Modern Languages, Assistant Professor

SESSION 2
THE US-NORTH KOREA RAPPROCHEMENT;
AVOIDING NULCEAR HOLOCAUST
BY DR. WASEEM ISHAQUE
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES
(NUML) ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN
1

THE US-NORTH KOREA RAPPROCHEMENT;
AVOIDING NULCEAR HOLOCAUST
NORTH KOREAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR THREAT
조선전략적핵무력건설
NORTH KOREA CONDUCTS NUCLEAR TEST
NUCLEAR EVENT
NORTH KOREA
PUNGGYE-RI
2013 NUCLEAR TEST SITE
Pyongyang
2

Causal Factors Affecting Rapprochement

- Perception and misperception about North Korean regime
- North Korean skeptical view of United States policies
- Questionable credibility of US threats and promises
- Credibility of Chairman Kim as a Rational Actor
- De-nuclearization as ultimate end-state

3

De-nuclearization and Rapprochement

- Competing geo-political interests of other stake holders
- Consistent Policy of Nuclear Brinkmanship by North Korea
- US policy dilemma of confrontation or compromise
- North Korea perceives US exaggerated threat assessment as a provocation
- Constructive engagement remains the most preferred option

4

Strategic Puzzle of De-nuclearization

Key Questions complicating strategic puzzle of Northeast Asian Security environment

5

Contested Models of De-nuclearization

Chinese dual track approach

North Korea's corresponding measures approach

USA's maximum pressure approach

6

In Search of Consensus Solution

- Dismantling North Korea's Nuclear Program
- Dismantling Missile capability
- In complete, verifiable and irreversible manner

7

In Search of Consensus Solution

- Dual Track Approach
- Pursuing peace negotiations
- Establishing Peace Mechanism

8

In Search of Consensus Solution

9

In Search of Consensus Solution

10

President Moon Jae –In's Vision

Panmunjom Deceleration April 2018

- Peace
- Prosperity
- Unification

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Strategic Discourse in the USA

North Korea part of Axis of Evil

Fire and Fury to Destroy North Korea

North Korea- Irrational Actor

12

Amazing Summits- Singapore and Hanoi

- No mention of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization
- No time lines for denuclearization
- Safeguarding North Korean regime stability
- Unilateral suspension of joint military exercise with South Korea

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Trilateral Talks

Russia-China-North Korea Approach

- Reciprocity
- Parallel
- synchronous
- Gradual

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Process of Rapprochement

Security guarantees for North Korean Regime

Iraq and Libya surrendered WMDs and faced brutal consequences

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Avoiding Perceived Provocations

US-Japan and US-ROK defence alliance- conduct of joint military drills a precursor to regime change

Deployment of THAAD in ROK- A provocation and direct military threat

Propaganda loud speakers to defame North Korean regime

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Recalibrating US Strategy for North Korea

- Peaceful US-North Korea relations
- Establishing stable regime in Korean Peninsula
- Quid Pro Quo for denuclearization
- Enduring diplomatic engagement

Prospects and Challenges of De-nuclearization

Differing Versions on de-nulcearization

- Nuclear Free Peninsula
- Withdrawal of US Troops
- Complete roll back

How Denuclearization Can Happen?

- Bilateral agreement between US and North Korea
- Multilateral approach
- IAEA safeguards
- Lifting of sanctions from North Korea
- North Korean regime security under international safeguards

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH NEW US ADMINISTRATION

Breaking Stalemate and Re-engaging North Korea

"The ultimate goal is complete denuclearization of North Korea"

"Under no illusions about the difficulty in getting North Korea to give up its nuclear Arsenal"

"We both are deeply concerned about the situation"

"I would not do what had been done in the recent past"

Biden- Moon Meeting on Friday 21 May 2021

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Breaking Stalemate and Re-engaging North Korea

Limited strategy by US to slow growth of North Korean WMDs

Good Arms Control Agreement

US Strategic Dialogue with North Korea

Incentives for North Korea

22

Breaking Stalemate and Re-engaging North Korea

- US unilateral announcement to end Korean war
- US should Factor in the alliance partnership as well
- Mitigating South Korean and Japanese vulnerabilities
- Constructive engagement-Avoiding rhetoric and provocations

23

Conclusion

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I Thank You All for Patient Hearing

DR. WASEEM ISHAQUE
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF MODERN LANGUAGES
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

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DAY 2

Session 3

Presenter 1

Eric Julian BALLBACH

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Korea Foundation Fellow

SWP

European Track 1.5-Initiatives with North Korea

A Critical Evaluation

Dr. Eric J. Ballbach

Korea Foundation Fellow

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
German Institute for
International and Security Affairs

Introduction

Challenges in the evaluation of Track 1.5 initiatives

- Informal nature of the dialogues
- Skepticism on the part of organizers (conceptual, organizational, and ethical objections)
- Varying goals and methods for achieving goals

Significance of evaluation of Track 1.5 initiatives

- Insufficient coordination among the various initiatives
- Insufficient understanding of how, when, why/ under what conditions Track 1.5 dialogues are/can be successful - and when they are not
- Overcoming the "it-feels-good-so-it-must-be-good“ attitude

2 Dr. Eric J. Ballbach, European Track 1.5 Initiatives with North Korea June 14-16, 2021

Introduction

Central Questions

- What are the main characteristics and structural features of European Track 1.5 dialogues with North Korea?
- What are their advantages and strengths and the main challenges and limitations they face?
- What distinguishes European Track 1.5s from other (e.g., U.S.- or ASEAN-led) Track 1.5 dialogues with North Korea - and what is the added value of the evaluated cases?
- Which structural features promote or hinder the success of European Track 1.5 initiatives with North Korea?
- Can we identify and summarize best practices relevant to other cases of informal European Track 1.5 initiatives with authoritarian states?

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Analytical Design

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Background

North Korea and Security-Related Track-1.5 Dialogues: A Genesis

- Ever since the 1990s and especially since the outbreak of the 2nd nuclear crisis, the significance of informal Track 1.5 initiatives has successively increased
- Unofficial dialogues repeatedly helped jumpstart and/or complemented official negotiations.
- In the absence of sustained official dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea since the collapse of the Six Party Talks, Track-1.5 dialogues have continued to serve as a crucial mechanism for communication and information gathering.

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Background

The Different Arrangements of Track 1.5 Dialogues with North Korea

- Apart from the respective outputs, outcomes, and impacts, the various Track 1.5 dialogues throughout Europe and Asia involving North Korean representatives considerably differ e.g. with regard to their
  - thematic focus (regional security, CSBMs, etc.),
  - objectives (merely keep channel of communication open vs. tangible steps towards a specific goal),
  - funding (private vs. state-funded),
  - personnel composition (composition of experts and (former) officials),
  - degree of institutionalization (one-off vs. regular meetings),
  - organizational structure (bilateral vs. multilateral/ conference-type vs. exclusive).

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European Track 1.5s with North Korea

Country	Official nature of meeting	Participants	North Korean participants (level)
Finland	explores approaches to CBMs & reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula	NK diplomats, former US and South Korean officials and academics, observers from the United Nations and Europe	Choe Kang Il, a deputy director general for North American affairs at North Korea's foreign ministry
Sweden	Regional security issues, confidence and security building	NK diplomats, European experts, supplemented occasionally by U.S. experts and observers from regional and/or international institutions and organizations such as the EU or the UN	Vice Foreign Minister level, Korea Europe Association
	CBMs	experts and government reps from South and North Korea, sometimes also from the US, Japan or China	Institute for Disarmament and Peace
Spain	Regional security	NK diplomats, experts from Europe, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, observers from EU	Vice Foreign Minister level, Korea Europe Association, Institute for Disarmament and Peace
Switzer-land	Regional security	Bilateral dialogue and annual conference (Zermatt roundtable)	Institute for Disarmament and Peace

European Track 1.5s with North Korea

General Characteristics of European Track-1.5 Initiatives with North Korea

- Usually conducted as exclusive, informal dialogues typically facilitated by an impartial third party.
- Brings together North Korean representatives with experts from Europe and (often) other 'involved' states as well as officials from European countries and/or international organizations.
- The involved participants usually have access to decision-makers at home.
- Main objective of opening new or maintaining existing channels of communication with North Korea.

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European Track 1.5s with North Korea

General Characteristics of European Track-1.5 Initiatives with North Korea

- While these dialogues also involve the discussion of current positions of the conflicting sides, they usually aim at the exploration of the underlying causes of the dispute in the hope of jointly developing alternative ideas, thereby fostering, over time, a changed perception of the conflict and the "other."
- Many European Track-1.5 dialogues with North Korea are designed as ongoing processes rather than "one-off" meetings.
- The meetings are conducted quietly and informally to create an atmosphere within which "outside-the-box" thinking can flourish and participants are not afraid to propose and explore ideas that could not be entertained by an official process or by one where exchanges might be repeated in the ´media.

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European Track 1.5s with North Korea

Major strengths of European Track 1.5s with North Korea

- Offer an alternate route to the continuation of the discussion of pressing issues when official routes are blocked.
- Generate informal space for official contacts
- Create space for the discussion of new ideas
- Create space for direct information-sharing and transmission
- create space for establishing social contacts among conflict parties
- Provide tangible contributions to defusing the conflict

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European Track 1.5s with North Korea

Challenges and Limitations of European Track-1.5 Initiatives with North Korea

- Political Dependencies
- Manage Expectations
- Lack of Coordination among European Track 1.5 Initiatives
- Caught between too specific and not specific enough
- Socialization on a Second Track?

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European Track 1.5s with North Korea

(Some) Lessons Learned

- Aim for ongoing initiatives.
- Track-1.5 organizers and funders need to have a deep commitment to the process, also amidst potentially unfavorable political framework conditions and short-term setbacks.
- Significance of the third party and the right participants
- Significance of the right location.
- Identify realistic goals.
- If possible, aim for policy-relevance.

Dr. Eric J. Ballbach, European Track 1.5 Initiatives with North Korea June 14-16, 2021

SWP

Thank you!

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Presenter 2

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Tangible and Intangible Legacies of 70 years of Polish–North Korean relations (1948–2018)

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Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures of the Polish Academy of Sciences

IKŚiO PAN

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1. Assumptions.
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5. Relations between Poland and North Korea between 1980 and 1989.
6. Relations between Poland and North Korea after 1989.
7. Disputes between Poland and North Korea.
8. A review of Polish literature related to North Korea.
9. Conclusion&findings.
10. Questions&suggestions?

1

Assumptions

1. During the studied period, the primary goal of the North Korean leadership was its welfare. The regime tried to obtain as much monetary support, as well as food and equipment, as it could. **During the period 1948–1980, North Korea was not directly threatened by foreign states.**
2. As of now, with growing American interest in North Korean issues, the priority of the North Korean state organisations is their survival instead of welfare issues.

2

Theoretical background

1. The Rationalist Theory in International Relations
2. The Theory of Choices.

3

The Korean War period and its aftermath (1950–1959)

1. Polish support after the Korean War.
2. Educational and cultural suport.
3. North Korean orphans in Poland.

4

5

6

Relative Disturbance in Polish-North Korean relations (1959–1980).

1. Economic cooperation.
2. Political cooperation.
3. Cultural cooperation.
4. Educational cooperation.

7

Relations between Poland and North Korea between 1980 and 1989.

1. Economic cooperation.
2. Political cooperation.
3. Cultural cooperation.
4. Educational cooperation.

8

Relations between Poland and North Korea after 1989.

1. Economic cooperation.
2. Political cooperation.
3. Cultural and Educational cooperation.

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Disputes between Poland and North Korea.

1. Mixed marriages between North Korean and Polish citizens.
2. Defection of North Korean citizens in Poland.
3. North Korean workers in Poland.
4. Disputes involving the North Korean embassy in Warsaw.

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Disputes between Poland and North Korea.

1. Mixed marriages between North Korean and Polish citizens.
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4. Disputes involving the North Korean embassy in Warsaw.

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National Institute for
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The humanitarian and cultural cooperation between Poland and North Korea in the 2000s

1. Humanitarian cooperation.
2. Cultural cooperation.
3. Polish movies in North Korea.

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Conclusion&findings.

1. North Korea was not as closed a country as foreign analysts usually describe it.
2. Poland did make efforts to successfully foster mutual relations, sometimes regardless of the Polish interest. North Korea focused on its interests and not on those of fraternal nations.
3. The North Korean national interest was prioritised in the establishment of relations with Poland and that therefore there is asymmetry in the quality of relations between the two countries.

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Questions&suggestions?

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Presenter 3

Zsuzsa Anna FERENCZY

Free University of Brussels, Affiliated Scholar

A 'geopolitical' EU in the Indo-Pacific: prospects for cooperation on North Korea

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1. **The context - a new reality.**
   US-China geopolitical rivalry.
   Race for tech leadership, new mindset altering geopolitics & security. Connectivity. Emerging dynamics in the Indo-Pacific.
   EU-China, 'a new stage'. EU-North Korea, 'same old'.
   China, key in addressing the North Korea challenge.
   Global health crisis.

2. **Fundamental questions to ask** – on global leadership, on the EU's role.

3. **Main argument** – EU-China ties central in the EU's own global positioning, self-perception and capacity as a 'geopolitical' actor in the Indo-Pacific. Conceptual shift ongoing in EU: 1. on China, 2. on its role in Indo-Pacific.

4. **Looking ahead** – On the Korean Peninsula, EU-China relations will continue shaping the EU's capacity to take an assertive role.
International cooperation of like-minded partners, vital.

A new reality, as perceived in Brussels

- As "we see the rebirth of geostrategic competition between China, Russia and the US", "the EU has the option of becoming a **player**, a true geostrategic actor, or being mostly the **playground**" (HR Josep Borrell, 2019)
- The role of the EU and "the question of how it should deal with a **China** increasingly pursuing a strategy of global influence are issues of **fundamental importance for our future**" (HR Josep Borrell, 2020)

- **The China factor**. For the EU, China is central in its global positioning and self-perception.
- Regional anxiety in the Indo-Pacific, Quad; global anxiety.

A new reality and the future of the EU

- "China is now prepared to use its technological and military advantage to enhance its political influence" (HR Borrell, 2020)
- Race for **technology and innovation** leadership, and **standard setting** – AI, quantum computing, big data, 5G. Whoever sets standards will shape the future. Taiwan, an immediate strategic priority.
- Pandemic - a catalyst exacerbating the underlying rivalry.

- **Conceptual shift inside the EU, driven by the China factor**.
- Shift on multiple layers: **language** and **action.**

Fundamental questions to ask

- The broad question on **leadership**:
  - In the midst of a geopolitical rivalry driven by a technology race, who will set technology standards? *Who* will lead, and *how*?
- For the **EU**:
  - Can the EU develop its own approach to deal with emerging challenges, including an assertive China, as it pursues its 'geopolitical' ambitions?
  - How can the EU shape efforts to address the North Korea nuclear threat with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific?

Where are we? EU-China.

- EU-China, from '**strategic partner**' (2003) to '**systemic rival**'(2019).
- A **conceptual shift** unfolding on China, from naïve to assertive; shift in the EU's role in the Indo-Pacific, from passive observer to active stakeholder (Apr. 2021)
- Asymmetry; *toward* internal consensus: from China as 'opportunity' to 'threat'.
- **A new chapter of hostility, distrust, uncertainty.**
- High-profile acquisitions by Chinese SOEs: **COSCO** owns minority stakes in container terminals in Antwerp (BE), Las Palmas (SP) and Rotterdam (NL), controlling stakes in container terminals in Piraeus (GR), Valencia (SP), Bilbao (SP) and Zeebrugge (BE); case of KUKA(DE)/Midea, 2016
- "**Battle of narratives**" (HR Borell) – EU fears China's growing influence in EU.

Current state of play, EU-China

- **Dec. 2020 Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) –** strategic mistake?
- **March 2021** – EU imposed **sanctions** on 4 Chinese officials & 1 state-sponsored company for human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
- China **counter-sanctions** on Europeans – 5 MEPs, 3 national lawmakers, 4 entities. EP human rights committee (DROI), EU Political and Security Committee (PSC).
- Future of CAI – EP resolution May, 2021, freezing legislative process for ratifying CAI.
- **Future of EU-China relations?**

Technology, innovation and leadership

- Investing in technology & innovation determines whether a country can lead.
- **China's industrial policy approach –** 2013 reform program, leadership pledged to allow market forces to drive innovation. In strategic sectors, tech, infrastructure, energy, market doesn't prevail; CCP does. Approach violates WTO terms.
- **Made in China 2025 (**2015), central planning. Make China a major industrial competitor in high tech. President Xi extending state's reach into the economy.
- Technology, key in **14th 5 Year Plan** (2021-2025) on 5G, AI, big data, cloud computing.
- **China Standards 2035**, aims for global leadership in setting technology standards.
- Beijing claims it has an **alternative**, **state-guided model**, instead of converging with advanced economy norms where the state plays a limited role.

Policy response to China's tech push

- 2017, **US:** China's technology push "unreasonable, discriminatory, a burden on US commerce".
- Under **Trump administration**, US Commerce Dept. put regulation ahead of innovation, imposing export control on emerging technologies, such as AI (14 categories), visa restrictions on Chinese scientists. US trade advisor Navarro: China an "economic threat".
- **Biden administration** – maintains pressure on China tech. Huawei, Hikvision, "unacceptable risk" to national security. Semiconductors, AI to drive US' China policy.
- **EU-level measures** – 2020, EU names China (& Russia) as a source of disinformation linked to coronavirus undermining Western democracies; **FDI screening** mechanism; coordination on **disinformation** & **5G**; increased **coordination.**
- **EU's move to reshape EU-China relations.** Dec. 2020, Commission Communication.

"A new EU-US agenda for global change", 2020

- "We need to start acting together on **AI** - based on our shared belief in a **human-centric** approach and dealing with issues such as facial recognition… EU will propose to start work on a **Transatlantic AI Agreement** to set a blueprint for regional and global **standards** aligned with our values"
- "The EU is proposing to establish a new **EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC)…**to strengthen our technological and industrial leadership." (Call renewed in March 2021)
- "It will focus on … developing compatible **standards** and regulatory approaches for new technologies."

EU-US Consultations, May 2021

- Both welcomed a "**revitalized transatlantic partnership".**
- The two sides reiterated "the United States' and EU's relations with **China** are multifaceted and comprise elements of cooperation, competition, and systemic rivalry."
- Common interest: **cooperate,** to address China's rising influence.
- HR Borrell, on TTC: proposal is not about siding with the US to outflank China. "That would be a crazy objective. We need China". (Days before CAI negotiations concluded)

Connectivity, infrastructure

- China – **BRI**, geostrategic attempt to re-establish a Sinocentric regional order.
- US goal: develop a **network of allies** in Asia to push back Chinese assertiveness, provide alternative to BRI.
- 2019 – US, Australia, Japan in the **Blue Dot Network (**BDN**)**, multi-stakeholder initiative to promote high-quality standards for sustainable global infrastructure.
- Japan's '**Partnership for Quality Infrastructure**' (PQI,2015), revised in 2016 as 'Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure' (EPQI) – for sustainable infrastructure to build trust, transparency. BDN complements Japan's EPQI
- South Korean firms – increasingly important players to strengthen connectivity across the region; 2017 **New Southern Policy** to strengthen links with ASEAN, India, region central to Indo-Pacific.

EU, connectivity, and the Indo-Pacific

- **Convergence** inside EU to assume a bigger role in Asia; response to BRI, 17+1 framework.
- EU "to develop a more **politically rounded approach to Asia**… expand our partnerships, including on security, with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and others… We will promote non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula." (EU Global Strategy, 2016)
- "We will pursue a coherent approach to China's **connectivity** drives westwards by maximising the potential of the EU-China Connectivity Platform." (Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU Strategy, 2018)
- "The European way: sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity" (2018)
- April 2021, "EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific" – rebalance EU's relations with China. China not mentioned; indirectly via reference to geopolitical competition, tensions over supply chains, human rights. **Fragmentation remains**.

The Indo-Pacific, as a geopolitical concept

- Response to China's rise, divergent views persist.
- **Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy** (FOIP) Pres. **Trump,** 2017, incorporated into US National Security Strategy; to maintain predominance in the region and contain China.
- Pres**. Biden's** return to more traditional foreign policy in Asia: prioritize allies.

- Cooperation of all like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, mutual trust needed to address regional challenges.
- Common interest of like-minded partners : **promote peace in the region, mitigate North Korean threat, hedge against China's rise.** Coordinated response requires improved relations.

Japan, India and the Indo-Pacific

- **Japan's Free and Open IP Strategy –** the first to revive concept in **2007**. PM Abe Shinzo proposed the notion of "Asia's democratic security diamond", where Japan, India, Australia US would play a greater role.
- Goal: increase multilateral engagement. Japan claims it wants **to cope with, not contain China**.
- **India** - opportunity to position itself in regional architecture, to strengthen its presence in East Asia, boost cooperation with US & allies. India sees itself as the center of the Indian Ocean.
- Modi focuses on **inclusivity.** India claims it wants to **avoid confrontation with China** and balance relations.
- **China** on IP: "attention-grabbing idea", will "dissipate like ocean foam".

EU in the Indo-Pacific

- More than 35 % of all European exports go to Asia-Pacific markets, a majority of those (about 90 %) transit through the sea lanes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
- **Europe dependent** on unimpeded maritime highways or sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that pass through the Indo-Pacific.
- Europe and countries in the region share same geopolitical concerns: not to be caught in the US-China great power politics.
- **EU-Japan** (27th summit, May 2021) collaborate on global standards, connectivity and quality infrastructure; support for nuclear non-proliferations, for CVID by North Korea of its nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

ROK and the Indo-Pacific

- "We agree we will work to align the ROK's New Southern Policy and the United States' vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific and that our countries will cooperate to create a safe, prosperous, and dynamic region." (Joint statement 2021, Pres. Moon Jae-in and Pres. Joe Biden)
- Reorientation in Seoul's foreign policy in a dynamic regional context – an assertive China, Trump's disregard for allies, factors pushing for New Southern Policy.
- ROK participation in Quad would enhance credibility. ROK as an active player would secure its trade connection with EU, a key export market.
- **Vaccines** – ROK 1 of 5 largest exporters of vaccines globally. ROK pharmaceutical firms critical to the rollout of vaccines in Indo-Pacific.
- **ROK-Japan** – security and economic cooperation growing incrementally and substantially, without addressing historical issues.

EU-ROK, ROK-Japan, China.

- The EU's willingness, capacity to address North Korea, seen as vital in Seoul for a stronger EU-ROK partnership; it will also affect the EU's 'geopolitical' ambitions.
- Joint EU-ROK press release, 2020 summit: EU affirmed its support to the ROK's efforts to engage with the DPRK and achieve peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.
- **EU should pursue a strategic debate on North Korea, like it is doing on China.**
- **ROK-Japan** – Mistrust, negative perceptions endanger regional security architecture. Weakening of cooperation can lead to severe ramifications if a crisis happened.
- Strong ROK-Japan relationship vital for collective security of Indo-Pacific, to address regional challenges by China's rise and North Korea's nuclear capabilities.
- **China's** increasing military capacity & assertiveness.

The way forward

- Security alliance against North Korea needs **trust** among like-minded partners. ROK-Japan still to overcome historical challenges, transatlantic relations improving, EU becoming more active, reshaping its China policy.
- North Korea wants to be treated as an equal partner. Role of **China**. Pyongyang demands US roll back their "hostile policy towards DPRK". Likelihood of North Korea agreeing to denuclearization while receiving no concession in return is close to zero.
- Is a gradual approach possible? Gradual arms reduction, gradual denuclearization with gradual concessions?

"If the EU can't take serious action against Belarus then really there is a question about whether the EU has a credible foreign policy. This should be a no brainer" (Tweet, Anthony Gardner, US Ambassador to EU 2014-'17)

"The issue is no longer whether Europe matters but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace and at what point of time" (Thomas A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, 2003)

Presenter 4

David Hyland MITCHELL

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Comparing the peace processes in Ireland and Korea

Emerging Leaders Fellowship 2021
Dr David Mitchell
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Reconciling Divided States: Peace Processes in Ireland and Korea

Edited by Dong Jin Kim and David Mitchell, Routledge, 2022

Comparative chapters by scholars from Europe and East Asia on:

- history of colonialism
- high politics and security
- roles of women
- faith organisations
- sport
- memory and commemoration

Basic conflict comparison

	Korea	Ireland
Scale	3 million die in 3yr Korean War	3,500 die in 30yr 'Troubles'
Structure	Multiple actors, competing regional and global interests	Contained to Britain and Ireland, stable regional context
Substance	Intra-Korean, ideological, and geo-political dimensions	Ethno-national clash

Motivations for comparative study of Korea and Ireland

- Opportunity for new comparison
- Precedent of comparisons and parallels in history
- Engage with contemporary developments
- Peacebuilding impact: sharing lessons and inspiration

Yanaihara Tadao, 1893-1961

Five comparative observations

1. The level of mutual political recognition achieved
2. The degree of coexistence attained
3. The role of negotiation preconditions and extent inclusivity
4. The peacebuilding capacity of civil society
5. The nature and impact of international conditions

1. Mutual recognition

2. Coexistence

3. Inclusivity

4. Civil society

Figure 2. Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding.

From *Building Peace* by John Paul Lederach, (US Institute of Peace, 1997, p. 39)

5. International conditions

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