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  - Institute for Unification Education
  - Korea Foundation

# 1. Welcome Message

Honorable Yu, Hyun-seok, President of Korea Foundation,

Distinguished scholars and junior international experts who will deliver a presentation or discussion,

Great to see you all. I am Lee, Geum-soon Head of the Institute for Unification Education.

It's a pleasure and honour for me to invite scholars and practitioners at home and abroad who are interested in the Korean Peninsula issues to the 3rd International Academic Conference.

Distinguished guests,

Northeast Asia which the Korean Peninsula is part of is a center of the world economy taking up a quarter of the global trade and 20% of the total production.

However, political and security situations are getting worse in this region as the conflicts over historical, territorial and military issues still linger.

Most of all,

North Korea's constant attempt to develop nuclear weapons is posing the biggest threat to peace and stability not just in Northeast Asia but in the world.

Despite the active and flourishing economic cooperation Northeast Asian countries are still in conflicts over political and security issues.

We refer to this situation as "Asia Paradox".

In response to the "Asia Paradox", President Park Geun-hye has proposed "Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative".

The initiative aims for Northeast Asian countries to deal with soft security issues as a head-start by engaging in dialogues for trust-building, based up which, more cooperation will be made throughout the region to overcome conflicts and distrust, which will ultimately contribute to creating the order of multilateral cooperation.

I firmly believe trust and cooperation we build will play a pivotal role not only in resolving North Korean nuclear issues but also advancing the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Distinguished guests,

This year is a historical year, marking the 70th anniversary of both Korea's liberation from the Japanese colonial rule and its split into North and South.

For the past seven decades, Republic of Korea has lift itself out of ashes of war and successfully accomplished industrialization and democratization.

However, we have not torn down the wall of division as yet.

The Park Geun-hye administration has initiated and implemented 「Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula」 in order to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula, and hence build a foundation for unification

Despite constant nuclear tests and military provocations from the North, President Park Geun-hye follows her principled dialogue and cooperation for improvement of inter-Korean relations.

We keep our doors open to dialogue, incentivize North Korea to come back to the table, and actively support civilian inter-Korean exchanges, which will bring us back to a sense of unity as one nation.

Distinguished guests,

Just as German reunification occurred in the mood for peace and harmony in Europe, Korean unification will take place driven by peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia.

A unified Korea will do away with problems of North Korea including nuclear weapons, missiles and human rights issues, thereby driving the Northeast Asian economic growth, and being a catalyst of peace and prosperity in the region.

In this regard,

I believe this International Academic Conference will provide a meaningful opportunity for experts at home abroad to share your insight to think about the international cooperation for the Korean unification.

Last but not least,

I am kindly asking you, scholars and junior experts who gather together here to keep supporting us for peace building in the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the world.

Thank you

**Lee, Geum-soon**

Head of Institute for Unification Education

## 2. Conference Schedule

[ Date & Venue : July 8(Wed), 2015 / University of North Korean Studies, Seoul, Korea ]

Time & Role	Program & Participants		
08:30-09:00	<b>Registration</b>		
09:00-09:20	<b>Opening Ceremony</b>		
Opening Speech	<i>Keum-soon Lee</i>	Korea	Assistant Minister of Unification Education, Ministry of Unification
Welcoming Speech	<i>Hyun-seok Yu</i>	Korea	President, The Korea Foundation
09:20-09:50	<b>Keynote Speech: Unification Diplomacy and International Cooperation</b>		
	<i>Yong-woo Kwon</i>	Korea	Director-General, Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
09:50-10:10	<b>Break</b>		
10:10-12:40	<b>Session 1 Unification Diplomacy and Northeast Asian Peace Cooperation</b>		
Moderator	<i>Sang-hyun Lee</i>	Korea	Director of Research Planning, Sejong Institute
Presenters	<i>Shin-wha Lee</i>	Korea	Professor, Korea University
	<i>Ji Eun Baik</i>	USA	Research Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School
	<i>James Burt</i>	UK	Research and Policy Officer, European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea
Discussants	<i>Naoko Kumagai</i>	Japan	Associate Professor, International University of Japan
	<i>Marina Kukla</i>	Russia	Assistant Professor, Far Eastern Federal University
	<i>Yun Young Cho</i>	Korea	Professor, Chung-Ang University
	<i>Chad O'Carroll</i>	USA	Chief Correspondent, NK News
	<i>Tingting Li</i>	China	Assistant Professor, Peking University
	<i>Sebastian Roesner</i>	Germany	Vice Director, Point Alpha Foundation
	<i>Leonie Allard</i>	France	Junior Fellow, Asian Center
	<i>Rhodora M. Joaquin</i>	Philippines	Research Specialist Supervisor, Center for Int'l Relations and Strategic Studies
12:40-14:00	<b>Lunch</b>		
14:10-16:40	<b>Session 2 International Cooperation for the Korean Unification</b>		
Moderator	<i>Kang Choi</i>	Korea	Vice President, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Presenters	<i>Jihwan Hwang</i>	Korea	Professor, University of Seoul
	<i>Daniel Wertz</i>	USA	Program Officer, National Committee on North Korea
	<i>Cordula Von Denkowski</i>	Germany	Professor, Hochschule Hannover University
Discussants	<i>Nicolas Levi</i>	Poland	Adjunct Professor, Polish Academy of Science
	<i>Ranjit Kumar Dhawan</i>	India	Ph.D. Candidate, Jawaharlal Nehru University
	<i>Byeong Ro Kim</i>	Korea	Associate Professor, Seoul National University
	<i>Haohao Ye</i>	China	Ph.D. Candidate, Sun Yat-sen University
	<i>Tamaoki Kohei</i>	Japan	Diplomat, Embassy of Japan in Korea
	<i>Kristina Voda</i>	Russia	Junior Research Associate, Institute of World Economy and International Relations
	<i>Marco Milani</i>	Italy	Ph.D. Candidate, Cagliari University
	<i>Ngugen Tien Cuong</i>	Vietnam	Deputy Head, Foreign Service Training Center, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
16:40-17:10	<b>Discussion Summary</b>		
17:10-18:10	<b>Session 3 Dialogue with Journalists on North Korea</b>		
Moderator	<i>Kwang-joo Sohn</i>	Korea	Chairman, Korea Unification Institute, Daily NK
Presenters	<i>Seon-Young Choi</i>	Korea	Senior Editor, North Korea Desk, Yonhap News
	<i>Seongha Joo</i>	Korea	Reporter, Dong-a Ilbo
18:30-20:00	<b>Dinner</b>		

### 3. List of Participants (Alphabetical order by country and surname)

	<b>Tingting Li (China)</b> Assistant Professor Dept. of Korean Studies Peking University		<b>Haohao Ye (China)</b> Ph.D. Candidate School of Asia-Pacific Studies Sun Yat-sen University
	<b>Leonie Allard (France)</b> Junior Fellow Korean Studies Asian Center		<b>Cordula Von Denkowski (Germany)</b> Professor Social Welfare and Health Care Hochshule Hannover University
	<b>Sebastian Roesner (Germany)</b> Vice Director Point Alpha Foundation		<b>Ranjit Kumar Dhawan (India)</b> Ph.D. Candidate Korean Studies Division Jawaharlal Nehru University
	<b>Marco Milani (Italy)</b> Ph.D. Candidate Social and Institutions Sciences Cagliari University		<b>Naoko Kumagai (Japan)</b> Associate Professor International Relations International University of Japan
	<b>Kohei Tamaoki (Japan)</b> Probationary Diplomat Embassy of Japan in Korea		<b>Yun Young Cho (Korea)</b> Professor Chung-Ang University
	<b>Kang Choi (Korea)</b> Vice President Asan Institute for Policy Studies		<b>Seon-Young Choi (Korea)</b> Senior Editor North Korea Desk Yonhap News

2015 Korean Unification for Junior International Experts Program



**Jiwhan Hwang (Korea)**

Professor  
International Relations  
University of Seoul



**Seong Ha Joo (Korea)**

Reporter  
Dong-a Ilbo



**Yong-woo Kwon (Korea)**

Director-General  
Korean Peninsula Peace  
Regime Bureau  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs



**Byeong Ro Kim (Korea)**

Associate Professor  
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**Keum-soon Lee (Korea)**

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Ministry of Unification



**Sang-hyun Lee (Korea)**

Director of Research Planning  
Sejong Institute



**Shin-wha Lee (Korea)**

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**Kwang-joo Sohn (Korea)**

President  
Korea Unification Institute  
Daily NK



**Hyun-seok Yu (Korea)**

President  
Korea Foundation



**Rhodora M. Joaquin  
(Philippines)**

Research Specialist Supervisor  
Center for Int'l Relations and  
Strategic Studies  
Dept. of Foreign Affairs



**Nicolas Levi (Poland)**

Adjunct Professor  
Polish Academy of Sciences



**Marina Kukla (Russia)**

Assistant Professor  
Korean Studies  
Far Eastern Federal University



**Kristina Voda (Russia)**

Junior Research Associate  
Center for Asia-Pacific Studies  
Institute of World Economy  
and International Relations



**James Burt (UK)**

Research and Policy Officer  
European Alliance for Human  
Rights in North Korea



**Ji Eun Baek (USA)**

Research Fellow  
Belfer Center  
Harvard Kennedy School



**Chad O'Carroll (USA)**

Chief Correspondent  
NK News



**Daniel Wertz (USA)**


Program Officer  
National Committee on North  
Korea



**Nguyen Tien Cuong  
(Vietnam)**

Deputy Head  
Foreign Service Training Center  
Diplomatic Academy of Viet-  
nam





## **4. Presentation Materials: Session 1**

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**Unification Diplomacy and  
Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation**



## **Shin-wha Lee**

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**Regional Security Dynamics and  
Challenges in Northeast Asia: Implications  
for East Asian Community Building  
and Korean Unification Diplomacy**

*(Session on East Asian Peace Cooperation and Unification Diplomacy)*

## **Regional Security Dynamics and Challenges in Northeast Asia: Implications for East Asian Community Building and Korean Unification Diplomacy**

Shin-wha Lee

Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University

### **I. International Relations of Northeast Asia Today: “*Two contradictory faces*”**

- 1) Integration** – expanding economic interdependence, cultural communication (e.g. people-to-people contact, Korean wave, tourism), common threats (e.g. climate change, cross-border pollution, communicable disease, transnational crimes)
  
- 2) Disintegration** – rising nationalism, territorial claims and conflicts, historical animosity, uneven and shifting power structure of the region, populism and domestic politics


#### **Hopeful Explanations:**

- Economic Integration, Increasing trade volume
- Greater role of the civil society (people-to-people contact)
- Expansion of Cultural, tourist and other social exchanges
- Increasing Awareness and Efforts for East Asian Regional community building

#### **Frustrating Explanations:**

- Increasing Military build-up in the Region
- Clear and present (immediate) concern – North Korea (nuclear development program, WMD, proliferation concerns)
- History, ideology, and nationalism still matter a lot: Lack of reconciliation between Japan and other Asian neighbors; Ideological confrontation (both at the inter-state and intra-state levels)
- Political transition, populism, historical revisionism, weak leadership

- North Korean questions: traditional challenges (e.g. nuclear arsenals, WMD and biochemical weapons, military provocation), non-traditional challenges (e.g. NK refugees, food and economic crisis)
- Great Power rivalries, nostalgia for empire among big powers






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### 3) Changing Power Shift and Regional Order

1. "East Asian Miracle" first coined by the World Bank in 1993
  - East Asia as a group based on its economic performance
  - more fundamental factors to define East Asia as a region and regional people?
2. Rise of China (Economic, Military rise vs. the U.S.)
  - Chinese military build-ups
  - TPP vs. RCEP
3. US "Return to Asia" (November 2011) – "Pivot" or "Rebalancing"
  - Shale Revolution, the US power, and the regional implications
4. Japanese Desire to become a "normal state" & "right-wing" moves
  - ("Japan is not turning to the right. We will continue to go on straight").
  - Japan-China Tensions: history, territories and regional hegemony
  - Korea-Japan Tensions: history, textbook, comfort women, territories
  - Korea-China relations in "strategic convenience" (?)
5. Russia's "Return to Asia" (Putin's grand plan for Asia)
  - Russia-Japan Relations over the Northern Territories
  - US-Russia Tensions over the Ukraine Crisis and its regional ramifications


6. ICT Revolution - SNS, Telecommunication
7. Power Shift through leadership change and Fragile and instable Political Leadership (Domestic Politics, public opinion – complex 'intermestic politics')
8. Korea's position in changing US-China relations (in 2<sup>nd</sup> Obama term and the Xiziping era)
9. North Korea-China relations strained?
10. North Korea flirting with Russia? (re-igniting ties b/w NK and Russia)

## II. Public Attitudes Toward Each Other (S.Korea, Japan, China)



\*Source: HAN Sung-Joo, International Policy Studies Institute, IHJ presentation, October 2012.

Great Powers' Perception of China Replacing the United States (Pew Global Survey July 13, 2011)



Note: Scale: from 0 to 10 0: don't like at all, 10: very much interested in it or like it a lot  
 The list of countries from the top: US, China, Japan, and North Korea (in order)

Source: Asan Policy Institute, The Asan Public Opinion Brief, <http://asaninst.org/contents/14%eb%85%84-7%ec%9b%94-%ea%b5%ad%ea%b0%80-%ed%98%b8%ea%b0%90%eb%8f%84/>

## Emerging Security Issues

### 1) Changing Security Dynamics?

- Rising China – possible conflict b/w US-China or b/w China-Japan
- Normalizing Japan – suspicion and concern among neighbors
- *Politics Matters at Economy.*

(unit: 100 million Yuan)

	China-Japan Trade		Korea-China Trade	
2011	3428.9	(15.1%)	2456.3	(18.6%)
2012	3249.5	(-3.9%)	2563.3	(4.4%)
2013	3125.5	(-5.1%)	2742.5	(7.0%)

Korea-China-Japan Export Intensity Index

Exporter	Korea		China		Japan		Intra-region
Importer	China	Japan	Japan	Korea	China	Korea	
2003	3.30	3.75	2.59	1.87	2.17	3.03	1.60
2004	3.22	3.51	2.42	1.86	2.10	3.13	1.61
2005	3.46	3.39	2.17	1.79	2.09	3.08	1.57
2006	3.25	3.18	1.90	1.72	2.14	2.97	1.52
2007	3.20	2.76	1.80	1.72	2.19	2.91	1.43
2008	3.05	2.45	1.64	1.83	2.22	2.75	1.38
2009	2.87	2.24	1.73	1.62	2.29	3.06	1.33
2010	2.66	2.10	1.53	1.43	2.04	2.78	1.31
2011	2.45	2.40	1.51	1.38	1.98	2.68	1.18
2012	2.41	2.43	1.39	1.37	1.75	2.60	1.13
2013	2.43	2.18	1.36	1.34	1.66	2.74	0.99

Korea-China-Japan Import Intensity Index

Importer	Korea		China		Japan		Intra-region
Exporter	China	Japan	Japan	Korea	China	Korea	
2003	2.05	3.15	2.69	3.80	3.17	1.69	1.88
2004	1.97	3.22	2.53	3.72	2.99	1.63	1.81
2005	1.96	3.15	2.47	3.93	2.71	1.63	1.75
2006	1.89	3.03	2.50	3.84	2.40	1.65	1.67
2007	1.96	2.98	2.48	3.69	2.22	1.55	1.59
2008	1.93	2.80	2.49	3.40	2.01	1.38	1.50
2009	1.67	3.16	2.50	3.06	2.17	1.26	1.47
2010	1.54	2.83	2.19	2.81	1.98	1.24	1.33
2011	1.50	2.73	2.16	2.63	1.93	1.41	1.28
2012	1.31	2.68	1.93	2.63	1.77	1.42	1.17
2013	1.29	2.88	1.87	2.69	1.72	1.35	1.12

Source: Data calculated based on trade statistics of three countries. 2014 Trilateral Economic Report, pp. 38-39.

- "Concert of Power" among rising three big power (China, India and Japan)
  - role/task of Korea, ASEAN, middle powers – how to compete w/China and India's economic dynamism
- Emergence of multiple transnational challenges – some new, some old (WMD, terrorism, civil wars, local conflicts, energy, food, health care, failed states, famines, economic collapse etc): greater regional and international cooperation
- Maritime Power (Southern Triangle) vs. Continental Power (Northern Triangle)?

## 2) Security Implications of Emergent Regionalism in East Asia (and NEA)

- Regional cooperation (East Asian Community) without the United States?
  - The US has enduring interests in East Asia as a resident power: continuing engagement with the region: NEA states prefer US presence in the region as a balancer.
- US Involvement: A Network of Bilateral Alliances: "Return to Asia" strategy
- A Maritime coalition called "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" (Aso Taro)

### III. A quest for Scenarios

#### 1) Order led by the US and Supported by the Democratic Coalition

- Traditional security structure centered on bilateral alliance with the US remains as a frame of regional relations with continuing hegemony of the US in the region
- Coalition or network of liberal democratic states supports US led order

#### 2) Continental Powers (China and Russia) Acquiring Hegemony and Formation of New Bipolarity

- China's rise in economic, military and diplomatic arenas increasing its influence in the region while the US' position becoming relatively weakened
- China, Russia and North Korea forms close political and economic ties to stand against the US.
- SCO (with Russia and Central Asian countries – NATO of the East?)

#### 3) China-Russia Coalition and Loose Tripolar Structure

- China and Russia forms strategic partnership while aligning with India and Iran to counter US hegemony
- China-Russia relation is not solidified as an alliance, and thus a loose tripolar structure is created among the US, China and Russia

#### 4) No Man's Land

- No singular country acquires hegemony in the region

- While regional states cannot create ties among themselves, competition and the possibility of conflict increase

#### IV. **Regional Community Building: Progress and Limits**

- 1) ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1967 August  
Philippine, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand  
Brunei (1984)  
Vietnam (1995) Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia
- 2) ASEAN+3 (China, Korea, Japan) 1997 December
- 3) EAS (East Asia Summit) ASEAN+3+3(Australia, New Zealand, India)  
December 2005
- 4) ASEAN+3+3+2(US, Russia) - The summit members grew 16 to 18 states with  
the joining of the US and Russia in November 2011
- 5) Korea-Japan-China Trilateral Summit 2008 December
  - No summit held from 2013 due to bilateral tensions between China-Japan  
and Korea-Japan, respectively
- 6) APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) 1989 January
- 7) ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), 1996 March

#### Limitations:

- Controversies over Regional Identity: Definition of East Asia: Is it Asia-Pacific or  
specified to East Asia as a geographical region?
- Historical Legacy & Territorial Disputes
- Priority of Bilateral Relations with the US
  - Foreign policies of the NEA states based on bilateral relations with the US –  
(greater confidence toward the US in security matters)
- Lack of experience in regional multilateral cooperation
- Low Level of Political Will and Public Awareness concerning Regional Multilateral  
Security Cooperation
- Limitations of “Functionalist” Approach
  - Confidence building measures in a “more traditional” political and military sector:  
political leaders with strong commitment for political breakthrough.

V. **Implications**

- 1) Primary Task: how to maintain peace, stability and economic dynamism  
(+ new security threats including climate change and disease)
- 2) Rise of China (and Rise of India) – East Asia's big challenge  
-> a Regional institution can manage 3 big powers? China, Japan, India?  
-> regional building w/o the US feasible?
- 3) NEA views on Asian regionalism
  - Expectations of a power shift to China, but greater trust in the US (CSIA Survey 2009)
  - Broad support for an "EA Community," but greater confidence in bilateral alliance and global institutions than in regional ones.
  - no consensus on membership ("different dream")
- 4) Perspectives for multilateral Cooperation in NEA – not bright
  - contradiction between states too deep
  - bilateral military alliance too strong
  - field for common political interaction too narrow
  - NK nuclear threat as a common concern but with different priorities
- 5) limits in applying the EU-like functionalist approach in NEA.
  - : the difficulty of enhancing integration through cooperation in areas of *low politics* eventually leading to cooperation on issues of *high politics*.
  - : EU break-up? Role model for East Asia?
- 6) NEA multilateralism/regionalism *ON the Table Menu* in foreign policy of NEA states ("*community of Destiny*") →
  - "Minilateralism" – a form of multilateralism with a smaller scale of groups dealing with specific issues or objectives
  - "bi-multilateral" cooperative structure (Robert Scalapino's concentric arc theory)

**Suggestions:**

- 1) Need Consensus on what to do with ASEAN+3 (APT) and EAS
  - APT integrating into EAS or a division of labor b/w two (e.g. functional EAS ; strategic EAS)
- 2) Need clarification about NEA-specific regional institution (e.g. NEA)
  - NEA institution as a sub-organization under ASEAN+3 or as an independent institution

(then what relations with ASEAN+3?; NEA summit w/o North Korea?)

- 3) Develop complementary strategies for renovating regional overarching architecture
  - facilitate emerging ones e.g. i) China-Korea-Japan summit; ii) NEA strategic dialogue of NEA + US, Russia, India, Australia; iii) APT – Europe functional cooperative network)
  - consolidate existing EA regional organizations (APT, EAS) with emerging ones
- 4) Regional Cooperation beyond functional cooperation
  - Strategic dialogue (e.g. NK contingency plan; Human Security Dialogue)
  - role of the Epistemic Community at the regional level (identifying common agenda/view; enlightening the public)

## VI. Korean Reunification Diplomacy

Portions drawn from Shin-wha Lee, *South Korea's Search for a New Diplomatic Strategy Toward North Korea: Trustpolitik as a Goldilocks Approach?* (Washington DC: KEI 2014)

- With the North Korean nuclear threat still lingering, the international community's decades-long effort to bring about peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was in vain. Although there were only a few optimistic moments for establishing a peace regime on the peninsula, no such mechanism has been created thus far. The Six-Party Talks' last push for a permanent peace regime in late 2007, which was facilitated by the September 19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Joint Agreement, was as close as we could come. Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy of engagement, Roh Moo-hyun's unreserved outreach to North Korea, and Lee Myung-bak's stern response to the North's nuclear program and provocations all failed to induce changes in North Korea. There seems to be no escape from the treacherous repetitive patterns in dealing with North Korea. This is the sobering legacy that Park Geun-hye inherited from her predecessors.
- Inter-Korean relations have long been a seesaw, with North Korea's repetitive cycle of provocations followed by weak international sanctions and its conciliatory initiatives that often ended abruptly with little progress.
- Despite the strained relationship with North Korea during the first months after her inauguration, Park pursued the "Hanbando shinroe" (Korean peninsula trust-building) process, putting emphasis on the importance of maintaining dialogue, honoring every promise that has already been made, and abiding by international norms. "Trustpolitik" is known to be an expression of Park's philosophy based on historical experience that sustainable cooperation among states requires both trust and awareness of the realities

of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. In addition, the “Dongbuka pyonghwa gusang” (Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative: NAPCI) was proposed as a roadmap to carry out trustpolitik at the regional level and shift from current mistrust and rivalry driven by an “Asian Paradox” (strengthening economic interdependence in Northeast Asia, which is offset by an escalation in territorial and historical disputes) into a new structure of trust-based cooperation and sustainable peace in the region. The Park administration has emphasized the difference between NAPCI and previous Northeast Asia initiatives that were proposed since President Roh Tae-woo in the late 1980s, stating that NAPCI intends to promote a culture of regional cooperation through building trust and aims to accumulate habits and practices of dialogue and cooperation starting with soft security issues.

- Park's approach has induced no real change in *de facto* nuclear North Korea.
- North Korea seems to pursue the strategy of “tongnam tongmi” (setting up relations with the United States through enhancing its relationship with South Korea) instead of the long-held strategy of “tongmi bongnam” (Trying to set up relations with the United States while insulting and refusing a relationship with South Korea).

### **Trustpolitik as a Workable Goldilocks Strategy: What Should Be Done?**

- Through the catchword *trustpolitik*, Park has repeatedly expressed her genuine desire and willingness to engage in the “Peace Process” for improving inter-Korean affairs. This process is an operable manifestation of *trustpolitik*, which underscores South Korea's proactive diplomatic initiatives to create favorable external conditions as a crucial prerequisite. Therefore, *trustpolitik* can be both a means to achieve peace and security on the peninsula and an end goal to be fulfilled by the Peace Process. The Park administration also claims that whereas the policies of past governments have gone from one extreme to another, her strategy is a policy of alignment, i.e., neither a coercive policy nor an appeasement policy, but rather an effective and balanced combination of contending or competing policy options, such as inter-Korean and foreign relations, pressure and dialogue, and deterrence and co-operation, while separating humanitarian issues from those related to politics and security.
- With the possibility of increasing uncertainty and unrest in North Korea in recent months, questions have been raised about South Korea's preparedness for contingency scenarios that could include regime change. Given geostrategic circumstances surrounding the peninsula and the unique resilience of the North Korean leadership, a sudden collapse is unlikely in the foreseeable future. During her New Year press conference on January 6, 2014, Park mentioned “tongil daebak” (unification being the jackpot), which generated a

hot debate over whether unification would be a jackpot or crackpot. Due to the enormous economic burden “tongil biyong” (unification costs), a growing number of South Koreans have begun to consider this long-desired prospect as not only improbable, but also undesirable. Others claim that ‘bundan biyong’ (division costs) are equally exorbitant, if not greater, because North Korea’s perilous and unpredictable actions have often generated a “Korea discount” in the global market and South Korea’s overall image in the international community. Ordinary South Korean citizens also do not wish to tolerate any longer the insecure or uncertain environment on the peninsula arising from the North’s provocations.

- Considering that the ultimate objective of Park’s Peace Process and *trustpolitik* is peaceful unification that would be ‘daebak’ not only for the Koreas but for all of Northeast Asia, there is reason to pursue new approaches to North Korea. First, the South’s strategic communications and policy coordination with the United States and China are important to prepare for possible scenarios on the Korean Peninsula. For this, information sharing with these states and international consensus on handling unstable situations are desirable, deepening the ‘2+2’ information-sharing formula between South Korea and U.S. diplomatic and military authorities and more actively consulting with the epistemic community at the regional level in analyzing North Korea’s power restructuring trends and developing indicators for measuring its instability would be instrumental.
- Second, independent of North Korea’s nuclear crisis, its human rights problems and humanitarian crisis such as food shortages, political prisoner camps, and refugee issues should be continually addressed on the international stage (*Note that UN COI report was published in 2014*). The Park administration needs to develop strategies for how to take full advantage of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, the United Nation’s Human Rights resolution targeting the North Korean regime, and other international human rights NGO activities. Third, the administration should seek ways to effectively build an international consensus for the eventual unification of the two Koreas. Employing various Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 2 approaches is necessary, although, using direct government channels with China requires caution. During 2013, Park had a total of 27 summit meetings, including the ones with four great powers, and foreign ministers’ meetings were more frequent. It is important to develop follow-up measures based on Park’s linkage of *trustpolitik* and the Peace Process to NAPCI.
- What I call Park’s “middle of the road policy,” which is similar to Obama’s Goldilocks approach, needs to be reconsidered for its effectiveness. If Park’s North Korean policy takes the safe road of not rocking the boat, she is subject to criticism, as Obama is, of being too wary and ineffectual in forging a breakthrough for rocky inter-Korean relations. A step-by-step approach towards developing the Goldilocks diplomatic strategy in the

short and long-term should be clearly presented. The short-term should be a stepping-stone approach. In retrospect, there has been a plethora of ambitious and grandiose rhetoric in dealing with the North Korean problems. To be fair, previous administrations in South Korea and the United States alike made considerable efforts to bring about the denuclearization of North Korea. However, with a lack of clear understanding about the desirable end state on the Korean peninsula and the methodology to arrive there, they hastily attempted a variety of "comprehensive solutions." For instance, the George W. Bush administration proclaimed it was ready to take a "bold approach" to meet what it considered to be Pyongyang's needs, including negative security assurance and economic incentives in exchange for North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons programs in a comprehensive fashion. As such, the policy makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington had come up with their own versions of policy initiatives which varied in name but were not-so-different in essence: a "package deal."

- Roh Moo-hyun's "Peace Regime" and Bush's 'complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization' (CVID) are the most well-known examples. Though the merits of such deals should not to be ignored, North Korea's notorious "salami tactics" proved to be particularly tricky to overcome. The Lee government's "Vision 3000" was not so different in this regard. When the decades-long effort turned out to be a series of failures, it was clear to everyone that a major paradigm shift or a "game changer" in dealing with the North was absolutely necessary. Park's *trustpolitik* should avoid these past patterns.
- Longer term planning should be related to preparation for unification. Diplomatic efforts should be centered on building and strengthening an international consensus for this. In this process, North Korean refugees and humanitarian issues should not be put aside. South Korean decision makers may have to reconsider their previous "low profile" approaches to these issues.
- In addition, South Korea can take valuable lessons from German unification, where the East German government did not merely change, it collapsed completely from within. Purely in order to ease the suffering of partition, the two sides negotiated with one another. Yet, they did not cooperate with one another, though the West was a dialogue partner for the East.
- Similarly, as reconciliation with the North Korean dictatorship proceeds, a regime that gravely represses its people must not be a collaborative partner. It should be remembered that a national coalition cannot be formed between a free market system and a dictatorship that, at least on the outside, calls itself socialist. A unification strategy must be formed from this perspective. In educating young South Koreans about unification, the Park administration must rightfully acknowledge that the regime of Kim

Jong-un does not represent the will of the North Korean people. They are taking the people hostage, and are not to be viewed as a party for cooperation. In this way, the next generation will take an interest in North Korean human rights and democratization.

- Nearly all previous efforts to reach an agreement with North Korea have failed to achieve meaningful accomplishments because Seoul had adhered to a negotiating principle of reaching a collective, comprehensive, and grand bargain, which was countered by North Korea's "salami tactics" and other precarious strategies to stall progress.
- Learning from these past experiences, it is therefore better to strive for small but meaningful results in the short-term, while also building on these achievements to move forward towards the ultimate goal in the mid to long-term, in order to cultivate an environment for unification, Seoul needs to concentrate on cooperating with the international community and building global consensus and support for unification, while simultaneously dealing with issues in North Korea, not only traditional military issues but also human rights and humanitarian assistance.

**Ji Eun Baek**

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**How Information  
Fracking can Open up North Korea**

**Republic of Korea's Ministry of Unification**

**July 8, 2015**

**Korean Unification for Junior International Experts**

**“How Information Fracking can Open up North Korea”**

**by: Jieun Baek**

**Central Argument:** In order to achieve long-term regional peace and sustainable unification of the two Koreas, North Korea needs to fundamentally change. Sending outside information and media into North Korea is a good option to create conditions for the regime to consider incremental political changes.

**What is information fracking?**

It's simply a term that Professor Graham Allison and I came up with when thinking through this issue for the past few years. The fracking revolution in the energy field could point the way to a new and successful strategy when it comes to North Korea. Hydraulic fracking, as you know, combines advanced technology and clever tactics to liberate large reserves of oil and gas within rocks previously beyond the reach of man. This occurs by using pressurized bursts of water, chemicals and rocks to penetrate deep rock formations. Once sufficient pressure pierces through the hard surfaces, gases start seeping out.

The big idea here is, the U.S. government and other actors, such as civil society groups, dissidents, and private companies, must mobilize an *analogous* mix of knowledge, innovation, and radical techniques to “frack” North Korea with pressurized bursts of foreign information and democratic ideas. In return, pressure for change may start seeping out through the cracks of the regime, *so much so* that Kim Jong Un will not be able to merely ignore or eliminate them.

**Why?**

The “North Korea Problem” is a hodgepodge of *enormous* issues. Obviously, there's the nuclear weapons threat. The *egregious* human rights violations. There's a stunted population due to chronic malnutrition. And so much more. North Korea's intractable leadership, their *reliable reneging* from international treaties, and a seemingly bizarre yet hyper-rational foreign policy has led to *displeased* policy makers and negotiators. The “North Korea Problem” has both frustrated and intrigued the international community, giving rise to a cottage industry for media and news stories that showcase and often exaggerate the spectacularly violent nature of executions, and victimize the entire population as brainwashed Communists without any agency or entrepreneurial survival skills. The collective exasperation among practitioners and North Korea watchers have inadvertently led to somewhat of a normalization of North Korea's unacceptable behavior.

They have become more immune to punishment for its bad behavior than any other sovereign state. They shoot missiles. They make bombastic nuclear threats. They *test* nuclear weapons. They call our President, President Barack Obama, and other world leaders sexist and racist names that even children don't say in the schoolyard. They use hostages as a microphone to make demands. They clearly do not play well with others in the international arena. They have hacked South Korea's banking and other governmental computer systems. They most likely hacked into Sony. Such recent events underscore the fact that North Korea is collecting more offensive capabilities.

As the novelty of such behavior has worn off, however, North Korea's domestic and international policies and actions have become almost white noise in our day-to-day affairs.

Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 2 diplomacy ought to continue, along with targeted sanctions that aim to squeeze certain revenue streams into Kim Jong Un's coffers. But these decades-old measures *alone* are not going to create much damage to Kim's hardened regime. Despite China's growing displeasure with Kim's government, a collapsed North Korea is the worst among bad options for China. North Korea will leverage this fact and continue to lean on its biggest trade partner for the foreseeable future, however *irritated* China may be.

*Therefore*, it is time to add a new strategy to the policy mix towards North Korea.

The US government, and other interested states, as well as an assortment of civic organizations, North Korean defectors, tech and business people can collectively marshal resources to sponsor information campaigns to create and sustain pressures for North Korea to reevaluate its foreign and domestic interests and priorities.

### **How do we send information in?**

This is the fun part. I've been studying and speaking with all sorts of people involved in psychological warfare and non-violent resistance movements from different countries to inform my thoughts and ideas about how information could get in.

The good news is, information is, and *has been*, getting into North Korea for 20 years or so. Dissident groups, with the help of others, have been sending in media we all know about – South Korean soap operas and American TV shows and movies on DVDs, then CDs, then USBs, and micro SD chips. Novels, political articles, self-help books, pornographic movies, and even a few Bibles have been snuck in through a profit-driven and sometimes *compassion*-driven network of defectors, activists, religious groups, Chinese middlemen, and Chosun-jok businesses. Radio stations run by former North Koreans, and others paid for by the South Korean, British, and American governments all help to disseminate information in a piece-meal fashion.

Anecdotes illuminate the phenomenon that outside information, coupled with the widespread dependence on the black market and grey economy, has led to a younger generation of more

savvy, risk-taking, independent, skeptical North Koreans who crave to know more about what they *don't* know. Mr. Kretchun's widely cited intermedia report details some of these social domestic changes *sparked* by outside information.

*But* there is *so much more* to do. Although information fracking does not promise rapid changes in North Korea, it *does* offer the best prospect for creating conditions for the government to consider incremental political changes. The more informed its citizens are, the less North Korea's leadership will be able to eliminate all the "bad seeds" in society by relegating alleged criminals and their relatives to political prison camps or worse. Individual self-determination and access to information are two properties that Pyongyang fears most for its citizens to possess.

Empowering individuals with independent sources of information is a way to transform the political system without resorting to drastic regime change. Therefore, the U.S. government and other interested parties should pursue three strategies to promote information fracking if its operational objective is to force North Korea to reappraise its own interests. Success requires enlisting a broad range of stakeholders as part of its three-pronged strategy:

**1. Strengthen covert operations to break into North Korea's information channels and support internal dissidents.**

One tactic could be to collaborate with dissidents and their contacts inside Pyongyang to infiltrate the regime's propaganda machines. Rodong Sin-min, domestic cellphone network, and the state's intranet called Kwang-Myung could all be targets. Another tactic is more subtle and sophisticated, which is to cultivate and empower delicate actions of self-determination.

The key to creating domestic pressure on the regime will be to develop a critical mass of people who refuse to cooperate with the government's oppressive measures, despite expected punishment. A "North Korean Spring" or "Pyongyang Square" demonstrations are unlikely to take place any time soon. However, quietly turning citizens away from their government's propaganda machine by opening their minds to the rest of the world could encourage self-rule. The sky's the limit when it comes to crafting the creative content to deliver on these tactics. Using the non-physical dimension that the regime does not have monopoly over is one idea, such as spreading stories, songs, jokes, and fables by word-of-mouth. Also, funding projects that build horizontal social relationships centered on non-political issues is important, because these social relationships can be later primed for collective action.

**2. Increase funding for NGOs in the U.S. and South Korea to transmit outside media into North Korea.**

Strengthening NGO capabilities to disseminate information is essential, especially those run by former North Koreans. Also, just like how tech companies invest money in testing and iterating on products to come up with better versions of the iPhone, Chromebook, and a driver-less car,

money should be put into a “slush fund” to test projects to touch as many people as possible with information.

### **3. Bolster training for North Korean defectors in journalism, IT, and social media.**

North Korean defectors are the primary liaisons between North Korea and the outside world. Saving North Koreans not *only* advances human rights, but *also* bolsters national security. Refugees are North Korea’s Achilles’ heel because they undermine the country’s most prized asset for maintaining its *power*: secrecy. By investing in this unique human capital, we can provide their networks of people who remain inside with information that can be used to ultimately weaken the regime.

#### **Funds / Operationalize**

The US State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has funded *some* of such projects, and I hope they continue to do so. Surprisingly, I have come across many private wealthy individuals who want to invest their own capital into information dissemination initiatives. *This is good news*. Think about the possibility of wealthy private individuals in New York funding North Korean defectors in South Korea with their projects conjured up by tech geniuses in Silicon Valley with the political support of policy makers in DC to collectively tackle a decades-old problem of a hardened North Korea? *It’s a phenomenal synergy among practitioners and scholars to jointly address a foreign policy problem*.

I am certain that funding for these ideas exist. If not public, then private funding. The *demand* for the information inside North Korea exists. Ordinary people are risking their lives to satiate their curiosity of the world outside their country’s borders. And the political support from DC and its partners can certainly help to put firepower behind information fracking.

#### **Monitoring, Evaluation, Performance Tracking**

In addition to funding, another thing that is needed to effectively disseminate information is performance tracking, monitoring, and evaluation. The number of USBs and SD chips being pushed *into* North Korea is not that important. Rather, we need to measure the impact that it’s having on citizens. Surveys among defectors and *Joseonjok* people in China exist, but this is a very self-selecting group of people. Of course this is a difficult endeavor, but one worth pursuing. We could perhaps address this in the Q&A or later on.

#### **Conclusion**

These ideas and policy recommendations are not ground breaking, and would be considered quite *ordinary* if the target country were any country other than North Korea. Access to information for a 24-million strong population in this digital age of instant communication and information sharing should be considered an *obvious* provision by the international community.

It is time to test a new policy towards North Korea. If implemented, the three recommended strategies could successfully create *unprecedented* tension inside North Korea and force the Kim regime to re-evaluate its domestic and foreign priorities. Hopefully, this could lead to a brighter future for North Korea and peace for its neighbors in Northeast Asia.

Thank you

**James Burt**

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**Unification Diplomacy and  
Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation:  
What Role for Europe?**

## **Unification Diplomacy and Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation: What Role for Europe?**

Is the unification of the Korean peninsula solely an issue for the Republic of Korea and the North Korean people? Or does unification call upon the inputs of regional and global state and non-state actors? This question does not yield an easy answer. Many aspects of unification will be for the Korean peoples to consider and decide upon, but other aspects will undoubtedly call for the international community's involvement.

In my role within a European organisation that looks to North Korean human rights, I would argue that the area of substantive human rights, transitional justice, and accountability calls for international action. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is the world's worst human rights violator and for decades the North Korean leadership has conducted a targeted, brutal, and widespread campaign to disenfranchise and suppress its citizenry, leading to the deaths of millions. Despite sporadic international pressure, the DPRK has remained largely unmoved by the international community's traditional diplomatic tools of coercion and deterrence, allowing a human rights crisis, which has been described as "unparalleled" in the modern era, to persist on the Korean peninsula to this day.

Since the release of the report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the DPRK (COI) in February 2014, the international community has been aware that mass exterminations, vast prison camp networks, forcible starvation, systematic rape, and the abuse of children are established tools of DPRK state policy. Crimes against humanity — an area that demands the international community take action — have undoubtedly been committed.

Today, the question for concerned states is: How can the international community act to improve human rights conditions in North Korea? Tomorrow, and come unification, the question will be: How can the international community integrate justice, human rights, and accountability into a political process that allows for the voices of the Korean victims to be heard? This is as fundamental a question for the South Korean government as it is for the international community.

Although it is important to look to the future, we, and Europe, must also look to the present and consider how Northeast Asian cooperation can aid future justice for North Koreans. To answer this question, the COI provided a recommendation — 1225 H — which called upon

states to “form a human rights contact group to raise concerns about the situation of human rights in the [DPRK] and to provide support for initiatives to improve the situation”.

In proposing this multilateral and largely regional security mechanism for North Korean human rights, I believe that the COI has placed human security squarely within the discourse of Korean unification.

At the outset of this initiative, we must be aware of Northeast Asia’s complex regional environment that has been largely unsympathetic to the introduction of human security alongside more traditional security concerns. Couched within the ‘Asian Values’ debate of the 1990s, which held that the region’s socio-economic development justified a focus on collective, rather than individual, rights, Northeast Asia’s security discourse was initially vocal in its opposition to human security as a foundation for national and regional peace.

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev’s All-Asia Security Conference in 1986, regional states invested significant resources in multilateral security cooperation initiatives — such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, the Shangri-La Dialogue, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — but all have taken place against a backdrop of historical enmities, ongoing territorial disputes, and a preference for soft-security and economic integration over the well-being of the individual.

But as the global discourse on human security has evolved, so too has its relevance for governments in North East Asia. In 2013, Park Geun-hye, President of South Korea, initiated the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative — a regionalisation of Park’s *trustpolitik* concept. Though yet to bear fruit, this is significant for its placement of non-traditional security as a keystone for regional security.

Like all normative shifts in international relations, the tide will turn slowly for human security in North East Asia. Park’s acknowledgement of a “disconnect between growing economic interdependence on the one hand, and backward political, security cooperation on the other”, which she termed “Asia’s paradox”, is no guarantee that states will accept the right of the individual alongside the right of the nation-state. Yet the presence of a regional contact group will undoubtedly augment a growing awareness that non-traditional security concerns will become vital to regional stability and central to Korean unification.

How can Europe play a part in this regional contact group? Speaking in February 2015 on the possibility of a North Korean human rights contact group, Michael Kirby, Chair of the COI,

asked “who could launch such an initiative?” It is my contention that the European Union could mediate and lead this a North Korea human rights contact group.

The EU has played a key role in bringing the abuses of the DPRK government to the attention of the international community. Whereas regional states, such as China, South Korea and the United States, have been protagonists in the region’s traditional security mechanisms — such as the Six Party Talks and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization — the EU has taken the lead in non-traditional security. A co-sponsor of resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly and a candid critic of the North Korean leadership in bilateral talks, the EU continues to prioritise human rights in its dialogue with Pyongyang.

In terms of mediation, the adoption of the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities in November 2009 has provided the European External Action Service (EEAS) with an in-house Mediation Support Team (MST) that has become a core component of the EU’s peace-building toolbox and is ready-made for contact group settings.

**Legitimacy:** The EU can point to a long history of supporting North Korean human rights. The EU has co-sponsored annual UN resolutions on the human rights situation in North Korea and the European Parliament has adopted numerous resolutions on issues concerning the DPRK. Internationally, the EU has significant experience in conflict mediation, contributing to over twenty peace processes.

**Leverage:** The EU’s leverage is dependent upon: 1) Its considerable political and financial weight; 2) Its trade and development tools; 3) The presence of two UN Security Council Members — the United Kingdom and France — within the Union. The EU maintains strong relations with China, Japan, and South Korea, and has long engaged with regional civil society actors.

When looking to gain leverage over North Korea, the annual EU-DPRK bilateral talks, the European Parliament’s Korean Peninsula Delegation, the representative EU embassies in Pyongyang, and the DPRK’s embassies in Europe must all be considered. Leverage may also be acquired from the EU’s long-standing provision of humanitarian aid to the DPRK government, which has totalled over €366 million since 1995, the EU’s co-sponsoring of international resolutions on the DPRK, and by way of the European Commission enacting autonomous directives on the DPRK in the areas of luxury goods, nuclear proliferation, and the monitoring of DPRK diplomatic personnel.

**Capacity:** The EU can provide mediation to a North Korean contact group through a range of actors, including: The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; the EU Special Representative for Human Rights; EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions; EU delegations; or indirectly through individual Member States.

The EU is also well placed to offer technical coordination and expertise in capacity building to the contact group through the EEAS Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments Division (CPPMID) and its Instrument for Stability (IFS). The CPPMID is mandated to provide mediation support to EU mediators, whilst the IFS Policy Advice and Mediation Facility allows the EU to distribute funding to contact groups and fund longer-term mechanisms through the EU Peace-building Partnership, which seeks to mobilise and consolidate grassroots and civilian expertise in peace building.

**Mediation Team:** The EEAS MST would provide an EU mediator with technical and issue-specific expertise in three areas. First, the MST can draw from a roster of over seventy experts to offer operational support to a mediator. Second, the MST would provide a mediator and mediation team with tailored training on topics related to peace processes and conflict resolution. Third, the MST would impart knowledge management to a mediator based upon past experiences of contact group settings and conflict resolution processes.

**Individual Personality:** The individual personality of an EU mediator will be of importance, but the EU's institutional identity and its existing relations with regional actors in Northeast Asia can aid progress in a North Korean human rights contact group. Despite there being little shared understanding within the EU concerning its domestic organisational identity, internationally, the EU's identity has been crafted around positive ethics and norms — namely, the upholding of principles, democracy, justice, and peace.

**Limitations:** EU mediation requires effective co-ordination and communication between relevant EU institutions and involved Member States. Differences within or between these actors would likely prolong initial negotiations on the formation of a contact group and potentially hinder the ability and independence of an EU mediator throughout the lifetime of the group.

The experiences of the North Korean people, which were described by the Michael Kirby as “very similar to the testimony one sees on visiting a Holocaust Museum,” cannot continue. The realisation of human dignity for every North Korean should not be left until unification — instead, they must become a foundation for Korean unification. As such, Europe can play

an important role in the formation and leadership of a contact group that can document abuses for future justice and formulate policies that seek to combat the DPRK's flagrant violations of humanity.

**Naoko Kumagai**

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**Experiences and Perspectives of  
Transnational Cooperation between  
South Korea and North Korea in the Issue of  
Comfort Women**

Unification Diplomacy and Northeast Asian Peace & Cooperation

**“Experiences and Prospectives of Transnational Cooperation between South Korea and North Korea in the Issue of Comfort Women”**

**Naoko Kumagai**

**Diplomacy and Transnational Relations**

Diplomacy is conducted basically by national governments. However, the purpose of diplomacy of pursuing one state's national interests or of maintaining and/or developing reliable and stable international relationship can be achieved with complementary tools of transnational communications.

In the 1970s, it is pointed out that the role of multinational corporations has significantly influenced international relations. Since the 1990s, the role of non-governmental organizations has increasingly grown its importance and affected the behaviors of governments and then international relations. One prominent example is the successful conclusion of the Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines in December 1997. In this treaty, the strong initiative of international NGO network, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, successfully led many reluctant governments to embark on a comprehensive ban on anti-personnel landmines.

In this line of argument, it is expected that transnational relations among non-governmental organizations would lead to have positive influence on intergovernmental relationship. It could be applied to more enhanced cooperation between South Korea and North Korea in the issue of comfort women.

**The Issue of Comfort Women**

Comfort women are those women who claimed that they were forced to provide sexual services to Japanese soldiers and officers after Japan's continental invasion and during the Second World War. Many comfort stations are found in areas where Japan made military advancements, including Manchuria, mainland China, the Philippines, the Malay Peninsula, and Indonesia. The total number of comfort women is not accurately known but estimated as between 20,000 to 200,000. Many women from Japan and the Choson Peninsula were mobilized while local women in Southeast Asia and the Pacific were also victims as comfort women.

The issue of comfort women had long been ignored. It was hardly dealt with in the negotiation toward the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations of Japan and the Republic of Korea,

which normalized the diplomatic relations, and the 1965 Claims Settlement Agreement. The issue became the `issue` only when former comfort women Ms. Kim Hak-Sun came forward to confess that she was comfort women in August 1991. Afterwards, the issue has come to be talked on the media and studied by scholars. The Japanese government conducted two official investigations and issued the Kono Statement in August 1993, a statement by the then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono to acknowledge the involvement of the wartime Japanese authority in the establishment and management of comfort stations and the sufferings of comfort women and to express his sincere apologies to them. Subsequently, the Japanese government set up the Asian Women`s Fund to make moral atonement to former comfort women. The main pillars of the atonement project were atonement money of 2 million Japanese yen (JPY) to each former comfort women and Japanese Prime Minister`s letter of apologies.

The atonement money was based on Japanese people`s donation, which upset and disappointed many former comfort women and their supporters; the atonement money, not from the Japanese government, was just a scapegoat and thought as exempting the Japanese government from its responsibility. With the absence of any diplomatic relationship between Japan and North Korea, the Asian Women`s Fund has not compensated to former comfort women living in North Korea.

In 2014, former executive managing director of the Asian Women`s Fund disclosed that only 60 former comfort women in South Korea, less than one-third of the total number of officially recognized comfort women (207) in South Korea, received atonement money from the Asian Women`s Fund.

Dissatisfied with the incomplete reconciliation effort from the Asian Women`s Fund with the absence of official compensation, former comfort women and their supporters have to date continued their efforts to reach reconciliation with the Japanese government through demanding truth investigation, official compensation, official apologies, and history education.

Efforts for reconciliation in the issue of comfort women include transnational cooperation between South Korean supporters and North Korean supporters for former comfort women. As will be explained below, their transnational efforts have implied protectives for not only reconciliation in the issue of comfort women but also further cooperation between South Korea and North Korea in other issue areas.

### **South and North Cooperation in Women`s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan`s Military Sexual Slavery**

One of demands from the victims was the punishment of those who are responsible for the establishment and management of comfort stations. Then supporters for former comfort women organized the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery in 2000. Though it was a private court, it strictly followed formal criminal court procedures. It judged 9 Japanese wartime officers and political leaders, including Showa Emperor Hirohito, guilty.

In the preparation for the court, there was transnational cooperation between South Korean group, the Korean Council for the women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan and North Korea's Central Committee of the Chosun Democratic Women's League. Two North Korean former comfort women along with South Korean former comfort women participated in the tribunal and made testimonies.

### **South and North Advocacy Cooperation for the Recovery of the Dignity of Former Comfort Women**

The Asian Association Conference on the Comfort Women Issue is led by the Korean Council and started in summer 1992 to consolidate voices for demand for apologies and compensation for former comfort women. The conference is composed of victims and their supporters from Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. On top of their annual gathering and hearing session of the victims' testimonies, they advocacy and lobbying activities to seek to translate their demands into official policies. The Conference has served as an organizational foundation in organizing the above-mentioned International Women's War Crimes Tribunal.

In terms of the Korean Council's cooperation with North Korean counterpart, it cooperates also with North Korea's Committee for Compensation for the Victims of Sexual Slavery and Abduction (朝鮮日本軍性的奴隷及び強制連行被害者補償対策委員会), which was formed in August 1992, after the North-South Summit in February 1992. The Committee issued a joint statement with the Korean Council on August 15, 2012 to demand apologies and compensations for Japan's forced recruitment, conscription, mass killings, and other crimes.

### **South and North Academic Cooperation**

Transnational cooperation between South Korea and North Korea is mainly at the advocacy level. It takes place also in academia with focus on the academic examination of the documents found. For example, in the international conference, held in Yanbian University on May 30, 2015, researchers from South Korea, North Korea, and China participated in. They examined public documents on the Japanese military found in the Jilin Province and called for thorough truth investigation on the issue of comfort women.

### **Future effects and perspectives of South-North Cooperation**

As mentioned above, there are diverse types of transnational cooperation in the issue of comfort women between South Korea and North Korea. Such cooperation has diverse meanings and effects. First of all, such transnational efforts of investigation and the consolidation of voices of victims would facilitate the efforts for reconciliation between former comfort women and the Japanese government.

Second of all, the process of investigation on the issue of comfort women leads to the examination of the process and effects of Japanese colonialism over the Korean peninsula. The Korean Peninsula under the Japanese colonial rule was used as the source of supply of former comfort women to be transported to the Japanese military's battlefield and compounds in the Asia Pacific particularly since the 1930s, as Japan invaded and made military advancement to wide area of mainland China and later on to the Malay peninsula and the Pacific region. The colonial rule also led to the mobilization of forced labor forces and diverse types of exploitation of Korean people. The investigation of the issue of comfort women in the context of colonial rule would also reveal many other issues, including forced labor, thus facilitate understanding of Japan's colonial rule over the Korean peninsula. Transnational efforts for the resolution of the issue of comfort women between South Korea and North Korea would lead to a better and common understanding between South Korea and North Korea about Japanese colonialism, which would in the future serve as good foundation for constructive dialogue of both Koreas for true reconciliation with Japan.

Third, the transnational cooperation over the issue of comfort women serves as good foundation for democratization of North Korea and smoother reunification in the future. The issue of comfort women is one of main human rights issues. Joint work between South and North Korean supporters for former comfort women and scholars would lay a good foundation of common understanding of women's rights both in South Korea and North Korea, which would facilitate as a good beginning of cooperation between the two with possible ramification effects on transnational cooperation in other types of human rights and also in other issue areas.

## **Marina Kukla**

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### **Economic Cooperation between Russia and North Korea and its Implications for Northeast Asian Cooperation**

**Economic Cooperation between Russia and North Korea  
and its Implications for Northeast Asian Cooperation**

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*The paper studies the collaboration between Russia and DPRK in 2013-2015, and its capability to influence the Inter-Korean relation.*

Russia's desire to prevent military and political complications in the Korean Peninsula, as well as striving for mutually profitable relations and ensuring security in the Northeast Asia that provides for the development of the Far Eastern territories – all of that have triggered active policies towards the DPRK in 2010s.

For a long time, the unsettled debt of North Korea hindered cooperation between the countries. The financial authorities of both countries resumed negotiations on this issue only in the late 2006 after a long interval (since 2002). However, they failed to come to any agreement then. Only in May 2014, the law was adopted on Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea on settling the debt of the DPRK made when the country took loans from the Soviet Union. According to this law, the DPRK's debt owed to Russia (as of 2012 it amounted to 10.96 billion US dollars) was to be consolidated with Russia writing off 90% of it. The remaining sum – 1.09 billion US dollars – is supposed to be paid off during 20 years. The funds paid by DPRK as its debt settlement will be spent on the healthcare, education and energy projects<sup>1</sup>.

The economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea is to be promoted by the Russia-DPRK Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy and Research. There are several subcommittees: on forestry, transport, cooperation in research in technologies, and interregional cooperation. In 2014, a decision was made to establish a subcommittee on labor resources. The Intergovernmental Committee has regularly updated and actualized the laws and regulations related to trade and economic relations between Russia and the DPRK.

In January 2012, the countries signed the Agreement on Cooperation in Preventing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Harvesting of Marine Bioresources. In October 2012 in Pyongyang, the countries signed the Protocol on implementation of the Agreement on labor activity of the citizens of one state on the territory of the other state, dated August 31, 2007<sup>2</sup>. For a long time these resources were an obstacle to efficient economic cooperation between the countries.

*Trade*

Despite the recent trends, trade and economic relations between Russia and the DPRK are not instrumental for economies of both countries. The trade turnover dynamics is not stable. According to the RF Federal Customs Service, the trade turnover between Russia and DPRK in

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<sup>1</sup> on Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea on settling the debt of the DPRK made when the country took loans from the Soviet Union: federal law dated 05.05.2014 #88-Ф3//Rossiiskaya Gazeta. 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Trade and economic relations between Russia and DPRK: Russian Embassy in DPRK: <http://www.rusembdprk.ru/ru/rossiya-i-kndr/torgovo-ekonomicheskoe-sotrudnichestvo>

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2013 went up in comparison with 2012 by 48.1% and amounted to 112.7 million USD, with 103.4 million of the Russian export (59.1% growth) and 9.3 million of import (16.2% reduction). The share of trade with the DPRK in Russia's external trade is extremely low: it does not exceed the statistical margin of error (0-1%).

During the 6<sup>th</sup> session of the Russia-North Korea Intergovernmental Committee in 2014, the countries acknowledged the necessity of boosting their trade relations and reaching the volume of 1 billion US dollars by 2020<sup>3</sup>. The trade relations between the countries can be expanded by implementing mining projects on the DPRK's territory as well as resuming the direct trade ties bypassing third countries.

In 2012-2013 Russia mostly exported vehicles, equipment and machinery; timber, cellulose and paper goods; metals and metallic goods; foods and agricultural products. The DPRK's export into Russia mostly included textile goods and footwear, chemical goods, mineral fuel, metals and metallic goods.

### *Trade with the Far Eastern Federal District (FEFD)*

The Far Eastern Federal District (RFE) of Russian Federation being the Asian part of Russia territorially and thus having potential to develop its ties with Asian countries, is composed of nine members of the Russian Federation, and holds 36.08 % of the entire territory of Russia. Since 2008, the main economic indicators of the Far East – GRP (gross regional product), trade, investment – increase surpassing the national average. Two main trends are particular when regarding Far East external trade. First, Asian countries accounted for 80 % of foreign trade of the RFE. Second, the significant trade surplus is determined by an overwhelming (more than 10 times) trade surplus of Sakhalin Oblast. In 2012, Sakhalin Oblast shared almost 64 % of all Far Eastern Federal District exports, specializing in production and export of oil and natural gas. For example, the share of the Republic of Korea in RFE turnover is far above the national average, amounting to 28.2% in 2012.

As for the DPRK, it does not play a significant role in the trade of the Russian Far East: its volumes, like in the country as a whole, are extremely low – below 1%. The Russian Far East accounted for 21% of Russia's trade with the DPRK in 2013.

Primorsky Krai is a leading trade partner of the DPRK among all FEFD regions, which is explained by its proximity to the country. Thus, in 2012 over a half of the FEFD's trade with the DPRK was with Primorsky Krai, whereas in 2013 this subject of the RF accounted already for 95% of the trade turnover.

The major import items included: plastics, ferrous metal goods. The major export items were as follows: oil and oil products except for crude oil; frozen fish; rough timber.

The commodity structure of trade between the FEFD and the DPRK is very inconsistent showing the lack of stable annual demand for exported goods (from both sides) except for the oil and oil products (demand from the DPRK). Therefore, the commodity structure of the turnover between Russia and North Korea is changing almost every year.

### *Labor migration*

The number of labor migrants from the DPRK to Russia is not very high and shows low relative indexes. Thus, in 2012 North Korean citizens accounted for only 1.87% of the total number of foreign migrants in Russia – only 26300 people (40000 – unofficial data). However, the dynamics of the inbound migration from the DPRK into Russia is positive.

North Korean citizens find jobs only in those FEFD's regions and territories where local authorities have established high foreign labor force quotas – primarily in Khabarovsk Krai and Primorsky Krai, Amur Oblast, and Sakhalin Oblast, where in 2001-2009 the foreign labor force quota was between 15 and 36 thousand people annually. Labor migrants from the DPRK are mostly males, involved in construction, agriculture and timbering.

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<sup>3</sup> Russia-North Korean relations are aimed at a new qualitative level and breakthrough in trade and economy: Official website of the RF Ministry of Development of the Russian Far East. [http://minvostokrazvitia.ru/press-center/news\\_minvostok/?ELEMENT\\_ID=1905](http://minvostokrazvitia.ru/press-center/news_minvostok/?ELEMENT_ID=1905)

In 1991, Russia stopped providing the DPRK with technical assistance on favorable terms; since then, the investment cooperation between the countries has been quite insignificant. According to the Bank of Russia, direct investments of the Russian Federation into the DPRK had peaked by 2012 (113 million US dollars) connected with the Rajin Project. Currently, investments are almost non-existent.

Investing into the Rason Trade and Economic Zone (construction of an intermodal transshipment complex) and reconstruction of the railway between Khasan and Rajin is currently the major successful project of Russia in North Korea. The primary goal of the project was to launch prospective international container traffic from the station of Rajin along the Trans-Siberian Railway as well as to increase the competitiveness in the APR transportation market.

Increased volumes of transshipping Russian coal ensure the economic efficiency of the Rason project. Since the cargo volume already significantly exceeds the handling capacities of Far Eastern ports, opening of the port of Rajin provides for the increase in the export of coal. New coal transportation corridor from Russia is primarily profitable for consumers in the South and Southeast China, where coal remains the major energy source. Coal will be shipped from the stations of West-Siberian railway through Rajin to the south ports of China.

The investment project implemented by Russia in Rason together with local objectives can be viewed as a part of an ambitious plan of connecting the Trans-Korean Railway with a subsequent link to the Trans-Siberian Railway resulting in the longest Eurasian transport corridor and a platform for trilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation, DPRK and Republic of Korea if the Inter-Korean relations are normalized.

Trilateral cooperation in this area has brought positive results. In December, 40.5 thousand tons of Russian coal were delivered to the South Korean port of Pohang from the North Korean port of Rajin<sup>4</sup>. The shipment was monitored by a special Russia-South Korean Commission of 17 experts from South Korea. The Rajin-Khasan logistic scheme was examined and positively evaluated by POSCO, the top steel company of South Korea, which annually imports about 2 million tons of coal from Russia, and by Hyundai Merchant Marine Company.

#### *New trends and prospects*

In 2014-2015, negotiations on different economic projects for government and business were of a scale unprecedented for the last three decades. In April 2015, the 7th session of the Intergovernmental Commission took place in Pyongyang.

A new cooperation concept seems to be emerging from the Russian leadership's increased attention to the DPRK. Russia's overall approach is very pragmatic. North Korea's most valuable resources are minerals and raw materials, and these have been at the center of most deals<sup>5</sup>.

During the intergovernmental session in Pyongyang the North Korean side suggested many barter operations given the lack of financial resources at its disposal, with interest by some Russian companies (like coal in exchange for pig iron, etc). Many of the projects are based on modernization of plants and facilities, created in cooperation with the former Soviet Union.

The North Koreans are especially interested in getting a supply of energy from the Russian Far East and are ready to pay in copper. Russian companies expressed interest in revitalizing North Korea's hydro and coal fired power plants and agreed to set up a special working group to study the

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<sup>4</sup> South Korea gets a trial cargo of Russian coal shipped through the DPRK: <http://eastrussia.ru/news/5784/>

<sup>5</sup> Toloraya, G. Korean Security and Unification Dilemmas: A Russian Perspective// Korea Economic Institute of America. Academic Paper Series, June, 11.2015. [http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/kei\\_aps\\_georgy\\_toloraya\\_june11.pdf](http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/kei_aps_georgy_toloraya_june11.pdf)

issue of electricity supply to the Korean Peninsula, including an analysis of possible route supplies of fuel and energy balances of the participating countries and the cost of electricity.

“The Pobeda project” involves investing 25 billion US dollars in exchange for the access to the DPRK’s natural resources<sup>6</sup>. Russian companies will explore the North Korean mineral resources and sell them; the DPRK will invest the funds into modernization of railways. Russian business shows great interest in DPRK’s mineral resources; however, these projects are hindered by the lack of reliable and comprehensive information on their volumes. Currently, a specialized catalogue of DPRK’s resources available to Russia is being compiled. This joint effort of Russian and North Korean experts is required to realize the volumes of future projects.

It is agreed that Russian geologists would conduct a survey of mineral resources in the DPRK, based on the materials which were accumulated during decades of Russia-DPRK cooperation. The DPRK is interested in Russian investment in the Wonsan-Kumgansan tourist zone.

The project of resuming vehicle traffic between Primorsky Krai and the DPRK via the Tumangan Bridge is being discussed and coordinated.

A “Year of Friendship” was officially inaugurated on April 14th. A special plan of cultural events was adopted, comprising visits of sister cities delegations, sport exchanges, exchanges in educational sphere, delegations of scientists, and increase in tourism.

As for Far Eastern Federal University, it takes part in the educational and science exchanges with DPRK. DPRK’s universities have been showing growing interest towards active educational cooperation, including teaching Korean language in Vladivostok. One of the events was our visit to Pyongyang in May, 2015 to participate in the russian-korean conference on the questions of teaching Korean and Russian as foreign languages. I must say, that I have a pleasure to participate in a round table with the professors of the department of international economy of the Kim Il Sung’s University. They insisted that Russia was a main economic partner of DPRK, and their country was mostly interested in the labor migration, energy and tourism projects.

### *Trilateral cooperation*

The second pillar of Russian strategy – to attract South Korean capital into trilateral projects – could really become a game-changer in regional cooperation. While Russia and North Korea have in principle found the balance between North Korea’s desire to get aid and Russia’s intention to get profit, the agreements that have already been reached are hard to implement<sup>7</sup>.

In 2014, the Rajin logistic project reached a multilateral level when the first Russian shipment of coal was delivered to the South Korean city of Pohang. South Korea’s involvement into this project and the country’s awareness of its economic relevance are significant for the trilateral cooperation and can facilitate more active actualization of the Eurasian Initiative. However, the measures taken by the South Korean government in response to the sinking of South Korean navy corvette Cheonan remain an obstacle to inter-Korean relations. These measures known as the May 24 Directive prohibit business contacts between South Korea and North Korea outside the Kaesong Industrial Zone.

The possibilities for developing a trilateral cooperation are also provided by the Kaesong Industrial Complex (DPRK). Until now, this Complex has been an exclusively inter-Korean project; now the plans for Russian investments are being discussed. Kaesong specializes in manufacturing consumer goods for export and the Russian side has officially announced its interests in participating in this project.

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<sup>6</sup> Pobeda Project: a new model of Russia-North Korea relations. <http://eastrussia.ru/news/5779/>

<sup>7</sup> Toloraya, G. Korean Security and Unification Dilemmas: A Russian Perspective// Korea Economic Institute of America. Academic Paper Series, June, 11.2015. URL: [http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/kei\\_aps\\_georgy\\_toloraya\\_june11.pdf](http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/kei_aps_georgy_toloraya_june11.pdf)

Power industry is a very promising area of cooperation. The project of power transfer from Russia to the DPRK may be extended to the Republic of Korea. The countries agreed to start a feasibility study of the project of “power bridge” to South Korea through the territory of North Korea. According to Alexander Galushka, China is supposed to take an active part in the project through intermediary of Russia, “North Korean partners agree that Russia, including RusHydro Company, will conduct negotiations with South Korean partners on trilateral projects”.

In December 2014, the RusHydro and South Korean K-Water Corporation signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which can become a major step forward in this area of cooperation. The Memorandum is aimed at finding mutually profitable areas of cooperation in hydraulic power engineering, renewable power sources, and the projects in water treatment, water discharge and addressing environmental challenges of water management<sup>8</sup>.

According to A.S. Galushka, the RF Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East, announced the Russia’s posture on the need for activating the inter-Korean dialogue. He said, “Currently, we serve as a mediator between the DPRK and South Korea in joint trilateral projects. However, we have been emphasizing the necessity for comprehensive trilateral cooperation. The North Korean side has shown a positive attitude towards this suggestion<sup>9</sup>”.

So it can be concluded that both Russia and DPRK are waiting South Korea to make steps toward full-scaled inter-korean, and after that trilateral dialogue. Russia has prepared some ground for this collaboration.

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.rushydro.ru/press/news/96277.html>

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.ruskorinfo.ru/data/economy/14889/>

**Rhodora M. Joaquin**

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**UTILIZING TRACK 2 DIPLOMACY  
AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES**

## SESSION I: UNIFICATION DIPLOMACY AND NORTHEAST ASIAN PEACE AND COOPERATION

*Discussant:*

**RHODORA JOAQUIN**

*Philippines*

### **UTILIZING TRACK 2 DIPLOMACY AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES**

The reunification of the two Koreas in itself will be a nation-building process that will necessarily involve all of the stakeholders, which means not just the governments who will negotiate the agreements and establish the institutions, but also their people who are key to keeping the long term peace, progress and stability.

In my discussion, I wish to veer away from the high-level aspect of unification diplomacy to other forms of diplomacy which I believe are just as important – if not even more important – than the government-to-government exchanges: track 2 diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges, which is also referred to as track 3 diplomacy.

**Track 2 diplomacy** is defined as “unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities aimed at building relationships and encouraging new thinking that can inform the official process. Track 2 activities typically involve influential academic, religious, and NGO leaders and other civil society actors who can interact more freely than high-ranking officials.”<sup>1</sup> In some cases, government officials or representatives are also invited to these track 2 fora to participate in their personal capacity.

An example of a track 2 is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), which provides an informal mechanism for scholars, officials and others in their private capacities to discuss political and security issues and challenges facing the region. It also provides policy recommendations to various inter-governmental bodies, convenes regional and international meetings and establishes linkages with

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<sup>1</sup> Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), <http://glossary.usip.org/resource/tracks-diplomacy> (accessed 17 June 2015).

institutions and organizations in other parts of the world to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area of regional political-security cooperation. The establishment of CSCAP was a response to the need to provide a more structural regional process of a non-governmental nature to contribute to the efforts towards regional confidence-building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation and cooperation.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia Pacific-wide multilateral forum for official consultations on peace and security issues in the region, is the main client of CSCAP. But ARF also engages in other track 2 activities such as conferences, workshops, seminars, and working group meetings. Critics have pointed to the ARF's failure to respond to critical situations and to move beyond being a mere "talk shop." But these so-called "talk shops", I believe, still serve a very important purpose in confidence-building – something which can be very helpful in improving the ties between the two Koreas, where the element of mistrust looms large. The mere presence of both the DPRK and South Korea in both the ARF and CSCAP presents an opportunity for us as a region to encourage more constructive relations between the two sides.

The intractability of their positions on political-security issues should not be a hindrance for the two Koreas to engage in discussions on other "softer" issues, or low politics issues, where they may eventually reach a common understanding. The less guarded atmosphere presented by track 2 meetings could develop trust and a habit of dialogue which, over time, can be elevated to the more critical issues, assuming that both sides are ready.

**Track 3 diplomacy** is defined as "people-to-people diplomacy undertaken by individuals and private groups to encourage interaction and understanding between hostile communities and involving awareness raising and empowerment within these communities. Normally focused at the grassroots level, this type of diplomacy often

involves organizing meetings and conferences, generating media exposure, and political and legal advocacy for marginalized people and communities.”<sup>2</sup>

Given the current situation between the two Koreas, this track may be quite difficult to operationalize and manage because of its very informal nature, but its potential benefits are more likely to ensure the success of unification efforts at the track 1 and track 2 levels. Cultural, educational, and tourism exchanges may be starting points for this type of diplomacy. Also, the role of media in promoting understanding and cooperation in both countries cannot be overemphasized. Any effort towards this end must involve them.

People-to-people exchanges, once realized, could allay fears of North Koreans and South Koreans about reunification – the perceived economic and social costs for the South Koreans, and the difficulty of integrating North Koreans into the lifestyle of the cosmopolitan South, among other issues.

The discussion I have presented comes from a Southeast Asian perspective, from a region where dialogue and consultation play an important role in managing relations among states, among organizations, among peoples and individuals. Southeast Asia has not seen an armed conflict among its members in a very long time despite irritants in their bilateral relations, and this can be attributed to the ASEAN habit of dialogue. Today, track 2, track 3, and even a multi-level form of diplomacy is being employed to facilitate the community-building efforts of the Association. One of the biggest challenges today is building an ASEAN identity, something which cannot be achieved by governments alone.

The challenges faced by the two Koreas are certainly different from the ones we face in Southeast Asia. Conditions here, particularly in the North, may not be conducive to such activities as academic and cultural exchanges, for instance, and the hardline positions on political and security issues may not be easy to overcome. The CSCAP and the ARF track 2 initiatives can only do so much in facilitating the unification


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<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

process. We can look at reunification as a nation-building (or perhaps rebuilding?) process which can only be sustained if the people are involved. More opportunities for exchanges must be created.

The question I therefore wish to raise is whether the South Korean government has engaged North Korea in track 2 and people-to-people exchanges? If not, is it open to the idea of hosting track 2 activities and people-to-people exchanges with North Korea, if at all possible? Or is it possible for a third country or organization to initiate such activities? Is there a possible role for ASEAN in this respect?

I hope these points I raised will contribute to enrich our discussion.



## **4. Presentation Materials: Session 2**

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**International Cooperation  
for the Korean Unification**



## **Jihwan Hwang**

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**International Cooperation for Laying  
Foundation for Korean Unification**

## **International Cooperation for Laying Foundation for Korean Unification**

Jihwan HWANG (University of Seoul)

### **I. Introduction**

The South Korean governments have made every effort to build the foundation for peaceful unification on the Korean peninsula. The Park Geun-hye government has also emphasized the importance of laying a foundation for peaceful unification and presented it as one of four national priorities. However, every Korean government has pursued the state-centric approach toward unification. Whoever governs in South Korea, they have always given their first priority of unification diplomacy on four great powers. It may be inevitable to accept that the state-centric approach is one of the most important strategies for the Korean unification, given the history of the division of two Koreas and international relations around the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, the German unification in 1990 was made possible thanks to the interaction and cooperation among neighboring powers in the process of the Cold War's collapse, so we cannot underestimate the roles and influences of four great powers in the process of Korean unification. However, the Korean unification has not been realized yet despite many efforts by state-centric approach. On the contrary, it is open to question if the state-centric approach focusing on great powers makes the unification rather difficult because there are serious conflicts of interest among those powers regarding the Korean unification. It is the paradox of unification diplomacy in building the foundation for peaceful unification on the Korean peninsula. So, it is very necessary to recognize the weaknesses that the state-centric approach carries in the Korean case and to search for a new possibility that the non-state actors can produce.

### **II. Regional Powers and the Korean Unification**

First of all, the U.S. will support the Korean unification. However, it is not certain that the United States will strongly support the early unification of the Korean peninsula. The U.S. may agree easily to a slow and gradual unification because it will be helpful in making the Korea-U.S alliance solid and balancing against China's rise. However, it may be concerned about the sudden changes to the Northeast Asian status quo that may destabilize the regional situation and weaken U.S. strategic interest. In this sense, the U.S. is expected to seek a status-quo strategy in Northeast Asia, at least in the foreseeable future. Such a strategy can be seen from the Obama administration's military restraint

that tries not to involve militarily in the external conflicts. The recent debate on U.S. retrenchment explains U.S. difficulties very well.<sup>1</sup> Because the U.S. is relatively declining compared to the fast rise of China and does not have enough resources to cope with the sudden changes in international relations due to the financial difficulties, it would prefer the status-quo in Northeast Asia. Although the U.S. has recently stressed the importance of this region by stating the 'Pivot to Asia' and 'Rebalancing,' it is less likely to be involved in the unexpected military conflicts with China.<sup>2</sup> In this vein, the U.S. does not appear to take the risk by accepting the regional instability and unpredictability caused by the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime and unification.

On the other hand, even if the U.S. chooses to support the early unification on the Korean peninsula, China would not support it as long as the Korea-U.S. alliance is strongly maintained. China may play as a veto power in this case just like the Soviet Union did in the German case.<sup>3</sup> Although the Soviet Union changed its course of action due to its domestic troubles, China is in a completely different situation. China is now getting much stronger and would behave according to its strategic interest in the region rather than be persuaded by other powers. In this sense, China also appears to prefer the status-quo in Northeast Asia rather than to expect a sudden change in regional environment.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, China is now rising very fast in both economic and military areas, so there is no reason that China likes to see the sudden changes in this region. So, China is more likely to choose the status-quo on the Korean peninsula with the current North Korean regime rather than the unpredictable situation the Korean unification may result in.<sup>5</sup> The Chinese leaders would perceive that the Korean unification is not very helpful for its strategic and national interest.

However, China is now rising and building its own sphere of influence. China does not want a major

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment" *International Security* Vol. 37, No. 3 (2012/13); Paul K. Macdonald and Joseph M. Parent. 2011. "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment" *International Security* 35 (4).

<sup>2</sup> Jeffrey A. Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).

<sup>3</sup> According to one survey on the Korean unification, most American (84%) and Japanese (94%) experts believe that China will be strongly against the Korean unification. See *Chosun Ilbo* May 22, 2014.

<sup>4</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013).

<sup>5</sup> Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder, and John S. Park, "Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea," United States Institute of Peace Working Paper (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008).

military conflict with the U.S., but it is strengthening its military power in East Asia and pushing the U.S. out of the region.<sup>6</sup> Because such a situation will get more serious as the Chinese power is growing, there is a growing concern that the U.S.-China relations may produce the crisis instability in the future.<sup>7</sup> Under such a situation, there is no possibility that China will accept the early Korean unification with the Korea-U.S. alliance still in effect. China may seek somewhat revisions to the status-quo in Northeast Asia in the long term, whatever the reason may be, just as the Soviet Union did in the late 1980s, but it would accept the Korean unification only when it will not threaten China's security and national interest in the region.

Even if China supports the early unification, it is uncertain that Japan and Russia are persuaded by the U.S. and South Korea. Russia now appears to be less against the Korean unification, because it is very interested in the ongoing project of developing the infrastructure and energy resources in East Siberia.<sup>8</sup> The North Korea-Russian relations is not really close now, so Russia may change its course of action and agree to the unification if it does not threaten Russia's strategic interest and security in the region.<sup>9</sup> However, it is still doubtful how much role Russia can play in the process of unification though it does not veto. Japan appears to disagree to the early unification because of the destabilizing factors that the unification may cause. If the unified Korea gets closer to the Chinese side even with the alliance with the U.S., it would give Japan a serious strategic challenge.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, a unified Korea may emerge as a rival against Japan given the past history between two countries.

In short, when we seek to apply the German unification procedure to the Korean case, there exist many serious challenges at every stage. The German unification provided both the United States and the Soviet Union with a stabilizing variable in changing international relations of Europe. The Korean case should also produce such a stabilizing variable in Northeast Asia. Only when both the United

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<sup>6</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013, Annual Report to Congress (2013)*; Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, Kevin L. Pollpeter, *Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States*. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007).

<sup>7</sup> Avery Goldstein, "First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations" *International Security* Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013).

<sup>8</sup> Stephen Blank, "The Significance of Russia's Frustration with North Korea," *The Diplomat*, (December 23, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> Alexander Lukin, "Russian Strategic Thinking Regarding North Korea," *The Asan Forum*, (October 7, 2013).

<sup>10</sup> Many Japanese leaders are concerned about the possibility that the unified Korea may get closer to China. Author's interview with Japanese experts on Korea in Tokyo, Japan, March 2014.

States and China see the Korean unification in a positive way, it can be accepted internationally. If the Korean unification is perceived to be deteriorating the U.S.-China relations and to be causing the revisions to the status-quo, however, both countries would be seriously concerned about the outcome. In this sense, unless Northeast Asia itself suffers from a great change, major powers around the Korean peninsula have little motivation to support the Korean unification.

### **III. Inter-Korean Relations and International Cooperation for the Korean Unification**

#### **1. Exploring the Principles of Balanced Approaches to Inter-Korean Relations**

Should the normalization of inter-Korean relations be achieved, the balance in the methods of approaches toward inter-Korean relations needs to be pursued as an important principle. First of all, dialogue and sanctions should be balanced. It implies that the current government should recognize the uselessness of the policy that emphasized the principles and sanctions as well as the inefficiency by emphasizing dialogue and cooperation as exposed in the practices of the past governments.

Second, balancing in the cooperation between the South and the North and international community must be pursued in the North Korea policy. Normalization of inter-Korean relations is available with stability not only in the inter-Korean relations but also in the international order around the Korean Peninsula. In particular, it is necessary to be recognized that structural changes in inter-Korean relations are not possible without stability and resolution of the nuclear issue. However, it should also be perceived that the bilateral development in the relations with the North is important in the inter-Korean relations. As long as North Korea accentuates “the spirit of being on our own nation,” emphasizing coordination with the international community can only increase the chance of turning our government policy toward North Korea into containment.

Third, it is necessary to keep balances between the diplomatic agenda and the political and economic, social and cultural agendas. In the past experiences of inter-Korean relations, economic, social and cultural areas had attribute to develop together with the country’s stability in the political and diplomatic sectors. This is because economic, social and cultural exchanges become foundations that allow development of political and diplomatic agendas possible.

Lastly, harmonious use of hard and soft power in the inter-Korean relations is required. This means that taking balanced approaches toward social and cultural aspects is necessary as much as perspectives of military and economic power in the development of inter-Korean relations.

2. Seeking Phased Principles for Inter-Korean Relations

It should be recognized that normalization of inter-Korean relations does not occur in the short term. Therefore, presenting such goals as holding a summit meeting or disarmament talks in a short period is neither practical nor desirable. Therefore, normalization of inter-Korean relations can be presented as three steps, short, medium and long-term basis, putting the phase of “trust-building” as step one of normalization of inter-Korean relations. The “trust-building” step can be a stage forming trust by stably managing such pending agendas as humanitarian assistance and operating Kaesong Industrial Complex under the current inter-Korean relations.

Step two can be set the phase of “being stabilized” in the inter-Korean relations as the “negative peace” from the point of view of Johan Galtung, or “unstable peace” of Kenneth Boulding. This is understood to prevent the possibility of instability through regulation of agreement and avoid any South-North armed clash with managing conflict. The measures possibly taken in the step two are like releasing the 5.24 measures, expanding the Kaesong Industrial Complex, seeking a new South-North economic cooperation, and starting military talks. Step three can be set the stage of normalization based on the perspectives of “positive peace” of Galtung and “stable peace” of Bolding. This means the relationship is being normalized as the cause of structural conflict is removed. In this case, it will be understood as reaching the “reconciliation and cooperation step” as presented in the step one in the Unification Plan for the Korean National Community.

**Table.** Three Steps to Build Unification Foundations and to Normalize the Inter-Korean Relations

Action Plans	Detailed Tasks
Step 1: Trust-building	Included humanitarian aid, regularizing separated family reunions, resuming Mt. Geumgang tourism, and building inter-Korean dialogue
Step 2: Stabilization	Included internationalizing KIC, developing underground resources, agriculture and environmental cooperation, exploring new economic cooperation, building livelihood infrastructure including power, transportation and communication
Step 3: Normalization	Included external integration of North Korean economy (joining the international financial institutions, etc.), North version of Marshall

	Plan (expanding SEZ, etc.), establishing exchange and cooperation offices in Pyongyang and Seoul, disarmament talks, and a peace regime
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Due to the characteristic of the inter-Korean relations, all the above mentioned may not be feasible to implement within the tenure of the Park Geun Hye government. But the composition of the trust-building policy has oriented in this direction, making it necessary to take a step-by-step approach. It is preferable for the government to approximately target the entry to the initial stage of “being stabilized” of the step two in its term. Such a step-by-step approach is significant in that it can look for the implementation of next step depending on the North’s actions or responses. From this point of view, the strategies to prosecute the trust-building policy may be directed to find a good agenda focusing on the one currently available to do on the one hand, but, on the other hand, in terms of policy continuity, sustainable development of future inter-Korean relations in normal and institutional dimensions, and particularly building unification foundations, it might also be desirable to carry them forward with having the concepts of step-by-step setting and timeliness in mind.

### 3. Constructivist Approaches and Seeking Ideological Changes in Inter-Korean Relations

If the past modern international relations showed those of conflict and collision in terms of the theory of constructivism, the South-North relations were also in the relationship that was in the context of Hobbes. Therefore, recognizing that there is a possibility for ideological changes in the international order to create new international relations, it is necessary to exert efforts to move the perspective of inter-Korean relations from Hobbes’ to Kant’s points of view. This means that it is important to look at the reality of the inter-Korean relationship from reconciliation and co-operational point of view rather than from conflict and collision, trying to understand it not only for theoretical sectors but also for current policies.

Taking the reality of inter-Korean relations and the attribute of North Korea into account, it might be difficult to carry out such ideological changes in earnest. But in North Korea policy, positive perspectives and skills should be taken rather than negative attitudes. For example, to make the ideological changes possible, it is better to take a positive way of thinking like “when North Korea takes a certain measure then we will give more advanced compensation” than to react with such a recognition or a reference as “if North Korea doesn’t take any action, we will impose sanctions

against them.” In other words, it is necessary to cope with a positive reciprocity strategy rather than a negative tit-for-tat.

For example, the grave suggestions offered by the National Defense Commission and the special offer should not be negatively refuted, but positively managed in such a way of responding that it has room to be improved for the sake of desirable ideological changes in the inter-Korean relations (KCNA January 16, June 30, July 7, 2014). Under current inter-Korean relations, such a transition of ideological awareness might not be easy, but it should be understood as something that requires giving epistemological efforts to create a virtuous circle in the inter-Korean relations instead of the opposite one.

#### 4. Neo-institutionalism and Institutionalization of Inter-Korean Relations

Institutionalization efforts of relationship are essential in the course of endeavor to make progress in the South-North relations and to shift ideas from conflict and clash to cooperation and harmony. Institutionalization efforts are important because they serve the progressed steps and ideology in the relationship not to go back to the previous state. It implies forming a new regime in the relationship between South and North Korea. A regime in international relations can refer to the established system for each issue, which is defined as implicated or explicated set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes in which actors of a given area of international relations have common expectations.

Judging that there was not any system that can be called a regime in the past inter-Korean relations, forming a new regime can be a major variable in the normalization of the inter-Korean relations. Examples of such are found in the past experiences of South-North economic cooperation. It didn't take long for the operation of Kaesong Industrial Complex to be resumed after its shut-down for a while. But it was not the case for Mt. Geumgang tourism which has remained suspended since the program was interrupted. If a new regime is established in the relationship of the two Koreas in the same way as to the KIC's example, this means the both sides share attraction to maintain the new regime.

#### 5. Networked Union and Seeking Synergistic Effect

It is required to pursue synergistic effect by interactively connecting such agendas as peace settlement, economic cooperation, social and cultural cooperation, and humanitarian aid in network. Denuclearization and peace settlement need not to be hurried to consistently carry out by finding suitable models for the Korean Peninsula denuclearization. For the economic cooperation, the South-North economic cooperation and building industry infrastructure for the North should be pushed ahead in stages. The effort for social and cultural exchanges and cooperation needs to be more expedited than economic cooperation so that social and cultural homogeneity could be recovered faster. Increased humanitarian assistance should be made with urgency so that trust-building between the two Koreas could be formed. Managing the speed differentially for the diverse agendas, networked combination of the agendas are required in the process of an agenda being matured to be coupled with another.

#### 6. Combining Independent Approaches and Multilateral Approaches

In proceeding North Korea policy for the sake of normalizing inter-Korean relations, stepwise combination of agendas are necessary while separately responding to them for what South Korea can independently act and for what may be available for multilateral approaches. Peace settlement in the Korean Peninsula should be promoted as a way to combine the multilateral powers around the Korean peninsula and the bilateral two Koreas. For economic cooperation should be prosecuted within the framework of international community utilizing mini-multilateral approaches considering the relations including South-North-Russia, South-North-China, South-North-Japan, and South-North-U.S. relationships. For the social and cultural exchanges, South Korea can autonomously carry them out. Strategically, at the beginning stage, South Korea can take the central roles to develop and then expand them to invite participations of other countries so that they can be systemized by combining the multilateral framework. For humanitarian aid, it is strategic to increase South Korea's own line of roles in stages while using the international and multilateral approaches while having leverage of help from international organizations and NGOs.

## **Daniel Wertz**

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**Talk at Korean Unification for  
Junior International Experts Conference**

## International Cooperation for Korean Unification

Daniel Wertz

Talk at Korean Unification for Junior International Experts Conference

July 8, 2015

I would like to give my sincere thanks to the Ministry of Unification and the KUJIE program for inviting me to speak today. I work as a Program Officer at the National Committee on North Korea, but I will be speaking solely in a personal capacity. I'd like to give one American's perspective on Korean unification, and also to talk a little bit about the role of the United States in preparing for unification.

The United States is committed to Korean unification, under the assumption -- an assumption many of us share -- that it will take place largely under Seoul's auspices, leading inevitably to a democratic, market-oriented, and Western-aligned nation. The 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement articulated this quite clearly: "Through our Alliance we aim to build a better future for all people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy."

This commitment has been repeatedly reconfirmed at the highest level. During President Obama's 2014 visit to South Korea, he described a shared "vision of a unified Korea where people throughout this peninsula enjoy the political and economic freedoms that exist here in the South."

Making this vision a reality will be hard. The North Korean state and its attendant ideological system have proven far more resilient than most people have been willing to give credit for, weathering predictions of collapse and rejecting genuine attempts for peaceful reconciliation. The current status quo on the Korean Peninsula cannot last indefinitely, but it is very difficult at this moment to imagine how such change might come about peacefully.

But when unification does come, it will be a very path-dependent process. What comes after unification will be highly contingent upon how reunification happens: whether it is precipitated by a change of policy within North Korea, a sudden collapse, palace intrigue, a second Korean War, or -- as has often happened in history -- by some completely unanticipated and seemingly unlikely confluence of events, events which will

challenge prior assumptions and demand that decisions with tremendous long-term ramifications be made on the spot amidst a vast number of unknowns.

As much as we debate and plan for Korean unification -- and I think of course that doing so is necessary -- we must recognize the tremendous uncertainty inherent to the subject. The economic and social integration of peoples North and South, the construction of infrastructure linking both halves of the Peninsula to each other and to the region, the disposition of North Korea's WMD, the process of seeking justice and reconciliation for victims of human rights abuses, the settlement of property disputes, the future of the US-ROK alliance, the relation between China and a unified Korea: all of these are incredibly important issues, yet they are all dependent on the process and means by which unification takes place.

Nonetheless, no matter how unification takes place, I think there are a few things will almost be certain, and South Korea, the U.S., and other interested parties can prepare for unification by taking action now in these areas of near-certainty. I'd like to focus on two such areas in particular: the role of North Korean defectors in facilitating a successful long-term unification, and the need for effective coordination with China as the unification process unfolds.

First, North Korean defectors will play a key role in the ground-level process of unification. There is an enormous gap between North and South in culture, norms, and even language, and defectors, with their knowledge and experience on both halves of the Peninsula, will be at the forefront of bridging this divide. Defectors will be the connecting nodes as networks of people from North and South are brought together. They will be among those best suited to explain to North Koreans the realities of life under free institutions in terms they can understand. They will also be effective intermediaries in explaining the realities of life in the north to southerners.

Furthermore, after unification, it is likely that many leadership positions across the Peninsula -- in business and politics, in educational institutions and learned professions -- will be filled by southerners, whose educations and life experiences will be far better suited to manage the institutions of a unified Korea. I suspect that many northern Koreans will come to resent having little choice but to work at a factory managed by a southern boss, or to serve in a military unit commanded by a southern officer. North Korean doctors and scientists will likely find their technical knowledge woefully outdated compared to their southern counterparts, and will struggle to compete for jobs commensurate with their educational status.

This situation is to some extent unavoidable, but it could be mitigated if there was a sizeable group of North Korean defectors prepared to take on leadership roles in a unified Korea. Defectors who have top-level training in economics, business, engineering, or other fields could be key drivers of successful economic unification. Defectors who today have experience in organizing advocacy campaigns, engaging in civil society, or participating in democratic politics in the south may tomorrow find themselves organizing northerners to represent their unique interests in a unified Korea, through political parties, labor unions, or other organizations.

The South Korean government, civil society, and of course defectors themselves are the key actors for defector empowerment. But I think the U.S. could play more of a supporting role. For example, the U.S. could expand the WEST exchange program -- which lets young Koreans come to the U.S. for up to 18 months to study English, take an internship, and travel -- to specifically target young North Korean defectors. This would likely require reaching out specifically to the defector community in South Korea, incorporating opportunities for more comprehensive English study for those with little initial language ability, and otherwise tailoring the program to fit the specific needs of the defector community. Perhaps the U.S. -- either the government or civil society -- could also help fund defectors to attend advanced degree programs at American universities.

On a related note, the U.S. could also do a little more to promote educational exchanges with North Koreans who are not defectors. Bringing North Koreans to the U.S., or other countries abroad, to learn about topics such as market economics could yield long-term benefits, even if these exchanges only occur over short time frames and with the select few who are allowed out of North Korea. While the North Korean government has of course erected the largest barriers to such exchanges, there are areas where U.S. policy could be more forward-leaning. For example, the U.S. has been inconsistent about issuing visas to North Koreans, even to those who are invited for uncontroversial topics such as cultural exchanges. To my knowledge, the U.S. has issued nearly no visas to North Koreans since the collapse of the Leap Day Agreement in 2012, and I don't see how this policy does us any benefit.

A second area of near-certainty about Korean unification is that China will play a crucial role. Exactly what this role is, of course, depends on how the process of unification occurs. But it is hard to imagine that Beijing won't be a central player in the Korean endgame, either through the actions that it takes or the actions that it decides not to take.

Although China has long been frustrated in its efforts to influence North Korean decision making, regime stability remains its top priority. China worries about the prospect of

refugees flooding across its border, and no doubt fears the possibility of unaccounted-for fissile material making its way across the border, as well. And of course, the prospect of American soldiers stationed across the Yalu has been a long-standing security concern for China, one that in 1950 led to the decision to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers to keep the North Korean regime alive.

There will be a pressing need for the U.S. and South Korea to be able to coordinate on some level with China if and when reunification happens, and to have some common understanding in advance of what the others' interests and decision-making may look like. High-level dialogue on this issue, at the military-to-military level as well as on the political level, could therefore have a tremendously important long-term payoff. But Beijing is wary of engaging in such dialogue on contingency planning, assuming perhaps that Pyongyang would interpret such actions as a stab in the back. A fully-realized dialogue would also have to touch upon issues that the U.S. and South Korea would be sensitive to, such as the future of the Alliance after reunification and the role of U.S. forces on the Peninsula. Tensions between the U.S. and China on a number of other fronts further complicates the prospects of such a dialogue in the foreseeable future.

Given these sensitivities, this may be an area where Track II or Track 1.5 discussions (involving retired officials, nongovernment experts, and officials speaking in a personal capacity) may be the best available option. There appears to be a growing tolerance in China for prominent individuals to openly criticize North Korea, and perhaps this signals that some new doors for frank discussions with retired Chinese diplomats or military officers may be opening. Although Track II dialogue is no substitute for actual diplomacy, it could help kindle the idea within Chinese policy circles that Korean unification could actually be in China's interest -- or at least, that it is not as bad an outcome for China as previously thought.

And although Chinese diplomats are not currently in a position to openly discuss Korean unification, perhaps Chinese bankers are. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank could play an important role in financing reunification, either after the fact or as part of a process of North Korean reform and opening. Either in the AIIB forum or as part of a bilateral dialogue, economic officials from South Korea and China could discuss how a reunified Korean Peninsula could fit into President Xi Jinping's "One Belt, One Road" concept, as well as President Park Geun-hye's "Eurasia Initiative." Beginning a dialogue with China about the economic aspects of Korean reunification might make it a little easier to follow up with further discussions on more sensitive security issues.

In addition to the role of China and the importance of defectors, there are several other aspects of unification that can be considered just about certain, regardless of the circumstances of how unification occurs. The costs will be immense, and the process of integration will be very gradual. Securing North Korea's fissile material and other weapons of mass destruction will be an immediate priority. The U.S. and South Korea will have to fundamentally rethink the goals and structure of their alliance, even though the factors framing this decision are impossible to predict with any accuracy.

Even in the full awareness of these issues, however, it is an impossible task to be fully prepared for Korean unification, however and whenever it may come. The scale of the problems to be addressed is multiplied by the vast number of ways in which they could unfold. Many of the key decisions affecting the process of unification will have to be improvised. Yet that process of improvisation will be made far easier we lay some of the groundwork now.

## **Cordula Von Denkowski**

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**Preparing Social Welfare  
and Social Work for a Unified Korea**

# Preparing Social Welfare and Social Work for a Unified Korea

## What Can We Learn From German Unification?

Cordula von Denkowski, Hochschule Hannover, Germany  
KUJIE Conference, July 8, 2015, Seoul

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## Introduction

- ▶ Focus of research on Korean unification mostly on political and economic aspects
- ▶ Social implications of unification still neglected topic
- ▶ Unification will lead to fundamental social changes on the Korean peninsula
- ▶ Need to prepare for these social changes in order to minimize social exclusion, poverty and social conflicts

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## Main Questions

In case of Korean unification...

1. Which will be the most urgent social problems and the most vulnerable social groups during and after this transition?
2. How can the ROK's social welfare system and social services prepare themselves for addressing such future social problems?
3. What can be learned from the development of social welfare in Germany before and after unification?

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## Possible Social Consequences of Korean Unification

- Depending on transition process (peaceful vs. violent / sudden vs. slow) and its outcome (one Korea, two confederate states)
- Ideal case of peaceful unification:
  - Collapse of NK state institutions will first affect urban population in the North: lack of food, basic health care, education etc.
  - Massive migration flows to China and South Korea
  - Disadvantaged groups (people with disabilities, mental disorders or chronic diseases, young children, elderly people etc.) without treatment or even basic care
  - Social conflicts due to competition for scarce resources (employment, education, health care etc.) and cultural differences (norms, values, prejudice and discrimination)

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## Social Welfare and Social Work in ROK (Kim, 2013; )

- Only short welfare history
- Comparatively low social welfare expenditure rate
- Today: market-centred neo-liberal welfare model
- Social services often privatized: competition among service providers, no quality management system
- Major challenges:
  - Low birth rate and ageing population
  - Increasing rate of contractual workers with no access to welfare system
  - Increase of working poor and income polarization
  - Increasing immigration
  - Relatively low level of public awareness of welfare issues; civil society movements increasingly supervised by central government

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## How to prepare ROK's social welfare system for unification?

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## Case Study: Social Welfare in West and East Germany before and after Unification (1)

### Before Unification:

- ▶ Big differences in social welfare systems between West and East
- ▶ **West Germany:**
  - ▶ subsidiary principle
  - ▶ Social services focus on individual
  - ▶ variety of social service providers
  - ▶ academic education of social workers
  - ▶ Crisis of social work in 1980s: lack of concepts for dealing with urgent social problems of that time

(Amthor, 2012)

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## Case Study: Social Welfare in West and East Germany before and after Unification (2)

### Before Unification:

- ▶ **East Germany**
  - ▶ State-centred social welfare
  - ▶ Official ideology: socialism resolves all social problems
  - ▶ People with social problems regarded as anti-social or pathological
  - ▶ Church-based social work: under government control and limited scope
  - ▶ Focus on collective, state-organized education and healthcare
  - ▶ Non-academic education of social workers

(Nöthling, 2009)

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## Case Study: Social Welfare in West and East Germany before and after Unification (3)

### After Unification:

- ▶ East-German system of social services almost completely abolished
- ▶ West-German system of social welfare and social services transferred to the East and implemented almost without adaptations
- ▶ Reforms and new approaches developed by East German activists during the transition period not taken into account
- ▶ East German social workers re-trained according to Western system

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## Case Study: Social Welfare in West and East Germany before and after Unification (4)

### Advantages:

- ▶ very fast achievement of single uniform system
- ▶ Clear legal framework, institutional structures and rules

### Disadvantages:

- ▶ Functional aspects of Eastern infrastructure and services also abolished
- ▶ Disregard of Eastern professional expertise
- ▶ Western system not prepared for dealing with specific Eastern social problems and with social consequences of transition

**Social problems were the most long-lasting negative consequences after German unification!**

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## Preparing Social Welfare and Social Work for Unification: Some Suggestions

- Increase social welfare expenditure
- Develop social welfare system that can successfully address contemporary challenges in ROK
- Elaborate detailed scenarios about social consequences of unification and develop measures to address them, using expertise of international aid organizations with long-term work experience in NK (Reed, 2011)
- Support European NGOs' approach to capacity building and sustainable development in NK (Park & Hur, 2012)
- Introduce information on social welfare, culture and living conditions in NK in academic curriculum of social work, education, health care etc.
- Promote professionalization of young NK defectors in the social welfare field

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**Nicolas Levi**

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**The case of the cooperation  
between Poland and North Korea**

# International Cooperation for the Korean Unification: The case of the cooperation between Poland and North Korea

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## **Abstract**

The aim of this article is to provide some examples of potential cooperation between both Koreas based on the relations between Poland and North Korea. The first four parts of this article are dedicated to a summary of the relations between North Korea and Poland after 1989. The last part is focusing on the humanitarian and education cooperation between both countries.

The article points to two major areas of consideration. The first is the decreasing role of the economic cooperation between both countries between 1989-2014 in comparison to the period between 1948 and 1989; the second, a meaningful cultural cooperation between both countries.

## **Key-words**

North Korea, DPRK, Poland, Cultural Diplomacy, Humanitarian cooperation

## **Introduction**

In 2014, South Korea and the Visegrad Group (V4 - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) agreed to hold consultations between themselves on a regular basis; the aim was among others to hold seminars on sharing the V4 countries' experience of socio-economic transformation and preparing for the unification of the Korean Peninsula; create a working-level committee for cooperation in the energy field and conduct projects on cultural and youth exchanges. Already in the past and starting from the 1990s, South Korean delegations used to travel around Central Europe observing the transformation in these

countries<sup>1</sup>. The main assumption of this article is the following: Poland is expressing its willingness to play its part in inducing North Korea to change, drawing on its cultural diplomacy toward North Korea.

This article will focus on the relations between North Korea and Poland as a starting point for the implementation of potential cultural projects between both Koreas<sup>2</sup>. Back in the past, the fall of the communism already changed the foreign policy of the DPRK. In 1989, Poland lost its status as a communist friend and its privileged position in contacts with North Korea. However despite the change from communism to capitalism in Poland in 1989 and Poland's establishing relations with South Korea<sup>3</sup>, relations between Poland and DPRK remain at the at a fair level. Poland supports international efforts to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, in particular through the Six Party Talks process, set up in 2003 to address international concerns over the nuclear activities of North Korea<sup>4</sup>. Poland tried also in the past to conducts regular political dialogues with North Korea. Since the 50's, Poland is also highly activating with the humanitarian assistance. This paper aims at preparing a strategy concerning the future of relations between both Koreas based on the relations between Poland and North Korea. The paper aims also to prove that the nuclear realistic policy of the DPRK may jeopardize bilateral relations between both countries. This paper is organized into five substantive chapters, following this introduction. The first section begins with a discussion related to the methodology of this article. The next chapter examines how social changes in Poland which took place in the 80's affected the diplomatic relations between both countries. The third and fourth chapters discuss economical and cultural relations between both countries. The final chapter is dedicated to the humanitarian and education cooperation

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<sup>1</sup> The author represented the Polish side during one of these meetings at the Collegium Civitas in 2012.

<sup>2</sup> North Korea is also called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

<sup>3</sup> Polish People's Republic was the official name of Poland between 1952 and 1989. The country was renamed as Poland in 1989.

<sup>4</sup> *Poland joins international community in protesting North Korea missile launch*, "Radio Poland", 13<sup>th</sup> December 2012. <http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/121363,Poland-joins-international-community-in-protesting-North-Korea-missile-launch>

between both countries. Moreover the paper is based upon Polish, South Korean and North Korean sources. This article looks into the perspectives mentioned above, however due to the quite different topics mentioned it cannot be an exhaustive guide to North Koreans – Poland relations.

### **1. Methodology**

This article uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in order to analyze the events associated to the relations between Poland and the DPRK. The whole is done in order to develop important observations and draw conclusions. On the other side, based on statistical data provided by the Polish Ministry of Economy, some elements are quantifiable and may affect the analysis of the considered policy. The paper aims at interpreting the policy of the two countries towards them with a focus on diplomatic, economical and cultural issues. The collection of data was also affected by the fact that the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not disclosing its diplomatic data for the last 25 years. Therefore some of the sources are based on interviews and Internet data. This article plenty supports the hypothesis and theoretical conclusion that the DPRK national interest was prevalent in the establishment of relations with Poland and that therefore there is an asymmetry in the quality of relations between both countries. This article also is a source of information for potential new developments upon the cooperation between both Koreas.

### **2. Relations between Poland and North Korean between 1989 and 2011**

As an introduction, I would like to summarize the relations between both countries between 1948 and 1989<sup>5</sup>. Poland recognized the DPRK on the 16<sup>th</sup> October 1948. Poland was one of the first states which diplomatically recognized the DPRK, the country which represented the Korean Peninsula in the communist world for the next 41 years. Due to

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<sup>5</sup> For those interested by relations between Poland and the DPRK in the 1948-1989 period, you may consult the following text: Nicolas Levi, *Zarys Stosunków między Polską Republiką Ludową a Koreańską Republiką Ludowo-Demokratyczną* [in] Świat i Polska wobec globalnych wyzwań, [Relations between North Korea and the Communist Poland] (red.) Ryszard Żelichowski, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN - Collegium Civitas, Warszawa 2009, pp. 345-363.

historical reasons, during the period of the Cold War, Poland maintained limited but good relations with the DPRK. On the 16<sup>th</sup> October 1948, Poland was one of the first states which diplomatically recognized the DPRK. It's interesting to remark that Juliusz Burgin, the Polish ambassador to the DPRK was appointed only two years later, on the 24<sup>th</sup> December 1950. Given that Korean War which occurred between 1950 and 1953, exchanges between both countries were limited to a marginal economical cooperation and mostly to the support of Poland to DPRK related to the reconstruction of the DPRK. Poland provided a financial support (transport of medicine and food) and assisted the DPRK by taking in orphans (around 1200) and students who arrived in late 1952<sup>6</sup>. On the 8<sup>th</sup> June 1953 Poland became a member of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) which was supposed to oversee the repatriation process of prisoners of war from the Korean War. This organ was also composed by the Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland.

Between 1953 and 1989, the cooperation between both countries was especially concentrated on cultural exchanges and some minor trade. Due to a similarities (Two Wars which destroyed two capitals: Warsaw and Pyongyang) and common ideologies, many Polish songs and movies were presented in the DPRK and many North Korean movies were available in Poland<sup>7</sup>. As mentioned above, North Korea needed Poland rather than Poland needed North Korea due to its national and economical interests. The first stage of the relationship from 1949 until 1953 could be also characterized as a period during which was intensified efforts of Poland toward the reconstruction of the DPRK. The second phase of the relations from 1953 to 1989 can be characterized as a period where the DPRK look for a financial support from Eastern European Countries such as Poland. This was a period of turbulences and confusion where Poland wasn't in position of challenging the Soviet

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<sup>6</sup> J. Krysowata, *Sieroty Koreańskie*, Karta, nr 42, 2004, pp. 98-122.

<sup>7</sup> Interview with Mieczysław Dedo which was held on the 4<sup>th</sup> April 2010. Mieczysław Dedo is a former Polish diplomat who was twice the Polish ambassador to the DPRK. Mieczysław Dedo passed away in December 2014.

Union as did the DPRK. This was due to the fact that Poland was a member of the Warsaw Pact at the difference of the DPRK which didn't join this organization.

The state of relations between both countries changed in the late 80's for internal and external reasons. First let's mention the internal reasons: when the dominance of the Polish United Workers' Party was eroded and in 1989 had triumphed in Poland's the first partially free parliamentary elections since 1945, the DPRK showed its objections<sup>8</sup>. Eventually Lech Walesa, a non-communist official won the presidency in 1990. On an external basis another fact which depreciates the quality of relations between Poland and the DPRK was the opening of official ties between Poland and South Korea on the 1<sup>st</sup> November of 1989<sup>9</sup>. The relations between Poland and North Korea were strongly affected by this fact as North Korea considered this act as a betrayal<sup>10</sup>. 6 years later in 1995 Polish soldiers were withdrawn from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). Within the next days, the Polish ambassador Ryszard Baturko was recalled by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs after being 4 years in Pyongyang. North Korean authorities also recalled its diplomats based in Warsaw as well as other North Korean based in Poland (North Korean workers, students, technical specialists, sportsmen among others<sup>11</sup>). A major part of the small community of Poles based in the DPRK was also forced to leave this country. Nevertheless it should be noted that the Polish journalist Krzysztof Darewicz was the only one Western reporter who was able to assist to the funerals of Kim Il-sung in 1994<sup>12</sup>. It may be a symbol of the double ecke policy of the DPRK.

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<sup>8</sup> Interview with Mieczysław Dedo which was held on the 4<sup>th</sup> April 2010. Mieczysław Dedo is a former Polish diplomat who was twice the Polish ambassador to the DPRK. Mieczysław Dedo passed away in December 2014.

<sup>9</sup> Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, Piotr Mejssner, *Polish-South Korean Relations: New Ways Forward*, Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs, nr 55 (650), 28<sup>th</sup> April 2014.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Mieczysław Dedo which was held on the 4<sup>th</sup> April 2010.

<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless on the 13<sup>th</sup> May 1989 (before the fall of the Wall of Berlin), a Taekwondo (North Korean version of this version) match between the team of Poland and the DPRK took place in Koszalin. A few weeks later, the junior Polish team went to Pyongyang for the 13<sup>th</sup> International Festival of the Youth and Students which was held in the capital of North Korea. .

<sup>12</sup> Mr. Darewicz, the only Western reporter regularly accredited to North Korea, describing the scene at the statue of Kim Il-sung at his funerals. *Death of a Leader: The Scene; In Pyongyang, Crowds of Mourners Gather at Kim Statue*, "The New York Times", 10<sup>th</sup> July 1994.

These relations changed after 1997. After some consultations between both countries, Pak Sang-am, a new DPRK ambassador to Poland was appointed on the 19<sup>th</sup> July 1997<sup>13</sup>. In 1998 he was removed from his position and sent back to North Korea. The former North Korean ambassador was replaced by Kim Pyong-il<sup>14</sup>, a step-brother of Kim Jong-il, who was considered in the 70's as an enemy of the North Korean leader<sup>15</sup>. Kim Pyong-il was sent to Poland being considered as a threat for the regime. He was nominated as one of the youngest North Korean diplomats of the DPRK diplomatic corps.

### Ages of selected DPRK diplomats

Identity	Year of Birth	Country of Accreditation	Year of Accreditation	Age at the Accreditation	Time spent as an ambassador
Kim Pyong Il	1954	Hungary	1988	34	2 months
Kim Pyong-il	1954	Poland (the 4th country where he's based)	1998	44	16 years
Kim Kwang-sop	1952	Czechoslovakia	1985	33	8 years
Kim Kwang-sop	1952	Austria (the 2nd where he's based)	1993	41	21 years
Jon Hui-jong	1930	Cambodge	1968	38	5 years
Kim Jae-gyong	1934	Sweden	1974	40	2 years
Choe Su-il	1950	Pakistan	1991	41	4 years
Paek Nam-sun	1929	Poland	1974	45	5 years
Kim Hung-rim	1947	Sweden	1995	48	5 years
Pak Ui-chun	1932	Algeria	1980	48	7 years
Ri Won-guk	1931	Zimbabwe	1980	49	5 years
Paek Yong-ho	1945	Morocco	1997	52	3 years
Kim Guk-hun	1919	Cuba	1972	53	5 years

*Document prepared by the author collected from various issues from Vantage Point (a South Korean research journal focused on North Korean issues)*

On the Polish side, A Polish ambassador was one more time sent to Pyongyang in 2001 and Poland became one of the seven European countries with an embassy in the DPRK. Poland was then represented by Wojciech Kaluza (who faces psychological issues after

<sup>13</sup> Pak Sang-am was also representing the DPRK interest in Hungary. *New Ambassadors Present Credentials*, "Magyar Távirati Iroda", 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1998.

<sup>14</sup> The author met Kim Pyong-il several times and wrote several articles related to these meetings and to the person of Kim Pyong-il, for example *Kim Pyong Il: North Korea's Man in Poland*, "DailyNK.com", 17<sup>th</sup> May 2009; A longer biography of Kim Pyong-il is available within the next articles. Nicolas Levi, *A Biography of Kim Pyong Il: A Second Dauphin?* [in] „Parallax” (Suffolk University – USA), vol. VII, nr 1, Fall 2010, pp. 33-49

<sup>15</sup> Nicolas Levi, *A Biography of Kim Pyong Il: A Second Dauphin?* [in] „Parallax” (Suffolk University – USA), vol. VII, nr 1, Fall 2010, pp. 40-47.

serving in North Korea). Between 2005 and 2014, each of Polish ambassadors who served in Pyongyang had a military background (many are retired officers or senior non-commissioned officers). Some of them told the author of this article, that North Korean authorities pay a high esteem to foreign military officials<sup>16</sup>. The last military ambassador of Poland to North Korea was General Edward Pietrzyk who previously served as the Polish ambassador in Iraq (2007-2010). Before him, Roman Iwaszkiewicz served and was a General of the Polish Army. Edward Pietrzyk was replaced by Krzysztof Ciebień in 2014, who is the first Polish civil ambassador since 2005.

Concerning diplomatic visits, in 2001, Radosław Sikorski, the deputy minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland came to the DPRK for political consultations as a part of the strategy on relations with the DPRK of the EU<sup>17</sup>. These consultations were repeated in 2004 and 2007. On the other side, a DPRK delegation was sent to Poland in 2008 and between the 15 and the 17<sup>th</sup> October 2008, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Ryszard Schnepf was in North Korea for the celebration of the 60 years of relations between both countries. 3 years later, the DPRK deputy minister for foreign affairs, Kung Sok-ung was in Poland on the 13<sup>th</sup> September 2011 in Warsaw. Between the 17<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> September 2013, Filip Grzegorzewski, the director of the Asian department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland paid an official visit to the DPRK.

In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. No meetings between representatives of Poland and North Korea took place until 2006. It's also important to mention that in spite of the limited "visible" cooperation between both countries some hidden elements remain unavailable to the public. North Korea

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<sup>16</sup> Interview with Wojciech Kałuza which was held in November 2008 and with Mieczysław Dedo which was held on the 4<sup>th</sup> April 2010. Both were former Polish ambassadors to the DPRK. Wojciech Kałuza passed away in 2010 and Mieczysław Dedo in 2014.

<sup>17</sup> The EU established relations with North Korea in 2001. Bernhard Seliger, *Capacity Building for Economic Change in North Korea* [in] Myungkyu Park, Bernhard Seliger, Sung-jo Park (eds.), *Europe – North Korea? Between Humanitarianism and Business?*, Lit Verlag, Berlin 2010, p. 180.

is also trying to approach the Poles on the issue of establishing relations with capitalist countries especially with Japan and the US. Moreover some of the meetings related to the nuclear program of the DPRK were held in Warsaw. This diplomatic channel in Warsaw is one of the main reasons of the maintaining of relations between both countries in spite of the limited cooperation as we will see in the next point of this article. The role of the DPRK embassy in Warsaw can be compared (within its limits) to the role of the Chinese embassy in Warsaw, which secretly and partially organized the visit of Richard Nixon in Beijing in 1971<sup>18</sup>.

#### **Polish ambassadors to DPRK**

Mieczysław Dedo	1986-1990
Ryszard Batur	1991-1995
Mieczysław Dedo (chargé d'affaires)	1996-2001
Wojciech Kałuza	September 2001- December 2005
Roman Iwaszkiewicz	December 2005-October 2009
Edward Pietrzyk	November 2009-December 2014
Krzysztof Ciebień	December 2014 - ...

#### **DPRK ambassadors to Poland**

No ambassadors	1989-1998
Pak Sang-am	1997
Kim Pyong-il	1998 -2015
Ri Gun	2015-...

<sup>18</sup> Yukinori Komine, *Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China*, Ashgate, Farnham 2008, p. 116.

Since 1989, the following agreements had been signed between Poland and the DPRK:

Type of agreements	Signature Date
Trade and Payment Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the DPRK.	12 <sup>th</sup> May 1992
Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the DPRK on regulation of mutual obligations in clearing rubles in payment relations due to the alteration of the convertible currency payments from 1 January 1991	12 <sup>th</sup> May 1992
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the DPRK on co-operation of fisheries.	2 <sup>nd</sup> October 1997
Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the DPRK on validity of bilateral international agreements in relations between the Republic of Poland and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1 <sup>st</sup> February 2007

### 3. Commercial exchanges between Poland and North Korea

In a nutshell, the commercial cooperation between Poland and North Korea is highly limited to some minor activities as we will see below. Poland is exporting meat, industrial machines and tools, and medical supplies. Concerning North Korea, this country is exporting mainly raw materials and spare parts to Poland. The DPRK is also exporting to

Poland some products which are produced by South Korean companies based in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Both countries seem to have a special relationship at least when it comes to business<sup>19</sup>. Indeed, the first and oldest foreign joint venture company in North Korea is Polish. It's a shipping company with offices in North Korea and Poland. One of the 12 founders of the European Business Association (EBA) in Pyongyang was the Polish CEO of the company in Pyongyang. The foundation ceremony of the EBA was also attended by a visiting Polish business delegation headed by the Vice Minister of the Polish Ministry of Transportation. Additionally According to Felix Abt, a Swiss businessman who was based in Pyongyang in the 2000's, "Polish people were those who contacted him on seeking advice on how to do business in North Korea in the last 12 years than by any other European nationality<sup>20</sup>".

Starting from the mid-2000s many North Koreans were also dispatched on rural areas of Poland where they were learning agricultural techniques in Poland and North Korea<sup>21</sup>. Polish authorities are also donating farm machines to North Korean cooperatives<sup>22</sup>. The first discussions related to this topic were performed via a meeting between a North Korean delegation led by Kil Sang-bong, the vice-chairman of the Central Committee of Agricultural Workers of Korea and the Polish Ministry of Agriculture in 2005<sup>23</sup>.

Mieczysław Dedo, a former Polish Ambassador to North Korea, has always described his visits with the North Korean leadership as "nice,"<sup>24</sup> but emphasizes the difficult economic situation of the country. These difficulties coupled to the economical model of the DPRK limit the exchange between the DPRK and foreign countries. As of 2004, the

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<sup>19</sup> Conversation with Felix Abt (a Swiss businessman who was based in Poland for over 10 years between 1992 and 202) which was held on the 18<sup>th</sup> December 2014.

<sup>20</sup> Conversation with Felix Abt (a Swiss businessman who was based in Poland for over 10 years between 1992 and 202) which was held on the 18<sup>th</sup> December 2014.

<sup>21</sup> Officials of the Polish embassy in the DPRK are regularly visiting the Korea-Poland Friendship Jangsuwon Cooperative Farm in Samsok district. *Friendship meeting with Polish delegation*, KCNA, 19<sup>th</sup> October 1999; *Polish Diplomats Help Korean Farmers*, KCNA, 26<sup>th</sup> October 2006.

<sup>22</sup> *Poland Donates Farm Machine to DPRK*, KCNA, 20<sup>th</sup> November 2008.

<sup>23</sup> *North Korean delegation leaves for Russia, Poland*, KCNA, 26<sup>th</sup> November 2005.

<sup>24</sup> Interview with Mieczysław Dedo which was held on the 4<sup>th</sup> April 2010.

value of the exchanges between both countries was about 10 mln of USD. Concerning economical ties, there were always very limited. The current cooperation is limited to the activities realized by Chopol, a North-Korea-Polish maritime shipping company which is still functioning. It's also worth to note that some Polish companies participated to international trade fair which took place in Pyongyang<sup>25</sup>. Edward Pietrzyk, the former Polish ambassador to the DPRK between 2009 and 2014 has also been seen in the past at some Fair Trade involving business in North Korea and at the main table of receptions between the diplomatic corps in Pyongyang and North Korean businessmen<sup>26</sup>.

Data regarding commercial exchanges for the years between 2010 and 2013 are presented below.

**Exchanges between Poland and the DPRK (in mln of USD)**

Year	Polish Export to the DPRK	DPRK Import to Poland		
2010	0,8	16,9	17,7	-16,1
2011	1,4	10,9	12,3	-9,6
2012	0,2	5,02	5,22	-4,8
2013	0,5	7,5	8	-7

*Source: Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

North Korea has also an outstanding debt owed to Poland since the 70's which is still unregulated. As of 2011, the DPRK owed to Poland a debt estimated at about 4.3 millions of USD<sup>27</sup>. From the Polish point of view, during the Cold War it was seen as necessary

<sup>25</sup> Andrzej Bobber, *The Last Twenty years of Relations between the Republic of Poland and the Democratic People's Republic of Korean: selected aspects*, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 25 nr 2 (Fall-Winter 2011), p. 29.

<sup>26</sup> Guan Yang, *2012 China-DPRK Expo to deepen ties*, "CCTV.com", 13<sup>th</sup> October 2012.

<sup>27</sup> Andrzej Bobber, *The Last Twenty years of Relations between the Republic of Poland and the Democratic People's Republic of Korean: selected aspects*, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 25 nr 2 (Fall-Winter

support to a fraternal regime and the financial returns were considered as unimportant. With increasing demands from the DPRK side for further support for post-War reconstruction and development of North Korea, the question of payment arose and there was some tension which particularly emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc<sup>28</sup>. If North Korea is going to repay its debt, which is rather not possible in the foreseeable future; the trust toward this country may increase as its transparency. Reschedule the debt in exchange of reforms maybe also a solution to this financial issue.

#### 4. Dispute between Poland and North Korea

There are many disputes which are jeopardizing an amelioration of relations between both countries. One of them is related to the renting of parts of the DPRK embassy in Warsaw to various companies (Ciszewski Public Relations, 4Fun Media, The Venue among others) and Non Governmental Organizations (for example the NGO “Czas na Muzykę”) since 2008.

Since the beginning of the 2000's, North Korea has also dispatched dozens of construction and agricultural workers to Poland, sending them to sites in several cities mainly in the northwest, south-east of the country and in the suburbs of Warsaw. The total number working in Poland is currently more than five hundred. They live under the strict control of Polish-speaking North Korean supervisors<sup>29</sup>. As of 2014, they are living in different parts of Poland (Gdansk, Szczecin, suburbs of Krosno, Maciejowice among others). The North Koreans work for more than 10 hours a day. Their wages are apparently deposited into a communal bank account controlled by the North Korean government in

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2011), p. 29. The global debt of the DPRK is estimated at 18 bn. of USD. Bernhard Seliger, *Creating a Good Bank for North Korea* [in] Myungkyu Park, Bernhard Seliger, Sung-jo Park (eds.), *Europe – North Korea? Between Humanitarianism and Business?*, Lit Verlag, Berlin 2010,

<sup>28</sup> Yang Moon-soo, *North Korea's External Debts: Trend and Characteristics*, KDI Review of the North Korea Economy, March 2012.

<sup>29</sup> Nicolas Levi, *North Koreans Suffer Around the World*, “DailyNK.com”, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2009.

dollars or in zlotys, the Polish currency. More than the half their wages are deducted for the cost of food or so-called voluntary contributions. There are many such similar cases. As far back as 2006 the Polish newspaper “Gazeta Wyborcza” covered the story of North Koreans working as welders in the Gdansk Shipyard, which was suffering a staffing crisis. They were supposed to be paid 600 Euro a month; however after deductions they were receiving only 15 Euro. The problem in Poland, as for many of the countries where the North Koreans are to be found, is that there are no legal restrictions or minimum wages, so as long as the North Koreans have work permits there is nothing more their host government can or need do. The only possible legal basis for contesting the situation, for some of the workers at least, is Article 1 of an “EU Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings”.

Moreover in 2005, the American authorities accused North Korea of manufacturing high-quality counterfeit \$100 bill notes. Many of these notes were manufactured under auspices of the government of North Korea and were exported through North Korean diplomatic representations. According to American officials, one of these diplomatic representations might be the Polish outpost which was used to provide notes to potential customers, including Sean Garland, the leader of the Marxist-Leninist Worker’s Party, an arm of the Official Irish Republican Army, who regularly visited the North Korean embassies in Russia and Poland<sup>30</sup>.

In May 2011, Three North Koreans were arrested in Ukraine for trying to smuggle 20,000 packs of cigarettes into Poland. There were supposed to be working at the North Korean embassy in Poland. All of them were protected by their diplomatic immunity<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> Bill Gertz, *U.S. accuses North Korea of \$100 bill counterfeiting*, The Washington Times, 12<sup>th</sup> October 2005.

<sup>31</sup> *North Korean diplomats moonlight as smugglers*, “RT.com”, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2011. The DPRK embassy has already been engaged in some smuggling issues in the past (essentially starting from the 70’s), when the North Korean leadership tried to attract large amount of foreign currencies to Pyongyang. This was possible through the selling of smuggled items to some Poles.

In 2013, Andrzej Kompa, the owner of Kompa Investment Co., lent more than \$2 million to the North Korean government through the embassy to carry out work on the building in 2005<sup>32</sup>. The North Korean government never reimbursed the Polish businessman.

In spite of these (not always confirmed) misunderstandings between North Korean and Polish authorities and because of the minor consequences of these facts, economic relations between both countries have a real potential. In the current economic situation, Polish companies face many challenges, they must find new markets and North Korea is an interesting option because its local tariffs are lower than in China and the North Korean market of wealthy people is increasing. Therefore due to historical and constructive relationships and on its experience, Poland should be a pioneer in terms of prosperous relations with North Korea. Invest in North Korea should no more be considered as a risky adventure or bet, it should envisaged as a kind of new frontier of business development (which is illustrated by more than 130 Chinese companies already present in the DPRK<sup>33</sup>) for Polish companies. However major obstacles include North Korea's aggression behavior, its nuclear activities, some issues dealing with human rights record, and its illegal activities. Nevertheless We can hope that with the death of Kim Jong-il and the profound economic changes through the open policy of Kim Jong-eun<sup>34</sup>, the new leader of North Korea, we will see a new path concerning the relations between the DPRK and foreign countries and I personally believe, these relations may result on a bright future for the North Korean nation. We also find that economic relations between Poland and the DPRK have a substantially greater non-commercial component through the cultural cooperation.

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<sup>32</sup> Nicolas Levi, *North Korea refuses to pay Polish builders*, "The Telegraph", 28<sup>th</sup> January 2013.

<sup>33</sup> Stanislas Roussin and César Ducruet, *The Nampo-Pyongyang Corridor*, in] Myungkyu Park, Bernhard Seliger, Sung-jo Park (eds.), *Europe – North Korea? Between Humanitarianism and Business?*, Lit Verlag, Berlin 2010., p. 265.

<sup>34</sup> Kim Jong-eun is setting new priorities on economical issues and by emphasising "people's livelihood". You Ji, *Kim Jong-un's Power Consolidation and Worsening ChinaDPRK Relations*, East Asian Policy, nr 4, vol. 4, p. 106.

## 5. The humanitarian and cultural cooperation between Poland and the DPRK

With the activation of the Lisbon Treaty, signed by the EU member states on 13<sup>th</sup> December 2007, the EU became apolitical unit with a defined strategy concerning North Korea. From this year, Poland had to follow EU directives regarding North Korea in some subjects such as the nuclear crisis or human rights. However there are some fields where Poland can act alone. This field covers the some of the interactions between both countries. In spite of the nature of the North Korean regime, a win-win game can be imagined through humanitarian and cultural cooperation<sup>35</sup>

Cultural diplomacy can be defined as follow. It's a set of actions, which are based on the exchange of ideas, values, and traditions whether to strengthen socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interests. Cultural diplomacy can be practiced by either the public sector, private sector or the civil society.

First Poland is supporting North Korea on humanitarian issues (including financial support and dealings with humanitarian rights). Regarding humanitarian rights, the Polish Embassy in Pyongyang is regularly informing the DPRK government on its position on human rights. For example in may 2008, when a DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister visited Poland for consultations, Krzysztof Ciebień, a former Polish consulate to China, said that DPRK diplomats were open in its criticism of the human rights situation in North Korea<sup>36</sup>. Regarding humanitarian assistance, Polish humanitarian organizations, such as "Polska Akcja Humanitarna" (PAH), are present over North Korea. It's one of the few aid agencies present in North Korea. The considered support is however partially monitored by North

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<sup>35</sup> Nicolas Levi, *Evaluation and prospects concerning Relations between Poland and North Korea* [at] "9<sup>th</sup> Korean Studies Graduate Students Convention", Warsaw, 17-20<sup>th</sup> September 2012; Nicolas Levi, *Dlaczego Polska musi utrzymywać stosunki z KRLD?* [Why Poland should maintain diplomatic relations with DPRK?], Poland Asia Research Center, 5th November 2010.

<http://www.polska-azja.pl/2010/11/05/nicolas-levi-dlaczego-polska-musi-utrzymywac-stosunki-z-krld/>

<sup>36</sup> Krzysztof Ciebień is the current Polish ambassador to the DPRK. He was nominated on the 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2014. *Zapis przebiegu posiedzenia komisji*, <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?documentId=156B08DD9D458645C1257CB6004A8819> (last access on the 5th January 2015).

Korean entities and the previous mentioned PAH<sup>37</sup>. The humanitarian support has a historical background. Since 1952, Poland is assisting the DPRK in some efforts to grow its own capabilities of food production. Polish organizations sent large quantities of rural technologies and fertilizers and trained North Koreans<sup>38</sup>.

Besides Poland is also accepting North Korean defectors, some of them are living in different parts of the country<sup>39</sup>. However one of the problem lies on the fact that some of the North Korean defectors do not speak Polish and therefore can find only physical jobs<sup>40</sup>. The South Korean community in Poland is also not big enough to provide full-time jobs to potential North Koreans defectors.

The DPRK policy may change with the arrival of a new leader such as Kim Jong-un. This leader is realizing a policy which is different from the one which was realized by his father. The traditional North Korean planned and militaries economy is being emulated by a more reform oriented process. Therefore we can imagine that the North Korean leadership will promote some economical changes which may open North Korea and change the nature of the regime. This lack of economic expertise due to a closing to the knowledge transfer for sixty years as of now combined to the long relations between both countries may have an impact on the nature of relations between the DPRK and Poland. Furthermore since 2002, North Korean bureaucrats have been authorized to receive

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<sup>37</sup> This paper must also evocate the role of Joanna Hosaniak, a Polish woman committed to Human Rights in North Korea. She's a senior programs officer with the activist group Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights.

<sup>38</sup> Nicolas Levi, *Zarys Stosunków między Polską Republiką Ludową a Koreańską Republiką Ludowo-Demokratyczną* [in] *Świat i Polska wobec globalnych wyzwań*, [Relations between North Korea and the Communist Poland] (red.) Ryszard Żelichowski, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN - Collegium Civitas, Warszawa 2009, pp. 347-355.

<sup>39</sup> For security purposes the source of the information won't be quoted. Some North Korean students who were based in Poland in the 80's defected in 1989.

<sup>40</sup> Further information related to North Korean defectors in Poland maybe found there: Nicolas Levi, *Can North Korean defectors settle and live in Central Europe?* [at] „Whiter the two Koreas? Continuity and Change in the North Korean Peninsula”, Budapest (Hungary), Central Europe University, 6-8th September 2012.

training from abroad in some economic-related subjects<sup>41</sup>. Then what could be the role of Poland in such a configuration? In addition to NGO activities, some Polish Universities may opt for an expanding of their engagements with the DPRK. We can also imagine that Polish economists may educate the future leadership of North Korea. Some Polish specialists (such as Grzegorz Kolodko, a Polish professor of economics and a former Minister of Finance between 2002 and 2003, who went to North Korea for education project purposes or Jacek Mironski who was an active participant to the conference entitled “Economic Reform and the Development of Economic Relations between the EU and the DPRK“which took place in Pyongyang in October 2005) may participate to the elaboration of a new DPRK leadership. These specialists may be motivated for educating about entrepreneurship, free markets and the linkages between economic and societal liberalization at the relatively open-minded Pyongyang University of Sciences and Technology or through the Swiss MBA Program<sup>42</sup>. The aim of Poland would be to provide some knowledge to North Korean specialists with certain knowledge in order to enable them to change their country. In exchange we can imagine that North Korea may give access to Poland to its raw materials (for instance giving some concessions).

In terms of culture<sup>43</sup>, the situation is different. Poland is participating to an important number of cultural events in the DPRK and North Koreans are also visible through contests in Poland. Polish movies companies participated to the 17<sup>th</sup> International Festival of

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<sup>41</sup> Peter M. Beck and Nicolas Reader, *Training for Economic Reform* [in] Myungkyu Park, Bernhard Seliger, Sung-jo Park (eds.), *Europe – North Korea? Between Humanitarianism and Business?*, Lit Verlag, Berlin 2010, P. 45.

<sup>42</sup> JoonYoung-hur, *From Communist Cadre into Capitalistic Managers?: The Case of Western* [in] Myungkyu Park, Bernhard Seliger, Sung-jo Park (eds.), *Europe – North Korea? Between Humanitarianism and Business?*, Lit Verlag, Berlin 2010, P. 45.p. 316.

<sup>43</sup> There is a DPRK-Poland Friendship Association with branches all over Poland. *Radom Branch of Poland-Korea Association Formed*, KCNA, 12<sup>th</sup> September 2004; *Branch of Poland-Korea Association Inaugurated in Poland*, KCNA, 11<sup>th</sup> November 2005. Members of this association are defending the North Korean political model, *Wooden Sculpture Presented to Kim Il Sung by Polish Figures*, “KCNA”, 24<sup>th</sup> December 2014. They are also translating in Polish the propaganda sent from Pyongyang. *Kim Jong Un's Work Published in Poland*, “KCNA”, 11<sup>th</sup> July 2014. Those who are belonging this association are sometimes considered as “useful idiots”.

Cinema of Pyongyang<sup>44</sup>. In this festival Poland has won many awards, including the prize for Best Film in the year 2000 for the film “U Pana Boga za piecem”<sup>45</sup>. Meanwhile many North Koreans were educated at the famous Leon Schiller National Higher School of Film, Television and Theatre of Łódź. Some of them participated to the conceptions of Polish movies. *Rex* and *Przygody Kapitana Clippera* (The Adventures of Captain Clipper), both Polish animated series were prepared by a certain number of North Koreans who were educated in Poland (including Kim Un-chun, Chon Song-chol, Kim Dog-jong, Kim Kwan-son, Kwon Jon-kil, Pak Gwang-hyon – decorator. All of them worked on the preparation of the Polish cartoon *Rex*). Many North Korean companies are also still subcontracted to work for European producers of children films<sup>46</sup>.

At the spring festival (which gather artists from the entire world) of Pyongyang, Poland is also sending some delegations (in 2002 from the Frederic Chopin University of Music of Warsaw and from the University of Music of Wroclaw in 2003). During the 25<sup>th</sup> Spring Friendship Festival in April 2007 the Polish singer Danuta Stankiewicz won the contest<sup>47</sup>. In 2012, Poland was represented by Joanna Lawrynowicz who participated to the previous mentioned festival between the 10<sup>th</sup> and the 18<sup>th</sup> April 2012<sup>48</sup>.

On the other side Poland is promoting young North Korean scholars who want to get an education in Poland<sup>49</sup>. The North Korean students Choe Jang-hung and Ri Yu-jong who

<sup>44</sup> 제 17 차 평양봄철국제상품전람회 개막 (chae 17 ja Pjongjang Pomcholkukjaesangpomcheonlamhoe kaemak), the 17<sup>th</sup> Festival of Cinema of Pyongyang. “ryomyong.com”, 13<sup>th</sup> May 2014.

<sup>45</sup> Wiosenny Festiwal Przyjaźni [The Spring Festival of Friendship], [http://www.pjongjang.msz.gov.pl/pl/c/MOBILE/aktualnosci/promocja\\_i\\_kultura/](http://www.pjongjang.msz.gov.pl/pl/c/MOBILE/aktualnosci/promocja_i_kultura/) (accessed on the 10th December 2014). Some Polish producing companies participated to these event (Chronos and Poltel).

<sup>46</sup> Park Sung-jo, *Software and Animation in North Korea* [in] Myungkyu Park, Bernhard Seliger, Sung-jo Park (eds.), *Europe – North Korea? Between Humanitarianism and Business?*, Lit Verlag, Berlin 2010, p. 287.

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.skene.pl/osoba/4425/DANQA-Danuta-Stankiewicz> (accessed on the 3rd May 2014).

<sup>48</sup> [http://english.lawrynowicz.info/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=197&Itemid=118](http://english.lawrynowicz.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=197&Itemid=118) (accessed on the 3rd May 2014).

<sup>49</sup> Many North Koreans were also educated in Poland. For example until the end of the 90’s, a dozen of North Koreans were studying at the Gdynia Maritime University. Due to structural changes which occurred in Poland, all of them (including two North Korean agents who were responsible for their journey in Gdynia) left Poland from one day to the next. The reason for their departure mentioned by the DPRK embassy in Poland was their participation on military exercises in North Korea. They never came back to Poland.

won recently the Chopin Prize<sup>50</sup>. A soccer match between Poland and the DPRK is also planned in a near future<sup>51</sup>.

Regarding educational exchanges, some projects are realized between both countries. For example a Polish North Korean dictionary of 530 pages was published on 7500 copies in 2012. This dictionary was jointly prepared by Polish koreanists (Małgorzata Terlecka, Tadeusz Korsak and Magdalena Hornung) and North Korean scholars (Kim Song-il, Kim Min-chol and Kim Jong-ho). This project was supported by the Polish Humanitarian Organization PAH and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. North Korean scholars who were involved in the projects were students from the Polish Faculty of the University Of Foreign Languages Of Pyongyang, which was established in the 2005<sup>52</sup>. Jo Song-mu<sup>53</sup>, the head of this faculty received a Polish award as an expert on the Polish language in 2010<sup>54</sup>. Some North Koreans were also granted facilities to study the Polish language at the Warsaw Centre of Polish Language and Culture for Foreigners. North Korean is also sometimes exhibited in Poland. Between the 2<sup>nd</sup> and the 6<sup>th</sup> September 2008, there was an exhibition in Warsaw which was dedicated to the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the opening of diplomatic relations between Poland and the DPRK. Other exhibitions were held mainly in Gdansk, where there is a major University Center of Asian Studies. One of them was held in September 2014<sup>55</sup>.

## Conclusion

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<sup>50</sup> *Korean Children Prove Successful in International Piano Contest*, KCNA, 18<sup>th</sup> May 2012.

<sup>51</sup> Quote from Łukasz Graban, a Polish official responsible for Korean affairs at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The quote was issued during an open meeting with students from the University of Warsaw on the 12<sup>th</sup> November 2014.

<sup>52</sup> The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsored computers for the Faculty of Polish Language at the Foreign Languages University in Pyongyang. Interview with Professor Waldemar Dziak, the most preeminent expert on North Korean issues in Poland. The interview took place on the 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2012.

<sup>53</sup> Jo Song-mu is a former North Korean orphan who was educated in Poland in the 50's (during his High School and University).

<sup>54</sup> Mateusz Wojnarowski, *Pan Jo Song-mu i nagroda za promocję Polski w Świecie!*, „northkorea.pl”, 11th December 2010.

<sup>55</sup> *Wystawa koreańskiej sztuki w Gdańsku*, <https://kfapolska.wordpress.com/2014/09/17/wystawa-koreańskiej-sztuki-w-gdańsku/>, „KFA Poland”, 17th September 2014.

I would like to conclude by underlying the cultural diplomacy of Poland toward North Korea. Considering how many of the actions are, we cannot but conclude that Poland is doing well and is even ahead of many Western countries in cultural diplomacy toward the DPRK. Most of the Polish cultural Diplomacy is government-controlled. This allows Polish authorities to design carefully actions. On the other hand, it hampers the development of a cultural policy based on a network of independent actors. It should be underlined that a deep knowledge of the other's culture can be the first step towards the improvement of international relations. Based on the Polish knowledge of the North Korean reality, some joint actions may be held between South Korean, North Korean and Polish Authorities. In the past a famous South Korean organizer of concert asked whether it would be possible to organize a joint concert of South and North Korean artists in Poland. The project was never realized however it may be an idea to promote in the future.

## **Ranjit Kumar Dhawan**

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### **India's Efforts for Peace and Unification of the Korean Peninsula**

## India's Efforts for Peace and Unification of the Korean Peninsula<sup>1</sup>

Ranjit Kumar Dhawan<sup>2</sup>

### Abstract

*India has made significant efforts for peace and unification of the Korean peninsula. An Indian was appointed as the chairman of the UNTCOK and he opposed the division of the Korean peninsula. When the Korean War broke out India sent a medical team and made efforts for the armistice agreement. Later India chaired the NNRC for repatriation of the POWs. During the Cold War period India's policy towards the Korean peninsula was guided by non-alignment. After the end of the Cold War, India initiated economic liberalisation and "Look East" policy which gave impetus to its renewed engagement with the Korean peninsula. India has consistently urged North Korea to dismantle its nuclear and missile programs and has supported peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula. India's deepening engagement with the two Koreas has been recognised by the US and it has been seeking India's help in diffusing tensions on the Korean peninsula. This paper makes an analysis of the efforts made by India in the Korean peninsula for peace and unification in a historical perspective.*

### Introduction

India's relations with the Korean peninsula go back into centuries. The early connections between India and Korea can be found in the myth of the marriage of an Indian princess from Ayodhya named Suriratna to a Korean King Kim Suro of Gaya kingdom in 48 A.D. In the 8<sup>th</sup> century Korean monk Haecho visited India and wrote his travelogues about the five kingdoms of India. The cultural transmission through Buddhism played an important role in shaping the Korean culture as it was a flourishing religion in Korea during the ancient times and was patronised by the kings of various Korean kingdoms. In the modern times Mahatma Gandhi's principles of *Satyagraha* and the non-violent struggle against British colonialism in India had its

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<sup>1</sup> This is a draft paper and should not be quoted. The earlier version of this paper was presented in the Canadian Peace Research Association (CPRA) Annual Conference, 3-5 June 2015, Ottawa, Canada. It is an improved version of the paper titled "India's Non-Aligned Foreign Policy: A Study of India's Role in the Korean Peninsula, 1947-54," presented in the Researcher's Association for the Study of Korea (RASK), 22-23 March 2013, New Delhi, India.

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impact on the Korean people's movement against brutal Japanese colonial regime (1910-45). The *Samil* or the March First movement of 1919, which was a non-violent Korean national movement against Japanese colonial rule inspired Indians as well. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of independent India has mentioned in his book, "The Glimpses of World History" about the Korean non-violent freedom movement. Nehru wrote this book when he was under imprisonment in British India. The great Indian scholar Rabindranath Tagore wrote a quatrain where he described Korea as "Lamp of the East" and was published in Dong-A Ilbo newspaper in 1929, which provided great inspiration to the Korean masses in their struggle against colonialism.

Korea and India were liberated from the colonial occupation in 1945 and 1947 respectively but on the same day, that is August 15. Also, both countries suffered the horrors of national division along with independence; Korean peninsula was divided into North and South Korea on ideological grounds whereas British India was divided into India and Pakistan on the communal lines. Since historical times, Korean peninsula had been an arena of contestations between various powers in the region, mainly due to its geographical location. It is often remarked that "Korea is like a shrimp surrounded by the whales." During the Cold War era also, it became an arena of rivalry between the big powers. On the other hand, India adopted the non-aligned foreign policy after independence which reflected the ethos of Indian freedom struggle against colonialism and the ideologies of the founding fathers of the Indian republic. The crisis in the Korean peninsula had been a testing ground for the Indian non-aligned foreign policy. India made its utmost efforts to prevent the partition of the Korean peninsula and played a neutral and dynamic role during the Korean War (1950-53), which brought lots of appreciations but also condemnations.

During the Cold War period India's policy towards the Korean peninsula was guided by non-alignment and it maintained equidistance and balanced approach towards both Koreas. With the end of the Cold War India made a strategic shift in its economic and foreign policy, it liberalised its economy and initiated "Look East" policy. This gave impulse to India's renewed engagement with the East Asia region including the Korean peninsula. In the subsequent years India has developed closer relations with both Koreas. India has been providing humanitarian

and educational assistance to North Korea and has developed strong economic and strategic ties with South Korea. India is among the few countries in the world which has maintained cordial ties with both Koreas.

Korean peninsula has remained at the center of East Asian regional peace and stability and is a major conflict zone in the world. The acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles by North Korea has made the Korean peninsula one of the most dangerous regions in the world. With the presence of heavily armed soldiers on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which has divided the Korean peninsula since the Korean War (1950-53) into two antagonistic and ideologically opposed states, any miscalculation could lead to horrific consequences. While the Cold War has ended in other parts of the world but the Korean peninsula continues to be a Cold War zone and remains divided even after seven decades since liberation from the colonial occupation. Although India is not a major player in the Northeast Asia region but as members of several international organisations it has made efforts to bring down tensions and maintain peace in the region. In the recent years the United States (US) has been discussing issues related to the Korean peninsula with India and has been seeking its help in controlling the proliferation of dangerous weapons by North Korea and diffusing tensions on the peninsula. This paper makes an analysis of the efforts made by India for peace and unification of the Korean peninsula in a historical perspective.

### **Origin of the Korean Crisis**

With the defeat of Japan in 1945 by the Allied Powers, the thirty-five years of brutal Japanese colonial rule in Korea came to an end. As a result the Japanese forces surrendered to the Allied powers. Soon after liberation from Japan, the Korean leaders tried to form an independent government in the Korean peninsula. Just before the surrender, the Japanese colonial regime in Korea approached Yo Un-hyong, a prominent left-wing Nationalist leader<sup>3</sup> to form a transitional government in Korea, so as to maintain law and order and to protect the life and property of the retreating Japanese from the Korean peninsula. Subsequently on August 16, 1945, Yo Un-hyong

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<sup>3</sup> Yo Un-hyong never joined the Communist Party because of his disagreements with Marxism such as regarding the materialist interpretation of history. His political ideas were a mixture of Christianity, Wilsonian democracy and socialism (Cumings 2005: 191).

formed the “Committee for the Preparation of National Reconstruction” which functioned as provisional central government in Korea. The committee comprised of both Nationalists and Socialists except the extreme right wing Nationalist leaders who boycotted the committee (Nahm 1988: 332).

But the joy of independence remained short lived for Koreans as the country soon got engulfed in the larger Cold War confrontations. The Allied powers had divided the Korean peninsula along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel or the 38 degrees north latitude. When the committee members came to know that Korea had been divided by the Allied powers, the members quickly resolved to form a “People’s Republic of Korea” in their meeting in Seoul on September 6, 1945 and appointed Syngman Rhee as the President and Yo as the Vice-President of the People’s Republic (*Ibid*). The ministers in the government were drawn from both Nationalist and Socialist factions in the country. But soon in the northern half of the peninsula, which came under the control of the Soviet Union, the Communists under the leadership of Kim Il Sung consolidated their power.

In the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Allied powers in December 1945, a decision was taken to form a Joint Commission of the United States (US) and Soviet military commands and a five year trusteeship of the US, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and Nationalist China in Korea. However the ideological differences between the Allied powers led to an impasse. With no further progress being made the US was compelled to submit the Korean problem in the United Nations (UN) in September 1947. In November 1947 the UN General Assembly voted for the setting up of a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), which was given the responsibility to conduct free and fair elections for the formation of an independent national government in the Korean peninsula. India was one of the nine members of UNTCOK.

### **Efforts Made by India for Peace before the Korean War**

In 1948 K.P.S Menon of India was unanimously elected as the chairman of UNTCOK. Before his appointment as the chairman, he had said that, “Our commission does not recognize the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. It is only interested in it as a political anomaly which must be removed. In our eyes,

Korea is one and indivisible”<sup>4</sup>. This suggests that India was from the beginning itself opposed to the partition of the Korean peninsula. But the Cold War ideological confrontations once again came in way for the elections in the Korean peninsula. The Soviet Union and the de-facto political regime in the north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel refused to participate in the elections for the formation of the national government in Korea. As a result the matter was once again brought to the UN. The UN Interim Commission passed a resolution for the elections only in the South of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. K.P.S Menon opposed the idea of holding separate elections but at the time of voting India voted in favour of the UN Interim Commission’s decision (see Tiwari 1988: 17). After the elections India refused to recognise the Government of South Korea as the sole legitimate authority in the entire Korean peninsula. But later India voted in favour of the US proposal of extending UN recognition to the government of South Korea as the only legally constituted government in Korea in the third regular session of the UN General Assembly (Kim 2010: 25).

After the elections under the UNTCOK, it was replaced by United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK). This time again an Indian, Anup Singh was elected as the chairman of one of the sub-committees of UNCOK. India made its utmost efforts for national reconciliation in the Korean peninsula. Kim ChanWhan says, “As member of the UNCOK, Indian representative, Anup Singh, repeatedly tried to contact the North Korean regime to promote the unification but to no avail” (Kim 2010: 25-26). Having itself under gone through the horrors of national division, India made due efforts to reunify the Korean peninsula. But India could not stop the fate of Korean division which was followed by Korean War, one of the most barbaric wars fought in the history of mankind.

### **India’s Involvement during the Korean War**

The Korean War was one of the most horrible and futile war in the world history. After three years of the war no party could be regarded as winner or loser because the war ended approximately at the same point from where it had started. A largely civil war in Korea was appropriated by the Cold War rivals and became an international conflict, “which solved nothing, only the status quo ante was restored” (Cumings 2005: 298). The war led to severe human

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<sup>4</sup> UN DOC. A/523, 9 February 1948, p. 20, cited in Kim (2010: 24)

sufferings, death, poverty and barbarity. The Korean War had the potential to spill into another World War; however the war came to a halt after interventions from several countries who warned that the protracted war in the Korean peninsula was threatening the world peace and security. Among those countries which were making serious efforts for peace and reconciliation in Korea was India. India pursuing a non-aligned policy did not join any of the parties in the military confrontations but played a dynamic role.

The military confrontations broke out in the Korean peninsula with the launch of massive aggression on the militarily ill-equipped South Korea by the North on 25 June 1950. India criticised North Korea for attacking South Korea but when a resolution for the halting of aggression and restoration of peace and security in the Korean peninsula was brought in the UN Security Council on 27 June 1950, Indian representative did not participate in the voting because of lack of specific instructions from the Indian government. But on 29 June 1950, India endorsed the Security Council resolution by issuing the following statement,

“The Government of India have given the most careful consideration to the resolution of the Security Council in the context of events in Korea and also of their general foreign policy....The halting of aggression and the quick restoration of peaceful conditions are essential preludes to a satisfactory settlement.”<sup>5</sup>

The North Korean army swiftly swept across the southern half and captured the entire Korean peninsula, barring the Busan perimeter, a 230 km long, small strip of land in the south-eastern part of the peninsula. The US forces led by General Douglas MacArthur under the UN flag rushed to provide military support to South Korea with the orders from President Harry S. Truman. Korea suddenly became important for the “containment policy” of US. India did not endorse the formation of US led UN command for Korea and declined to send its troops to join the UN coalition forces. As K.P. Karunakaran has stated, “India declined to send armed forces to Korea on the ground that the structure and organization of her armed forces were designed for home defence and that her internal needs at that time were such that the government could not afford to send any of those forces to remote areas out of India” (Karunakaran 1958: 103).

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<sup>5</sup> The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 30 June 1950, quoted in Karunakaran (1958: 101-102).

Later India warned the UN forces against crossing north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel as that would provoke Communist China and it would lead to larger confrontations. Since Communist China was not a member of the UN at that time so it informed the then Indian ambassador in Beijing, K.M. Pannikar that if UN forces crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, China would be forced to enter the Korean War. Communist China feared that its own territorial sovereignty would come under threat by the US forces.<sup>6</sup> Truman did not heed to India's warnings and gave permission to General MacArthur with the support of the UN to cross into North Korea. When the UN forces were about to reach the Yalu river border with China, Chinese People's Volunteers, who had gathered in large numbers along the border entered into the war. This led to heavy casualties as the war got escalated because of surprise Chinese attack. Also, due to severe cold and lack of food and other essential goods there was an increase in number of deaths. During the Korean War, India sent a field ambulance to Korea. The 60<sup>th</sup> Indian Field Ambulance Unit, which was a unit of the Indian Airborne Division, consisted of 346-men including 14 doctors (Kim 2010: 26). The unit was led by Lt. Col A.G Rangaraj. This mobile army surgical hospital treated more than half of the wounded soldiers, an average of 250-300 civilians a day, during the UN operations in late 1951 (Panda 2012). India continued to make efforts for peace and reconciliation in the Korean peninsula. With the efforts of India and several other countries, an armistice agreement<sup>7</sup> was signed as "both the warring sides accepted a resolution sponsored by India, and the ceasefire was declared on 27 July 1953" (MEA 2013).

### **India's Role in the Korean Peninsula after the Korean War**

After the cessation of the military confrontations in 1953, the urgent need for the repatriation of the prisoners of war (POWs) became a major issue. India again played an important role. Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) was established in 1953 to repatriate 23,000 POWs,

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<sup>6</sup> Historically the relationship between China and the Korean peninsula had been referred to as "Lips and Teeth." The security of the mainland China was linked with the security of the Korean peninsula. Prior to the Korean War China had fought against Japan in 1894-95 to protect its interests in Korea.

<sup>7</sup> The Korean War ended with an armistice but there was no peace agreement. The two Koreas remain technically at war with each other to this day. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is the de-facto border between the two Koreas since the Korean War. The areas across the border are heavily militarized.

who refused to be repatriated to their respective countries. Lt. General K.S Thimayya of India served as the chairman of NNRC.

The Custodian Force of India under the leadership of S.P.P Thorat and comprising of about 3000 men played an important role in the repatriation of POWs. India's role as the chairman of NNRC was appreciated by both blocs. "The two Indian Generals K.S Thimayya and S.P.P Thorat are still remembered with gratitude and admiration in Korea for the selfless and onerous task they did for the peace-keeping and POWs repatriation work in Korea" (Bhatnagar 1979: 129). NNRC remained in existence till 1954 after which it was finally disbanded.

### **Criticisms of India's Role during the Korean Crisis, 1947-54**

Although India's role in the Korean peninsula during the period 1947-54 was appreciated by several countries but it also had to face heavy criticisms on certain occasions by some people including the then leader of South Korea, Syngman Rhee. As a non-aligned country, India had to face wrath from both blocs. India was considered to be pro-communist by the then leadership in South Korea. There were several instances when India's stand was questioned by the critics. Some of these are as follows:

- 1) Although K.P.S Menon had opposed the holding of separate elections but later India voted in favour of the UN Interim Commission's decision for elections only in the South of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, which institutionalised the partition of the Korean peninsula.
- 2) After the elections in South Korea under UNTCOK and victory of Syngman Rhee as president in 1948, India refused to recognise it as the legitimate government in the entire Korean peninsula. Later India voted in favour of the US proposal of extending UN recognition to the government of South Korea as the only legally constituted government in Korea.
- 3) When the Korean War broke out the Indian representative in the UN, B N Rau hurriedly blamed North Korea as the aggressor, without giving the North Korean representatives opportunity for explanation (Tiwari 1988: 18).

- 4) When a resolution for the halting of aggression and restoration of peace on the Korean peninsula was brought in the Security Council on 27 June 1950, Indian representative did not participate in the voting but on 29 June 1950 India endorsed it.
- 5) India abstained from voting for the resolution regarding the creation of the UN command under the leadership of US following the outbreak of the Korean War.
- 6) India did not endorse the resolution by US and its allies on 7 October 1950 in UN General Assembly for allowing the UN forces to cross over into North Korea and reunify the Korean peninsula.
- 7) When Communist China entered the Korean War, India refused to accept it as an aggressor.

These issues had been contentious and created confusions. The then South Korean foreign minister, in a letter to the UN Secretary General on 8 June 1955 expressed that, "...knowing as we that India, with its propensities to curry favor with the communist countries would side with the communist members on crucial questions. This Government's fears were fully substantiated by the Indian Chairman's pro-communist action within the Neutral nationals Repatriation Commission" (see Kim 2010: 31). The Government of South Korea was from the beginning itself hostile to India as the chairman of the NNRC and even threatened to use force against the Indian custodian force upon its landing in Korea. When Indian troops were compelled to open fire on some POWs to repel rioting in a camp on 1 October 1953, the South Korean Government spokesman vehemently condemned the incident as violation of the armistice agreement and warned that his Government would "take action to prevent Indians killing any more of our citizens" (Karunakaran 1958: 128). Despite India's contribution of its troops for peace efforts, it has to face condemnations. As Sandeep Bhardwaj (2014) writes, "It was a thankless job for which India received flak from all sides."

### **India and the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War**

After the end of the Korean War, there was not much engagement between India and the Korean peninsula for almost a decade. The bilateral relations were revived in 1962 when India established consulate level relations with both Koreas, recognising the existence of two separate

political entities on the Korean peninsula but also supporting their unification. The consulate level relationship was upgraded to full diplomatic ties with both Koreas on December 10, 1973. India's efforts of giving recognition to both Koreas were in contrast to the Cold War rivals who did not officially recognise the existence of one of the other Koreas. In the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) summits and in the UN, India consistently supported the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula without any foreign interference. North Korea also became a member of the NAM in 1975. Since becoming the member of NAM, North Korea has played an active role in the organisation. During the seventh NAM summit at New Delhi in 1983,

“The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed their support for the Korean people to reunify their homeland peacefully and their efforts to achieve this goal free of all foreign interference, in conformity with the three principles of independence, peaceful unification and great national unity, set forth in the joint North-South statement of 4 July 1972” (Summit Declarations of NAM 2011:232-233).

The relations between India and South Korea remained low key during the Cold War period. India criticised South Korea's participation and contribution of troops in the Vietnam War (Brewster 2010: 404). South Korea was an integral part of the US led capitalist regimes and a frontline state against Communism in the Northeast Asia region during the Cold War. The ideological differences kept India and South Korea apart during this period.

### **India and the Korean Peninsula in the Post-Cold War Era**

The end of the Cold War was a significant development for India which led to a dramatic shift in its economic and foreign policies. With the loss of an important ally and trade partner of the Cold War period, that is Soviet Union<sup>8</sup>, India started to look for new partners and allies. As a result, India under the leadership of the then Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao initiated “Look East” policy in 1992. Rao's government also made structural changes in India's political economy through economic liberalisation. These changes in India's economic and foreign policies reflected India's seriousness in its renewed engagement with the East Asia region. In September 1991, when both North and South Korea approached India for its support for becoming members of the UN, India maintaining its equidistance policy supported the membership of both Koreas.

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<sup>8</sup> India and Soviet Union signed a treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1971.

“Both North and South Korea appreciated India’s position regarding their entry to the UN” (MEA Annual Report 1991-92: 21).

India has remained wary about the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology between Pakistan and North Korea. As a result, India has on several occasions impounded North Korean ships and has also denied the use of its airspace to the North Korean plane, suspecting them of carrying missiles and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A chronology of these incidents is as follows<sup>9</sup>:

- a) In June 1999, near Gujarat coast, a North Korean ship named Ku Wol San, which was allegedly sailing to Pakistan, was seized by the Indian authorities. During the search operation parts of missiles were found on the ship (Nanda 2001: 68-69).
- b) In August 2008, India denied the use of its airspace to the North Korean aircraft bound for Iran, suspecting that it might be carrying ballistic missile parts. India acted on the request of the US officials (Zee News, 2008).
- c) In August 2009, Indian Navy seized another North Korean ship named MV Mu San near Andaman coast but found that the ship was carrying 16,000 tons of sugar and was bound for West Asia (Cherian 2009).
- d) In October 2009, Indian coast guards detained a North Korean ship named Hyangro near Kerala coast which was bound for Pakistan. Nothing suspicious was found on the ship (The Telegraph 2009).

North Korea did not make hue and cry over India’s denial of the airspace or the frisking of North Korean ships. While the staking of North Korean cargo ship Kang Nam I in June 2009 by the US drew strong criticisms from Pyongyang but in the case of India’s grounding of the Mu San, North Korean response was muted (Chaulia 2009). India has played its role in accordance with the international resolutions and has consistently urged North Korea to dismantle its nuclear and missile programs and act according to the UN resolutions.

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<sup>9</sup> The chronology of incidents is drawn from the author’s paper titled, “Locating North Korea in India’s Look East Policy: Issues and Challenges,” *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*, 18: 4 (2015/04), 145-146.

India's increasing political, economic and strategic relations with the Korean peninsula has been noticed by the US and it has been seeking India's help in diffusing tensions on the Korean peninsula (Dhawan 2015: 159-160). In the year 2011, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell said in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, "the United States and India have discussed North Korea in our Strategic Dialogue and other bilateral and multilateral exchanges" (The Indian Express 2011). Later in April 2013, the visit to North Korea by Gautam H. Bambawale, the then joint secretary in-charge of the East Asia division of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs was speculated by some analysts to have been due to requests by the US in order to defuse the rising tensions on the Korean peninsula during that time (see Hughes 2013). In the same year there was meeting of the foreign ministers of India and North Korea and visit by an official delegation from India to North Korea, "which took place amid unusually heightened diplomatic activity between New Delhi and the reclusive Pyongyang" (Krishnan 2013).

India-South Korea relations have increased dramatically in the post-Cold War period. South Korean companies such as Hyundai, Samsung, L.G, etc. have become house hold names in India. India and South Korea have established Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2009 and strategic partnership in 2010. The trade relations between the two countries are booming.

### **An Assessment**

India has remained reluctant in getting involved in any conflict outside its borders unless it is invited by the country or the countries concerned including those in the Korean peninsula (see Weigand 2012). Although India has not been a major player in the Northeast Asia region but it has given its best efforts to maintain peace whenever there has been any crisis situation on the Korean peninsula, as members of several international organisations or when India was invited. Such as being members of the UNTCOK and UNCOK, India tried for national reconciliation in the Korean peninsula. During the Korean War India warned the UN forces against crossing the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel because Communist China had informed the Indian Ambassador in Beijing about Chinese entry into the war. India also played an important role during the Korean War by sending a medical team and then during the armistice agreement. As NNRC member and efforts

for the repatriation of the POWs, India was praised by both Cold War rivals. In the NAM summits and in the UN, India has reiterated its stand for peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula without any foreign interference. In the recent years India has sent official delegations to diffuse tensions on the Korean peninsula and acted according to the international resolutions on the proliferation of WMDs by North Korea.

India is one of the few countries which have cordial relations with both Koreas. Despite India's worries over North Korea-Pakistan nexus on the issue of proliferation of WMDs, it has provided humanitarian assistance and equipment for human resource development to North Korea. At the same time by asking for the humanitarian aid the fiercely nationalist and proud regime in North Korea has shown trust in India (Nayar 2011). On the other hand, President Park Geun-hye recently remarked that India can be South Korea's "best partner" and thanked India for urging Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions (Sohn JiAe 2014). India's deepening engagement with the Korean peninsula has been recognised by the US and it has been seeking India's help in diffusing tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The present government in India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has put its focus in making India a manufacturing hub through "Make in India" strategy and has been striving to make the "Look East" policy more effective through "Act East" policy. Since India has consistently pursued the policy of neutrality and equidistance towards the Korean peninsula therefore India could play an important role in easing out tensions in the peninsula and play a constructive role in the Korean unification efforts. However, India has not shown much enthusiasm in getting entangled into the power dynamics of this region and it has refrained from taking sides during any major conflicts in the region and has urged all parties to maintain peace.

### **Conclusion**

India's role during the Korean crisis in the mid-twentieth century should be viewed in a holistic perspective. India at the time of the Korean crisis was itself a newly independent country, preoccupied with the horrors of national division, communal violence and the problem of national integration of hundreds of princely states, which were left out of the Indian Union by the erstwhile British rulers, including the most contentious of all, the state of Jammu and Kashmir. India took a pragmatic approach by taking a non-aligned position which was to keep

equidistance from both blocs of the Cold War era and not to get involved into the messy ideological confrontations of the period. Militarily also India was not in a position to contribute its troops to any side during the conflict. But India did make contributions by sending the Field Ambulance Unit during the Korean War and later the Custodian Force for the repatriation of the POWs. At the United Nations and in the various commissions for Korea, such as UNTCOK, UNCOK and NNRC, India's chief goal was to diffuse the tensions in the peninsula and bring about national reconciliation for the unification of the Korean peninsula. India also played an important role during the armistice agreement. In the NAM summits India's position had been the same that is to unify Korea without military confrontations and foreign interferences.

In the post-Cold War era India's policies of economic liberalisation and "Look East" were in tune with the changing geopolitics. Korean peninsula has emerged as an important component in India's renewed engagement with the East and the "Act East" policy. In the recent years India has developed closer ties with both Koreas. India has been providing humanitarian and educational support to North Korea but at the same time had been tough on the issue of nuclear and missile proliferation. With South Korea India has developed closer economic and strategic relations. The US has been discussing the issues related to the Korean peninsula with India. This suggests that US regards India as a partner in the Northeast Asian affairs. Apart from this the South Korean leaders have also been seeking India's support for the denuclearisation of North Korea and unification of the Korean peninsula.

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**Ye Haohao**

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**The Significance of International  
Cooperation to the Korean Unification**

The Significance of International Cooperation to the Korean Unification

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Abstract: As the process of peaceful Korean unification will have direct impact on the future configurations of the international structure in the East Asian region or even the world, the issue of Korean unification is a matter of global significance. The international cooperation has an important role in the process of achieving Korean Unification. Generally speaking, there are three aspects of significance of international cooperation to the Korean unification including security guarantee, internal impetus and external support. And apart from the external guarantee form the international cooperation, unification in the Korean peninsula will come through the initiative of the Koreans themselves based on the mutual trust between the South and North Korea.

Key Words: International Cooperation, Korean unification, South and North Korea

The current division of Korea is a legacy of Cold War. It can trace back to World War Two when Korean peninsula was partially occupied by soviet troops. The southern part was under US occupation for three years. Efforts through the UN to end the occupation and create a unified Korea were rejected by the Soviet Union and thus the democratic people's republic of Korea in the north and the Republic of Korea in the south were established in 1948. In 1950 North Korean armed forces invaded the south. The Truman administration perceived this conflict as an act of communist aggression and quickly committed forces under the aegis of the UN which restored the status quo by 1953.<sup>1</sup>

According to the geopolitics, Korea's strategic location in East Asia made it the object of great-power rivalries for centuries. The Korean peninsula shares a long border with China's industrial heart land in the northeastern part of China and it is also contiguous with Russia and adjacent to Japan, two traditional rivals of China. For the last century, the Korea peninsula has served as an object, or area of conflict and an invasion corridor among its four major powers, China, the United States, Russia and Japan.<sup>2</sup> Until now, the Korean Peninsula remains volatile. There is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea, the modernization of conventional forces across the region, and the great-power rivalries highlighting the endemic security dilemmas that plague this part of Asia. A conflict between the two Korea has

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<sup>1</sup> Christoph Bluth, *Hot Spots in Global Politics: Korea*, Political Press, 2008, P1.

<sup>2</sup> Hun-Bong Park, *China's Position on Korea's Unification and US Force Korea*, the *Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 1, P118.

the potential of escalating into a serious confrontation, even war, among the major powers, whose interests intersect in the peninsula.<sup>3</sup> And North Korea's nuclearization also not only poses a major threat to the peaceful Korean unification, but also to the international community because Pyongyang could develop long-range missiles with nuclear warheads or transfer nuclear technologies and materials abroad. Therefore, the issue of Korean unification is a matter of global significance. The international cooperation has an important role in tackling North Korean militarism and nuclear brinkmanship as well as achieving the peaceful Korean unification. Generally speaking, there are three aspects of significance of international cooperation to the unification of Korea including security guarantee, internal impetus and external support.

### International Cooperation Provides Security Guarantee

National security is the basic need of national survival and development so that maintaining national security is the main goal of the foreign policy. The North Korea is regarded as the greatest external threat to South Korean security. And this threat is enormously magnified by the history of the Korean war, North Korean attempts at subversion and sabotage which climaxed by the 1968 and 1983 assassination attempts in the Cold War and the incidents of Cheonan ship and Yeonpyeong Island happened in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. On the other hand, North Korea claims the external threat to its security emanates from the hostile attitude of the United States. This threat has a political and a military component. The political component consists in the rejection of the legitimacy of North Korea. And the military components consists of the presence of US forces in Korea and Japan as well as the global military power protection capabilities which include tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. As far as North Korea concern, its seemingly aggressive behavior is based on its search for security in a hostile world. As a result, the Korean peninsula falls into the security dilemma which has a negative effect in the Korean unification. Therefore, in order to break this dilemma, it is necessary to set up a regional security regime aiming at providing security guarantee to both sides. According to the theory of neoliberalism, even though the international system is anarchic, international cooperation is possibly achieved. Especially under the invigorating effect of international regime, the international cooperation is not only possible, but also necessary. Therefore, the North-east Asian security regime should be encouraged to be built up with the joint efforts of the related countries in this region. And South and North Korea will be brought into the regime. If so, on one hand, their behavior will be constrained within the regime, and on the other hand, their security will also be guaranteed by the regime. Besides, North Korean nuclearization also poses a major threat to the peaceful Korean unification and the North-east Asian region. In this situation, South Korea is able to mobilize the security regime to help it dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear program and make Pyongyang realize that it can survive and even prosper without nuclear weapons. Mutual security guarantee will have a positive effect in the conclusion of a peace

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<sup>3</sup> B. C. Koh, *Inter-Korean Relations: Seoul's Perspective*, Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 11, P1108.

treaty ending the Korean Armistice, which will legally restore peace to Korea from a state of war and work toward the peaceful Korean unification.<sup>4</sup>

### International Cooperation Provides Internal Impetus

There are massive obstacles to unification. Among them, the most important one is the mutual distrust between South and North Korea, which is rooted in history and culture. Each leadership group assumes that the other side intends to overthrow it if possible, and responds in kind. A lack of trust has long undermined attempts at genuine reconciliation between North and South Korea.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, the suspicion between South and North Korea hinder the process of peaceful Korean unification. That is why President Park Geun-hye laid out a process for building trust on the Korean peninsula when addressing in a joint session of the U.S. Congress. “In order to transform the Korean Peninsula from a zone of conflict into a zone of trust, South Korea should adopt a policy of trustpolitik establishing mutually binding expectations based on global norms.”<sup>6</sup> In President Park Geun-hye’s opinion, the trustpolitik should be comprised of two coexisting strands: first, North Korea must keep its agreements made with South Korea and the international community to establish a minimum level of trust, and second, there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the peace. International cooperation acts as a platform for South and North Korea to conduct exchange, communication and transaction, which will enabled the two sides to take a bold step toward peace on the Korean peninsula and eventual unification.<sup>7</sup>

According to the theory of constructivism, the cognitions between the actors can be constructed and are not invariable. There are three kinds of role structures depending on the different mutual cognitions between actors. They are respectively enemy, rival and friend. And with the mutual trust deepened, the mutual identity cognitions will also develop from enemy, rival to friend.<sup>8</sup> According to the character of the relationship between South and North Korea, it is appropriate to increase one more identify cognition called “brother”. Compared with the other three identity cognition, the mutual trust between brothers is the deepest. And the brother identity cognition will also be the greatest impetus for the Korean unification.

The mutual cognitions between South and North Korea are not invariable and their behaviors will also change with their mutual cognitions. During most time in Cold War, each side treated the other as an enemy. This mutual cognition determined both sides to take hostile policies with each other. After Cold War, with the improvement of relationship between two Koreas, their mutual cognition once developed to the level

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<sup>4</sup> Woonsang Choi, From War to Peace: A Permanent Solution to the Korean Question, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 24, No. 1, P7.

<sup>5</sup> Park Geun-hye, a New Kind of Korea : Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 5 , P14.

<sup>6</sup> Park Geun-hye, a New Kind of Korea : Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 5 , P13-18.

<sup>7</sup> Hyug-Baeg Im and Yu-Jeong Choi, Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations through the Window of Regional Integration Theories, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 5, P795.

<sup>8</sup> Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, P23.

of rival as a token of the Inter-Korean Summit. But during the period of Lee Myung-bak's administration, the relationship between two Koreas deteriorated. Lee's "Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness" proposal was rejected by North Korea and as a consequence, the North and South talks halted. In response, North Korea also closed Mt. Kumgang to South Korean tourists. The possibility of closing the Gaesung Industrial Complex was even discussed. Especially after the Cheonan ship and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, Lee's conditional engagement shifted to a harder-line policy of disengagement, and he turned "the clock of reunification" back to the Cold War era.<sup>9</sup> So the mutual identity cognitions also came back to enemy. Until now, the mutual cognition between two Koreas can be identified to be the one between enemy and rival. And international cooperation can play an important role in promoting trust between South and North Korea and helping their mutual cognition develop to rival or even friend in the period of Park Geun-hye's administration.

Recently China launched the project of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which aims at facilitating the construction of infrastructure of Asian countries. It will be an effective platform for international cooperation. And South Korea is supposed to mobilize it to promote its cooperation with other Asian countries which includes North Korea. It will also be in accordance with President Park Geun-hye's declaration of Dresden which unveiled a package of proposals calling for bolstering exchanges with North Korea as first steps toward building trust between the two sides to lay the groundwork for unification. President Park Geun-hye declared that "an example of larger economic cooperation would be the South building infrastructure in the North in exchanges for underground resources in the North", and "the South will actively pursue joint economic projects that would involve not only the two Koreas, but also China as well."<sup>10</sup> But it is not easy to reach a consensus on the identity cognition to the North Korea, because the different perceptions of North Korea range from that of a brutal, dangerous dictatorship that must be contained and ultimately removed from power, to that of a small, desperate state that considers itself besieged by the most powerful country in the world. North Korea behaviors are often regarded as irrational and unpredictable. There are persistent rumors about internal dissent and disagreements within the ranks of the military, military leaders and political leaders, but little hard evidence.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, it is also very difficult for South Korea to take effective measures to improve its identity cognition in the eyes of North Korea. Because there is a paucity of data, which makes it very hard to know what is really going on in North Korea.

However, there is no doubt that the mutual cognition between South and North Korea will play a decisive role in the process of Korean unification. And international cooperation provides a platform for both Koreas to have exchange and communication with each other, which will form internal impetus to enhance their mutual trust and prompt their mutual cognition up to the highest level of brother.

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<sup>9</sup> Hyug-Baeg Im and Yu-Jeong Choi, Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations through the Window of Regional Integration Theories, Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 5, P799.

<sup>10</sup> Yonhap News Agency, Park unveils proposals to N. Korea to lay groundwork for unification, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20140328000552315>.

<sup>11</sup> Christoph Bluth, Hot Spots in Global Politics: Korea, Political Press, 2008, P5.

### International Cooperation Provides External Support

Because of the geopolitical strategic value of the Korean peninsula, the situation in this peninsula constantly obtains the focus of the international community, especially the surrounding powers. Compared with the background of the unification of Germany, even though the unification of Germany happened in the time of Cold War, the Korean unification confronts a more complicated situation in North-east Asia. At that time, the unification of Germany obtained general support in the Europe, which was a positive external factor for the achievement of unification. However, the surrounding countries of Korean peninsula have their own different national interests in the issue of Korean unification so that it is of difficulty to make a consensus on this issue. In other words, although all the powers pay lip service to the idea of unification, they do so in accordance with their respective national policies and interests. If there is no a strong push by the Koreans, no single outside power or combination of powers will work to change the status quo except to gain a strategic advantage for them. Therefore, under this background, South Korea is supposed to strengthen international cooperation with related countries especially China and the United States, both of which have enormous strategic interest and influence in Korean peninsula, in order to obtain the external support to push the process of peaceful Korean unification. That is why President Park Geun hye chose the United States and China as the first two countries to pay a state visit to after she took offices. And President Park Geun hye also emphasized the importance of cooperation with the great powers in dealing with Korean Peninsula issues.

When President Park Geun hye paid a state visit to America in 2013, two states presented the Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance in celebration of sixty years of bilateral partnership and shared prosperity between the Republic of Korea and the United States. The declaration reiterated that “the U.S.-ROK Alliance has served as an anchor for stability, security, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in the Asia-Pacific region, and increasingly around the world”, and both sides “pledge to continue to build a better and more secure future for all Korean people, working on the basis of the Joint Vision to foster enduring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and its peaceful reunification based on the principles of denuclearization, democracy and a free market economy”.<sup>12</sup> Besides, President Park Geun hye also laid out a process for building trust on the Korean peninsula when addressing in a joint session of the U.S. Congress, which was an approach to lay the groundwork for "durable peace" and eventually unification. President Park’s proposal obtained positive response from President Barack Obama. If North Korea continued to issue threats and provocations firing long-range missiles, staging nuclear tests which would undermine peace on the Peninsula, the South Korean government would strengthen its cooperation with the U.S. and other

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<sup>12</sup> Full text of the Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance between the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the United States

international partners to bring North Korea into compliance with its international obligations and promote peace and prosperity in the Korean peninsula

After President Park finished her visit to the United States, she chose China as a second country to pay a state visit to, which was different with her predecessors who visited Japan. Entering into 21<sup>st</sup> century, China becomes the second largest economy in the world and its unprecedented economic growth has continuously increased its comprehensive national power. With China rising rapidly, it has greater influence in Asia and even the world. With the end of the Cold War, economic interdependence replaced ideology as a defining factor in East Asian relations and opened new economic and political opportunities between South Korea and China. These opportunities came at the expense of North Korea, as Chinese leaders gradually found that mutual economic interests with South Korea outweighed long-standing ideological and personal ties with North Korea.<sup>13</sup> However, because of the factor of history and geography, China has a traditional friendship with North Korea. There is no doubt that China's attitude and support will play an important role in the process of Korean unification. And we can hardly imagine the peaceful unification in the Korean Peninsula without China's support. Therefore, President Park attached high importance to the cooperation with China in a multitude of areas including politics, security, economics, trade, human and cultural exchanges, and international cooperation. During President Park's visit in China, she had a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping and the two leaders announced a joint statement on a future vision for Seoul-Beijing ties pledging to expand partnerships. Actually, China and South Korea share common interest in maintaining the peace and stability in the Korean peninsula. Especially on the North Korean nuclear issue, the two presidents were of one voice in opposing the North's nuclear armaments and agreed that a nuclear-armed North Korea will never be tolerated under any circumstances.

It is said that behind the issue of Korean peninsula is the competition between China and the United States. Facing the competition or even conflict between China and the United States in Asia, how to cooperate with these two great powers simultaneously will be a challenge for President Park's administration. The United States and China are involved in a major strategic rivalry in the Asian-pacific region. Even though both shares the common interest in maintain the stability of the Korean Peninsula, difference of their strategic interest is huge. The optimal long-term scenario for the US would be a united, democratic Korea which is a strong alliance partner. But for china this outcome is not desirable, because China cannot tolerate sharing its border with US force stationed in Korea<sup>14</sup> and a military alliance between a unified Korea and the United States would make China uncomfortable. However, China is also not enthusiastic about Korean unification under the DPRK. A unified communist Korea, like Vietnam, would be too tough to cope with. Besides, if the Korean peninsula comes under communist control, international tensions in East Asia

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<sup>13</sup> Hun-Bong Park, China's Position on Korea's Unification and US Force Korea, the Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1, P119.

<sup>14</sup> Youngho Kim, The Great Powers in Peaceful Korean Reunification, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 20, No. 3, P3.

which would harm Chinese economic modernization in turn.<sup>15</sup> For China, the unified Korea should be neutral or at least nonaligned. Besides, China and the United States also share different ideas on how to approach the North Korea. China prefers to pursue a policy engaging the north. It seems that the ideal way of reunification should be based on voluntary and evolutionary participation. China would support the political dialogue and economic transaction initiated by the two Koreas as the first step to reunification. But the United States would favor a policy of containment and isolation. Therefore, when cooperating with these two great powers, South Korea should look for the balancing point to obtain their strong external support to push the process of peaceful Korean unification.

### Conclusion

Even though the economic cost of Korean unification will be huge because of the different levels of economic development between South and North Korea,<sup>16</sup> a unified Korea will enjoy enormous objective advantages as a whole nation. Firstly, a united Korea with seventy million people would be an impressive medium-sized state. Secondly, with a considerable natural resource base and an internal market bigger than many industrialized countries, it would enjoy a considerable measure of economic independence. It would have defensible natural boundaries. It would be freed from at least part of the enormous present military burden and from the threat of subversion and attack within the peninsula. It would be also freed from the trauma of divided families.<sup>17</sup> And according to a research report published by South Korean Modern Research Institute in 2014, the GDP of a unified Korea would reach 2.07 trillion in 2020, and 3.28 trillion in 2030. Unification will bring new development energy and create a huge internal market, which will make this unified country to be the eighth biggest economy in 2040.<sup>18</sup> And a unified Korea would also create stability and peace on the Korean peninsula and do good to eliminate the existence of external military and political forces in the region. President Park also mentioned that a democratic and unified Korea would be an economic and security asset to the region and even the world. Therefore, there is huge impetus for South and North Korea to pursue a peaceful unification in the Korean peninsula.

On the other hand, because the process of peaceful Korean unification will have direct impact on the future configurations of the international structure in the East Asian region or even the world, it requires the external support stemming from international cooperation. So to South Korea, it is supposed to cooperate with the

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<sup>15</sup> Hun-Bong Park, China's Position on Korea's Unification and US Force Korea, the Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1, P125.

<sup>16</sup> According to the estimation of World Bank, the cost of Korean reunification would be between \$250 billion and \$3.5 trillion. (Yoav Cerralbo, Reunification Costly, but Worth it, The Korea Herald, August 31, 2009.) And one study aims to determine the cost of doubling of the North Korean gross domestic product within 4 years of reunification. Based on this criterion, reunification will cost between \$50 and \$670 billion. (Charles Wolf, Jr, and Kamil Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs and Consequences of Korean Unification, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005, P38.)

<sup>17</sup> Donald Stone Macdonald, The Koreans Contemporary Politics and Society, Westview Press, 1988, P261.

<sup>18</sup> Xinhua net, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/cankao/2014-03/17/c\\_133191924.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/cankao/2014-03/17/c_133191924.htm).

international community especially the great powers in the world to pursue consensus and external support to guarantee the achievement of Korean unification in a peaceful way.

However, even though the great powers announce commitment to peaceful unification, they are hesitant to take a bold initiative in rapidly changing the status quo or to replace it with a new security arrangement when they are not confident that the new formula can guarantee peace on the peninsula and stability in the region. Therefore, the most essential point for Korean unification lies in the Koreans. Peace between the two Koreas will not be possible without a combined effort. Reunification will come through the initiative of the Koreans themselves. It is necessary for South and North Koreans to get rid of the mutual cognition of enemy and cultivate mutual trust in order to promote their mutual cognition to the level of brothers. Even though the process of mutual cognition evolving from enemy to brother is not one-step-to-reach, which takes a long way to go, it is not impossible. Given the external support from the joint efforts of international cooperation and the common aspiration of the Korean people for unification, it is reasonable to expect that the Korean unification will be achieved eventually.

## **Tamaoki Kohei**

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### **Toward Comprehensive Solutions of North Korean Issues: Possibility of Cooperation**

## Toward Comprehensive Solutions of North Korean Issues: Possibility of Cooperation

### THREE aspects of North Korean issues

#### I. Geopolitics: A zero-sum game between great powers

- After the collapse of Imperial Japan, the Korean Peninsula was divided by the U.S. and the USSR, resulting in the Korean War, where the U.S. fought with China.
- Even at present, China seems to see North Korea as its strategic buffer, while the U.S. has deployed its troops to show its commitment to Northeast Asia.

#### II. Regime: A dictatorship exploiting geopolitical tensions

- Kim dynasty, a by-product of the Cold War, has taken advantage of discord among great powers to survive, resorting to brinkmanship or provocations at times.
- North Korea's failed economy implies enormous costs and serious confusion in case of unification, which might be functioning as a deterrent against any attempt of regime change.
- China might no longer see its relationship with North Korea as a special one, but it fears that the collapse of Kim regime would generate large-scale refugee flows and destabilize its border area.

#### III. Security: Nuclear weapons as a deterrent against regime change

- Kim regime seems to be developing its nuclear program with the aim of being recognized as a nuclear weapon state to assure its safety.
- The U.S. and China share common interests in denuclearizing North Korea because North Korea's nuclear weapons would not only damage their national security but also justify military expansion and further nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, which might threaten their military superiority.

### Implication


- These aspects are inter-linked, though the geopolitical one is the most fundamental. North Korean issues have its root in the historical and strategic contexts of Northeast Asia. The U.S. and China have played key roles in the issues.
- The U.S. and China might have diverse interests in the future of the Korean Peninsula and how to deal with North Korea's regime, but they can cooperate more closely on denuclearization of North Korea as an urgent problem.
- Therefore, cooperation on nuclear issues is the most feasible step toward further discussion on comprehensive solutions of North Korean issues, including unification in the future.

### Possible approaches toward North Korean issues

- The countries concerned, especially the U.S. and China, should send North Korea a clear message in a coordinated manner that nuclear weapons provide no assurance of safety, implying that DESPITE their diverse geopolitical interests and possible costs they could cooperate in squeezing more tightly or 'eliminating' the regime unless it abandons nuclear programs.
- Under proper conditions, the Six-Party Talks could function as a multilateral forum not only on nuclear issues but also on further regional cooperation in relaxing geopolitical tensions, which is an essential prerequisite for unification.
- Japan and the ROK can cooperate in promoting policy coordination between the U.S. and China through Japan-U.S.-ROK and Japan-China-ROK trilateral cooperation.

\*This paper only reflects a personal opinion and has nothing to do with the official position of the Government of Japan.





## **4. Presentation Materials: Session 3**

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**Dialogue with Journalists on North Korea**



## **Seon-Young Choi**

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### **Views on Unification within North Korea**

## Views on Unification within North Korea

Seon-Young Choi

Senior Editor, Yonhap News Agency

※ A summary of the changed views on unification within North Korea after the 1990s based on the conversations with North Korean defectors who came to South Korea

■ The starting point of a change in the view on unification within North Korea

○ Change arose largely after going through the Arduous March in the mid-1990s which caused many victims.

- A decline in loyalty toward the regime as a result of the death of numerous people from hunger in the 1990s and the continued economic hardship afterward.

- The prevalence of mammonism and heightened ideological relaxation throughout the society, not only among the general population but also among the high-ranking officials and the privileged class, due to the expanded adoption of the partial market economy.

○ The effects of South Korea's economic development and Hallyu (Korean Wave)

- As assistance to North Korea from the South Korean government increased in the 2000s, a lot of the population came into direct and indirect contact with South Korean rice, goods, etc., and they opened their eyes to South Korea's development and a fantasy was created.

- The number of business travelers increased as trade exchange with China expanded; South Korean culture penetrated deeply into the North Korean society, which led to a fantasy about South Korea.

○ This kind of environment eventually brought about skepticism concerning unification under communism, which was indoctrinated by brainwashing to the privilege class and the general population for decades.

- That is, the perception that a politically and economically powerful South Korea can no longer be unified by force of arms.

■ There are differences in the perception toward unification within North Korea depending on the environment and interests the individual faces.

○ In the case of the general population

- As South Koreans live without usually thinking about unification, North Koreans do not have the time either to think about it as they are busy making a living.

- Unlike the South Koreans, who each have a view on unification, North Koreans do not even have such a view as they lead a hard life.

- Nevertheless, every time North Koreans get exhausted with their weary life, it appears that they have thoughts of desperation, such as “I wish a war would just break out,” or they have vague hopes that their lives would somewhat become better if North Korea unified with an economically abundant South Korea.

○ The case of the privileged class

- Even if skepticism toward unification by force is prevalent, it is absolutely difficult to see that they would desire or welcome unification through absorption into South Korea.

- Even if the power circle in the privileged class, such as the Worker’s Party of North Korea and the State Security Department, think that they will not be able to defeat South Korea because of its international status and economic abundance, it appears that they fear unification through absorption out of concern for their circumstances after such unification.

- It appears that even among the privileged class, those administrative officials or middle-ranking officials who are alienated from the power circle would have more skepticism toward the regime and think, “we cannot continue like this,” rather than have a fear for unification

through absorption.

○ The case of the intellectual circle

- Unlike in capitalist countries, the standard of living of the North Korean intellectuals, including scientists, technicians, doctors, professors, etc., are slightly better than the general population.

- The North Korean intellectuals have the perception that in a capitalist country, those intellectuals who have the technology/skills/techniques get treated well and can live an abundant life, and they can adapt to any system as long as they possess such knowledge.

- It appears that because of this, resistance toward unification through absorption will be the least among the intellectuals within North Korea.

Introduction of the Presenter

Reporter Seon-Young Choi was born in Pyongyang, North Korea, and graduated from the Korean Language Department at Kim Il-sung University. In 1996, while working overseas, she came to South Korea and began working as a reporter for NWT News from July, 1996, for 2 years and 6 months.

She joined Yonhap News Agency in 1999 and she is a specialist journalist for the North Korea Department up to date.

She became the senior manager of the Korean Ethnic News Department (the current North Korea Department, Editorial Bureau) in 2004, the general manager of the same department in 2008, the general manager of North Korea Data in 2011, and after being a member of the planning committee and the deputy managing editor of the North Korea Department in 2013, she became a senior journalist in the same department in 2015.

In January 15, 2009, while working as a specialist journalist, she was the first in the world to report the news on the selection of Kim Jong-un, the third son of Kim Jong-il, as the next political successor, and she constantly released follow-up articles on it. For this, she won the Grand Prize for the Korean Journalist Award given by the Journalist Association of Korea in

2011.

Earlier in 2010, she received the Kwanhun Press Award from the Kwanhun Club, a gathering of journalists. She also received the Korea Newspaper Award from the Korean Association of Newspapers, the Female Journalist of the Month Award from the Korea Woman Journalists Association, and the Samsung Journalism Award from the Samsung Press Foundation.

**Seong Ha Joo**

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**Korean Unification:  
Method and Realistic Problems**

## **Korean Unification: Method and Realistic Problems**

Seong Ha Joo

Reporter, the Dong-A Ilbo

I am Seong Ha Joo, a reporter at the Dong-A Ilbo, who came to South Korea after escaping from North Korea 13 years ago. Before commencing the discussions, I would like to first thank the Korea Foundation organizers for providing me the opportunity to make a presentation at this meaningful forum today.

I believe that I know about the realities of North Korea better than anyone else since I lived in North Korea and because I manage an information network in North Korea.

However, I don't think I will be able to say a lot as I do not have much time today. Thus, at this venue from now on, I plan on giving you my opinion on how unification can be achieved in the Korean Peninsula.

So far, both South and North Korea have made it clear that the only method of unification is one of federal unification. However, it can be said that actually this method is a realistically impossible scenario.

As a matter of fact, unification is only achievable with the end of the North Korean Kim Jong-un regime. South Korea has no intentions whatsoever of abandoning liberal democracy, and also it cannot. On the other hand, if liberal democracy enters North Korea through unification, Kim Jong-un will never be able to maintain the three-generation succession regime. Therefore, it is impossible for South and North Korea to approach unification through South and North negotiations. Unification is only possible when one side becomes extinct; however, the probability that South Korea will be defeated in this game can be said to be almost zero.

Of course, externally, the peaceful reunification theory must be thoroughly put forth, but the most realistic unification theory cannot but be the collapse of North Korea.

The following cases can be assumed for the collapse of North Korea: the case of North Korea's self-destruction due to system contradictions and the awakening of North Koreans; the case in which North Korea's political leadership is removed; the collapse as a result of a North-South war; and the collapse due to sanctions and pressures at home and abroad, including China. What South Korea can prepare for is the threat of war. However, we do not desire war; and North Korea, which shows an overwhelming economic gap, also lacks the

will to go into war. Most importantly, this is because Kim Jong-un himself knows very well that if he goes to war, his regime will collapse.

In the case of North Korea's self-destruction, the time and results cannot be predicted. In some cases, we could encounter a North Korean economy that is much more in shreds than the present and a public order that has become chaotic. There is a need to prepare thoroughly for unification with these in mind.

Nobody can know when the North Korean regime will collapse. Whether or not the North Korean regime will persist is not something we can choose and if we cannot avoid it, we must provide for and be prepared for the shock.

However, it is not an easy environment for the South Korean government to prepare for unification due to 3 reasons.

First, it is very difficult to maintain consistency in South Korea's unification policies. Depending on the government, it cannot but move back and forth from left to right. This is because one cannot but be conscious of the president's approval ratings and support groups. We say that North Korea has no credibility, but the same is true that North Korea also does not trust the South Korean government as policies toward North Korea differ every 5 years.

Second, it is impossible for unification policies to be implemented unilaterally. No matter how well a unification plan is made, North Korea will perceive it to mean, "they are trying to destroy us with that method," and it is obvious that North Korea will desperately just be an impediment.

Third, the North Korean nuclear issue. When an ideal unification plan and a nuclear disarmament plan contradict one another, the South Korean public opinion will, first of all, become divided on the issue of which should come first. If North Korea plans to hold on to its nuclear weapons till the end, even the best unification policies will have no effect at all.

How to prevent the "hollowing out" of the North Korean region during the process of unification and how to solve the North-South conflict due to discrimination are issues that must be overcome. In order to prepare for unification, such issues must be studied and prepared for in advance.

At the beginning, unification demands economic sacrifice from the South Koreans and emotional sacrifice of enduring discrimination from the North Koreans. Therefore, the ideal leader of the unification era must be someone who provides the people with a vision of a better future and someone who perseveres with the people and unifies them.

I believe that it is correct to approach unification by focusing on the people and not on

economic issues. In other words, unification must first begin with the integration of the people and end with integration, rather than be approached with economic logics. Only then can it become a genuine, complete and happy unification.

There are many people in South Korea who think that the North Koreans will be grateful if North Korea is provided with an enormous amount of economic assistance and presented with liberty and democracy. However, the most unbearable things for people who have escaped from the worries of surviving are discrimination and contempt. Nobody can guarantee that after unification the voices asking you to leave the North Korean territory immediately will not be louder than words of thanks. Even if North Koreans, who have a strong sense of nationalism; were to be discriminated against foreigners, they will not be able to withstand being discriminated by their own race. Thus, in order to prepare for unification, the South Korean society must now, above all, learn how to embrace them.

Personally, I think unification is similar to the process of childbirth. If the period of preparations for unification is “the patience of conception,” the period in which there are mixed emotions of hope, thrill and worries, the moment of unification will indeed become the moment of immense pain and confusion that is comparable to the delivery. Also, the initial stage of unification is no different from the task of raising an infant, where the days are spent frantically breastfeeding the new-born baby, changing diapers, and putting the baby to sleep. After the hectically busy days go by and you pass through the child’s growth phase in which you swing back and forth, ten times a day, from feelings of hatred and love, and you live together for a long time by closely interacting with one another, affections begin to grow at some point. It is only after the child has fully grown up when, for the first time, you look back at the time that has passed by and can say, “Still, it was a good thing that I had the child.” I wonder if unification is something like that.

I believe that whether a unified Korea will become a devoted child or an undutiful child will be proportional to the patience and sacrifice we must pour into it hereafter. Thank you.

### **Introduction of the Presenter**

Seong Ha Joo graduated from Kim Il-sung University in North Korea and fled from North Korea in 1988. During his escape, he was sent back to North Korea after getting arrested in China. After he had a near-death experience in 7 Chinese and North Korean prisons, he

finally entered South Korea in 2002.

He started working as a reporter immediately upon arriving in South Korea and is currently a reporter at the Dong-A Ilbo since 2003.

He currently writes a column called “Seo-ul-gwa Pyeong-yang sa-i (translated, “Between Seoul and Pyongyang”)” serially for the Dong-A Ilbo and he also manages a blog called “Seo-u-re-seo sseu-neun Pyeong-yang i-ya-gi (translated, “Pyongyang Stories Written in Seoul”),” which is the world’s most-visited site concerning North Korea with more than 66 million accumulated visitors.

In addition, he hosts daily and weekly regular programs for as long as 7 years at Radio Free Asia, KBS Han Nation and Voice of Freedom, which are the 3 major radio programs on North Korea.

He is currently the youngest council member of the National Unification Advisory Council, a presidential advisory body, and also a consultant to the Korea Defense Intelligence Agency. Besides, he participates in compiling the “White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea” as a member of the North Korean Human Rights Special Committee of the Korean Bar Association. He is the editor of a magazine for North Korean defectors, which has more than 30 thousand copies issued, called “Dong-po-sa-rang (translated, “Love for One’s Countrymen”).”

He has written and published a total of 6 books up to now, including “Pyongyang Stories Written in Seoul.” He has published a co-translated book and also 5 research papers concerning unification.

He has won many prizes, including the 2<sup>nd</sup> Korea Human Rights Press Award, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Cho Gye Chang International Press Award, the 5<sup>th</sup> No Gun Ri Peace Award, the 258<sup>th</sup> Journalist of the Month Award, the first prize for the VOA's Essay Contest in the US in 2003, the Korea Blog Award in 2009, and so on.

## 5.Organizers

# Introduction of the Institute for Unification Education

Wednesday, July 2, 2015.




Introduction of the Institute for Unification Education

## Contents

- 1 Ministry of Unification-Organizational Chart
- 2 Vision & Goal
- 3 Strategies
- 4 Mission
- 5 Program Curriculum

## 1. Ministry of Unification-Organizational Chart



## 2. Vision & Goal

Making People committed to advancing Unification on the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.



### 3. Strategies



Setting a direction, putting a system in place, and developing contents.

Providing people of all walks of life with unification education.

Supporting schools and social institutions for active unification education.

### 4. Mission



Providing unification education contributing to national unity.

- Designating the “Unification Week” to raise people’s interests in unification across the country
- Establishing and operating governance for unification education.
- Developing education contents with a balanced view of security, peace and unification.
- Reinforcing unification education to induce international cooperation thereby creating an enabling environment for unification: e.g.,KUJIE

## 4. Mission



Raising awareness of the necessity of unification to be prepared for the era of unification.

Systemizing infrastructure for unification education.

Developing and distributing unification education materials.

Building a North-South Korea Youth Exchange Center.

## 5. Program Curriculum

### Day 1<sup>st</sup>

**Lecture 1** : Republic of Korea's Unification Policies

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**Lecture 2** : A Vision for a Unified Korea

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## 5. Program Curriculum

### Day 2<sup>nd</sup>

- Lecture 3** : Discussion – Neighboring Countries’ Policies towards the Korean Peninsula
- 
- Lecture 4** : Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation
- 
- Lecture 5** : “Lessons” From German Unification?
- 



## 5. Program Curriculum

### Day 3<sup>rd</sup>

- Field Trip**
- Visit to Historical and Cultural Sites in Seoul
  - Gyeongbok Palace, Hanok Village of Namsangol
- 



## 5. Program Curriculum

### Day 4<sup>th</sup>



## 5. Program Curriculum

### Day 5<sup>th</sup>

**Lecture 6** : Understanding of North Korean Society and the People's Lives

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**Field Trip** • Hanawon  
- Settlement Support Center for North Korean Defectors

• Hangeore High School

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## 5. Program Curriculum

### Day 6<sup>th</sup>

**Lecture 7** : The Park Geun-hye government' Unification Policy

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**Field Trip**

- National Museum of Korean Contemporary History
- Changduk Palace

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## 5. Program Curriculum

### Day 7<sup>th</sup>

#### International Academic Conference on Korean Unification

**Session I** : Unification Diplomacy and  
Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation

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**Session II** : International Cooperation for the Korean Unification

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**Session III** : Talk with North Korean Defector Journalists

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## 5. Program Curriculum

### Day 8<sup>th</sup>

#### Field Trip

- Panmunjom, Dora Mt. Observatory, Inter-Korean Transit Office

#### Farewell Dinner

## 5. Program Curriculum

### Day 9<sup>th</sup>

#### Feedback Fill-Out



#### Certificate Awarding



# Thank You



## 5. Organizers



The Korea Foundation (KF) was established in 1991, and has been Korea's leading public diplomacy institution that is devoted to enhancing understanding about Korea abroad and facilitating international interactions between Korea and the world. The KF's public diplomacy initiatives include its active support for overseas Korean Studies and Koreanists and support for cultural exchanges between Korea and the world, along with the promotion of people-to-people interactions with a variety of forum events and intellectual exchange programs. The KF endeavors to promulgate objective facts and knowledge about Korea that are not yet part of the dominant international discourses, such as the recognition of Korea as a "responsible middle power," which because of its late modernization is uniquely situated to understand the quite different situations of both the developed and developing countries; and hence, for example, should play an important role in helping mediate disputes that are an increasing threat to international peace.

### 〈Main Activities〉

#### **Public Diplomacy**

KF pursues a better understanding of Korea, as well as its people, in the global community through intellectual networking and open communication among prominent figures, next-generation leaders and students across the globe. In addition, KF also organizes forums and seminars so that Korean and foreign specialists of various fields can get together to discuss key issues of their mutual concern.

- Invitation of prominent foreign figures and future-generation leaders to Korea
- Bilateral and multilateral forums with more than 15 countries
- Support for overseas think-tanks and domestic NGOs.
- Programs to advance Korea's Public Diplomacy initiatives (Global Seminar, Global Internship, etc.)

#### **Support for Korean Studies Overseas**

KF implements a variety of support initiatives to help establish and enhance Korean studies institutions and programs internationally, as well as to nurture next-generation Korean studies specialists abroad through various fellowships.

#### **Culture and Arts Exchange**

KF nurtures understanding and friendship between Korea and other countries through various forms of culture and arts. In addition, KF extensively collaborates with prominent foreign museums to invigorate the Korean art exhibitions and programs through museums abroad. KF Cultural Center also serves a venue to facilitate two-way cultural exchanges by hosting various events for global culture and arts.

#### **Support for Media**

KF publishes and distributes Korea-related publications, video content and films to the global audience, to disseminate information about Korea and its culture.