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PREFACE



The Korean Peninsula has reached a critical juncture in 2021. Ever since the 2019 Hanoi Summit ended with no deal, the dialogue and negotiations process among Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the United States (US) has remained at a standstill for an extended period of time. In January 2021, however, the Eighth Party Congress in North Korea and the inauguration of the Biden administration created another important opportunity to upturn the situation.

Amid this flexible transition, the ROK government devoted its resources to facilitate even the slightest chance of peace on the Korean Peninsula. First, the ROK and the US emphasized its shared commitment to address Korean Peninsula issues by taking a calibrated and practical approach that is based on dialogue and diplomacy in close coordination and consultation. The US highlighted that it harbors no hostile intent towards North Korea and is open to dialogue without any pre-conditions. In accordance with this, the ROK government continued its efforts to promote dialogue and negotiations in order to simultaneously pursue denuclearization, establishment of peace, flexibility on sanctions, and cooperation towards peace. We proposed the “end of war declaration” as a catalyst to jumpstart stalled denuclearization negotiations – a starting point for peace – and requested a positive response and support from the international community. In particular, the ROK and the US continued a series of in-depth discussions and urged North Korea to respond so concrete progress could be made towards the end-of-war declaration.

After a yearlong hiatus, the inter-Korean communication lines were fully restored on October 4th, 2021. To overcome the COVID-19 pandemic, the ROK government took one step further to propose installing inter-Korean video conferencing systems while making it clear on multiple occasions that South Korea is ready to talk “regardless of the time, place, and agenda.” Non-political and non-military agendas including coexistence and the response to COVID-19 were underscored as urgent tasks in inter-Korean cooperation. To realize a community of life and safety on the Korean Peninsula over the long term, the ROK government launched the “Health and Medical Cooperation Platform on the Korean Peninsula.” Furthermore, additional proactive institutional reforms were implemented, including amendment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act to enhance local government's autonomy in their inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects, which resulted in creating the conditions for stable and sustainable inter-Korean cooperation.

In 2021, the ROK engaged more actively in international cooperation than it ever had before to resolve issues on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK government's proposal for an end of war declaration at the United Nations General Assembly attracted much attention and reverberated not only in countries directly involved in the matter, such as South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China, but also in the French Senate and the UK Parliament. In addition, ROK President Jae-in Moon met with Pope Francis on the sidelines of the G20 Summit. Pope Francis affirmed his support for inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation and stated his willingness to visit North Korea. As President Moon met with the Pope, the “Peace Cross,” a piece of artwork made with barbed wires from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), was on display at an exhibition in Rome, and it touched many people yearning for peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Meanwhile, the ROK continued its efforts to build a social consensus to facilitate the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Citizens from all corners of South Korea participated in social dialogues over the last four years and agreed on a peace and unification vision statement. As a result, the National Unification Contract was adopted in June 2021 and then delivered to the ministry and the National Assembly. To raise awareness amongst the youth about unification, the ROK government developed peace and unification media content customized for the future leaders of the Korean Peninsula and strengthened its communication through various channels including Social Network Services.

Moreover, numerous projects were implemented in the inter-Korean border areas to share and spread the value of peace. As part of the “Peace Trails” initiative, the “Walking for Unification” project was opened to the public so they could experience the value of peace and ecology. The Inter-Korean Transit Office opened the first peace and unification art museum within the DMZ, and civil shipping in the Han River Estuary was conducted on a trial basis. These efforts represent the will of the ROK government and South Korean citizens to further strengthen peace within the DMZ and in the border areas.

Although tangible progress towards peace on the Korean Peninsula was suspended in 2021, the ROK continued its leading initiatives to drive the Korean Peninsula towards dialogue and engagement. However, such efforts did not yet lead to a resumption of dialogue or cooperation. In 2022, the Korean Peninsula is undergoing a critical period once again. Early this year, North Korea fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which it had not launched after 2017, and has escalated tensions by revealing its intention to reconsider the moratorium¹⁾ on nuclear and long-range ballistic missile

1) On March 24, 2022, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), lifting its moratorium on ICBM testing.

testing. However, regardless of the circumstances, the groundwork laid for dialogue and negotiations, thanks to commitments made by South Korea, North Korea, and the United States, should not be destroyed, and the state of peace on the Korean Peninsula should never return to the time of confrontation and conflict. The ROK should recognize that now is the key moment in history for coexistence and co-prosperity to materialize, and it is a wise decision to resume dialogue and cooperation in a timely manner.

I realize the simple truth that peace does not take place overnight. Nevertheless, we are at a critical juncture in our continued efforts to make gradual progress, and we take a deep breath after each step, rather than alternate between joy and sorrow. Only patience and the desire for a wise and rational consideration of peace can turn the crisis into an opportunity and make history on the Korean Peninsula. This is the historical calling of our generation. The ROK government will remain steadfast in its efforts to achieve peace, prosperity, and unification of the Korean Peninsula in a calm and consistent manner. I ask for your participation in our journey as we make it to the finish line.

March 2022
Minister of Unification
In-young Lee

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
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01

Korean Peninsula Policy



- I – Implementation of Korean Peninsula Policy
- II – Denuclearization and the Establishment of Peace
- III – Spread of the Consensus on Unification
- IV – Cooperation with the International Community



Chapter

1

Korean Peninsula Policy

In 2021, the Republic of Korea (ROK) government invested in many initiatives to resume inter-Korean and DPRK-US talks and rekindle the Korean Peninsula Peace Process. The year 2021 started with stalled relations between South and North Korea and between North Korea and the United States as the world continued to grapple with the spread of Coronavirus-19 (hereinafter referred to as COVID-19). Moreover, the Eighth Party Congress and inauguration of the Biden administration in January led to more uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula.

Amid such uncertainties, the government of the Republic of Korea implemented its Korean Peninsula Policy in a consistent manner to develop inter-Korean relations and establish a permanent state of peace on the Korean Peninsula. President Jae-in Moon, in his New Year's speech on January 11, announced "Our determination to meet at any time and at any place to talk, even in a virtual setting, remains unchanged," thus highlighting his willingness to resume talks with North Korea. In addition, on March First Independence Movement Day, President Moon stated that he looked forward to North Korea's participation in a coordinated response to transnational and non-traditional security threats such as epidemics and the COVID-19 pandemic. Then on Korea's 76th Liberation Day in August, President Moon presented his vision of a "Korean Peninsula model" which contributes to the prosperity Northeast Asia as a whole through denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, at the 76th Session of United Nations General Assembly, President Moon proposed an "end-of-war declaration" for the Korean Peninsula in order to make irreversible progress in denuclearization and usher in an era of complete peace.

Following the inauguration of the Biden administration, the ROK government remained steadfast in creating the conditions to rekindle the Korean Peninsula Peace

Process by cooperating closely with the United States. The Biden administration made it clear that the United States had established its “calibrated and practical” Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) policy that is open to diplomacy with the DPRK in cooperation with the Republic of Korea. At the May 21 Summit, ROK and US Leaders agreed that diplomacy and dialogue are essential, based on previous commitments such as the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement. President Biden also expressed his support for inter-Korean dialogue, engagement, and cooperation. Since then, the Republic of Korea and the United States have been making multifaceted efforts to resume talks with the DPRK while having in-depth discussions on joint humanitarian cooperation and an end-of-war declaration.

Meanwhile, North Korea left the door open to renewed dialogue by curtailing its nuclear testing and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches²⁾. At the Eighth Party Congress in January, North Korea advocated its principle of “power for power and goodwill for goodwill,” stressing that the US’s abandonment of its hostile policy toward the DPRK is a precondition for dialogue. With regards to inter-Korean relations, North Korea insisted that fundamental issues need to be resolved but mentioned the “spring three years ago.” At the 5th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly on September 29, Chairman Jong-un Kim sent a more concrete message to the Republic of Korea and the United States by referencing the end-of-war declaration.

The government’s consistent endeavors to resume inter-Korean dialogue bore some fruits. Beginning in April, the two leaders of South and North Korea discussed how to recover inter-Korean relations by exchanging personal letters several times. During this window of time, inter-Korean communication channels were restored on July 27, a year and a month after they were severed on June 2020. Hence, the government conveyed a proposal to North Korea on July 29 to establish a video teleconferencing system, so inter-Korean dialogue could move forward safely despite the overall COVID-19 situation. After that, inter-Korean communication channels were temporarily suspended when North Korea stopped responding to calls on August 10 in response to the ROK-US combined military exercises. Nevertheless, they were restored again on October 4

2) On March 24, 2022, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), lifting its moratorium on ICBM testing.

to the point where South and North Korea maintain two daily correspondences, one in the morning and one the afternoon. However, the positive development unfortunately did not lead to substantive progress in inter-Korean dialogue to rekindle the Korean Peninsula Peace Process.

Furthermore, the government continued its activities to build a consensus on Korean Peninsula policy at home and abroad. From 2018 to 2021, it facilitated about 60 social dialogues on the adoption of the National Unification Contract in order to establish unification and North Korea policy based on the social contract. The National Unification Contract was adopted on June 26. Moreover, the Ministry of Unification reinforced the operation of its Incheon Unification Plus (+) Center and hoped to respond to demands for a region for peace and unification by expanding such a center to different locations. While abroad, the Ministry of Unification remained resolute in securing the major countries' interest and support for the Korean Peninsula Peace Process while continuing to strengthen its international cooperation and communication to build a consensus for ending the Korean War.

Section

1

Implementation of Korean Peninsula Policy

1 Policy Direction

The government set a goal to advance the Korean Peninsula Peace Process through dialogue, co-existence, and cooperation amid a deadlock in inter-Korean relations. It established the following policy direction for its work in 2021:

a) advance progress in denuclearization and a peace regime by moving forward with the Korean Peninsula Peace Process; b) create a community of life and safety on the Korean Peninsula for coexistence and peace; c) facilitate inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation; d) push forward the transformation of Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into an international peace zone and promote peace along the border areas; and e) build a foundation for sustainable policy, such as the institutionalization of inter-Korean relations.

The government did its utmost on numerous occasions to present and implement these concepts, so the state of inter-Korean relations could be improved. In his 2021 New Year's address, President Jae-in Moon stressed that "peace" equals "mutual benefit" and proposed inter-Korean cooperation on issues directly linked to the survival and safety of both South and North Koreans such as COVID-19, infectious livestock diseases, and natural disasters. He went on to explicitly express that our determination to "meet at any time and any place to talk even in a virtual format" remains unchanged. Along the same lines, he proposed to create a "community of peace, security, and life" not just on the Korean Peninsula but also across East Asia.



2021 Work Plan

Advance the Korean Peninsula Peace Process through dialogue, co-existence, and cooperation



- Active utilization of the factors that change the current circumstances based on three principles (zero tolerance for war, a mutual security guarantee, and co-prosperity) and turn the tide of inter-Korean relations
 - Stable management of the circumstances on the Korean Peninsula and the creation of favorable conditions for dialogue until inter-Korean relations are improved
 - Efforts to bolster the foundations for Unification and North Korea policy
- ① Advance progress in denuclearization and a peace regime by moving forward with the Korean Peninsula Peace Process
 - ② Create a community of life and safety on the Korean Peninsula for coexistence and peace
 - ③ Facilitate inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation
 - ④ Transform the DMZ into an international peace zone and promote peace along the border areas
 - ⑤ Build a foundation for the institutionalization of inter-Korean relations and a sustainable policy moving forward

In commemoration of the 76th Liberation Day on August 15th, President Jae-in Moon presented his vision of a “Korean Peninsula model,” which contributes to the prosperity Northeast Asia through coexistence, denuclearization, and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. At the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2021, following his speeches in 2018 and 2020, President Moon expressed the government’s willingness to make progress in denuclearization and bring about a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by repeatedly proposing an end-of-war declaration.

2021 New Year's Address (January 11)

Peace equals mutual benefit. . . I hope that the process of dealing with COVID-19 will initiate mutual benefit and peace. Collaboration in response to COVID-19 can expand to cooperation on issues directly connected to the safety and survival of South and North Koreans such as infectious livestock diseases and natural disasters. Our determination to meet at any time and any place and talk even in a contact-free manner remains unchanged. The two Koreas should jointly fulfill all the agreements made together to date – especially the three principles of mutual security guarantees, common prosperity and zero tolerance for war. If we can draw support from the international community in the process, the door to a community of peace, security and life will open wide, not just on the Peninsula but also in East Asia.



76th Liberation Day Congratulatory Address (August 15)

East and West Germany built trust by exchanging good faith and intentions. They created a “German model” that pursues universalism, pluralism, coexistence and co-prosperity. Although unification may take some more time, we can create a Korean Peninsula model in which the two Koreas coexist and contribute to the prosperity of Northeast Asia as a whole through denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.



2 Major Accomplishments

The government maintained its commitment to manage the situation on the Korean Peninsula stably and create the conditions for dialogue. As a result of such commitments, the situation on the Korean Peninsula did not deteriorate further, and in turn, instability was reduced to some extent, which paved the way for a development of inter-Korean relations and DPRK-US relations.

To begin with, the tension on the Korean Peninsula did not intensify. Along with the fact that North Korea has neither tested nuclear weapons nor launched ICBMs³⁾ as agreed to in April 2018, the faithful implementation of the “Comprehensive Military Agreement” by South and North Korea has mitigated military tension in the border areas. North Korea did in fact test launch three short range ballistic missiles and one submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The DPRK also issued a statement to denounce South Korea for conducting the ROK-US combined military exercises. Neither of these steps, however, led to a high level of tension.

While the low level of tension on the Korean Peninsula was steadily maintained, inter-Korean communication channels restarted on July 27 as a result of mutual confidence between the leaders of South and North Korea. The reestablishment of these channels took place about a year and one month after they were severed in June of 2020. Based on the stable operation of its inter-Korean communication channels, the government proposed to North Korea to establish a video conferencing system to enable dialogue under any circumstances including COVID-19. Thanks to the government’s efforts at inter-Korean dialogue after President Jae-in Moon’s proposal for an end-of-war declaration in his keynote speech at 76th United Nations General Assembly on September 21, inter-Korean communication channels, which were temporarily severed on August 10 due to the ROK-US combined military exercises, were restored on October 4. This development created a rudimentary foundation for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.

The government closely coordinated with the Biden administration in DPRK policy after its inauguration in January of 2021. The Republic of Korea and the United States reached a consensus on the importance of a DPRK policy that is based on dialogue and diplomacy for the sake of denuclearization and the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Based on such a consensus, the Biden administration established and announced its new DPRK policy which involves a “calibrated and practical” approach. A position towards North Korea that prioritizes dialogue and diplomacy was reaffirmed in the ROK-US Leaders’ Joint Statement on May 21. The leaders of the Republic of Korea and the United States believe that diplomacy and dialogue based on the previous agreements between South and North Korea and between North Korea and the United States, such as the “Panmunjom Declaration (2018)” and the “Singapore

Joint Statement (2018),” are imperative for achieving complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and establishing permanent peace. They also agreed to support humanitarian assistance for the North Korean people and facilitate reunions of separated families. Furthermore, President Biden expressed his support for inter-Korean dialogue, engagement, and cooperation. He expressed that whenever there is an opportunity for these things to come to fruition, the United States will be able to discuss all agendas without preconditions. President Biden also emphasized that the US harbors no hostile intent towards the DPRK.

In addition, the Republic of Korea and the United States reviewed humanitarian cooperation initiatives for North Korea while sharing the understanding that humanitarian cooperation need to be realized without regard to the political, military, and/or security situation. The two countries also had in-depth discussions on an end-of-war declaration.

ROK-US Leaders' Joint Statement (May 21)

“We also reaffirm our common belief that diplomacy and dialogue, based on previous inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK commitments such as the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and Singapore Joint Statement, are essential to achieve the complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. President Biden also expresses his support for inter-Korean dialogue, engagement, and cooperation. We agree to work together to improve the human rights situation in the DPRK and commit to continue facilitating the provision of humanitarian aid to the neediest North Koreans. We also share our willingness to help facilitate the reunion of separated families of the two Koreas. we also agree to coordinate our approaches to the DPRK in lockstep.”



3) On March 24, 2022, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), lifting its moratorium on ICBM testing.

Section

2

Denuclearization and the Establishment of Peace

1 Efforts to Resume Dialogue on Denuclearization

In 2021, the government continued its efforts to bring about denuclearization and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula, but the stalemate with North Korea continued. In his New Year's Address delivered on January 11, 2021, President Jae-in Moon affirmed that the main engines for the Korean Peninsula Peace Process are dialogue, co-existence, and cooperation. The ROK government strengthened the ROK-US alliance as President Biden was sworn in and expressed his willingness to transform the state of stalled inter-Korean relations and DPRK-US relations. However, the ROK government was not able to accomplish tangible outcomes in denuclearization and the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula as the COVID-19 prevailed and North Korea did not respond to the proposals for dialogue from the ROK government and the US. In such difficult circumstances, under the principles of “zero tolerance for war,” “a mutual security guarantee,” and “co-prosperity,” the ROK government sent consistent messages to North Korea about the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula and the improvement of inter-Korean relations in order to move forward with a restoration of dialogue and cooperation.

The newly inaugurated Biden administration maintained its position that the United States harbors no hostile intent towards the DPRK and can discuss all issues through dialogue without any preconditions. It also affirmed its policy objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, the stalemate in the DPRK-US relations continued.

The United States tried to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table to discuss

denuclearization in messages from US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and US Special Representative for the DPRK Sung Kim. Such efforts, however, did not bear any fruit. In his speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2021, Chairman Kim Jong-un assessed the US's DPRK policy to be just another instance of former US administrations' hostile policies and reiterated the DPRK position that the United States should first abandon its hostile policy before expecting anything more.

At the ROK-US Summit on May 21, the leaders of the Republic of Korea and the United States affirmed their joint commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and their willingness to deal with North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In particular, the two leaders reaffirmed their belief that diplomacy and dialogue based on the previous agreements between South and North Korea and between North Korea and the United States, such as the "Panmunjom Declaration (2018)" and the "Singapore Joint Statement (2018)," are imperative to achieve complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and establish permanent peace. They expressed their support for inter-Korean dialogue, engagement, and cooperation.

In a courtesy call with Pope Francis on October 29, President Jae-in Moon requested that the Pope pay North Korea a visit in order to create momentum for peace on the Korean Peninsula. In response, Pope Francis expressed his willingness to visit North Korea if he received an invitation from them. On October 30, President Jae-in Moon also tried to garner support for the Korean Peninsula Peace Process in his meetings on the sidelines of the G20 Summit with the leaders of key nations.

Meanwhile in its annual report on August 27, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assessed that North Korea had reprocessed spent fuel rods and started operating its 5-megawatt reactor again. The international community including the United States and the United Nations urged North Korea to refrain from any activities related to nuclear weapon development and resume dialogue and diplomacy.

The international community remained committed to a resumption of dialogue with North Korea. At the G7 Summit on June 13, the leaders issued a joint statement that called for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and called on all states to fully implement all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and their associated sanctions. They also called on the DPRK to engage and resume dialogue.

From late summer to fall of 2021, the participating countries in various international

conventions expressed their support for dialogue, diplomacy, the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the establishment of peace in the international arena. These settings included the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in August, the East Asia Summit (EAS) in October, and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in November.

2] Implementation of the Korean Peninsula Peace Process, Including an End-of-War Declaration

As he did at the 75th UN General Assembly Session, President Jae-in Moon delivered a keynote speech at the 76th UN General Assembly Session on September 21, in which he repeatedly called for an end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula to reinvigorate the Korean Peninsula Peace Process and break its state of deadlock. Affirming that the end-of-war declaration would be pivotal in creating a new order of reconciliation and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, President Jae-in Moon asked for the United Nations' and the international community's support. He emphasized that the declaration could help secure a state of mutual peace with irreversible progress in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In a congratulatory speech on the 73rd Armed Forces Day (October 1), President Moon reaffirmed his willingness to move forward with the declaration.

President Biden affirmed his willingness to resolve issues through dialogue and diplomacy by emphasizing a policy of serious and sustained diplomacy. He emphasized the importance of securing complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula while

Address by President Jae-in Moon at 76th Session of UN General Assembly (September 21)

“More than anything, an end-of-war declaration will mark a pivotal point of departure in creating a new order of ‘reconciliation and cooperation’ on the Korean Peninsula. When the parties involved in the Korean War stand together and proclaim an end to the War, I believe we can make irreversible progress in denuclearization and usher in an era of complete peace.”



Address by President Jae-in Moon on 73rd Armed Forces Day (October 1)

“Before the United Nations, I proposed an end-of-war declaration for the Korean Peninsula and a new era of reconciliation and cooperation. The foremost and greatest responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is to build and preserve permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.”



engaging in close communication with the Republic of Korea. At the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, he maintained that the US is ready to meet with North Korea without preconditions. On May 20, Congressman Brad Sherman and his colleagues introduced the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act (*H.R.3446*), which calls for a binding peace agreement constituting a formal end to the Korean War. On November 5, 23 House Democrats who supported the act wrote a joint letter to President Biden, urging him to seek a binding peace agreement that would formally declare an end to the Korean War. On the other hand, 35 House Republicans sent a letter to a US senior official on December 7, urging him to reject an end-of-war declaration with North Korea.

On November 29, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Armed Forces committee in the French Senate passed a resolution urging the French government to support an end-of-war declaration for the Korean Peninsula.

On September 24, Chairman Jong-un Kim's sister Yo-jong Kim said in a statement that the declaration of the termination of the war was an interesting and admirable idea. However, she presented mutual respect and withdrawal of hostile policies toward the DPRK as preconditions. Such North Korea's position was echoed in Chairman Jong-un Kim's speech at the Supreme People's Assembly on September 29.

On September 22, China expressed through a spokesperson its support for ending the state of war on the Korean Peninsula and replacing the state of armistice with a peace regime. The spokesperson also expressed China's willingness to continue to play a role in this regard as an important party to the Korean Peninsula issue.

Section

3

Spread of the Consensus on Unification

1 The National Unification Contract

The National Unification Contract project was implemented to ensure consistency and continuity in the ROK's unification policies. The project was carried out in accordance with the 100 Policy Tasks Five-year Plan. From 2018 to 2021, a total of 6,000 citizens participated in social dialogue forums at the regional and provincial levels over the course of 4 years. The goal of the National Unification Contract project is to create a sustainable unification policy based on people's trust. By promoting South Korean people's participation and communication, the government sought to reduce conflict within South Korea and build a consensus for the direction and principles of unification policy. In accordance with the principle of "civilian-led, government-supported," the government directed its efforts towards achieving impartiality and credibility.

In 2021, the government facilitated social dialogue to reach a final version of the contract based on a 2020 draft prepared by the Social Dialogue for Peace and Unification Building of Korea. Concentrating on disease control measures, four virtual meetings were organized in June to promote social dialogue discussions. 102 citizens of different genders, ages, regions, and political backgrounds took part in the dialogue. Citizen participants were recruited among both males and females and those above 19 years old, based on the Ministry of the Interior and Safety's resident population statistics as of the end of March 2021. To ensure a fair representation of participants, factors such as gender, age, and birthplace were balanced proportionally based on population statistics of Korean residents. The ideological orientations of the participants were matched using the average political orientation survey conducted by polling organizations over the

past 3 months.

The 2021 social dialogue forum “The Future of the Korean Peninsula and its Roadmap,” proposed in 2020, was deliberated upon as an agenda item to be included in the National Unification Contract. On Day 1, participants discussed ways to amend the 2020 draft, and the paragraph structure of the National Unification Contract was adopted. On Day 2 and 3, the order of the paragraphs agreed to on Day 1 was decided, as well as specific sentences of the contract. The agenda committee, composed of 6 experts (3 progressive and 3 conservative) and 10 civilian participants, jointly held a working group meeting to refine the finalized sentences into a draft. On Day 4, the draft was further polished, and the final version of the National Unification Contract was adopted by a vote at the plenary meeting.



Social Dialogue organized in 2021

(Unit: Person)

Title	Location	Date	Participants	Method	Agenda
Comprehensive Social Dialogue (4 sessions)	Seoul (Livestream: The Cultural Center for Inter-Korean Integration)	June 5	103	Hybrid (online and in-person)	1. Future of the Korean Peninsula Peace 2. Process and ways to actualize plans for the future
		June 12	102		
		June 13	102		
		June 26	102		
Total: 4 times			409		

The National Unification Contract is composed of a preamble, Chapter 1 “A Vision of the Future for the Korean Peninsula”, and Chapter 2 “A Vision of the Future for the Korean Peninsula.” Chapter 1 outlines 16 desirable future scenarios including “a peaceful Korean Peninsula without military threats” and “a Korean Peninsula that engages in humanitarian assistance and cooperates with the international community.” Chapter 2 specifies 8 tasks including “people’s participation and consensus-building” and “maintaining consistency in unification policy toward North Korea.” The participants made 22 recommendations to the government ministries, local governments, and the National Assembly for the continuation and development of social dialogue on peace and unification. A vision to expand the social dialogue to the inter-Korean context was recommended as well.

On July 5, the participants in the social dialogue process delivered the adopted National

Unification Contract and the accompanying Recommendations for the Continuation and Development of Social Dialogue on Peace and Unification to the Minister of Unification. The Minister reported the outcome of the contract to the President and the Speaker of the National Assembly on July 8 and September 23 respectively.



The Comprehensive Social Dialogue (June 5–26)



The National Unification Contract delivery ceremony (July 5)

The government supported the production of the KBS documentary *Shall We Talk?* (aired on Sept. 12) to raise public awareness about the National Unification Contract, which is the first ever social contract on Unification and North Korea policy. The documentary vividly portrayed how the participants learned to understand each other and form a consensus through deliberation.

The Minister of Unification also hosted a roundtable discussion with youth to raise awareness about Unification and North Korea policies and strengthen communication practices in the process. The Minister also invited young people in their 20s and 30s, politicians representing progressive and conservative groups, and experts to an interactive talk concert. To introduce Korea’s citizen consensus building experiences and social dialogue model to the international community, an online international symposium was organized on November 24, and it attracted attention and garnered support from global scholars.



Shall We Talk? (Sept. 12)



Dialogue with the Unification Minister (Oct. 22)



A talk concert with the next generation (Nov. 18)



National Consensus on Unification

Preamble

The National Social Pact on Unification (NSPU) is a social pact for peaceful resolution of inter-Korean confrontation and conflict and for production together of a future vision for the Korean Peninsula.

After liberation, the Korean Peninsula was divided into South and North and experienced war. Since the end of that war, confrontation and hostility have continued between South and North amidst the instability of the Armistice. This caused enormous suffering and social costs for the people on the Korean Peninsula, whose lives are greatly impacted by national division and inter-Korean relations. However, policy-making on this issue has been controlled by a small number of people with close ties to the government. Policies have been created and implemented without sufficient social consensus, marginalizing those directly affected and oversimplifying the issues as mere “political strife,” removed from the meaningful demands and everyday lives of the people. Policies toward the North have oscillated following changes of government, with little consistency. This has led to confusion and less strength in inter-Korean negotiations and meaningless social and political conflict in society, often described as “South-South conflict.”

The NSPU is part of the efforts to establish a consensus across political orientations and ideologies so that policies on the future of inter-Korean relations and the Korean Peninsula are created and implemented in a democratic and consistent manner. The social dialogue to formulate the National Consensus on Unification, or the draft NSPU involved balanced participation of representatives of conservative, centrist, and progressive civil society organizations and 7 major religions of South Korea. Since 2018, thousands of people, including activists and teachers, have participated in “deliberative democracy” on peace and unification. Experts with varying perspectives also took part in the process of developing the agenda, making presentations, asking questions and giving answers, and providing advice. The National Consensus on Unification was prepared by people, selected by a trusted public survey organization, after a lengthy process of deliberation.

The National Consensus on Unification becomes a genuine social pact when the National Assembly and the government develop it into an official pact based on respect for the outcome of the people’s deliberation. The NSPU shouldn’t simply be a declaration. It should continue to evolve with the political environment on the Korean Peninsula and in public perception. The social dialogue on peace and unification needs to continue and be established institutionally and culturally. Eventually, it needs to be expanded to dialogue and consensus among the governments and civil societies of North Korea and neighboring countries.

Main Text

Participants in the Social Dialogue on the National Social Pact on Unification, organized by the Social Dialogue for Peace and Unification Building of Korea upon request from the Ministry of Unification, adopt the following National Consensus on Unification based on deliberations on the vision for the future of the Korean Peninsula and process and means of realizing that vision, in four regional preliminary conversations and an 8-day national plenary conversation that took place between July 6, 2020 and June 26, 2021.

Chapter I. Vision of the Future for the Korean Peninsula

The Korean Peninsula we desire in the future is:

- a peaceful Korean Peninsula without military threats;
- a Korean Peninsula denuclearized in a peaceful manner;
- a Korean Peninsula where human rights and diversity of life are guaranteed;
- a Korean Peninsula of welfare states that ensure prosperity for all people in the South and the North;
- a Korean Peninsula with fairness established in the social system;
- a Korean Peninsula with freedom of the press;
- a Korean Peninsula where conflicts are resolved through social consensus;
- a Korean Peninsula with freedom of travel and tourism;
- a Korean Peninsula with active and diverse cultural exchanges;
- a Korean Peninsula where people can travel out to the world on an inter-Korean railroad;
- a Korean Peninsula that attracts the world as a center for culture;
- a Korean Peninsula developed through inter-Korean economic exchange and cooperation;
- a Korean Peninsula where the development of technology and resources are joint endeavors;
- a Korean Peninsula as a center for global logistics;
- a Korean Peninsula where the South and the North provide mutual humanitarian assistance; and
- a Korean Peninsula that engages in humanitarian assistance and in cooperation with the international community.

People of South and North Korea, along with the government, become agents in the unification process, and the Korean Peninsula becomes a model for peace and unification.

Chapter II. Process and Means of Realizing the Vision of the Future for the Korean Peninsula

People's participation and consensus-building

- Reach a national consensus on unification
- Promote unification to gain public acceptance and support
- Ensure participation of the people of South and North Korea in the policy-making process on peace and unification

Consistency in unification policy toward North Korea

- Implement unification programs continuously
- Realize and maintain the established unification policy
- Introduce and reform laws and systems for unification
- Hold regular inter-Korean dialogue
- Operate inter-Korean channels for dialogue and consultation
- Continue inter-Korean dialogue based on trust

Ending military confrontation on and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

- Establish a cooperative system for peace without military threat
- Convince neighboring countries to cooperate towards disarmament

Relations with neighboring countries

- Improve diplomatic relations between the South and the North and their neighboring countries
- Promote the necessity of unification in the international community
- The South and the North gain cooperation and support of neighboring countries for unification

Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation

- Promote exchanges between separated families
- Allow free visits between separated families
- Ensure inter-Korean cooperation for quarantine efforts regarding contagious human and animal diseases
- Manage and preserve the natural ecosystem of the Korean Peninsula through inter-Korean cooperation

Social and cultural exchange and cooperation

- Ensure continuous inter-Korean cultural exchange
- Promote exchange and cooperation in non-political areas
- Conduct joint research on language, history and culture to restore the inter-Korean community
- Engage in joint efforts to restore historical understanding
- Guarantee freedom of travel and tourism between the South and the North
- Ensure that the South and the North are open to each other's media and exchanges of information
- Ensure transparent journalism on realities of the South and the North

Economic cooperation and balanced inter-Korean development

- Establish trust in inter-Korean relations based on respect for each other's system and economic cooperation
- Develop concrete plans for integration of the economy and resources of the South and the North
- Connect and maintain transportation facilities through inter-Korean cooperation

Education on peace and unification

- The South and the North to conduct common education on unification

June 26, 2021

Participants in the Social Dialogue on the National Social Pact on Unification
Social Dialogue for Peace and Unification Building of Korea

김인성
김경민
정강진
이강산

Recommendations for the Continuation and Development of Social Dialogue on Peace and Unification

Participants in the Social Dialogue on the NSPU, organized by Social Dialogue for Peace and Unification Building of Korea, adopt the following recommendations for the government, the National Assembly, NGOs and the people based on the deliberation on ways to continuously develop social dialogue on the vision of peace and unification.

Recommendations to the central and local governments

- The central government expands social dialogue on peace and unification.
- The central government integrates the outcome of social dialogue on peace and unification into policy.
- The central government establishes a consistent unification policy based on the NSPU.
- The central and local governments establish the necessary policy and budgets to continue social dialogue on peace and unification.
- The central and local governments implement regular social dialogue on peace and unification of diverse scales and with participants from diverse backgrounds.
- The central government establishes a permanent institution for the social dialogue on peace and unification.
- The central government extends the promotion of social dialogue on peace and unification for more active participation.
- The central government creates diverse channels for the social dialogue on peace and unification.
- The Ministry of Unification establishes a platform for people to participate that opens the process and outcome of participant deliberation.
- The Ministry of Unification prepares an accurate manual for the social dialogue on peace and unification.
- The central government listens to diverse opinions on unification and creates a variety of communication channels.
- The central government provides adequate information on unification for the people.
- The central government creates opportunities for education on unification.

Recommendations to the National Assembly

- The National Assembly introduces law that supports the social dialogue on peace and unification.
- The National Assembly integrates the outcome of the social dialogue on peace and unification into policy.
- The National Assembly establishes a consistent unification policy based on the NSPU.

Recommendations to NGOs

- NGOs expand the social dialogue on peace and unification.
- Civil society organizations deal with diverse perspectives and themes in the social dialogue on peace and unification.
- NGOs provide adequate information on unification for the people.

Recommendations to the people

- People actively participate in unification education and the social dialogue on peace and unification.
- People monitor whether the NSPU is adequately integrated into government policy.
- People develop an objective understanding of North Koreans.

Recommendations for evolution into inter-Korean dialogue

- Develop the social dialogue on peace and unification into inter-Korean dialogue.

June 26, 2021

Participants in the Social Dialogue on the NSPU
Social Dialogue for Peace and Unification Building of Korea

김인성
김경민
정강진
이강선

2 The Operation and Expansion of the Unification Plus (+) Center

To satisfy diverse regional demands related to peace and unification, such as unification education, settlement support for North Korean defectors, inter-Korean cooperation, and information related to North Korea, the government opened the Incheon Unification Plus (+) Center as a pilot project in September 2018.

In 2021, the Incheon Unification Plus (+) Center (hereinafter referred to as “the Center”) carried out diverse projects to boost empathy towards peace and unification and create the conditions for them in the Incheon metropolitan area and the surrounding region. To begin with, the communication and cooperation network in Incheon was expanded. The Center organized weekly steering committee meetings with the Incheon Hana Center (a regional branch to support North Korean defectors) and the Unification Education Center Gyeonggi-Incheon Branch to enhance its coordination. The Center strengthened its partnership with local governments and education offices by participating in the Peace City Establishment Committee of Incheon Metropolitan City and the Preparation Group and Committee for the Peace School of the Incheon Metropolitan City Office of Education. Moreover, the Center consistently communicated with civil society organizations to identify local needs and gather opinions about peace and unification.

The Incheon Unification Plus (+) Center organized various participatory and communication programs in cooperation with relevant local agencies. In coordination with Incheon Metropolitan City and Ongjin County, the Center co-hosted a peace and unification camp for youths living on islands and provided unification education for national geopark tour guides working on Baengnyeong Island and Daecheong Island. Together with the Incheon Metropolitan City Office of Education, the Center co-organized a peace and unification site training program and experiential education for unification in the future. Along with the Incheon Human Resources Development Center, the Incheon Unification Plus (+) Center jointly conducted unification education programs for 1,477 government officials as well as employees of public institutions on 10 separate occasions. The Center also organized the “Mirae Eum Press Corps” (Press Corps for the Future), composed of youth in Incheon, to promote discussions on peace and unification and to raise awareness.



The peace and unification site training program for youth (coordinated with the Incheon Metropolitan City Office of Education, June 9)



The peace and unification camp for youths living on islands (co-hosted with Incheon City and Ongjin County, June 18)

The Incheon Unification Plus (+) Center organized multiple events to raise awareness about unification. Considering the COVID-19 situation, the 2021 “Incheon Towards Peace” event took place online and included special lectures, performances, and a photo exhibition on subway cars of the Han River Estuary’s migratory birds. In addition, the Center organized a wildflower photo exhibition in the former US Army installation Camp Market in Incheon’s Bupyeong District, a photo exhibition of Mt. Halla and Mt. Baekdu on the Incheon Airport Railroad, and a peace and unification PR competition for youth in Incheon.



Guitar performance
(YouTube livestream, June 2)



Wildflower photo exhibition
(Camp Market in Bupyeong, Oct. 1–17)

The Incheon Unification Plus (+) Center coordinated closely with the Unification Education Center Gyeonggi-Incheon Branch and the Incheon Hana Center to strengthen existing unification education and settlement support programs for North Korean de-

factors. With the Unification Education Center Gyeonggi-Incheon Branch, the Incheon Unification Plus (+) Center bridged South Korean youth and North Korean defectors together by facilitating a pen pal program, organizing theatre nights of performances about peace and unification, and designing a local map tailored for a peace tour. In collaboration with the Incheon Hana Center, the Incheon Unification Plus (+) Center provided job training for North Korean defectors, such as mock job interviews, career talks with peers, etc. In addition, by organizing online interactive programs, including kimchi-making tutorials, the Center supported local North Korean defectors as they adapted to South Korean society.

After the successful pilot of the Incheon Unification Plus (+) Center as a public awareness hub for peace and unification, follow-on action to install additional Unification Plus (+) Centers in each region was planned in 2020. In accordance with the plan, centers in the Honam and Gangwon areas were launched in 2021. Centers in the Chungcheong and Gyeonggi areas will be established in 2022.

3 Expanding the Consensus on Unification through Public-Private Partnerships

(1) Unification Cultural Events

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the government organized various forms of online and non-face-to-face cultural events on the topic of unification. In 2021, cultural events were tailored to promote participation and discussion among the future generation (specifically, those in their 20s and 30s), thus creating a venue to better understand and engage in peace and unification issues.

Themes such as music, dance, and art were utilized to draw the attention of the youth generation. Considering their proficiency in digital devices and online platforms, access to cultural events was opened through mobile and social media channels.

In March 2021, six youth representatives selected from a public contest and three career rappers participated in the “Peace, I Dream for Peace” project. In a hip-hop cypher style, participants wrote lyrics and composed songs about peace and unification. The song making process was broadcast through KBS and MBC and attracted a great deal

of attention from the time of its early production stage. 12 videos, including the final music video and the video of the production process, both of which exhibited a longing for peace, were uploaded to the Ministry of Unification's social media accounts. As of late December 2021, the total view count for the videos was about 78,000.

In May 2021, the “Youth Perspectives on ROK Unification and the Future” talk concert was held to facilitate dialogue between the Minister of Unification and five panels of youth residing in Jeju. The younger generation from Jeju actively engaged in the discussion and offered various insights on peace, unification, and inter-Korean relations. To uphold the government’s COVID-19 regulations, the scale of on-site participation was minimized, and online participation was encouraged through a pre-event survey and through livestreaming. As of late December 2021, the total view count for the talk concert was about 20,000.



“Peace, I Dream for Peace”
Music Video



“Youth Perspectives on ROK Unification and the Future” talk concert (May 31)

In June 2021, the live talk show “*Whispering Peace*” took place. In this forum, artists in their 20s and 30s had a discussion with the Minister of Unification about the theme of unification and enjoyed peace-themed artworks and performances. 6 videos including the artwork on the filmmaking process and the live talk show were uploaded to the Ministry of Unification SNS platforms. As of late December 2021, the total view count of these videos was about 104,000.

In October 2021, the Ministry of Unification targeted the youth generation by collaborating with the 1MILLION Dance Studio to produce a dance video called “Peace, Just a Mile Away.” The filming took place in the regions along the border area, including the Inter-Korean Transit Office, the DMZ Museum, and Jejin Station located in Goseong,

Gangwon Province. The video effectively portrayed the division, unification, and peace. 4 videos, including “Peace, Just a Mile Away,” were uploaded to the Ministry’s social media accounts. As of late December 2021, the total view count for the videos was about 346,000.



“Whispering Peace” live talk show (June 8)



“Peace, Just a Mile Away”
a dance video

The hashtag #PeaceMile challenge, which included point choreography symbolizing peace, was introduced to inspire youth participation. #PeaceMile is combination of “Peace” and “Smile,” thus denoting smiling for peace. By promoting the #PeaceMile challenge through the “Peace, Just a Mile Away” video, youth in their 20s and 30s were encouraged to share the video through social media platforms and openly talk about peace and unification.

The DMZ barbed wire, once a symbol of conflict and confrontation, was forged into a peace cross. A documentary called “*Barbed Wire, Heralds of Peace*” traced its transformation process and was broadcast in December of 2021.

(2) Public Communication

The Ministry of Unification created various digital contents and posted them on its website (www.unikorea.go.kr) and on social media to inform people about the progress of Korean Peninsula policy and inter-Korean relations as well as ways to strengthen public relations with regards to the government’s North Korea policies.

To enhance public awareness about peace on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea, the Ministry created 257 media contents including 109 visual aids on key policies and press releases, 120 infographics including “Peace Class,” “Culture in South Korea and North Korea,” and “Stories of Separated Families from Sowon’s Grandparents” as well as 28 policy promotional videos including “We are the Pioneers of the Future ROK,” “My First Day at Work,” and “Video Messages of Separated Families.”



“We are the Pioneers of the Future ROK” promotional video



“Peace Class” infographic series



“Culture in South Korea and North Korea” infographic series



“My First Day at Work” video series

To promote positive perceptions of North Korean defectors, 12 infographics on settlement cases were produced, including “True Stories of North Korean Defectors’ Successful Employment” and “Unification Wifi (Season 2).” Also, the webtoon series *Following Each Other with North Korean Defectors* aimed to bridge the language gap between South Korea and North Korea.




“True Stories of North Korean Defectors’ Successful Employment” infographic series



“Unification Wifi (Season 2)”

To respond to misinformed news on unification policy and deliver the facts to the South Korean people, the Ministry of Unification released 8 infographics in the “Well, Here are the Facts” section of its official website.



Infographics

(3) The Contest for UniKorea Culture Contents

Since 2015, the Ministry of Unification has held Unification Cultural Content Competitions for music, movies, and other kinds of artwork. In 2021, the “Let’s Sing Towards Unification” music contest was co-organized by the Ministry of Unification, Gangwon Province, and Cheorwon County.

115 teams submitted videos to the “2021 Let’s Sing Towards Unification” contest, performing various musical genres ranging from ballads, hip-hop, rock, Korean traditional fusion music, and trot. Among the 115 teams, 20 teams passed the preliminary round based on their video. Those 20 teams participated in the 2nd round and performed on the Korean Peninsula Island in Yanggu, Gangwon province, on September 16. 12 teams advanced to the final round and performed on the special stage constructed at the former Workers’ Party of Korea headquarters in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province on September 28. The final round was conducted in a hybrid format, with 100 local residents participating in-person and others attending online. 500 people watched the performance on a YouTube livestream, and the contest provided the opportunity for people yearning for peace and unification to enjoy the music online and in-person. The grand prize (Minister of Unification Award) was given to team Lazybone who performed the song “Okryugwan.” Awards of excellence (the Governor of Gangwon Province Award) were given to 7 teams including Lee Hoon-joo who sang “Dreaming about My Way Back to Anju.”

The final round of “Let’s Sing Towards Unification 2021” was recorded and broadcast by SBS and G1 (Gangwon Broadcasting). The winner of the grand prize was invited to perform at the “Concert for Korean Peninsula Unification” in Leipzig, Germany.



The final round of “Let’s Sing Towards Unification 2021” (September 28)



The grand prize winner performance in Germany (November 20)

(4) Internet Broadcast (UniTV)

Since 2011, the Ministry of Unification has managed the internet broadcasting station UniTV to raise awareness amongst the youth and the public about unification and expand their understanding of inter-Korean relations and unification policies. In 2021, UniTV produced high-quality videos focused on the theme of unification and uploaded its contents to the Ministry of Unification website (www.unikorea.go.kr) and on social media platforms. It also broadcasted its contents through Naver TV Cast and Kakao TV.

UniTV’s regular programming includes *Unification NOW*, which is composed of the following segments: “Unification Briefing,” “Unification Scene,” and “Unification Chatter (Season2).” 150 segments were produced in 2021.

“Unification Briefing” delivered news about inter-Korean relations and unification.

“Unification Scene” introduced the events and activities related to unification organized by the government and/or civil society. “Gwanghwamun Pencil Case” was merged into “Unification Chatter (Season 2).” In season 2, professional moderators hosted a talk show with experts and key figures on unification and North Korea issues in a timely manner to effectively deliver policy implications.



“Unification Briefing”



“Unification Scene”



“Unification Chatter (Season2)”

“Tong-jang,” a friendly expression for the head of a local community, was used as an acronym for the Minister of Unification. The “Greetings from Tong-jang” program showed the Unification Minister’s willingness to engage with various members of the community to promote peace and unification.

Distinct from the regular briefing format was the new biweekly “Weekly Tong-tong-official” program, which was customized with YouTube motion graphics to effectively deliver its message. Eighth episodes of the dating show “Romantic Relationships” with panel commentators expressing the different dating styles of South Korea and North Korea were also released.



“Greetings from Tong-jang”



“Weekly Tong-tong-official”



“Romantic Relationships”

In 2021, the Ministry of Unification aimed to further develop the incredible programs of 2020 and create new contents that substantially satisfied policy audiences. 44 segments featuring Ministry employees and families, celebrities, North Korean defectors, professional moderators, students, and the younger generation were produced. Key

contents included “Come to Unification (Season 2),” “Unification for 7-year-old” and “Find Me a Job.”

“Come to Unification (Season 2)” is a reality quiz show targeting teenagers and people in their 20s who share genuine thoughts about the road to unification. In “Unification for 7-year-old (Season 2),” Ministry of Unification employees explained unification terminology and North Korean words to their children to enhance the awareness of the next generation. “Find Me a Job” outlines the obstacles North Korean defectors face in searching for jobs and starting businesses. It explains about the employment support programs the Ministry of Unification offers and provides substantial assistance to North Korean defectors, such as on-the-job training experiences and vocational training. “Find Me a Job” will be released in 2022.



“Come to Unification (Season2)”

“Unification for 7-year-olds (Season2)”

“Find Me a Job”

To overcome the limitations of an internet broadcasting channel, UniTV airs its videos through other public channels as well. For example, *Unification NOW* is aired by Korea TV (once a week), Arirang TV (4 times a week), and Welfare TV (3 times a week). In addition, certain UniTV contents are aired on Consumer TV and EyTV (a channel for displaced persons).

Finally, the government welcomes teachers and public institutions to utilize UniTV videos for the purpose of unification education.

Section

4

Cooperation with the International Community

1] Cooperation with the Key Governments and International Organizations

The ROK government holds meetings to discuss issues pertaining to the Korean Peninsula with government officials and subject matter experts every year in its visits to the key nations involved in Korean Peninsula issues such as the United States, China, Japan, Russia and the European Union. Despite COVID-19, which continued to claim lives around the world since early 2020, the ROK government continued engaging in dialogue and communication through contacts with officials visiting the Republic of Korea and with foreign embassies in Seoul, even if it was in a limited capacity.

In particular, the Ministry of Unification held a bilateral meeting between Vice Minister of Unification Young-joon Choi and US Special Representative for the DPRK Sung Kim to strengthen bilateral communication on DPRK policy between the Ministry of Unification and the Department of State. In working-level discussions, the Republic of Korea and the United States held regular director-general level consultations where the two sides discussed creative ways to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and establish peace by exploring ROK-US cooperation projects for North Korea.

From early 2021, Minister of Unification In-young Lee held video conferences with various US lawmakers including Congressman Ami Bera, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation on January 13, Congressman Gregory Meeks, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 6, and Senator Edward Markey, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific on May 25. In these meetings, he offered his unwavering support and cooperation for the newly inaugurated Biden administration's

DPRK policy and the Korean Peninsula Peace Process. Moreover, Minister Lee called on US Special Representative for the DPRK Sung Kim (who visited the Republic of Korea on June 22 and August 24) to take an audacious and practical approach in resuming dialogue among countries concerned with the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula. On July 22, Minister Lee met with Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman to exchange opinions about how to engage with North Korea through existing ROK-US joint projects while also emphasizing the importance of diplomatic engagement for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and peacebuilding.

Vice Minister of Unification Young-joon Choi also had bilateral meetings with US Special Representative for the DPRK Sung Kim and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, and in these meetings, he discussed ROK-US joint cooperative efforts that could bring North Korea back to the negotiating table and establish confidence among South Korea, North Korea, and the United States.

The working-level team had a total of five director-general level meetings with Deputy Assistant Secretary for Multilateral Affairs and Global China issues (Deputy Special Representative for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Jung Pak: through videoconferencing on April 16, in Seoul on June 23, in Washington D.C. on August 4, in Seoul on September 16, and in Washington D.C. on November 1. During these meetings, the two sides coordinated how to move forward with ROK-US joint cooperative initiatives in the areas of healthcare, drinking water, and sanitation. They also discussed a joint ROK-US strategy for resuming negotiations on denuclearization and peace with North Korea.

The ROK government had senior-level discussions with China, Russia, and European Union countries, focusing on the roles of neighboring countries and ways they could cooperate to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula. Unification Minister Lee met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov, who visited the Republic of Korea on August 25, and called for Russia's constructive role in denuclearization, peace, and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, on the occasion of the 31st Anniversary of German Unity Day, Minister Lee visited Belgium, Sweden, and Germany where he urged the international community to engage diplomatically with North Korea. On September 30, Minister Lee held bilateral meetings with the European Commissioners in Brussels. On October 1, Minister Lee had senior-level meetings with



Meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman (July 22)



Meeting with the Foreign Minister of Sweden Ann Linde (Oct. 1)



Meeting with Olaf Scholz, a nominee as the SPD's candidate for Chancellor of Germany, during the 31st anniversary of German Unity Day (Oct. 3)



Courtesy visit to German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Oct. 4)

Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde and State Secretary Karin Wallensteen to discuss collaborative ways to create conditions for the Korean Peninsula Peace Process, an end-of-war declaration, humanitarian cooperation efforts for North Koreans, and the overall dialogue process. Moreover, Minister Lee attended the commemoration of the 31st anniversary of German Unity Day in Germany on October 3 and on the following day paid a courtesy visit to German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Minister Lee's conversation with the President focused on developments on the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean relations while conveying a congratulatory message for German Unity Day.

To attend the G20 Summit, President Jae-in Moon visited Rome in Italy and had a courtesy call with Pope Francis. Minister In-young Lee was the first Minister of Unification in South Korean history to accompany the president on his overseas travels, and he took part in President Moon's visit with Pope Francis on October 29. During his time in Italy, Minister Lee met with His Eminence Peter Turkson, Prefect of the Dicast-



Courtesy Visit with Pope Francis (Oct. 29)



Meeting with Cardinal Peter Turkson (Oct. 29)



Meeting the WFP Executive Director (Oct. 29)



Meeting with WHO Director-General (Nov.1)

ery for Promoting Integral Human Development, and Vatican Prefect Heung-sik You. The three of them discussed the role of the Vatican in promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula and ways they could cooperate.

On the occasion of European tour, the Minister of Unification held a series of talks with the heads of international organizations, including Executive Director of the World Food Program (WFP) David Beasley (Oct. 29); and Vice President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gilles Carbonnier, Secretary-General of the International Federation of Red Cross Societies (IFRC) Jagan Chapagain, and Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus (Nov. 1). With these global leaders, he had detailed discussions on humanitarian cooperation with North Korea in areas such as health and medical cooperation, separated families, climate change, and disaster management.

The government held the Korea-German Unification Advisory Committee based on a memorandum of understanding with the German Ministry of Interior in 2010 to understand implications for Korean unification and integration based on the case of German unification. The 2021 Korea-German Unification Advisory Committee meet-

ing was held at the Office of Inter-Korean Dialogue (August 4–5). The meeting was attended by advisors from both sides of Korea and Germany, including Vice Minister of Unification Young-joon Choi (Chairman of the Korean side), Federal Government Commissioner for the New Federal States Marco Wanderwitz (Chairman of the German side), officials from the German embassy in Korea and the Korean Embassy in Germany, German political foundations, and private experts. Discussions were held on the topic Evaluating the 30th Anniversary of Unification, Changes in the Consciousness of East and West German Residents, and the Implications for the Korean Peninsula.



Korea-Germany Unification Advisory Meeting (Aug. 4–5)

2] Building a Consensus in the International Community

The government continued various efforts to raise the international community's awareness and build a consensus for the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Through the Korea Global Forum for Peace (KGFP), which was first established in 2010, the government has annually invited experts from 20 countries around the world to Korea and has been leading an international peace discussion on the topics of denuclearization, peace, and co-prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

The 2021 KGFP was held from August 31 to September 2 with its theme of “A New Vision for Inter-Korean Relations and a Community of Peace, Economy, and Life on the Korean Peninsula” to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the 1991 Basic Agreement between the two Koreas and the simultaneous South-North joint entry into the United Nations. Discussions from various perspectives took place at

this meeting centered around topics such as “a new vision for inter-Korean relations,” “changes in North Korea in the era of Jong-un Kim,” “a peace economy and life community on the Korean Peninsula,” and “a sustainable policy toward North Korea.” 300 domestic and foreign speakers from 31 domestic and foreign organizations took part in this discussion.

The first day of the forum (Oct. 31) began with opening remarks from Minister of Unification Lee In-young and a congratulatory speech by National Assembly Speaker Park Byeong-seug. There was a keynote speech with the title “Evaluating the 30th Anniversary of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Vision of Inter-Korean Relations” delivered by Senior Vice-Chairman of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council Se-hyun Jeong. In addition, for the second year in a row, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres sent a special video message about building peace on the Korean Peninsula to the forum. In the afternoon, Vatican Secretary of State Pietro Parolin gave a keynote address on the theme “The Church’s Role in Building Peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

On the second day of the forum (Sept. 1), World Health Organization (WHO) Secretary-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus delivered a special video message on “Global Quarantine Cooperation After COVID-19 and the Northeast Asian Quar-



The 2021 Korea Global Forum for Peace in Seoul (Aug.31-Sept.2)

antine Community.” Next was an evaluation of the process of change in North Korea over the past 10 years since Chairman Jong-un Kim took office and a discussion of various instances of cooperation between South and North Korea and the international community for the realization of a community of peace and an economy and life on the Korean Peninsula, in areas such as health care, agriculture, tourism, infrastructure, and DMZ cooperation.

In addition to the *KGFP*, the government invited Korea-experts from major countries to hold “expert seminars for peace” on the Korean Peninsula. On March 12, North Korea experts from South Korea and the United States, including former US Special Envoy to North Korea Robert Gallucci, were invited to an online discussion to talk about the lessons and implications of past DPRK-US nuclear negotiations.

In September, the government sought to draw implications from the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which the United States used in the past to pursue the denuclearization of the former Soviet Union countries, and apply it to the denuclearization of North Korea. In particular, the government invited domestic and foreign experts, including former Senator Sam Nunn, who drafted this legislation on CTR in the United States in the early 1990s, and Dr. Siegfried Hecker, who has visited North Korea’s nuclear facilities several times, to video seminars to discuss the CTR program. Opinions were exchanged on the topics of “CTR’s possible applicability to the Korean Peninsula,” “energy security in the Republic of Korea” and “public health in North Korea” (Sept. 15, Sept. 24, and Sept. 28).

The government also held face-to-face international conferences when possible while observing social-distancing rules amid the COVID-19 situation. Recognizing the important role of foreign scholars in ensuring international cooperation, the government invited the heads of Korean Studies Centers and young scholars from prestigious international universities, such as the University of Hawaii, George Washington University, and the Free University of Berlin, to Korea. A workshop with these scholars was held in in Goseong, Gangwon Province with the theme “The Role of the International Community in Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula and Making Progress on Denuclearization and Ways to Cooperate” (July 13–15). The meeting emphasized mutual understanding and trust-building among South Korea, North Korea, and the United States, and the participants shared the view that the Korean Studies institutes abroad

play an important role in such a process.

On October 1, the government jointly administered an international forum with Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP) based in Stockholm Sweden, and 30 experts and government officials from the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and invited 30 experts and government officials from the United States, China, Japan, Russia and Europe. The theme of the forum was “Prospects for the Development of the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula, and participants discussed the challenges of the Korean Peninsula Peace Process and ways to overcome them. The current stalemate in US-DPRK relations was diagnosed in depth, and various measures to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table amid COVID-19 were also discussed.



A North Korea Policy Debate with North Korea Experts from Korea and the United States (Mar. 12)



A Workshop for Korean-American Scholars (July 13-15, Goseong)



North Korea Nuclear CTR+ International Conference (Sept. 15, Online)



1.5 Track Multilateral Conference on the Korean Peninsula (Oct. 1, ISDP, Sweden)

In addition, in a circumstance where travel and face-to-face contact were restricted due to the evolving COVID-19 situation, the government explained its direction for

North Korea policy in a total of 70 online settings, including Zoom meetings with international experts. In particular, in communication with former US Special Envoy for North Korea’s nuclear program Robert Gallucci, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn, former Deputy Chief of Staff for the Six-Party Talks Joseph Detrani, Joel Wit from *38 North*, former US Special Representative for the DPRK Joseph Yun, and former US Ambassador to South Korea Kathleen Stephens, Minister of Unification In-young Lee listened to experiences of past negotiations with North Korea and continued to seek creative and flexible solutions to advance the peace process on the Korean Peninsula.

Minister of Unification In-young Lee was the first Minister of Unification to attend, through videoconferencing, the Eastern Economic Forum as a special presenter (Sept. 9). The forum is held annually by the Russian government. In a session called “Tourism, the New Era of Hospitality,” Minister Lee stressed the importance of establishing coexistence through cooperation in tourism among South Korea, North Korea, and Russia.



Minister of Unification-Ambassador Gallucci video conference (Feb. 5)



Minister of Unification, special presentation at the Russian Eastern Economic Forum (Sept. 2)

In an environment where the importance of public diplomacy for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula is increasing by the day, the government started the “Overseas Academic Exchange Support Program for North Korean and Unification Studies” in 2020 to expand the base of foreign researchers in Korean unification and North Korea studies.

This program involves inviting foreign researchers to Korea and providing either scholarships for master's and doctoral degree programs or research funds for a long-term fellowship on Korean unification and/or North Korea research. In 2021, following the previous year, Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies and the University of North Korean Studies carried out the project. Two additional degree students

and 12 fellows participated in the program. With this program, the government aimed to create a favorable international environment for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula while expanding the base of overseas researchers who can understand issues related to peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula from the perspective of the Korean Peninsula.



Conference for participants in the “Overseas Academic Exchange Support Program for North Korean and Unification Studies” (October 14)

The government aimed to disseminate public diplomacy programs for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula by using culture. In particular, on the occasion of the G20 Summit in 2021, the exhibition “Barbed Wire, Heralds of Peace” was held at the Basilica of Sant’ignazio in Rome, Italy (Oct). The opening ceremony was attended by President Jae-in Moon and the first lady, the Cardinals of the Holy See, and other international organizations and religious officials, thereby raising awareness about the importance of peace on the Korean Peninsula and stimulating interest in the DMZ among people from all over the world who were visiting Rome on the occasion of the G20 Summit.




Exhibition of “Barbed Wire, Heralds of Peace” in Chiesa di Sant’Ignazio di Loyola (Oct. 29–Nov. 7)

The government continued cooperating in solidarity with international civil society organizations for the advancement of peace on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, it is cooperating with the “Peace Public Diplomacy Council” in which 22 domestic and foreign organizations participate and is continuing to support the “Peace and Public Diplomacy Corps” made up of civilian peace diplomacy envoys centered on the 2030 generation. The council selected about 80 members (42 domestic and 40 overseas) for its second phase of cooperation in 2021, and the government encouraged them to carry out public diplomacy activities as evangelists for peace on the Korean Peninsula in various domestic and international conferences and other settings.

Meanwhile, on September 24, 2021, experts who are actively engaged in the field of unification and inter-Korean relations gathered to launch the Council on Diplomacy for Korean Unification to revitalize unification diplomacy in the realm of civil society. The council is led by domestic and foreign experts who have studied unification and inter-Korean relations, as well as former bureaucrats who have worked directly in the field of inter-Korean relations in the past. In the future, the Ministry of Unification plans to strengthen its international unification diplomacy further by partnering with the council.

As part of its online digital public diplomacy in a new policy environment with challenges such as the evolving COVID-19 situation, the government started an online academic journal focused on North Korea and inter-Korean relations (www.globalnk.org) (Aug. 17). The idea for this journal came about from the realization that English online content related to North Korea is largely being led by foreign institutions such as *38 North*, and that there are large quantitative and qualitative differences in North



A web journal specializing in North Korea and inter-Korean relations (www.globalnk.org)

Korea research between domestic and foreign countries.

This project effectively communicates to the international community the research achievements of Korean researchers of North Korea and inter-Korean relations while promoting a balanced, objective, and comprehensive understanding of the Korean Peninsula. East Asia Research Institute, one of Korea's leading private research institutes, was selected as its web journal operator for three years from 2021 to 2023. Currently, the service is operated under the name of "Global NK Zoom & Connect," and an official launch seminar was held on August 17, 2021. A total of 60 commentaries, research analysis reports, and expert interviews were published from May to December.

In addition, the government has administered a variety of online and in-person programs to enhance understanding of inter-Korean relations, such as policy briefings for diplomatic missions in Korea and officials of international organizations, even amid COVID-19. In March, May, and October, the Minister of Unification invited the ambassadors of major countries, including EU member countries and Commonwealth realm countries, to hold a policy meeting with the theme of "The Current State of Inter-Korean Relations and Policy Directions for North Korea."

In addition, the "Monthly Inter-Korean Relations Study Group," which aims to enhance understanding of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean relations, held regular sessions in 2021 for domestic diplomatic missions in Korea and officials from international organizations. On December 16, the Ministry of Unification held an undisclosed roundtable jointly with the Council on Diplomacy for Korean Unification and with the participation of diplomatic missions in Korea, officials from international organizations, and foreign scholars residing in Korea. The situation in North Korea and the Korean Peninsula in 2021 was comprehensively evaluated, and the prospects for 2022 were discussed as well.

02

Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation



- I – Inter-Korean Economic Exchange
- II – Inter-Korean Social and Cultural Exchange
- III – Inter-Korean Development Assistance and Cooperation
- IV – Peaceful Uses of the DMZ
- V – Support for Companies Based in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)
- VI – Laying the Foundation for Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation



Chapter 2

2

Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation

In 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic and the state of stalemate between the two Koreas led to a disruption of various inter-Korean, government-led cooperation projects, including the connection and modernization of inter-Korean railways and roads. Such a disturbance was manifest in civil society as well. North Korea decided to maintain its border shutdown policy to reinforce its disease prevention measures, and it maintained a timid stance in external exchanges including person to person contact among civilians. Against this backdrop, the ROK government sought ways to continue the momentum of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation by pushing forward with projects that could take place on their own without any involvement from North Korea. It exerted its efforts in acquiring understanding and support for possible exchanges with North Korea. By laying legal and infrastructural foundations, the government worked to enhance its domestic and international capabilities to prepare for exchanges and cooperation once they resume.

Looking at each sector, in the field of economic exchange, South Korea made an effort to implement agreements between South and North Korea, such as the inter-Korean railway, the connection of roads between South and North Korea, and the joint use of the Han River Estuary. While making every effort to prepare internally for the modernization and connection of railways and roads agreed upon by the two Koreas, we conducted a railway restoration project in the Gangneung-Jeju section of the Donghae Northern Line, which could be realized on our own, and an ecological survey of wetlands on the southern side of the Han River Estuary. To provide for a speedy enactment of the Economic Zones for Peace and Unification, National Assembly members of the majority and minority parties were invited to hear explanations about the bill, and

various discussions and correspondences took place among the relevant government offices and agencies.

As for social and cultural exchange, the government held various projects to ensure a national consensus and maintain momentum for cooperative projects with North Korea. To publicize the inter-Korean joint excavations at Manwoldae, a Goryeo-era palace site in Gaeseong, it held an exhibition and opened a digital archive of the cultural heritage that the two Koreas have unearthed so far. As for the joint compilation of the *Gyeoremal-keunsajeon* (Grand Dictionary of the Korean People's Language), the government produced a draft of the dictionary, held an international academic forum with UNESCO, and created a stable foundation for the future by extending the law on the *Gyeoremal-keunsajeon* Committee another six years.

However, no religious or social exchanges occurred either directly between South and North Korea or via a third country due to the strained relations between the two Koreas and the border shutdown measures taken by North Korea.

The situation with sports exchanges was largely the same as international sports events were either canceled or delayed. Amid this ongoing trend, North Korea did not participate in any international sports events, contrary to the expectation that the two Koreas would both participate in them. The plan to make a bid to jointly host the 2032 Summer Olympics with North Korea was canceled after the International Olympics Committee opted to hold the event in Brisbane, Australia.

To realize a “community of life and safety on the Korean peninsula,” the government exerted its efforts in constructing cooperative foundations in the fields of disasters, forests and agriculture, and climate change. It reinforced the collaborative networks of the relevant agencies that aim to effectively respond to disasters, including the prevention of infectious diseases that affect domestic animals such as African Swine Fever (ASF) and Avian Influenza (AI) as well as floods along the rivers shared by South and North Korea. With respect to forestry, the government constructed regional centers (East, Middle, etc.) to ensure cooperation in managing forests, and as for the agricultural sector, it improved the environment for crops and harvests in response to climate change and sought ways to increase the cultivation of farm produce. These projects are set to move forward once cooperation between the two Koreas resumes. Moreover, following the increased necessity to cooperate with the international community in responding to

climate change on an inter-Korean level, various measures to cut greenhouse gases and achieve carbon neutrality were researched. The government also networked with the UN agencies and International Relief Organizations (INGOs) to build a foundation for international cooperation in the areas of forestry, agriculture, livestock, climate and the environment, energy, and water. It also held civil and government-led events, such as a policy forum on development cooperation and onsite visits, to improve the suitability of the policies.

The government also pursued the peaceful use and preservation of the DMZ. It opened the “DMZ Peace Trail,” while implementing strict preventive measures for ASF and COVID-19, and began tourism in the demilitarized Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom, offering people an opportunity to see and experience the scenes of peace in person. The government worked to elaborate on its policies at home and abroad on occasions such as the 2021 DMZ Global Forum on Peace and Cooperation and build a consensus on peace and unification. In addition, the construction of the DMZ Art and Peace Platform with unification-themed artwork as part of its implementation plans to transform the DMZ into a peace zone, which was agreed between the leaders of South and North Korea in 2018, allowed the Inter-Korean Transit Office to play its role as a transit gate between the two Koreas but also a central hub of peace, culture, and ecology.

The government also ramped up its efforts to support the companies based in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, amid the present situation in which the complex’s operations are at a halt. It continued to provide support measures to normalize the operation and management of such companies with the cooperation of the ministries, and the interest rate of the special loan from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (IKCF) was reduced from 1.5% to 1%. Various projects were spearheaded to normalize the management and operation of the complex, such as holding special sales, to help the GIC enter the market and sell their products.

To respond to the altered state of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, the government made some improvements to its relevant laws and systems. It proposed certain revisions to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act to ensure the stability and predicatability of exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas. Moreover, the enforcement decrees and enforcement rule of the same act were enacted and amended to ensure that the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Policy Council of Local

Governments could operate their projects within a systematic framework.

The Exchange and Cooperation Support Center (a component of the South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association) comprehensively supported civic groups, companies, and local governments to maintain their inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects. Moreover, the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council determines key agendas on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund budget plans. Following the amendment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, which was entered into force on March 9, 2021, the government strengthened a public-private partnership by increasing the number of civilian specialists from five to eight at the Promotion Council. The Governors Association of Korea recommended the civilian specialists who then joined the Promotion Council, which resulted in reinforcing cooperation between local governments and private sector partners.

It included granting autonomy to local governments in their inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation projects, introducing a preliminary approval system for their cooperative projects, and creating separate items for financial assistance from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund in order to reinforce the foundations of cooperation with local governments. Moreover, the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council convened, wherein officials from the relevant government offices and civilians had the chance to push ahead with the decentralization and governance of exchange and cooperation, such as making decisions on the major points of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation as well as plans for the IKCF.

Meanwhile, despite transit from both sides being put to a halt on January 30, 2020 due to the outbreak of COVID-19 and ASF (October 1, 2019), the Inter-Korean Transit Office held a joint simulation training exercise, which was led by the relevant agencies and involved a preemptive inspection of the areas jointly managed by South and North Korea.

Section

1

Inter-Korean Economic Exchange

1] Implementation of the Inter-Korean Agreements

(1) Continued cooperation in railways and roads

The government exerted its efforts independently to prepare for the connection and modernization of the railways and roads, a plan the two Koreas agreed in the Panmunjom Declaration of 2018. Meanwhile, it pushed ahead with the project to connect the Donghae Bukbu (Northern) Line (from Gangneung to Jejin) and restore South Korea's part of the railway on the Gyeongwon Line.

Due to the ongoing freeze in inter-Korean relations, the government focused on implementing the parts of the agreements made with North Korea that could be carried out on its own. First, it moved forward with the project to connect the Donghae Bukbu (Northern) Line (from Gangneung to Jejin, a total of 111.7 km), the only disconnected point on South Korea's Donghae Line. At the 313th session of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council held on April 23, 2020, it acknowledged the construction project of the Donghae North Line railway as a part of the inter-Korean exchange and cooperation while establishing a basic plan for its completion. The construction began at the end of November 2021 and is scheduled to be completed by 2027. The plan of the initiative is to connect the inter-Korean railway that has been disconnected since 1967 and connect it with transportation networks that go through the continents, such as the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) and the Trans-China Railway (TCR).

At the 322nd session of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council held on September 24, 2021, there were discussions on whether to use the IKCF to

compensate people for the land used in the railroad restoration construction projects in the southern section of the Gyeongwon Line. Ever since the project's change of plans in November 2016, people have been urging the government to complete the compensation process without delay. The government thus decided to finalize the process as soon as possible so that people's property rights, which had been restricted for while, were adequately protected.

The government also sought cooperation from the international community for the construction of the inter-Korean railway. The participants of the Conference of General Directors of the Organization for Cooperation of Railways (OSJD) held in December 2020 decided that the 49th annual ministers' meeting of OSJD would take place in Seoul on June 15–18, 2021. However, the global spread of COVID-19 led to a change of its format, and it ended up being held virtually during the same period.

The government has been ironing out the details to modernize the inter-Korean railway and roads by coordinating with the relevant agencies so that the cooperative projects of building and repairing railways and roads can take place in a rapid manner once inter-Korean dialogue resumes.

(2) Joint use of the Han River estuary

From November 5 to December 9, 2018, South and North Korea conducted a joint survey of the Han River estuary waterways shared by both sides, in accordance with the Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain (or "Comprehensive Military Agreement"). It was the first time in 65 years after the signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1953 that the two Koreas jointly carried out such a joint survey. The two Koreas have only rarely accessed the Han River estuary due to military tensions, but they have laid the groundwork for restoring it as a space of joint use for peaceful purposes.

In working-level military talks on January 30, 2019, the ROK government presented a nautical map of the Han River estuary it had produced based on the findings of the joint waterways survey. It then agreed to allow the free passage of private vessels starting on April 1 of the same year on a trial basis and expand free passage incrementally afterward. However, because inter-Korean relations reached a standstill after March, there were no follow-up working-level meetings related to this matter, and freedom of

navigation has yet to be realized.

As a result of such a stumbling block, the government sought to take measures for the peaceful use of the Han River estuary in ways that could be carried out without the participation of North Korea. First and foremost, it coordinated with the Ministry of Environment and the National Institute of Ecology to carry out an ecological survey of the wetlands on the southern side of the Han River estuary from September 2020 to August 2021. It intended to cover about 80 km² of the wetlands in the areas from Bogu Cape in Gimpo to Manu-ri in Paju and investigate the inhabitation of wild animals and the geographical characteristics of the plants. The survey allowed the government to confirm the ecological value of the site, especially with endangered animals inhabiting the area.



An ecological survey of the wetlands on the southern side of the Han River estuary

- ▶ **Project Period:** September 2020 – August 2021
- ▶ **Survey Scope:** Southern side of the Han River estuary [about 80km² from Bogu Cape in Gimpo to Manu-ri in Paju]
- ▶ **Survey Fields:** A survey of the ecosystem of the southern part of the wetland divided into 8 groups (vegetation, flora, fish, birds, benthic macroinvertebrates, insects, amphibians and reptiles, mammals)
- ▶ **Led by:** The Ministry of Environment and the National Institute of Ecology
- ▶ **Survey Purpose:** 4 seasons (joint surveys in the autumn, winter, spring, and summer) & a separate intensive survey in the winter (to study migratory birds and other mammals)
- ▶ **Survey Results:** 1) 1,829 species confirmed (excluding vegetation) 2) 22 species endemic to the peninsula 3) Among the birds, about 932 swan geese (Endangered Species Class II) have been found, indicating that it has a high ecological value



The ecological survey of the wetlands on the southern side of the Han River estuary
(Sept. 2020 – Aug. 2021)

Moreover, the government held the festival “Floating Boats on the Han River Estuary” in October 2021 to lay the foundation for the joint use of the estuary and attract people’s interest. This event expanded in scope from the previous ones that had been held by civil society groups since 2019. It took place in Seokmo Channel (a channel in the vicinity of Ganghwa island) and Yeomha Channel (a channel sitting between Gimpo and Ganghwa) with the support of the Ministry of National Defense and in cooperation with local governments, including the city governments of Incheon and Gimpo. Its location was only in the southern area of the neutral area of the estuary in consideration of inter-Korean relations, but it was meaningful in that the navigation reached over the Ganghwa Bridge for the first time since the armistice. Refugees and separated families participated in the test navigation of civilian ships and expressed their hope that the Han River estuary would transform into a space of harmony and co-prosperity for the two Koreas, paving the way for a new state of peace.



Test -navigating a civilian ship in the Han River estuary (Oct. 13)

The Ministry of Unification organized an exhibition titled “The Han River Estuary from the Odusan” in the Odusan Unification Tower to allow more people to have quick access to the various parts of the estuary. The message it sends to visitors is that the Han River estuary, which was formerly called the Ancestors’ River (Jo-gang), is a body of water that the two Koreas can use peacefully. The display also serves as a space of reconciliation and cooperation that can elevate people’s understanding about the estuary as well as their interest in it.



DMZ Display Content (Video)



DMZ Display Content (Media Wall)

(3) Tourism to Mount Geumgang

The government has been preparing to consult with North Korea about the issue of demolishing the facilities in the tourist district of Mount Geumgang and is closely watching North Korea's movements. At the the Eighth Congress Party held in January 2021, North Korea said, "We must transform in our way the Geumgang area into a modern cultural tourist site." It added that the party should come up with a five-year plan and take steps every year so that the area can be finished with a style distinct to North Korea. At the Supreme People's Assembly held on January 17, the will to develop facilities independently without South Korea was reaffirmed as there were several points of emphasis on the necessity of taking steps towards such a vision every year.

In response to these developments, the government came up with a plan to redevelop the tourist areas in Mount Geumgang with North Korea and have separated families make individual visits to the mountain first. At a seminar held on February 25 to discuss the measures and assignments needed to achieve them, Unification Minister In-young Lee said that his goal was to resume individual visits to Mount Geumgang once the COVID-19 situation turned around. He also promised to work hard to hold talks with North Korea and create a better future for the mountain. Moreover, he suggested a plan whereby the two Koreas cooperate in the field of tourism, adding that creating the East Coast Tourism Joint Special Zone that connects Mount Geumgang and Wonsan, Galma, and Seorak would make the area into an international tourist site. During a policy debate on peaceful tourism held on June 15, 2021, he emphasized that the two Koreas should consult with each other to normalize tourism in Mount Geumgang, saying that he would start by taking the necessary steps to reopen the closed path to

the mountain while working to promote individual visits of refugees and separated families and repair the surrounding facilities, such as the reunion center for separated families.

The government has been working day and night to build a national consensus for the plan. In June, Minister Lee consulted closely with companies connected to the mountain, deepened the communication process, and enhanced cooperation with regards to Mount Geumgang tourism in the pursuit of a national consensus. On June 1, he met with Hyundai chairwoman Jeong-eun Hyun, a visit that was quickly followed by meetings with the president of the Korea Golf Association Lee Joong-myung and the CEO of the Korea Tourism Organization Ahn Young-bae on June 4 and 9, respectively. In each of these interactions, he stressed the government's determination to normalize tourism in the vicinity of Mount Geumgang. The meetings allowed him to listen to the opinions of business leaders and discuss with them various measures to achieve the goal, including jointly developing Mount Geumgang with North Korea and hosting the World Golf Championship in the vicinity of the mountain area.

In consideration of COVID-19, the government plans to consult with North Korea on the issue of tourism in the mountain. It plans to prioritize the humanitarian aspect of the agreement made with North Korea to normalize tourism in the said mountain, starting with visits of the separated families and refugees. Once the conditions are met down the road, the government plans to expand the scope of cooperation to Wonsan, Masikryong, and other areas to further efforts to create an East Coast Tourism Joint Special Zone.



A meeting with the Hyundai Chairwoman (Jun. 1)



A meeting with the president of the Korea Golf Association (Jun. 4)

2] Laying the Foundation for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation

(1) Supporting Companies associated with Economic Cooperation, Trade, and Mountain Geumgang

The government sought to continue supporting companies associated with inter-Korean economic cooperation, trade, and Mount Geumgang who are suffering from difficulties because of COVID-19 and the prolonged halt on economic cooperation. On June 10, after a long period of review, the government made the decision to lower the interest rate by 0.5%p for companies who have received a loan from the IKCF. This decision benefitted a total of 246 companies, including ones with businesses in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. The annual size of their monetary value is about KRW 1.227 billion.

(2) Pursuing individual visit to North Korea

The government also strove to prepare and build a national consensus on individual visits so that consultations can happen, and actions can be taken as soon once talks with North Korea resume. On February 25, 2021, the South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association hosted a seminar on measures to make individual visits happen and identify the tasks that facilitate them. It also worked to seek the perspectives and opinions of experts and elevate people's understanding of the relevant policies. Experts in various fields (academic, business, civil society, etc.) participated in the seminar and suggested a plethora of measures to actualize individual visits. The government expressed its will to come up with a specific plan that reflects people's desires for the resumption of inter-Korean exchanges, which will be the basis to discuss matters with North Korea. On June 15, the South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association hosted a policy debate session on inter-Korean peaceful tourism in cooperation with the office of National Assembly member Lee Yong-sun. The pundits in the seminar expressed their belief that the government should open the doors to tourism and allow the civilians to join in its efforts. They also suggested various measures to resume cooperation in the field of tourism.

(3) Barter of Goods On a Smaller Scale

The May 24 Measures and the sanctions on North Korea have made the resumption of trade between the two Koreas difficult. The government announced to lift its “May 24 Measures” in May 2020 and moved forward with “barter of goods on a smaller scale” since July 2020 as a creative approach to create space for reciprocal cooperation between South and North Korea. “Small-scale trading” refers to the practice of the two Koreas exchanging goods that are not subject to sanctions on North Korea. For example, a South Korean trading company could bring in goods from North Korea, including liquor and bottled water, which are not subject to the sanctions on North Korea, and in return, the company could pay with medicine and other necessities that North Korea may need.

Based on the results of the “small-scale trading” initiative, the government is taking steps to review the trading process and create a cooperative system. It has been carrying out consultations and meetings with trading companies, sessions to explain its policies, visits to relevant sites, and discussions about transferring processes. Such efforts to resume and revitalize trade are expected to continue in the future.

Even though there are practical limitations to furthering “small-scale trading” due to North Korea’s border shutdown in response to COVID-19, various trading companies are continuously holding working-level meetings to trade with North Korea.

(4) Pursuing the Enactment of the Act on the Special Economic Zone for Peace and Unification

The special economic zone for peace and unification is slated to be established in the border districts to expand inter-Korean economic exchange and cooperation and lay the foundation for an inter-Korean economic community. The government identified the “designation and operation of the special economic zone for unification” as a key task in the “five-year policy for the Jae-in Moon administration of state affairs” which he outlined in July 2017. In his commemorative speech on National Liberation Day in 2018, President Moon mentioned, “special unification economic zones will be built in the border areas of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon-do provinces.”

Six bills regarding the special economic zone for peace and unification were proposed in the 20th National Assembly session that took place from May 30, 2016 to May 29,

2020. The government actively supported the National Assembly’s legislative review process for the Act on the Special Economic Zone for Peace and Unification, but the six bills were scrapped when the 20th National Assembly concluded.

In the 21st National Assembly, three bills regarding the special economic zone for peace and unification have been pending. The Subcommittee on Legislative Deliberation of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee had extensive discussions regarding the Act on the Special Economic Zone for Peace and Unification three times (February 19, June 28, and November 16), and in the process, the government explained the bill to the lawmakers of the majority and minority parties while closely coordinating with the relevant ministries and agencies to enact the law in a timely manner. It also continued work on expanding the public consensus for such legislation by holding a public hearing on the Act on April 29 and commissioning a study to iron out its details from April 19 to November 30 and ensure that follow-up actions are dealt with without anything amiss following its ratification.

(5) Building a Consensus on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation

On June 26, 2021, the government held the 2021 Korean Peninsula International Forum on the Peace Economy to bring about a national consensus on the importance of resuming inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation and actualizing a peace economy. In consideration of COVID-19, the forum was produced and broadcast in the form of a special documentary in coordination with the media company SBS. The topic of the forum was “negotiations and the peace economy.” It included interviews with Jim Rogers of Rogers Holdings and others, including a travel YouTuber, a peace marathon



2021 Korean Peninsula Peace Economy International Forum (Broadcast on SBS on Jun. 26)

runner, a participant in the DMZ Peace Walk, a collector of North Korean stamps, and a DMZ docent. The forum was an opportunity to share the stories of experts and ordinary people with viewers so that the resumption of the inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation as well as the future of peace economy could be easily understood and supported.

Moreover, the government held a talk concert about the peace economy on October 7, 2021 to delineate the vision of the peace economy on the Korean Peninsula through the “Peace New Deal.” “The Peace New Deal” is an initiative to expand the “Korean New Deal,” which consists of a “Digital New Deal,” a “Green New Deal,” and a “Human New Deal,” to the entire Korean Peninsula and is a strategy to implement the peace economy. At the same time, the “Peace New Deal” approach aims to act as an impetus for new growth in the South Korean economy by making inter-Korean exchanges and economic cooperation a new growth engine of the Korean economy.

At the concert, Unification Minister Lee and global investor Jim Rogers, along with experts in various fields, shared their ideas about a new future for the peninsula and their vision of a “Peace New Deal.” Minister Lee said, “Once inter-Korean economic cooperation develops into the ‘Peace New Deal,’ South Korea will witness the opening of a path that will allow the country’s economy to leap even higher.”

Chairman Jim Rogers expressed his sincere agreement with the government’s “Peace New Deal,” stressing that such an exchange between the two Koreas would benefit both sides and unearth new opportunities. Moreover, he said that unification would cause more people around the world to pay attention to South Korea and that there are a lot of companies seeking to invest in the peninsula. The future of the peninsula, according to Rogers, has a lot of potential since it could become a hub for transportation and logistics. Tourism would also experience a boom, and North Korea’s agriculture is expected to grow once it is fused with North Korea’s agricultural technology and IT capabilities.

The other experts who participated in the talk concert shared their opinions about the necessity of economic cooperation between the two Koreas and its possible impacts.



Peace Economy Talk Concert (Oct. 7)

1 Exchanges in the Realm of Cultural Heritage

(1) Joint excavation of Manwoldae in Gaeseong

Since 2007, the two Koreas have worked together in the excavation of Manwoldae, a Goryeo-era palace site in Gaeseong, to preserve national cultural heritage and restore the unity of South and North Koreans. In 2018, when inter-Korean relations were making progress, the excavation resumed (October 22 – December 10) but was suspended again in 2019.

In 2019, although the excavation was suspended, the government launched a touring exhibition called “Manwoldae: 12 Years of Excavation in Gaeseong” in Seonwonjeon, Deoksugung Palace. The aim of this exhibition is to present the findings of the joint excavation to the public. In 2021, it was held in Yongin, Gyeonggi Province (April 28 – June 27), Cheorwon, Gangwon Province (May 1 – August 30), Yeoncheon, Gyeonggi Province (November 1 – 30), and Incheon, Gyeonggi Province (November 23 – February 6, 2022). The traveling nature of the exhibition allowed more people to experience the palace on an intimate level.

The government also established a digital archive to showcase to the public the relics and artifacts excavated at Manwoldae. In the four years since its creation in 2017, the digital archive has come to include data on 120,000 of the total 600,000 materials excavated so far. The government has visualized the data in the form of webtoons, holograms, and 3D diagrams so that people can easily see and understand them. The digital archive of the joint Manwoldae excavation project (www.manwoldae.org) opened in December 2020.

2021 was the first year the public had access to the Gaeseong Manwoldae Digital Restoration Project,” which provided the public with an opportunity to experience the cultural heritage of Manwoldae in virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR), thus stimulating their interest in the two Koreas’ joint excavation of cultural artifacts.



“Manwoldae: 12 Years of Excavation in Gaeseong” Traveling Exhibition
(Apr. 28, 2021 – Feb. 6, 2022)

(2) Joint Compilation of the *Gyeoremal-keunsajeon* (Korean People’s Dictionary)

The Joint Board of South and North Korea for the Compilation of *Gyeoremal-keunsajeon* was established in 2005 to collect the *gyeoremal* (the Korean people’s language) used in South and North Korea as well as among overseas Koreans with the aim of compiling it into a single dictionary. The board has held 25 meetings so far and has selected 307,000 entry words to be included in the dictionary. It has also agreed to an orthographic system to satisfy the two sides and has continued to bridge linguistic differences.

Despite the suspension of its meetings in 2016, the South Korean side of the board has continued with the work that it can handle on its own. It has corrected and proofread the entry words the two Koreas have agreed on, has built a corpus, and has created illustrations. It has also been working to make a draft of the dictionary in preparation for a joint meeting.

The board has carried out various PR projects to help people see and appreciate the results of the *Gyeoremal-keunsajeon* compilation. It produced and distributed various news segments, including “Sign Language,” “Folk Games in South and North Korea,” and “Rhythmic Gymnastics and Artistic Gymnastics.” It also established a smartphone

application service called “South Korean Language and North Korean Language” in which people can compare basic everyday terms used in South and North Korea. Moreover, it listed the compilation process of the *Gyeoremal-keunsajeon* in 24 textbooks (4 subjects) and came up with two kinds of *gyeoremal* maps (a constellation and a world map), distributing them to various institutes, including children’s libraries, free of charge. To acquire support and a consensus from the international community for the project, a UNSECO International Academic Forum was held twice in both an online and in-person format (February 22–23 & November 25–26)



The *Gyeoremal-keunsajeon* Dictionary Draft



UNSECO International Academic Forum (Feb. 22–23)

On December 2, 2021, the Act on the Joint Board of South and North Korea for the Compilation of *Gyeoremal-keunsajeon*, slated to expire on April 26, 2022, was extended six more years, thus providing the project with a legal basis to continue its efforts.

2 Exchanges in the Realm of Religious and Social Groups, Academia, Culture, and the Arts

The Korean Conference of Religions for Peace (KCRP) and the (North) Korean Council of Religionists have worked to sustain the dialogue process between South and North Korean religious groups, including Protestants, Catholics, and Buddhists. Even when it was difficult to have face-to-face communication due to COVID-19, each religious group tried to communicate with North Korea through written correspondences. The Minister of Unification visited with various religious leaders, asked them to

play a key role in improving inter-Korean relations, and gathered opinions from them about specific religious cooperation projects.

Due to COVID-19, however, North Korea closed the border and took tough measures to fight the pandemic, making it difficult to have person-to-person exchanges through social and cultural events. NGOs, including the South Side Committee for Implementing the June 15th Joint Declaration (hereinafter referred to as the “South Side Committee”) and the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (KCRC), proposed holding a joint event to mark the 21st anniversary of June 15th South-North Joint Declaration several times starting at the beginning of the year, but North Korea did not respond. Consequently, a joint event was not held. On June 15, the South held a peace and unification event marking the 21st anniversary of the June 15th South-North Joint Declaration, which was attended by representatives and members of religious, civic, and social groups, including the South Side Committee and the KCRC. In the second half of the year, the committee tried to hold a commemorative event on the occasion the 76th anniversary of national liberation Day. It also sought to hold an event marking the 3rd anniversary of the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 19th 2018 and the 14th anniversary of the October 4th South-North Joint Declaration. In both cases, North Korea did not respond. Therefore, South Korea held the events on its own.

The South Side Committee also suggested that the North Side Committee for Implementing the June 15th Joint Declaration hold an online policy meeting in March with the Foreign Side Committee for Implementing the June 15th Joint Declaration, but the North Side Committee did not respond. Therefore, the event was held solely with the participation of the South Side Committee and Foreign Side Committee.

In the field of women’s issues, there were efforts to bring about inter-Korean exchange, including a joint statement in celebration of the 102nd anniversary of the March 1st Movement and a gathering of opinions about the project proposal to mark the 30th year of the Seminar on Peace in Asia and the Role of Women. However, North Korea did not respond.

Inter-Korean exchange and cooperation in the field of academia has often taken place in the form of international seminars and meetings hosted by a third country. However, such exchanges did not materialize due to COVID-19 and North Korea’s measures to close the borders.



The 21st anniversary of the June 15th South-North Joint Declaration (Jun. 15)

With respect to cultural exchange, there were several attempts to invite North Korea to work together in an exchange of traditional cultures and in video and music collaboration. Nothing fruitful came about, however, because of the COVID-19 situation that severely limited direct exchanges between the two Koreas.

3 Inter-Korean Sports Exchange

In 2021, just like the previous year, there were no sports exchanges between the two Koreas. International competitions were either canceled or delayed, and even in sporting events the two Koreas were both expected to attend, North Korea backed out of them, leaving South Korea to attend on its own.

As the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 qualifying matches in the Asian region were continuously postponed due to COVID-19, the Asian Football Association (AFC) made the decision on March 12 to hold the game in one location for every group. Group H (South Korea, North Korea, Turkmenistan, Sri Lanka, and Lebanon) was scheduled to hold its games in South Korea. When it was time to hold the remaining games for the second round of the Asian qualifiers (June 5-13), however, North Korea expressed its intention not to participate due to COVID-19 and therefore did not take part in the matches.

Moreover, when the date for the delayed Tokyo Summer Olympics was finally set (July 23 – August 8), there was some hope that the two Koreas would attend the games as one, but North Korea did not participate due to the pandemic. On April 6, the Ministry

of Physical Culture and Sports released on its official website “Sports in the DPR Korea” that the National Olympics Committee of North Korea “decided not to attend the Tokyo Olympics to protect North Korean athletes from the public health crisis brought about by COVID-19.”

The ROK government planned to hold follow-up working-level meetings with North Korea regarding the bid to jointly host the 2032 Summer Olympics as agreed to by the leaders of South and North Korea in the Pyeongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018. However, the conditions for the meetings were not met due to COVID-19 and the freeze in the inter-Korean relations.

Nevertheless, the government continued to discuss matters with the appropriate ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of Unification; the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism; the Seoul Metropolitan Government; and the Korean Sport & Olympic Committee. On April 4, the Seoul Metropolitan Government submitted a proposal to hold the 2032 Summer Olympics to the International Olympics Committee (IOC), and in a June 1 virtual meeting with the IOC and the relevant agencies, expressed its vision and willingness to jointly hold the international event with North Korea. However, the IOC made the early decision to hold the games in Brisbane, Australia, thus scrapping the plans for a joint hosting of the event with North Korea.

Moreover, the International Youth Football Tournament and other sports exchanges spearheaded at the private level made no progress because of the worsening COVID-19 situation.

Section

3

Inter-Korean Development Assistance and Cooperation

1 Development Cooperation Between the Authorities of the Two Koreas

The government maintained that any cooperation involving the lives and safety of the people in the two Koreas should resume immediately regardless of the political and military situation. It therefore strove to lay a foundation in each field for the resumption of inter-Korean exchanges amid the freeze in the relations.

In the field of forestry, the government started to construct the Inter-Korean Center for Forest Cooperation in Cheorwon, which along with a center of the same name in Paju and the Peace Nursery in Goseong, are contributing to forest cooperation in the East, Middle, West, and other major regions. The centers will also ensure immediate coordination once cooperation with North Korea resumes again in the future. Moreover, as part of the agreements made between the two Koreas, the government produced and stockpiled seedlings that are suitable for being planted in North. Common guidelines for responding to wildfires and landslides were also developed.

With respect to disease prevention measures, the government worked to create a communications system between disease control centers to share information in the event of a spread of African Swine Fever (ASF) in the border areas. In addition, it cooperated with the relevant agencies and local governments to search for any dead wild boars in the DMZ area and around the Civilian Control Line. It also built fences to block off the passage of wild animals and sterilized the surrounding areas, thus ensuring that ASF would not spread any further.

The government reinforced its cooperation with its agencies dealing with disaster response, and one of its efforts in this domain was sharing a plan to release floodwater

and dams in the border areas.

Moreover, regarding the environment, the government researched ways for both Koreas to achieve carbon neutrality and strove to come up with specific cooperation measures to implement once the two Koreas resume their work in the sphere of climate and the environment. These initiatives were pursued for the sake of a joint response to climate change and as a means of reducing greenhouse gases on the Korean peninsula. As for the field of agriculture, the government conducted a piecemeal study to improve the agricultural productivity of seedlings that can adapt to the northern regions. It sought to specify various cooperative models of seedlings, fertilizers, etc. before introducing them.

2] Efforts of Cooperation through Civic and International Organizations

The government not only carried out some tasks on its own but also actively explored ways to cooperate with North Korea through NGOs (at home and abroad) as well as through international bodies, rendering support to the maximum extent possible in consideration of the circumstances. It established an “organic cooperative system” with organizations concerned with development and cooperation to incorporate their experiences in discussions with North Korea and their expectations for projects regarding North Korea into policy.

In director-general-level meetings between the ROK and US, there were several discussions about providing humanitarian assistance, such as drinking water and sanitation, to North Korea. For its part, North Korea submitted a Voluntary National Review (VNR) to the United Nations after discussions with international bodies, seeking ways to cooperate with them in various fields, including climate change.

In November, the Ministry of Unification participated in the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) held from October 31 to November 13 to observe North Korea’s response to climate change. It also communicated with international bodies, groups, and experts to form an international consensus on climate cooperation between the two Koreas.

Moreover, since a joint response to the climate crisis on the Korean peninsula requires

the cooperation of the international community, the government laid a foundation that will allow itself to continue holding sessions with the international community and thus facilitate discussions on inter-Korean cooperation in various fields such as forestry, livestock, climate and the environment, energy, and water.

3 Establishment of a Public Private Partnership

In 2021, the government established a public-private cooperative system in a face-to-face and virtual format, including a forum on development, cooperation, and onsite visits. In response to the growing interest and demands for developmental assistance and cooperation following the inter-Korean summits, the government started holding policy forums on inter-Korean development cooperation on a regular basis, which the central and local governments, as well as public institutions, participated in.

Amid the international trend to focus more on climate change, the government regularly held policy forums on climate change and carbon neutrality, discussing cooperative measures that could be taken, such as jointly managing shared estuaries, fertilizer, and forestry.



Third meeting of the Policy Forum on Development Cooperation (Jul. 2)



Fourth meeting of the Policy Forum on Development Cooperation (Sept. 8)

The government strengthened its communication with those responsible for executing policies in each field and made “onsite visits” to establish a more effective plan and implementation system for inter-Korean cooperation. At the Center for Inter-Korean Forestry Cooperation in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, Unification Minister In-young Lee

participated in a tree-planting ceremony that aspired to achieve carbon neutrality for peace. He also joined a seed-planting event in the DMZ area, during which he emphasized the necessity of actualizing a community of life and safety on the Korean peninsula.

In the realm of forestry, the Ministry of Unification officials participated in the groundbreaking ceremony of the Center for Inter-Korean Forestry Cooperation in Cheorwon and headed to Yongmun Tree Nursery to inspect the country's readiness for forestry cooperation. In the realm of agriculture, the Ministry of Unification officials visited Chungcheongnam-do Agricultural Research and Services and Namhae Chemical Corporation to discuss possibilities for cooperation, including jointly researching agricultural technology and developing new varieties of crops to lay a foundation for food security in both Koreas.



Unification Minister Lee visits a tree-planting ceremony (Apr. 26)



The groundbreaking ceremony of the Center for Inter-Korean Forestry Cooperation in Cheorwon (Jun. 15)

1 Transformation of the DMZ into an International Peace Zone

In the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, South and North Korea agreed to cease all hostile acts in the DMZ and transform it into a peace zone. Following the signing of the *Comprehensive Military Agreement*, ammunition, arms, and troops from 11 guard posts were withdrawn on a trial basis. Moreover, in the Joint Security Area (JSA) of Panmunjom, landmines were swept while ammunition, arms, and guard posts were removed.

In his keynote speech at the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 2019, President Jae-in Moon proposed transforming the DMZ into an international peace zone through cooperation among the two Koreas and the international community. He also presented a concrete means for realizing that vision: namely, inscribing the DMZ as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, designating the area connecting Panmunjom to Gaeseong in North Korea as a Peace and Cooperation District, and removing anti-personnel mines in the DMZ.

In the first half of 2019, South Korea unilaterally began excavating the war remains of deceased soldiers on Arrowhead Hill in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province despite North Korea's lack of response to join in such efforts. As of June 2021, the government excavated a total of 3,092 remains and 101,816 artifacts on the South's side of Arrowhead Hill.

The government is currently working to solidify a legal and institutional foundation for a cooperative system across all ministries to systematically use the DMZ for peaceful purposes while closely communicating with civic and expert groups to solicit their opinions.

2] Creating the Conditions for the Peaceful Uses of the DMZ

(1) Reopening of the DMZ Peace Trail

In 2019, the government started transforming some of the areas of the DMZ into the “DMZ Peace Trail” and opened it to the public so that they could directly experience peace. The section in Goseong was opened first, followed by sections in Cheorwon and Paju. In the Paju section, sites where guard posts were withdrawn in accordance with the Comprehensive Military Agreement were opened to the public. However, in September 2019, the spread of African Swine Fever (ASF) led to the temporary closure of the trail, and later the relevant ministries and local governments cooperated to open it up again. Each local government assessed the danger and risk of ASF and set up fences to ensure that the virus would not spread further. The consultative bodies in the relevant ministries reviewed areas that required cooperation and discussed the overall status of the project, its operation system, and the construction of additional sections. Moreover, in preparation for the reopening of the trail, the government used funds from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (IKCF) to rebuild Bima Bridge in the Cheorwon section (that was destroyed due to heavy rainfall in 2020) and repair roads in the Goseong section.

The peace trails reopened on November 20 in accordance with the government’s guidelines announced that month to restore livelihood from the COVID-19 crisis.



“DMZ Peace Trail” Routes Within the DMZ

- ▶ **Goseong:** (Route A) 2.7 km of Walking + 5.2 km of Driving / (Route B) 7.2 km of Driving
 - ☞ (Route A) Unification Observatory → Geumgang Tongmun Gate (2.7 km of walking) → Mount Geumgang Observatory → Unification Observatory (5.2 km of driving)
 - ☞ (Route B) Unification Observatory → Mount Geumgang Observatory → DMZ Museum → Unification Observatory (7.2 km of driving in round trip)
- ▶ **Cheorwon:** 3.5 km of Walking + 11.5 km of Driving
 - ☞ Monument for the Battle of Baengmagoji → Tongmun Gate A (1.5 km of driving) → Tongmun Gate B (3.5 km of walking) → Tongmun Gate C (1.5 km of driving) → non-resident GP (1.5 km of driving) → Tongmun Gate C (1.5 km of driving) → Monument for the Battle of Baengmagoji (5.5 km of driving)
- ▶ **Paju:** 1.4 km of Walking + 19.6 km of Driving
 - ☞ Imjingak → Eco Trails along the Imjin River (1.4 km of walking) → Dora Observatory (6.5 km of driving) → Tongmun Gate (2.5 km of driving) → GP-withdrawn Site (3.6 km of driving, round trip) → Tongmun Gate → Imjingak (7 km of driving)

Along with the existing sections in Paju and Goseong, additional sections in Ganghwa, Gimpo, Goyang, Hwacheon, and Yanggu were added. As of 2021, the DMZ Peace Trail has attracted a total of 16,758 visitors so far.

(2) The DMZ Site Survey, the DMZ Peace Map, and the DMZ Global Forum

The government launched a site survey within the DMZ to identify the status of its forestry ecosystem and discover cultural artifacts, as well as to acquire the basic materials necessary for listing it as a UNESCO World Heritage site to ensure the peaceful use of the DMZ. Despite the challenges brought about by COVID-19 and the avian influenza (AI), the Unification Ministry cooperated with the Cultural Heritage Administration, the Korea Forest Service, and the Ministry of Environment, convening a total of 16 sessions of research in 2020 and 29 sessions in 2021.

The Ministry of Unification made sure that the project was carried out as smoothly as possible by coordinating with the United Nations Command (UNC) on several matters, including the entrance to the DMZ. The major results of the research on the cultural artifacts, forestry, and ecosystem are expected to be revealed to the public in the DMZ integrated system (called “Universe”: www.universe.go.kr) by early 2022.

Moreover, the Ministry of Unification commissioned the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies of Seoul National University to create a “DMZ Peace Map” and thus enable free and convenient access to information on the DMZ, the very place of division and peace. The map is significant because it conveys to the public that the DMZ has long been a field of life for Koreans and is now a place that calls for contemplation from both Koreas and the world on how to remain committed to its rebirth as a place of peace.

The DMZ Peace Map is available online, and it uses Geographic Information System (GIS) to analyze and process massive amount of historical data, spanning from the prehistorical era to the present, of the culture, ecosystem, and geography of the region. About 12,000 pieces of information were compiled in a systematic manner, thus contributing to the revitalization of DMZ research, which can be used for educational and tourism purposes.

Ever since 2018, the government has consistently held the DMZ Global Forum to raise awareness among the international community and stimulate their interest in

the peaceful usage of the DMZ. The forum also involves the construction of a peace platform for the sake of discussing sustainable ways to develop the DMZ and the surrounding areas. At the 2021 DMZ Global Forum held in Yanggu, Gangwon Province on October 28, 2021, officials and authorities from the World Food Programme (WFP), Birkbeck, the University of London, and the University of Colorado joined the event online to take part in the discussions. Local experts and activists also discussed topics including “DMZ laws and regulations,” “sustainable DMZ ecological, environmental, and cultural cooperation,” “joint use of the Han River estuary,” and others around the theme of “measures to bring peace to the DMZ in a time of climate change.” Afterward, the participants issued the 2021 Yanggu DMZ Declaration of Peace, expressing their shared desires for the establishment of peace in the DMZ.

Before the event, the on-site participants in the forum took part in the DMZ Peace Walk around the area of Dutayeon and explored the National DMZ Botanic Garden so that they could directly experience the incredible ecological environment and historical value preserved in the DMZ.

The government plans to solidify an international network of local and foreign experts to build a national and international consensus for turning the DMZ into a platform of peace.



The DMZ Global Forum 2021 (Oct. 27–28)

(3) Establishment of the Arrowhead Hill Memorial

Arrowhead Hill, located in Cheorwon, Gwangwon Province, is known as “the Iron Triangle.” It is the place where a fierce battle broke out between the ROK and Chinese forces in 1953 during the Korean War. However, despite being the site of pain brought

about by the division, the Comprehensive Military Agreement of 2018 allowed for a joint excavation of war remains in the area as a way to alleviate military tensions and build trust between the two Koreas.

Even though the excavation has taken place solely in South Korea since 2019, the government decided to construct a memorial at the aged Arrowhead Hill guard post to transmit the peaceful significance of excavating war remains to the next generation and develop it further.



The inside and outside of the Arrowhead Hill Memorial

(4) Panmunjom Tour

To provide easier ways to tour Panmunjom, the government consulted with the relevant agencies while also streamlining the process and opening a website.

However, despite the opening of the Panmunjom Tour Support Center on November 4, 2020 and the restarting of tours, the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted operations. Tours were suspended on December 15, 2020 to prevent the spread of the virus, but they resumed on April 20, 2021 after social distancing measures were lifted on February 15, 2021. However, when the pandemic measures ramped up on July 9, Panmunjom had to be closed to tourists once again. Then government announced a step-by-step restoration of daily life activities on November 1 and eventually the tours resumed once again on November 30.

The tour that resumed on April 20 accommodated 20 people per session in consideration of the COVID-19 situation. It was held four days a week (Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday), and each tour day was divided into two general sessions for tourists and two special sessions for distinguished guests.

 Panmunjom Tour Survey Results

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
I'm satisfied with the tour	74.5%	22.4%	2.6%	0.1%	0.4%
It helped me understand unification better	66.1%	29.5%	4.0%	0.3%	0.1%
I will recommend the tour to others or visit here once again	68.7%	27.7%	3.2%	0.3%	0.1%
It is convenient to book the tour	62.9%	32.2%	4.5%	0.2%	0.2%

* Survey Period: Jan. 1 – Dec. 31, 2021 (During days the tour took place)

As for the tour that resumed on November 30, the four total sessions of the previous kind were reduced to two (one general and one special session) as COVID-19 was still spreading domestically. In addition, visitors were required to bring a proof of vaccination status or a confirmation of a negative test to prevent any further spread of the virus.



Virus prevention measures

The Panmunjom tour

Despite the challenging times, the Panmunjom Tour Support Center revealed that in 2021 alone, a total of 1,985 visitors made their way to the historical site in a total of 116 sessions. The survey conducted after each tour resulted in 95.6% of the respondents reporting that their understanding of the peaceful unification increased, while 96.9% of the respondents said that they were satisfied with the tour. This indicates that the tour contributed to their increased and deepened understanding of peaceful unification.

3 Creation and Implementation of the Cultural Spaces for Peaceful Unification (DMZ Platform)

(1) The Creation and Installation of Artwork

The Inter-Korean Transit Office was designated as a place to symbolize the dialogue and reconciliation between South and North Korea to fulfill the inter-Korean agreements made in 2018. Starting from January 2021, the Ministry of Unification built cultural and arts spaces in the East and West Inter-Korean Transit Office, the withdrawn guard post in Paju, and Dorasan Station.

The project of constructing cultural spaces for peaceful unification is all about creating a cultural and artistic platform in the facilities the two Koreas are close to. It reflects the government's decision and willingness to return the DMZ to the people, and therefore it is created and shaped through the active participation of Korean citizens. Throughout the process, it also aims to satisfy their desire for culture.

To this end, the government capitalized on the space and meaning that is distinct to the Inter-Korean Transit Office as it displayed several works of art for people to see.

First of all, the Inter-Korean Transit Office building was renovated on September 4. The building was previously used in 2003 for the opening ceremony of the Transit Office, which was founded to ensure a smooth exchange of personnel and material between the two Koreas. Its name was also changed to "UniMARU." The building was used as the main facility of the cultural and peace space and thus showcased the exhibition when it was first opened. Its name "UniMARU" was coined after adding the first three letters of the English word "unification" to the Korean word "maru" that means platform, thus fitting its purpose of being the first-ever cultural and arts platform in the

DMZ. The government decided that the renovation should involve more than a simple betterment of facilities. Instead, it should attain the “spatial meaning” of being in the DMZ and “the characteristic of being the central cultural and arts space,” all the while preserving the historical significance of connecting the two Koreas together. Thus, the space could be interpreted as a work of art and culture itself. A total of 19 pieces of artwork were displayed here on September 9.

Furthermore on September 30, the government developed the landscape of the withdrawn guard post in Paju while also installing and displaying artwork to turn the site into a space of peace and reconciliation. The guard post itself was withdrawn in accordance with the agreement between South and North Korea.

The waiting room in Dorasan Station witnessed a change as well. Previously difficult to get access to due to its proximity to the Civilian Control Line, a curved “media wall” which breaks stereotypes was installed on September 9, and three pieces of artwork were showcased to turn it into a public-friendly space.

Moreover, ten pieces of artwork were displayed throughout Jejin Station, which is situated inside the Donghae Railway Transit Office on August 27. Two works that expand the message of peace were also installed in the National Institute for Unification Education on September 10. Finally, the Inter-Korean Transit Office prepared five display spaces for an exhibition to mark the three-year anniversary of the Panmunjom Declaration and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018.

The government’s aim is to transform the DMZ into a peace zone, and it plans to create a composite culture and arts platform the two Koreas can work on together so that the foundation of a permanent peace process can be safely established and inter-Korean relations can be managed with stability and consistency.



UniMARU



"Media Wall" in Dorasan Station



Jejin Station



The area of the withdrawn guard post in Paju



The National Institute for Unification Education

(2) The Opening of the Exhibition

The Inter-Korean Transit Office created a cultural platform for peaceful unification and simultaneously announced to the international and local community its intention to continue implementing the agreements made between the two Koreas. Moreover, it planned and held exhibitions to celebrate the transformed state of the DMZ as a space of peace elevated by art.

The exhibition "2021 DMZ Art & Peace Platform" was held from September 15 to November 15, 2021. A total of 33 teams and 30 international and domestic artists participated in the exhibition. Among the 37 pieces of artwork, 34 of them were newly finished works of these artists. However, the continued COVID-19 pandemic compelled the office to hold the event online, except for the month of November when the government announced the plan to gradually restore daily life activities. Though at a limited capacity, the exhibition was open to visitors from November 3 to 15.

The exhibition was held inside the transit office in UniMARU as well as Dorasan Station, the area of the withdrawn guard post in Paju, Jejin Station in Goseong, Gangwon Prov-

ince, and the National Institute for Unification Education. Each exhibit focused on the themes of “unification and peace,” “ecology and preservation,” “connection and solidarity,” and “exchange and expansion.” Thanks to the DMZ platform that stretches from Paju to Goseong, the exhibition served as the opportunity to spread hope for peace on the Korean peninsula to the rest of the world.

The exhibition also had a website (www.dmzplatform.com) and an online viewing room to ensure a near live experience for those who could not visit the site in person. It was covered and highlighted by various social media platforms, traditional media outlets, and the press. Broadcasting services like KBS, SBS, MBC, and Arirang TV, along with the major daily newspapers, introduced it to the public. Most notably, Artnet, a foreign arts newspaper, and CNN covered the exhibition and explained its background and significance.

The exhibition had 3,940 in-person visitors, and more than 340,000 views of its online viewing room.

Support for Companies Based in the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC)

1 Support for the Normalization of Business Management for GIC Companies

Amid the ongoing cessation of the complex, the government exerted efforts in various ways to stabilize the management of those GIC companies facing additional challenges due to COVID-19.

(1) Government support measures for GIC companies

In 2021, the government provided financial and taxation assistance as well as an employee retention subsidy to GIC companies so that they could return to normal operations as quickly as possible and minimize their challenges in operating their businesses. Various kinds of support were offered, including but not limited to a deferment of payment and an extension of the expiration period for loans granted by the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (IKCF) and policy funds. The government also extended the deadline for paying national and local taxes, postponed dispositions, deferred collections, issued insurance benefits for proven claims, and provided support for those without any labor insurance. The Ministry of Unification also decreased the interest rate of the special loan from the IKCF from 1.5% to 1%. The support measures from each ministry are shown in the table below.



Main Support Measures to Normalize the Operation of GIC Companies

Ministries	Main Support Measures
Ministry of Unification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deferred repayment of loans from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund • Interest rate reduction (1.5% → 1.0%)
Financial Services Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deferred repayment of loans from policy financial institutions and commercial banks • Extension of the expiration of guaranteed funds from the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund and the Korea Technology Finance Corporation and preferential treatment to GIC companies for guarantee fees (0.5%) • Interest rate reduction (a refrain from increasing interest rates without any consideration to credit ratings)
Ministry of Economy and Finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exemption of GIC companies from income taxes and corporate taxes when they establish alternative factories in areas other than the overpopulated districts of metropolitan areas that are subject to restrictions
Ministry of Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for contracts on consignment workshops within correctional institutions
Ministry of the Interior and Safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deferred tax payments including local taxes (up to one year) • Deferred collection of local taxes billed and taxes in arrears (up to one year) • Postponement of tax investigations for local taxes
Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extended deadlines for the payment of electric power charges (starting with the bills for January 2016) • Extended deadline for the payment of gas charges • Alternative factories (rental factories) and support (Knowledge Industrial Center at the Korea Industrial Complex Corporation) • Support for the use of warehouses (preferential allocation of warehouses at the distribution center of the Korean Industrial Complex Corporation)
Ministry of Employment and Labor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for those who do not have employment insurance (an offer of insurance benefits if they prove that they are working) • Grant exceptions from the Employment Permit System (up to 40% more than the usual standard)
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusion of GIC company products in the SME Myeongpum Maru, a showroom dedicated to SME products opened at railway stations (GIC companies are eligible to apply when announcing the opening of stores)
Ministry of SMEs and Startups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deferred repayment of loans from SME policy funds
National Tax Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extension of deadlines for the payment of corporate taxes and value-added taxes (VAT) (nine months) • Postponement of dispositions for corporate taxes and VAT in arrears (one year) • Delayed tax audits (in principle, a suspension of the commencement of audits)
Public Procurement Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for new market opening including the supply of uniforms to public offices

(2) Customized support for GIC companies

The government has been seeking various projects and means of support for GIC companies through the Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation.

It has continued the “performance-based support programs” in 2021 for companies that have showed a willingness to research and develop their products and technologies in close coordination with research institutes and university research centers.

Four companies were selected for this initiative, and they received a total of KRW 180 million for their businesses in the span of six months. The government also strove to ensure the systematic operation of the program, holding consultations and reviewing the performance of selected companies.



Performance-based Support Program (2020–2021)

(Unit: Companies)

Category	Number of Companies	Type	Note
2020	5	Technology development (1), Product development (2), Clinical test (1), Production certification (1)	Patent application (2)
2021	4	Facility development (1), Product development (3)	Patent application (1)
Total	9		

In addition, the government conducted a management normalization support program that offered customized support to GIC companies in need of publicity and consultation. A total of KRW 382.6 million was provided to 45 companies to help them with their businesses.



Management Normalization Support Program (2020–2021)

(Unit: Companies)

Category	R&D	Marketing	Support for certification	Others	Total
2020	7	28	5	11	51
2021	19	23	-	3	45
Total	26	51	5	14	96

Moreover, to help the GIC companies that are experiencing difficulties entering markets due to the shutdown of the complex, the government cooperated with the relevant agencies to facilitate their participation in mega sale shows entrance into market ventures. This initiative served as an opportunity for the companies to showcase their outstanding products and sell them.

The government also operated the Corporate General Support Center inside the Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation to act as a channel through which each company could communicate their difficulties and receive consultation and/or solutions. In

2021 Special Sales Events for GIC Companies

Category	Mega show	Hengbokhan Department Store	Mega show	Kyobo Hottracks	National Assembly Sales
Period	June 18–20	Year-round	November 18–21	Second quarter of 2021	December 16–17
Venue	KINTEX	Hengbokhan Department Store	KINTEX	Each branch of Kyobo Book Centre	National Assembly Members' Office
Collaborative Agencies	Small & Medium Business Distribution Center			Kyobo Book Centre	National Assembly
No. of participating companies	8	5	8	1	10

Special Sales Events for GIC Companies



2021 Mega show for consumer goods (Jun. 17–20 & Nov. 18–21)

2021, the government held a total of 355 consultation sessions with GIC companies on topics ranging from policy funds to corporate support.

The General Support Center's Consultation Services for GIC Companies (2020–2021)

(Unit: Case)

Category	Corporate support	Support for new markets	Policy funds	Legal & Tax Matters	Tenancy and investment	Employment support	Compensation for damages	Others	Total
2020	181	35	73	27	20	22	-	-	358
2021	220	7	53	17	5	9	23	21	355
Total	401	42	126	44	25	31	23	21	713

2 Strengthening Communication with GIC Companies

The government enhanced its cooperation and communication with GIC companies, understanding deeply that they are partners in enabling the resumption of the GIC.

After the new leaders of the Corporate Association of Gaecheon Industrial Complex were selected, Unification Minister Lee met with the association on May 25. The Association requested support from the government to reopen the complex and aid companies experiencing difficulties. In response, Minister Lee expressed his willingness to ensure that the government would do its best to create the conditions for the reopening of the closed complex by holding talks with North Korea and providing assistance to the companies in various ways.

On November 23, Vice Minister Young-joon Choi met with the corporate association's leaders and learned about the setbacks and challenges GIC companies are facing. He emphasized that joint efforts by the government and companies are important for reopening the complex.

Aside from these steps, the Director General for Inter-Korean Cooperation District Policy Planning Directorate and the leaders of the Corporate Association of Gaecheon Industrial Complex sat down for several meetings, including regular meetings and working-level consultations, to continue their close coordination.



Unification Minister Lee met with the members of the Corporate Association of GIC (May 25)



Unification Vice Minister Choi met with the members of the Corporate Association of GIC (Nov. 23)

Additionally, a survey targeting GIC companies was conducted from May to July in 2021. Although it was supposed to be carried out by visiting each company, phone calls and other forms of correspondences were pursued in cases where the companies were

not available to meet in person due to management problems or COVID-19. Such efforts contributed to a strengthening of communication and served as an opportunity to understand the managerial status of the GIC companies.



Companies visited in Seoul (Jun. 21)



Companies visited in Gyeonggi Province (Oct. 26)

3 Building a Consensus for Resumption of GIC

Marking the fifth year of the GIC shutdown, the government exerted its efforts in various ways to spread awareness, internationally and domestically, about the positive value the GIC has in contributing to a peaceful economy on the Korean peninsula.

(1) Education and promotion of the GIC

The government worked with the Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation to build a national consensus on the necessity of reopening the GIC, tapping into a variety of methods and channels. It held online and in-person events, such as a talk concert (Feb. 9 and Nov. 17), an online international discussion (Feb. 18), and a debate (Apr. 26) to collect opinions and ideas from people of different backgrounds and share their perspectives with others.

An education program targeting students, public officials, and ordinary citizens were made available, thus enriching the understanding of not only the GIC but also the peace economy on the Korean peninsula.

The government and the Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation shared experiences they had at the GIC with public officials, teachers, and students in cooperation with educational offices and local governments. Considering the COVID-19 situation, they



Online International Dialogue (Feb. 18)



Debate Session Marking the April 27 “Panmunjom Declaration (Apr. 26)

understood the educational demands of online education, so they maximized the educational contents, such as video materials, and distributed them to various people. In 2021, a total of 16,013 people participated in over 111 sessions of the program. Such sessions were an opportunity to share the peaceful value of the GIC and the integration experiences that took place there.



Results of the Sharing Experiences of Inter-Korean Unity at the GIC Program (2020)

(Unit: session, person)

Category	Teachers	Public institutions and officials	Students (elementary, middle, and high school)	College students	Total
Number of sessions	9	13	9	80	111
Number of people in the program	1,678	434	377	13,524	16,013

Furthermore, a training course designed to cultivate experts in inter-Korean economic cooperation was also carried out for local businessmen and public officials who wished to participate in businesses that foster inter-Korean economic cooperation. A total of 268 people from four regions (South Gyeongsang Province, Gwangju, Gyeonggi, and Daejeon) participated in the program, undergoing training that enhanced their capabilities to become potential businessmen uniting the two Koreas.

Additionally, the government operated the Gaeseong Industrial Complex Youth Academy for young people, who will take major roles in the future when GIC operations resume in the era of the peaceful economy on the Korean Peninsula. The GIC Talk Concert was held online as it was in the previous year. These events served as opportunities to share with the

youth various ideas and opinions regarding inter-Korean economic cooperation, peace, and the future of the Korean Peninsula.

 Results of Educational Programs Related to GIC

Program	Review	Main content
Sharing experiences of inter-Korean unity at the GIC	Year-round	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shared experiences of inter-Korean unity at the GIC with public officials, teachers, and students (from primary school to college). * Educated about 16,000 people in 111 sessions. ** Held a program review contest in November
Training course to cultivate experts in inter-Korean economic cooperation	April–November	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Educational program to cultivate experts in inter-Korean economic cooperation (Once a week for 8 weeks) - 4 regions (South Gyeongsang and Gyeonggi province, Gwangju, Daejeon). A total of 268 participants
The GIC Youth Academy	April–June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With college students (Once a week for 8 Weeks) * In cooperation with Dongguk University and Busan University of Foreign Studies. A total of 87 students participated
Online debate competition to build a consensus for peace on the Korean Peninsula	September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Online competition for middle and high school students and the public nationwide. - Quarterfinals, semifinals, and finals for each category * A total of 7,928 people witnessed the finals and award ceremony
GIC Talk Concert	February & October	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Through the cooperation of the local governments (Gyeonggi Province and Paju city) and a relevant agency (The Peaceful Unification Advisory Council), the concert reminded viewers of the value and meaning of the GIC. * A total of 193 people participated (71 for Feb. 9 & 122 for Nov. 17)

(2) Strengthening the cooperation system with the civilian sector

The government has continued to communicate and cooperate with the relevant agencies and institutes, such as the Korea Land and Housing Corporation, the Export–Import Bank of Korea, and the Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation, to discuss various issues, including the resumption of the GIC and corporate support.

Moreover, the government has continued to seek out the ideas and opinions of civilian experts (lawyers, accountants, researchers, etc.) to improve the GIC-related laws and regulations through the GIC Legal Advisory Committee. The council has been in operation since 2004, and in 2021, four written meetings were held to discuss various matters regarding the inter-Korean cooperation district and the GIC. Through such efforts, the government is now able to make plans for the reopening of the GIC in a more scrupulous fashion, create the conditions for it to thrive, and maintain the impetus for achieving its goals.

Laying the Foundation for Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation

1 Improving the Laws and the Legal System

(1) Submission of the Revised Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act to the National Assembly

In 2020, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the ratification of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act (effective date: August 1, 1990), the government prepared an amendment to the act in consideration of the demands for legislative improvement and the changes in the environment after gathering diverse opinions from experts and others. The revised act was then submitted to the National Assembly in January 2021, brought to the Foreign Affairs & Unification Committee on February 18, and moved to the Bill Review Subcommittee. As of December 2021, the bill's status in the National Assembly is currently pending, and the government is waiting for it to be passed in a rapid manner.



The main amended provisions:

- ▶ Establishment of a legal basis for procedures during a suspension of trade period and co-operation projects and support for the normalization of management
- ▶ Setting forth the grounds for rejections of proposed visits to North Korea
- ▶ Introduction of a certification system for trading business operators who have had the best performance
- ▶ Setting forth the grounds for the establishment of offices in North Korea

(2) Revision in the Enforcement Decree and Operation Regulation of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act

As a follow-up measure to the amendment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act on December 18, 2020, the enforcement decree of the same act was revised on March 9, 2021 to stipulate the matters necessary for the organization and management of the policy councils of local governments for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. On April 30, 2021, such a stipulation was enacted and implemented to both ensure the stable operation of the above policy councils and support them with a legal basis.

Moreover, for the sake of reinforcing cooperation with local governments and the civilian sector and in compliance with Article 165 (1) 1 of the Local Autonomy Act, the membership of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council should include more than one civilian expert and expand from 18 to 25 public official and civilian members. As a result, on March 9, the enforcement decree of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation and the management regulations of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council and working-level committee were revised.

Aside from these amendments, the Unification ministry supported the legislative process of the revision of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation (12 revisions) that are currently pending in the National Assembly. By continuously holding meetings with the relevant ministries and agencies to discuss measures to enhance exchanges and cooperation, it is working hard to ensure that the laws and the legal system are appropriately supplemented.

② Supporting the Cooperative Projects of Civilians and Local Governments

On September 10, 2019, to provide a one-stop service for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects, the government established the Exchange and Cooperation Support Center within the South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association (SONOSA). From the preparation stage in 2019, the Center provided systematic assistance to a total of 1,146 formal written requests regarding visits to North

Korea, contacts with North Koreans, and exemptions on DPRK sanctions.

In 2021, professionals specializing in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation were tasked with providing consultations (10 sessions) to organizations, the businesses and local governments who carry out inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects so that they could offer advice on matters of trade, economic cooperation, and humanitarian assistance. The SONOSA also held two briefing sessions in each region. These efforts facilitated the sharing of procedures, information and experiences regarding inter-Korean cooperation and enhanced the understanding of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.



A consultation session with a local government
(Mar. 30, Busan)



Inter-Korean exchange and cooperation orientation
(Apr. 20, Gwangju)

3 Laying the Foundation for Exchanges and Cooperation Based on Decentralized Governance

The government is rendering support to local governments and NGOs in various ways, so they can play an important role in inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. While respecting their autonomy, the government has devised support plans for each entity to promote exchange and cooperation projects. It also has remained in close communication with them through forums, debates, and other such events.

In particular, as the amended Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act took effect in March 2021, all local governments became institutional entities of exchange and cooperation and thus had elevated roles and functions for facilitating inter-Korean cooperation. The government is seeking multi-faceted ways to continue supporting them to

actively cooperate with North Korea. Moreover, it introduced a system to preliminarily approve the cooperation projects of local governments, which led to the approval of 24 projects, including the inter-Korean joint music festival of Goyang and agricultural cooperation among the following local areas and their specialties: Paju (Jangdan soy-beans), Gimje (seed potatoes), and Cheongsong (apples). The system created an environment wherein local governments can plan and spearhead exchange and cooperation projects with North Korea while maintaining transparency and autonomy in the process. The government also prepared plan to provide financial support when necessary.

Additionally, on September 14, the Regulations on the Handling of Humanitarian Aid Projects for North Korea were amended, and all local governments were designated as an operator of humanitarian aid program for North Korea, thereby creating the conditions for the humanitarian aid projects promoted by local governments to be carried out more quickly and efficiently.

The government also stepped up its efforts in upgrading “the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Policy Council of Local Governments” and “the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Working Group of Local Governments” to legal consultative bodies between the central and local governments to discuss inter-Korean exchange and cooperation initiatives. At the start of the policy consultative meeting on April 21, the central and local governments continued to share information regarding the status of their inter-Korean projects while also discussing ways to improve and adjust them.

 **Main Resolutions and Status of the Consultative Meeting on the Promotion of Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation**

Session	Date	Means	Main resolutions
318 th	Jan. 14	Face-to-face	Eight agenda items including looking into the status of separate families and IKCF support
319 th	Feb. 25	In writing	Report on the final accounts of the IKCF
320 th	Apr. 8	Face-to-face	Three agenda items including funding the restoration of Bima bridge in the DMZ Peace Trails
321 st	Jun. 3	Face-to-face	Three agenda items including the funding of building facilities for online meetings among separated families
322 th	Sept. 24	Face-to-face	Three agenda items including the provision of funds for a policy project on nutrition and public health cooperation in North Korea

Festivals and meetings with the local governments and organization heads were held to reinforce cooperation between the central and local governments. To this effect, the government conducted customized project consultations with Seoul, Gyeonggi Province, Gangwon Province, Jeju, and others with the aim of fostering understanding and enhancing competencies regarding inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation.

In 2021, in accordance with the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, the Minister of Unification chairs the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council, whereby vice-minister-level officials and civilian specialists sat together to discuss various matters. In the same year, five sessions were held to deliberate and decide on key matters related to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund budget plans.



The 321st Session of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council (Jun. 3)



The 332nd Session of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council (Sept. 24)

4 Managing the Inter-Korean Transit

While the shutdown of the cross-border passage due to ASF (Oct. 1, 2019) and COVID-19 was meant to be temporary, the explosion of the Joint Liaison Office on June 6, 2020 and other events worsened the relations between the two Koreas and deteriorated the circumstances of the passage. Yet even amid the continued suspension of the cross-border passage, the Inter-Korean Transit Office conducted a total of 65 simulated training exercises with the Korea Customs Service, the Ministry of Justice, and the Cultural Heritage Administration to prepare for the resumption of the cross-border passage as well as the safe operation and maintenance of the cross-border system. The



Personnel Check (Oct. 29)



Vehicle Inspection (Nov. 30)

said government agencies inspected vehicles and people, looking out for any attempts to smuggle cultural artifacts, which familiarized the personnel with the procedures to ensure they always stood ready.

Moreover, the Ministry of Unification held Inter-Korean Transit Office management consultative meetings (four times) and working-level consultative meetings (four times), and during the whole process of planning and evaluating the simulated training, the Ministry of Unification coordinated with the relevant agencies, including the Ministry of National Defense and the Korea Customs Service, for the purpose of supervision and adjustments.

The Eastern and Western Transportation Corridor refers to the special area within the DMZ for the passage of personnel and cargo between the two Koreas. The width of the eastern corridor is 100 meters, and the width of the western corridor is 250 meters. The length of each is 2 km south of the Military Demarcation Line. There is infrastructure set up in the corridors, including the railway, the road, electricity, and



Repairing the transmission tower (Mar. 18)




Repairing the road (Oct. 15)

communication. However, following the halt of GIC operations in 2016 and the freeze of inter-Korean relations, they are in operation only in emergency situations and when they are in demand for events.

For such circumstances, the Inter-Korean Transit Office held a management consultative meeting on November 11, 2020, wherein a total of 13 agencies participated, including the Ministry of Unification. There, they decided on the methods for managing the infrastructure in the transportation corridors, and on November 24, 2020, the office requested that the Korea Railroad Corporation and road management agencies provide maintenance and inspection services. Following this, in 2021, maintenance and inspection took place twice a year to lay the foundations for safe travel and passage.

03

Humanitarian Cooperation



- I – Humanitarian Cooperation
- II – Separated Families
- III – Prisoners of War (POWs), Abductees, and Detainees
- IV – North Korean Human Rights



Chapter

3

Humanitarian Cooperation

The government remains steadfast in carrying out humanitarian aid programs consistently regardless of the political or military circumstances. Especially amid the COVID-19 pandemic, it continues to prioritize humanitarian matters.

It has pursued various tracks to improve the humanitarian situation in North Korea and the quality of life for North Koreans. While sensing the necessity of inter-Korean cooperation in the area of infectious disease prevention — a non-traditional, cross-border security threat amid the COVID-19 pandemic — the government prepared to establish a “community of life and safety on the Korean Peninsula” through inter-Korean cooperation in healthcare and infectious disease prevention.

On November 10, 2021, the government launched the Health and Medical Cooperation Platform of the Korean Peninsula to enable the main agents of inter-Korean health and medical cooperation — the central government, local governments, international organizations, NGOs (at home and abroad), academia, experts, etc. — to regularly deliberate and coordinate on a relevant agenda.

In 2021, the government had director-level meetings with the United States three times to identify and prepare for joint humanitarian cooperation projects in areas such as public health, infectious disease prevention, drinking water, and sanitation. Additionally, through minister-level meetings with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), it confirmed the international community’s intention to actively cooperate in humanitarian cooperation projects for North Korea.

The government continued to work closely with NGOs through regular meetings with the public-private policy council for humanitarian cooperation. It also stepped up its communication efforts with local governments by coordinating with the newly launched Humanitarian Cooperation Division for Local Governments Working Council, which was launched in June 2021. By pursuing these actions, the government was able to amend the Regulations on the Handling of Humanitarian Aid and Coop-

eration Programs for North Korea in 2021, designating all 243 local governments as the primary agents of humanitarian aid programs for North Korea. Furthermore, the government increased funding from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (IKCF) for NGOs to facilitate its humanitarian cooperation. This greatly facilitated humanitarian cooperation at the private level. In addition, in September 2021, the government decided to allocate a total of KRW 10 billion to a policy program for nutrition and health cooperation for North Korea. By facilitating such funding for humanitarian cooperation projects in nutrition and health by the private sector, the government aimed to improve the humanitarian situation of vulnerable groups in North Korea, who have been the most adversely impacted by COVID-19.

Recognizing the issue of separated families as the most pressing of all humanitarian issues, the government has worked hard to ensure that separated family members can move forward with reunions immediately upon the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. Especially as the COVID-19 situation persisted, it expanded the system for video reunions of separated family members as an effective means through which seniors could meet their loved ones safely.

In 2019, the government renovated the 13 dilapidated video reunion centers across the nation, which had been unused since 2007. In 2021, it established seven more video reunion centers in provincial areas for greater convenience and for the safety of those separated family members who had mobility difficulties.

Meanwhile, in accordance with Article 6 of the Act on Inter-Korean Confirmation of the Life or Death of Separated Family Members and the Promotion of Exchange, the government conducted a survey of separated families in 2021, five years after the 2016 survey. It updated the individual application information of separated family members and prepared for a resumption of such exchanges including the full confirmation of the life or death of separated family members and reunions. It facilitated the production of about 1,000 video messages and about 1,000 genetic tests, which have been pursued every year for those who are the most senior separated family members. The government also strove to improve its system for exchanges of separated family members by increasing the user convenience of the Integrated Information System for Separated Families.

Considering the spread of COVID-19 and the needs of separated family members, the government took a number of steps to comfort and support them, including holding a photo exhibition of hometowns in North Korea (which was made available for both

online and offline viewing), producing and disseminating videos of the Online Gyeongmo Ceremony (a ritual to pay respects to one's ancestors in North Korea), and inviting separated family members to video meetings.

The government has continued its efforts to resolve the issue of POWs, abductees, and detainees. In the four years since its opening in 2017, the National Memorial Hall for Abductees during the Korean War received more than 127,000 visitors. It carried out various projects to restore the honor of those abducted during the Korean War. The projects included: holding the special exhibition *Art, go through War*; purchasing relics; publishing art brochures; operating a VR (virtual reality) exhibition hall; and producing and distributing online educational videos. The government held meetings of the Deliberation Committee on Compensation and Assistance to Abduction Victims and provided compensation funds to family members of those abducted after the war. Through systematic communication with appropriate institutions and international organizations, the government strengthened its base for cooperation (at home and abroad) in resolving humanitarian issues, and it also continued to visit family members of the victims.


The government has made an effort to establish a virtuous cycle among the promotion of North Korean human rights, the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the development of inter-Korean relations. It is pursuing a Second Master Plan to Improve Human Rights in North Korea (2020-2022), which was established after gathering opinions from the Policy Council for North Korean Human Rights, a council that represents the relevant ministries. In accordance with the North Korean Human Rights Act, the government received advice from the North Korean Human Rights Advisory Committee that consists of non-governmental experts.

The government has also worked to secure international support for increasing international understanding of its policies on North Korean human rights. In addition, it has strived to expand the public consensus on North Korean human rights and has strengthened public-private communication by supporting NGOs' activities regarding North Korean human rights.

In 2021, the government maintained its ongoing communication with NGOs involved in North Korean human rights humanitarian aid, and development cooperation. It also held a workshop on how the NGOs can build their capabilities. The government plans to expand and implement customized communication mechanisms that reflect the needs of private organizations.

1 Efforts to Move Forward with Humanitarian Cooperation

The government has consistently strived to improve the humanitarian situation in North Korea and the quality of life of North Koreans regardless of the political circumstances on and off the Korean peninsula. With COVID-19 continuing to spread in 2021, North Korea maintained the closure of its border with China, making it difficult to carry out humanitarian cooperation smoothly. Furthermore, relations between the two Koreas remained deadlocked. Even amid such circumstances, however, the government explored creative, stable, and sustainable means of humanitarian cooperation through multiple channels including the international community, NGOs, and local governments.



Launching the Health and Medical Cooperation Platform of the Korean Peninsula and adopting a joint declaration (Nov. 10)

While sensing the necessity for inter-Korean cooperation in preventing infectious diseases—a cross-border security threat amid the COVID-19 situation—the government prepared to establish a “community of life and safety on the Korean Peninsula” through health and medical cooperation. To this end, in November 2021, it launched the Health

and Medical Cooperation Platform of the Korean Peninsula, a consultative body made up of representatives of the government ministries, local governments, international organizations, NGOs (at home and abroad), academia, and experts to regularly discuss and coordinate all agenda items pertaining to health and medical cooperation on the Korean Peninsula. The first meeting was held on November 10 and 11, during which the participants declared the launch of the platform and announced the Joint Declaration on Health and Medical Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, which includes a vision, goal, and policy direction that can be agreed to by all the participants. The declaration upholds the basic principle that health and medical cooperation to protect the lives of people on the Korean Peninsula should continue regardless of the political or security circumstances and that efforts to this end should be pursued in solidarity and

Joint Declaration on Health and Medical Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula

We view that it holds significance that cooperation on protecting the lives of all the people on the Korean peninsula and on ensuring healthy and prosperous lives of the people continues amid global health risks regardless of political and security situation. Under the mutual understanding that those efforts to this end shall be made with the solidarity and cooperation of us all, today, we proclaim as follows on the occasion of launching of the health and medical platform on the Korean peninsula.

1. We shall create a community of life and safety on the Korean peninsula in response to imminent and potential health risks through reciprocal cooperation from the perspective of peace and prosperity, and co-existence on the Korean peninsula.
2. We shall make the health and medical platform on the Korean peninsula as a venue of collective knowledge as well as a community open to whoever has interests in health and medical cooperation on the Korean peninsula.
3. We more than welcome that South Korea and North Korea work together to implement sustainable development goals of the United Nations, and shall put utmost effort in cooperation with the international society to this end.
4. We shall encourage joint actions at the Korean peninsula level to respond to global health issues threatening the health security of the international society, and shall pursue the Korean peninsula where all the people in North Korea as well in South Korea enjoy healthy lives through inclusive cooperation on enhanced medical health system.
5. We shall share common goals with a humanitarian spirit, and shall cooperate and support them based on the respect for individual pursuits of all the participants of the health and medical cooperation on the Korean peninsula.
6. We agree that it is critical to develop the health and medical platform on the Korean peninsula as a sustainable community. Thus, we shall hold a regular meeting once every year and shall make effort to develop the platform through virtual cooperation as well.

10 November, 2021

Agreed by All the participants of Health and Medical Platform
on the Korean Peninsula

with cooperation from everyone.

The previous projects involving inter-Korean health and medical cooperation were off-and-on partial efforts for each project and agency, and as a result, there were limits to the extent to which participants were acting in tandem. Therefore, the Health and Medical Cooperation Platform of the Korean Peninsula was created with the intention of building an open and sustainable community in which anyone who is interested in inter-Korean health and medical cooperation can participate. Unlike the previous top-down, government-led approach, the new coordinated body will allow participants to work together in an autonomous way to ensure that it is a venue for collective intelligence. By connecting domestic and international, public and private, and professional working and academic groups, the body can play a key role in the future of inter-Korean health and medical cooperation.

The government is working hard to implement agreements by developing a joint response system against infectious diseases and increasing long-term cooperation in healthcare, as set forth in the Pyeongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 and the inter-Korean talks on healthcare on November 7, 2018. To this end, it formulated a cooperation plan for each sector to prepare for full-scale health and medical cooperation between the two Koreas. By commissioning research on “Cooperation on Infectious Disease for North Korea,” it drew up a policy to combat infectious diseases. By commissioning research on “A Roadmap for Cooperation on Non-Communicable Diseases for North Korea,” it analyzed and forecast the severity of chronic diseases that have spread among the North Korean population while establishing a roadmap for step-by-step cooperation.

The government also facilitated its communication with domestic and international NGOs involved in health and medical cooperation on the Korean Peninsula. It commissioned research on “Establishing Health and Medical Cooperation System with the International Community for North Korea” to build a network for sharing information as often as possible. It also commissioned research on “Building Public Consensus on Inter-Korean Health and Medical Cooperation to Establish a Community of Life on the Korean Peninsula” to nurture experts of the next generation in health and medical cooperation and build a public consensus. By doing so, the government systematically formulated various plans in preparation for the resumption of health and medical cooperation between the two Koreas.

In 2021, the government explored various means of cooperation with the international community. Even amid the recent challenges, it strove to continue humanitarian cooperation for the most vulnerable groups in North Korea including infants and women. In addition, the government held director-level meetings with the United States three times (Aug. 4, Sep. 16, and Nov. 1) to discuss joint humanitarian projects for North Korea in such areas as public health, infectious disease prevention, drinking water, and sanitation.

Through minister-level meetings with the WFP (Oct. 29) and the WHO (Nov. 1), the government confirmed the international community's intention to actively cooperate in humanitarian projects for North Korea, shared information about the humanitarian situation in North Korea, and discussed ways to implement humanitarian projects in the future. The government has carried out a 10 million dollar program through the WFP to support infants and women in North Korea. The program involves emergency food assistance and nutrition support for infants as well as pregnant and lactating women, and it also provides food such as corn for work projects.

The government is also implementing a five million dollar program for medical assistance for maternal and child health in North Korea through the WHO. The maternal and child health program aims to render medical supplies to medical colleges in North Korea and provide training for medical personnel. Since March 18, 2021, all staff members at international organizations have left North Korea. International bodies plan to resume such projects as soon as conditions permit them as their staff members expect to reenter into North Korea once the border control eases. From 1995 (when the government first started offering funds to international organizations for humanitarian cooperation projects in North Korea) to 2021, the government provided a total of USD 266.76 million to such international bodies.

The government plans to continue cooperating with international organizations in the pursuit of humanitarian cooperation in North Korea and aid programs for North Koreans while expanding reliable and sustainable relations with them to implement necessary assistance programs in a timely way without disruption.

Furthermore, since the government had no regular communication channels with local governments previously, it took steps to institutionalize communication and cooperation with them.

Since Jeju Island's citrus support project in 1999, local governments have been active in the field of humanitarian cooperation with North Korea, and they are planning various

projects for the future.

The government launched the Humanitarian Cooperation Division for Local Governments Working Council as a venue for discussing policies regarding humanitarian cooperation programs for North Korea. The council held its first meeting on June 23, 2021, during which the government expounded on its plan to promote humanitarian cooperation programs initiated by local governments and gathered opinions from local government representatives. At the second meeting of the working council on September 13, the government detailed plans for cooperation between the central and local governments based on the outcomes of the first meeting. Through such a process, it amended the Regulations on the Handling of Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation Programs for North Korea (as notified by the Ministry of Unification, September 14, 2021). All 243 local governments (17 upper-level and 226 lower-level local governments) were designated as agents of aid programs for North Korea, and from that point on, they able to carry out humanitarian aid programs by themselves without having to go through any application procedures.

As a result of the amendment, local governments can obtain funding for their aid and cooperation programs for North Korea from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (IKCF) if necessary. The government incorporated a budget for humanitarian cooperation programs for North Korea initiated by local governments in its budget plan for 2022. As for NGOs' programs that include local governments' subsidies as sources of finance, the Minister of Unification should notify the head of the appropriate administrative agency within seven days from the date a report on shipments is received. It is in this way that the Ministry of Unification can strengthen its cooperation with local governments as well as facilitate systematic cooperation among the central government, local governments, and NGOs.

The government actively pursued various measures to promote humanitarian cooperation for North Korea with NGOs. It gathered opinions from the private sector on various occasions including a public-private policy council for humanitarian cooperation and amended its regulations on January 4 to increase the amount and ratio of funding support for NGOs involved in humanitarian cooperation for North Korea. The amendment increased the installments of IKCF funding from once a year to three times a year for both agents of aid programs for North Korea and those who are granted approval for cooperation programs. Previously, an organization was not always able

to get funds when it carried out separate programs in humanitarian and development cooperation because it could only receive funds once. The new arrangement now remedies this issue, thus preventing interruptions and delays in programs. The amendment also reduces the financial burden NGOs cover themselves from 50% to 30% of the total funding. Considering the humanitarian situation the North Korean people currently face and the urgency of support for them amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the government decided on a KRW 10 billion policy program for nutrition and health cooperation in North Korea at the 322nd session of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council on September 24, 2021. The government will examine and select programs of domestic NGOs who carry out nutrition and health programs for vulnerable groups in North Korea and apply for funds after satisfying the required conditions. The selected programs will be given funds from the IKCF in an amount limited to KRW 500 million per program. By doing so, the government aims to ensure that it supplements the funding of NGOs so that NGOs with the intention and capability for humanitarian cooperation can effectively implement programs on a large-scale. The government held a briefing session for all NGOs involved in aid programs for North Korea. It first started receiving applications on September 29 and has carried out the policy since then. The government also actively rendered support for NGOs facing difficulties due to the closure of the North Korea-China border so that there would be no procedural inconveniences in applying to send supplies to North Korea or reporting contact with North Korean people. The sending of humanitarian cooperation supplies to North Korea by NGOs was suspended in September 2020. The government resumed to grant approval of sending supplies to North Korea when it approved two cases regarding nutrition and health on July 30, 2021. It took the measure in consideration of the urging by NGOs, the overall humanitarian situation in North Korea, and the pressing needs of vulnerable groups to obtain nutrition and health products.

2] Strengthening the Capacity to Pursue Humanitarian Cooperation

(1) Strengthening the cooperative system with the private sector, local governments, and the international community


In 2021, the government strove to establish a system for close cooperation among the

private sector, local governments, and the international community.

The government first decided to hold semiannual meetings (on Jun. 30 and Dec. 23) for the Public-private Policy Council for Humanitarian Cooperation co-chaired by the Vice Minister of Unification and the chair of the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea and attended by NGOs and the relevant ministries, including the Ministry of Health and Welfare; the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs; and the Korea Forest Service. In addition to the regular meetings, steering committee meetings were held three times in 2021 (Jan 21, Aug. 2, and Oct. 12) to support the council's affairs. The council was established in 2004 but was suspended in March 2012. It was then reinstated in 2019 and is now operating on a regular basis. The government also held three policy advisory meetings of the Humanitarian Cooperation Division (Mar. 31, May 6, and Aug. 2) to increase public-private communication in humanitarian cooperation. The Minister of Unification had meetings with the chairman of the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation on March 22 and with the chair of the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea on March 24 to clearly hear the perspectives of NGOs involved in humanitarian cooperation for North Korea and explore additional opportunities for cooperation in the future.



The Minister of Unification meets with the chairman of the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (Mar. 22)



The Minister of Unification meets with the chair of the Korea NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (Mar. 24)

The government also institutionalized channels to discuss its policies with local governments. It amended the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act to launch the policy council for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation by local governments as a statutory organization on April 21, 2021. Regarding local governments' humanitarian cooperation programs for North Korea, it launched the Humanitarian Cooperation Division for Local Governments Working Council and held two meetings (Jun. 23 and

Sep. 13). The central government and local governments (including 17 upper-level local governments) participated in the council and established a cooperative relationship for major policies regarding humanitarian cooperation for North Korea. Through such a process, the government amended the Regulations on the Handling of Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation Programs for North Korea (as notified by the Ministry of Unification), and as a result, local governments were collectively designated as the agents of aid programs for North Korea. The government pursued its institutional and financial support policies by incorporating humanitarian cooperation programs for North Korea initiated by local governments into its 2022 budget plan for the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.

The government also stepped up its efforts in reaching out to the international community. In November 2021, on the occasion of the launch of the Health and Medical Cooperation Platform of the Korean Peninsula, the government enhanced its communication with international NGOs as well as international organizations including the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), and the International Vaccine Institute (IVI). It also managed to secure the participation of major countries including the United States, Britain, and the Delegation of the European Union.

The Forum on the International Community's Network for Health and Medical Cooperation was held on September 30 and November 11. It was attended by people from various international NGOs and international organizations who had carried out humanitarian cooperation programs for North Korea. They shared their experiences and widened the base of communication with the ROK government. At task force meetings of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative for Infectious Disease Control and Public Health (Mar. 11, Apr. 22, Jun. 21, Aug. 19, Oct. 12, and Dec. 1), the government explored possibilities for humanitarian cooperation through international organizations and multilateral cooperation.

When the Minister of Unification went on a tour to Europe from late October to early November, he had meetings with key persons involved in humanitarian cooperation for North Korea. The minister met with Cardinal Turkson, the first Prefect of the Dicastery for the Promotion of Integral Human Development and WFP Executive Director David Beasley on October 29. He also met with WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus along with Vice-President Gilles Carbonnier and Secretary General Jagan Chapagain of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

on November 1. In these meetings, he affirmed the international community's support for peace and humanitarian cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and had in-depth discussions on ways to make progress in peace on the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean relations through humanitarian cooperation for North Korean people including children and women.

(2) Striving to build capabilities

As the COVID-19 pandemic persisted, the government continued its discussions with non-governmental experts in each sector and increasingly sensed the necessity of improving expertise further in inter-Korean health and medical cooperation to prepare for the resumption of health and medical cooperation in the future. It gathered opinions during the Conference of Experts in Infectious Diseases (Apr. 22, Jul. 9, Aug. 4, and Aug. 18) and the Conference of Experts in Chronic Diseases (May 28 and Jul. 7). Amid the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing humanitarian crisis in North Korea, the government tried to build a community of life on the Korean Peninsula through health and medical cooperation. To this end, on February 23, 2021, it held the Seminar to Build a Community of Life and Safety on the Korean Peninsula of Coexistence and Peace, which was co-hosted by the South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association and the Korean Red Cross.

On June 9 -11, the government held a workshop for agents of aid programs for North Korea to strengthen the capabilities and networks of NGOs involved in humanitarian cooperation for North Korea. Additionally, it held a forum made up of experts on North Korean sanctions as well as humanitarian and development cooperation on April 8 and sponsored an academy on development and cooperation for North Korea on May 11-13. Both initiatives were co-hosted with the South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association. Furthermore, through a program to strengthen the capabilities of NGO working staff involved in aid to North Korea on November 16-17, it facilitated a sharing of humanitarian cooperation outcomes by domestic NGOs and conducted training on the administrative work necessary for humanitarian cooperation programs, including sanctions exemptions, determination of strategic goods, and the sending of goods to North Korea.

(3) Establishing and operating integration and a management system

The government has comprehensively and systematically managed the humanitarian co-

operation programs for North Korea initiated by local governments and NGOs through the operation of an integration and management system. This project involves: ① an analysis and assessment of humanitarian cooperation programs and support for their capacity building; ② a collection and management of data and an implementation of cooperation programs; and ③ a management of the information system on aid to North Korea.

The government was especially intent to gather relevant data including data on the trends of international humanitarian cooperation, humanitarian cooperation organizations (at home and abroad), and the status of the programs. It also analyzed and assessed the issues surrounding humanitarian cooperation, thus laying the foundation for comprehensive humanitarian cooperation programs in the future and ensuring efficient program management.

Based on such efficient management, the government established an information system on aid to North Korea (hairo.unikorea.go.kr) that comprehensively offers the public information relating to humanitarian cooperation programs including business procedures, trends, and statistics (at home and abroad); application processing for the agents of humanitarian aid programs for North Korea; exemptions from UN sanctions on North Korea; and NGOs' application for funds from the IKCF. The government implemented guidelines on procedures for securing exemptions from UN sanctions on North Korea in the system, thus ensuring that applications for sanctions exemptions could be processed through the information system. The information system posts the status of domestic aid to North Korea and related statistics by subcategory including finances, main agent, region, purpose, and government. The status of international aid to North Korea and statistics by main agent and purpose are also posted on the system based on the data from the OECD and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Moreover, all kinds of information about humanitarian cooperation and development cooperation programs for North Korea can be identified in the system, including index data on the status of North Korea based on the SDGs; weekly reports of humanitarian cooperation; reports on humanitarian cooperation for North Korea from domestic research institutes and international bodies; and a monthly newsletter.



Main screen of the information system on aid to North Korea (hairo.unikorea.go.kr)

1 Status of Separated Families

As of December 31, 2021, 133,619 persons were registered as members of separated families in the government-run Integrated Information System for Separated Families. Out of the total 133,619 people registered, 87,404 persons had passed away, leaving 46,215 survivors.



Statistics on Separated Families

① By age

(Unit: Person, %)

Category	Aged 90 or over	Ages 80-89	Ages 70-79	Ages 60-69	Aged 59 or under	Total
Number of survivors	12,323	17,825	9,196	4,038	2,833	46,215
Percentage	26.7	38.6	19.9	8.7	6.1	100

② By Region of origin

(Unit: Person, %)

Category	Hwang-hae	South Pyeongan	North Pyeongan	South Hamgyeong	North Hamgyeong	Gyeonggi	Gangwon	Others	Total
Number of survivors	9,379	5,074	2,942	4,403	1,379	1,894	729	20,415	46,215
Percentage	20.3	11.0	6.3	9.5	3.0	4.1	1.6	44.2	100

③ By Gender

(Unit: Person, %)

Category	Males	Females	Total
Number of survivors	28,387	17,828	46,215
Percentage	61.4	38.6	100

④ By Residential area

(Unit: Person, %)

Category	Seoul	Busan	Daegu	Incheon	Gwangju	Daejeon	Ulsan	Gyeonggi	Gangwon	North Chungcheong
Number of survivors	11,971	2,047	1,066	3,758	440	1,015	364	14,018	2,766	1,528
Percentage	25.9	4.4	2.3	8.1	1.0	2.2	0.8	30.3	6.0	3.3
Category	South Chungcheong	North Jeolla	South Jeolla	North Gyeong-sang	South Gyeong-sang	Jeju	Sejong	Overseas	Total	
Number of survivors	1,439	803	671	1,411	1,105	452	177	1,184	46,215	
Percentage	3.1	1.7	1.4	3.1	2.4	1.0	0.4	2.6	100	

2] Laying the Foundation for Exchanges Among Separated Families and Expanding the Consensus

(1) Preparing for the resumption of exchanges including reunions of separated families

In 2018, the two Koreas held the 21st reunions of separated families on Mount Geumgang from August 20 to 26 in accordance with the Panmunjeom Declaration. Afterwards in the Pyeongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, South and North Korea agreed to restore and open a permanent reunion center as soon as possible, giving priority to video reunions and exchanges of video messages.


Since then, considering the aging of senior separated family members and the continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has been preparing to implement the agreements made between the two Koreas and expand the base for non-face-to-face exchange among separated families. In 2019, it renovated 13 video reunion centers across the nation, and in 2021, it built seven additional video reunion centers in

consideration of the population distribution of separated families and transportation infrastructure for each region. These efforts will make it possible for separated family members with mobility issues to participate in video reunions more easily and safely when video reunions resume in the future. In building additional reunion centers, the government carried out technical inspections and a trial operation of all 20 video reunion centers with the relevant institutions, including the Korean Red Cross, so that video reunions could be held as soon as the two Koreas agree to them.

The permanent reunion center for separated families on Mount Geumgang was completed in July 2008, but its opening was postponed indefinitely in response to the fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist. It has largely remained unused. When reunions of separated families were held there, some parts of the center, including the banquet hall were used, but because it has been 13 years since the center was constructed, it already requires extensive renovation. Accordingly, since the signing of the Pyeongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, the government has been working to build an international consensus on the restoration and opening of the permanent reunion center for separated families.



A video reunion center for separated families




The inside of a video reunion center



A map of video reunion centers (20 nationwide)

From April to October, the government conducted the 2021 survey of separated families. The survey was carried out with 47,000 people who are still alive and are among those who have requested reunions with their relatives in North Korea. As a statutory survey in accordance with Article 6 of the Act on Inter-Korean Confirmation of the Life or Death of Separated Families and Promotion of Exchange, it was carried out five years after the 2016 survey. It was conducted through non-face-to-face means, which included by phone and by mail, considering the COVID-19 situation.

The government carried out the survey in two stages: a complete enumeration survey and an in-depth questionnaire. First, it carried out the complete enumeration survey to check and update the personal information of all reunion applicants, including their addresses, contact numbers, and family members, thereby increasing the accuracy of information on separated family members. Such vital information could be used in exchanges including full confirmation of life or death in the future. The government then administered an in-depth questionnaire with a large sample of 5,000 people in order to fully grasp the state of exchanges among separated families and their perceptions of policies pertaining to separated families.



Findings of the Third Survey of Separated Family Members

Considering the aging of the most senior separated family members, the government is conducting genetic tests and preserving genetic information so that separated families can confirm their relatives even if they are deceased. The government took DNA samples from 25,149 persons from 2014 to 2021 and conducted three tests (autosomal chromosomes, Y chromosome, and mitochondria) on the family members taking the tests. The government has preserved the test results in a database of genetic information for separated families since the establishment of the database in 2015. In 2017, it transferred the genetic samples (blood, saliva, and hair) that were housed at private testing agencies to the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency for a more reliable storage of the genetic samples.

As part of the effort to build a database, the government produced 4,013 video messages from separated families in 2005. In 2008, it produced and exchanged 20 video

messages on a trial basis as agreed to with North Korea. Afterwards, to preserve the records of separated family members of an advanced age and to prepare for an exchange of written letters and video messages between the two Koreas, the government produced 20,044 more video messages from 2012 to 2021. A total of 24,077 video messages have been produced. If approved by the separated family members, the video messages are made public on the website for the Integrated Information System for Separated Families (reunion.unikorea.go.kr).

In 2020, the government redesigned the menu and layout of the website (reunion.unikorea.go.kr) to make it more user-friendly. It has continued to work to raise the level of public interest in separated families through diverse media content, including webtoons and videos about the story of separated families as well as the Online Hometown Photo Studio.



Video message from a separated family member



Webtoon "We Are One"

(2) Pursuing programs to comfort separated families and building a consensus on the issues surrounding separated families

The government has sought to bring comfort to separated families and to build a public consensus on the issues surrounding separated families.

From 2008 to 2019, it annually held a briefing on the government's policies for separated family members of an advanced age, seeking to console their pain of separation. Since 2020, however, the government has held the event through non-face-to-face means in consideration of the health and safety of the most senior family members due to the COVID-19 situation. On such national holidays as Lunar New Year and Chuseok and in the family month of May, it delivered letters of consolation and gifts to 3,000 separated family members of vulnerable groups who live alone or are of an

advanced age. It also produced a video about the Online Gyeongmo Ceremony (a ritual to pay respects to one's ancestors in North Korea) and delivered it to all applicants when they have reunions with their loved ones in North Korea. The video was intended to help soothe their longing for their families and hometowns without being able to visit the Mangbaedan memorial altar in person. During the Chuseok holiday, the government invited six families from Uijeongbu, Hongseong, and Jeonju to create video meetings and give their opinions on issues surrounding separated families while receiving consolation in the process. In addition, the government collected 200 photos of famous places and beautiful scenes across North Korea, held a photo exhibition of the places (both online and in-person), and delivered letters of consolation enclosed with photos of one's hometown to 21,838 members of displaced and separated families. The government has annually provided KRW 100 million in subsidies to the Korean Assembly for Reunion of Ten Million Separated Families for its efforts in promotion, culture, and academia.



Online Gyeongmo Ceremony (Feb. 10)



Delivering gifts of consolation (May 17)



Video meeting between the Minister of Unification and members of separated families (Sep. 16)



Online photo exhibition of hometowns in North Korea (Sep. 30 -)

3 Support for Exchanges Among Separated Families at the Private Level

The government is working to facilitate exchanges between separated family members at the private as well as at the government level. To promote private exchanges, it established guidelines on partially defraying the expenses for exchanges between separated families in 1998 and revising the guidelines four times until 2017 to cover more of the expenses. For private exchanges, the government provides KRW 3 million for confirming the life or death of relatives, KRW 6 million for reunions, and KRW 800,000 for ongoing exchanges including letter correspondences. In 2019, a total of 19 private exchanges took place, but in 2020, the exchanges were interrupted due to the imposition of tighter border controls by North Korea in the DPRK-Chinese border areas amid the COVID-19 situation. It remains difficult to engage in such exchanges today.



Defrayment of Expenses for Exchanges Among Separated Families at the Private Level

(Unit: Case, KRW million)

Category	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10
Cases	96	231	314	279	287	466	303	289	201	151	103	54	23
Payments	67	163	279	349	440	692	364	252	235	172	114	76	22

Category	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21	Total
Cases	12	16	28	12	10	10	14	12	7	0	0	2,918
Payments	12	16	51	23	16	18	34	21	15	0	0	3,431

Section

3

Prisoners of War (POWs), Abductees, and Detainees

1] Current Status

From April 1953 to January 1954, the United Nations forces exchanged prisoners of war (POWs) with the communist forces three times. The UN forces has estimated the number of missing South Korean soldiers at about 82,000, but only 8,343 were repatriated by the communist forces. It is thus presumed that a considerable number of missing South Korean soldiers were detained in North Korea against their will. Since the 1994 escape of POW Second Lieutenant Cho Chang-ho, a total of 80 POWs have fled to South Korea as of December 31, 2021.

Abductees are those who were kidnapped by North Korea and are held captive and/or live in North Korea. They are classified as wartime abductees if they were abducted during the Korean War (June 25, 1950 – July 27, 1953) and post-war abductees if they were abducted after the war. Although the statistics on war-time abductees vary depending on when and who conducted the surveys, the total number of them is estimated to be at 100,000. The Committee on Fact-Finding of Korean War Abductions and the Restoration of the Reputation of Victims was established in 2010 under the Prime Minister and remained in operation through 2016. The committee examined 5,505 abductions reported over the five-year period from 2011 to 2015 and designated 4,777 persons as wartime abductees. There have been 3,835 post-war abductees, 3,319 of whom were repatriated to South Korea. Among those repatriates, 3,310 were repatriated by North Korea and nine escaped on their own after a long period of detainment. As of December 31, 2021, it was estimated that 516 post-war abductees were still being held by North Korea.



Post-war Abductees (estimates)

(Unit: Person)

Category		Fishermen and sailors	Korean Air passengers	Military and police	Other		Total
					Korea	Abroad	
Abducted		3,729	50	30	6	20	3,835
Returned	Repatriated by North Korea	3,263	39	-	-	8	3,310
	Escaped North Korea	9	-	-	-	-	9
Still captive		457	11	30	6	12	516

North Korea detained Baptist missionary Kim Jung-wook in 2013 and missionaries Kim Kuk-gi and Choe Chun-gil in 2014. As of December 31, 2021, six South Koreans including three North Korean defectors were believed to be detained in North Korea.

2 Efforts to Resolve the Issues of POWs, Abductees, and Detainees

The government duly considers the resolution of humanitarian issues resulting from national division to be a state responsibility and is therefore working hard to address the issues of POWs, abductees, and detainees. It has strived to find the truth of wartime abductions and restore the reputations of wartime abductees in accordance with the Act on Fact-finding for Korean War Abduction Victims and the Restoration of the Reputation of Victims enacted in 2010.

As part of the effort to restore the honor of wartime abductees, the government opened the National Memorial Hall for Abductees during the Korean War in 2017. The memorial hall is a first-class specialized museum that displays 3,000 artifacts including photos, documents, and books. The memorial hall serves as a space to share with the public the pain of abductions that occurred during the Korean War and remind future generations of the importance of peace and unification. In 2021, the fourth anniversary of its opening, the number of visitors to the memorial hall exceeded 127,000. In that year, the venue held the special exhibition *Art, go through War* to inform the public of the abductions during the war and offer an opportunity for all to contemplate the importance of peace and unifica-

tion. A symbol that represents the purpose of the establishment of the memorial hall was also developed and used for the content of the exhibition and its promotional materials. In 2021 as in 2020, the government produced an art brochure (Art Brochure II) that introduced donated relics. It also improved facilities including designating a parking lot and installing directional signs for the convenience of visitors. It furthermore expanded non-face-to-face services by opening an online VR exhibition hall on its website (www.abductions625.go.kr) (so that the public could easily access its content during the COVID-19 pandemic) and by producing and distributing online educational videos. The government provides KRW 100 million in annual funding to the Korean War Abductees' Family Union to restore the honor of wartime abductees and improve their rights.



Special exhibition - Art,
go through War



Online educational videos on wartime abductees

Meanwhile, the Deliberation Committee on Compensation and Assistance to Abduction Victims was established on April 27, 2007, in accordance with the Act on Compensation and Assistance to Persons Kidnapped by North Korea. After the Conclusion of the Military Armistice Agreement, the government provided KRW 15.2 billion in compensation to abduction victims, as of the end of December 2021.

In 2021, the government held the 54th and 55th meetings of the Deliberation Committee on Compensation and Assistance to Abduction Victims (Mar. 9 and Apr. 1). It received applications for compensation from the families of those victimized by the exercise of government power relating to abductions by North Korea and decided to pay KRW 80 million to the families. The committee recognized abduction victims based on the witness statements of relatives, friends, or neighbors. This was the first decision



Funding and Other Compensation for Abduction Victims

(Unit for the “Amount paid” column: Cases, KRW million)

Category	Applications	Number of cases of payment decided	Amount paid
Monetary compensation	438	426	13,211
Settlement allowance and housing subsidy	9	9	1,773
Other compensation	14	3	261
Total	461	438	15,245

reached from a victim-centered perspective.

The government is also supporting efforts to restore the honor of post-war abduction victims and improve their rights. It provided KRW 185 million in funding to the statutory organization “the Korean War Abductees Family Union” to cover part of the medical and living expenses of senior abduction victims. To provide comfort to the families of abduction victims, it held meetings with the heads of relevant organizations, visited the families of abductees to offer consolation, and had meetings with them. The government provides housing subsidies to abduction victims who become homeless and is continuing to manage cases of abductees repatriated by North Korea to facilitate their livelihoods and settlement in society.

To console the families of POWs, abductees, and detainees, the government either made home visits or had meetings with them a total of six times in 2021.

While strengthening cooperation among the appropriate ministries to address the issues of POWs, abductees, and detainees, the government continued to seek an international consensus. The North Korean Human Rights Resolution, which was adopted at the 46th session of the UN Human Rights Council in March 2021, first addressed the issue of POWs who remain in North Korea today. In November 2021, the Minister of Unification met with ICRC Vice-President Gilles Carbonnier and asked for his cooperation in addressing humanitarian issues.

Section

4

North Korean Human Rights

1] Formulation and Implementation of Policies to Improve Human Rights in North Korea

Since it considers human rights a very important universal value, the government aims through policy to create a virtuous cycle among the improvement of human rights in North Korea, the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the development of inter-Korean relations. It is striving to develop inter-Korean relations and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula as well as improve human rights in North Korea in accordance with the North Korean Human Rights Act. Having established its policies to improve human rights in North Korea, the government is now in the process of implementing them.

Specifically, the government established and is implementing the Second Master Plan to Improve Human Rights in North Korea (2020-2022) after having gathered opinions from the North Korean Human Rights Policy Council the relevant ministries. It also received advice from the North Korean Human Rights Advisory Committee, which is composed of nongovernmental experts. The Second Master Plan includes a vision, goals, basic policy directions, and tasks to improve the protection of human rights in North Korea. The government declared “guaranteeing the basic human rights of North Koreans on a peaceful Korean Peninsula” as the vision for the plan. To implement the vision, it set forth two goals, three basic policy directions, and eight tasks. The details are presented in the table below:



Structure of the Second Master Plan to Improve Human Rights in North Korea (2020-2022)

Vision	Guaranteeing the basic human rights of North Koreans on the peaceful Korean Peninsula
Goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating a virtuous cycle between peace on the Korean Peninsula, advancement of inter-Korean relations, and human rights promotion of human rights in North Korea • Substantially improving human rights and the humanitarian situation in North Korea
Basic Directions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comprehensive and integrated promotion of both civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights • Human rights promotion through dialogue, exchange, and cooperation • Linking the promotion of human rights in North Korea to the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Tasks	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> ① Expanding investigation and research into the human rights situation in North Korea ② Resolving humanitarian issues including reunions of separated families ③ Improving human rights and the humanitarian situation in North Korea ④ Enhancing the quality of life of North Koreans through the implementation of SDGs ⑤ Promoting inter-Korean human rights dialogue and technical cooperation ⑥ Building a the national consensus on upholding human rights in North Korea ⑦ Increasing international cooperation to improve human rights in North Korea ⑧ Strengthening the implementation mechanisms on North Korean human rights

The government worked hard to ensure that the launch of the North Korean Human Rights Foundation could substantially improve human rights in North Korea and help develop inter-Korean relations in the process, thereby creating a virtuous cycle. It prepared assiduously for the launch of the foundation while seeking out the advice of experts (Apr. 9), securing a budget for its operation, and supplementing a plan of operation.

The government listened to advice from experts and held meetings to establish policies that would effectively promote human rights in North Korea. It duly considered opinions from various angles in establishing and implementing its North Korea human rights policies. In October, it held the international seminar “Promoting North Korean Human Rights Through Peace and Cooperation,” during which human rights experts

delivered presentations and had in-depth discussions on comprehensive approaches to peace on the Korean Peninsula, the development of inter-Korean relations, and the improvement of North Korean human rights.

The government strove to expand the public consensus on its policies to improve human rights in North Korea. It published and distributed the book *Learning About North Korean Human Rights 2021* to help the public understand issues surrounding North Korean human rights and develop a balanced perspective. It also provided English translations of the text to help foreign governments and international NGOs better understand the issues. In response to the COVID-19 situation, the government actively expanded its promotion efforts virtually by holding a talk concert in the form of a webinar, transmitting TV video content, and operating a portal for North Korean human rights.

2] Cooperation with the International Community and the Private Sector

The government is strengthening its cooperation with the international community and the private sector to substantially improve human rights in North Korea. To this effect, it is actively involved in the adoption of North Korean human rights resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly by coordinating policy, cooperating with countries that have similar positions on North Korean human rights, and supporting the UN's investigation into human rights in North Korea.

In particular, the government is actively cooperating with the various efforts of the UN, which plays an important role in improving human rights in North Korea. In the process of adopting the North Korean human rights resolutions at the 46th UN Human Rights Council and the plenary meeting of the 76th UN General Assembly, the government supported the adoption of the resolutions by consensus with the basic stance that it should work with the international community to substantially improve human rights in North Korea. The resolution adopted at the 76th UN General Assembly maintained the existing framework and understanding of the North Korean human rights situation while emphasizing matters of cooperation and accessibility regarding the transport of vaccines in response to COVID-19 by humanitarian aid organizations.

The resolution adopted at the 46th UN Human Rights Council also was the first to include language on concerns of continued violations of the human rights of repatriated prisoners of war and their descendants.

The government is also working with civil society organizations involved in North Korean human rights. As of the end of December 2021, 34 North Korean human rights organizations dedicated to improve human rights in North Korea were registered with the Ministry of Unification. They are expanding the purview of their activities into the realms of economic, social and cultural rights, human rights for vulnerable groups, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), civil and political rights. The government continued to pursue communication and cooperation with the private sector through its “Visiting and Communicating with North Korean Human Rights Organizations” program (12 times) and gathered opinions from experts on North Korean human rights. It also took various steps to raise awareness of its policies to improve human rights in North Korea, build a consensus on the need for such policies, and explore effective ways to substantially improve human rights in North Korea.

The government facilitated interactive dialogue (Mar. 12) among organizations dedicated to North Korean human rights, humanitarian assistance, and development to enable them to better understand and cooperate with each other. It also held two workshops on capacity building for North Korean human rights organizations and plans to hold more of such workshops to help address their difficulties and gather suggestions from them.



A workshop on capacity building for North Korean human rights organizations (Jun. 17–18)




A workshop on capacity building for North Korean human rights organizations (Oct. 6)

3 Managing the Center for North Korean Human Rights Records

(1) Overview

The Center for North Korean Human Rights Records (hereinafter referred to as “the Center”) was launched on September 28, 2016 to collect and record information with the aim of ascertaining and improving the human rights situation of North Korean people in accordance with the North Korean Human Rights Act. By focusing on grasping the overall human rights situation more accurately and accumulating records more systematically, it is implementing its mandates in accordance with the Act.

In 2021, the Center investigated the human rights situation in North Korea in compliance with international standards for such investigations and produced basic data for establishing policies on North Korean human rights. It conducted a survey on the overall human rights situation in North Korea through questionnaires and in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors and handwrote the defectors’ statements on specific cases of human rights violations in North Korea at the Settlement Support Center for North Korean Refugees (hereinafter referred to as “Hanawon”). The findings of the survey are managed according to the regulations on security and personal information protection, and the original documents of the investigation are transferred to the Ministry of Justice at the end of each quarter, in accordance with the applicable laws.



The investigation into North Korean human rights covers the overall human rights situation including both *Civil and Political rights (Civil Liberties)* and *Economic, Social, and Cultural rights (Social Rights)*. *Civil Liberties* include the right to life, liberty, security, freedom of movement, privacy, freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. *Social Rights* include the right to food, health, work, and education. The investigation also looked into the human rights situation of vulnerable groups (including women, children, and the disabled), POWs, abductees, and separated families in North Korea. The Ministry of Unification annually formulates the *Report on the Status of Improvement of Human Rights Protection in North Korea* and presents it to the National Assembly based on the findings of the investigations.

(2) The research and records of North Korean human rights

In 2021, the Center conducted a survey on the human rights situation in North Korea with 80 defectors. The survey sample was made up of 67 North Korean defectors (39 female defectors and 28 male defectors) admitted to Hanawon in 2021 and 13 North Korean defectors who had settled into South Korean society before 2021. Females accounted for 63.8% of the total sample, and Yanggang Province and North Hamgyeong Province accounted for 56.3% of the defectors' regions of origin. The investigation documented 65 specific cases of human rights violations and the original documents of the survey were transferred to the North Korean Human Rights Documentation Office of the Ministry of Justice at the end of each quarter, in accordance with the North Korean Human Rights Act.



Quarterly Survey Subjects and Records

Category	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Total
Subjects (persons)	28	31	18	3	80
Records (cases)	26	24	12	3	65

The Center compiles an annual report on North Korean human rights by consolidating the findings of the survey. In December 2021, it wrote the *Report on the North Korean Human Rights Situation* based on the 2020 investigation findings and distributed it to

the appropriate ministries and UN agencies.

The Center also commissioned studies including “An In-depth Study on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in North Korea” and “A Study on Legislation Regarding North Korean Human Rights in Consideration of International Covenants on Human Rights.”

(3) Systemizing the investigation and records of North Korean human rights

In 2021, the Center worked to establish and develop its system of investigating North Korean human rights, including its investigation methods, the progress of its investigations, and its record management practices.

Taking the survey findings of the past four years into account, the Center continued to devise investigation procedures and survey questions for each right after receiving advice from experts. It also streamlined the complicated classification system for each right in line with the international covenants on human rights. The Center securely managed the collected information about North Korean human rights through its Comprehensive Information System on North Korean Human Rights. It improved its records system with the data it has accumulated so that it can be more efficiently compared and analyzed.

The Center managed the Advisory Group for Investigation into North Korean Human Rights consisting of 10 experts, including academics and legal professionals, for its investigations into North Korean human rights. It also remains in close consultation with human rights experts (at home and abroad). To remain dedicated to its task of investigating and documenting matters regarding North Korean human rights, it established a cooperative system with the relevant agencies including the Ministry of Justice and the National Police Agency. In addition, through ongoing interactions and a joint workshop, it has strengthened its cooperation with the North Korean Human Rights Documentation Office of the Ministry of Justice and the United Nations Human Rights Office in Seoul.



A joint workshop on North Korean human rights with the relevant agencies (Nov. 29)



A briefing session with the United Nations Human Rights Office in Seoul (Dec. 17)

04

Inter-Korean Dialogue

- I – Pursuing Inter-Korean Dialogue
- II – Strengthening the Capacity for Inter-Korean Dialogue



Chapter

4

Inter-Korean Dialogue

In 2021, North Korea kept its border with China closed due to COVID-19. In the first half of the year, inter-Korean liaison channels remained disconnected as they had been since June 2020. Amid such difficulties, the government did what it could to prepare for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.

To encourage such dialogue, the government emphasized the need to restore inter-Korean dialogue to North Korea on several occasions, focused on creating favorable conditions for dialogue, and consistently reiterated its intent to implement the agreements made between the two Koreas. Although inter-Korean dialogue had been cut off, the government sought to restore inter-Korean communication lines through the exchange of handwritten letters between the leaders of the two Koreas, and finally the communication lines were reconnected on July 27, a year and one month after their suspension.

The government has strived to prepare for inter-Korean dialogue. It built an inter-Korean video conference room to ensure that inter-Korean dialogue could continue despite COVID-19. In an effort to connect it with North Korea, it proposed to North Korea the establishment of the inter-Korean video conference system. It even conducted a training simulation based on assumptions of how the conference would be held, held a forum on inter-Korean negotiations, and worked hard to build expertise through consultations with experts. The government also pursued various projects to mark the 50th anniversary of inter-Korean dialogue, including a ceremony and an academic forum.

Section

1

Pursuing Inter-Korean Dialogue

In the first half of 2021, the government held firm to its policy of creating the conditions for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. First, it urged North Korea to come to the dialogue table with an agenda of cooperation for building a community of peace, security, and life.” Such an agenda was first presented to them in 2020. At the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, North Korea stated that South Korea’s proposal was a non-essential matter. Nonetheless, President Jae-in Moon tried to seek a new breakthrough for inter-Korean dialogue while emphasizing in his New Year’s address and in a press conference that working together to respond to COVID-19 can develop into cooperation in matters directly involving the safety and survival of South Korea and North Korean people. He also emphasized his willingness to meet Chairman Jong-un Kim anytime and anywhere. Unification Minister In-young Lee, at a ceremony marking the third anniversary of the April 27, 2018 Panmunjeom Declaration, also delivered a message that he is willing to talk with North Korea anytime, anywhere, and regardless of any level of formality. Minister Lee continued to work hard to secure international support for resuming dialogue while building a consensus on the impor-




A ceremony marking the third anniversary of the April 27 Panmunjeom Declaration of (Apr. 27)



Unification Minister Lee’s meeting with US Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim (June 22)

tance of resuming inter-Korean dialogue and the need for close consultations between South Korea and the United States. He emphasized such matters when he met key foreign figures including US Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim.

These efforts led to the restoration of inter-Korean communication lines on July 27. From April until then, the leaders of the two Koreas communicated about the issue of restoring inter-Korean relations several times while exchanging written letters. In the process, they agreed to restore the communication lines that were severed after the demolition of the inter-Korean liaison office



Opening call at the inter-Korean joint liaison office on July 27 (currently in the Seoul Government Complex)

by North Korea in June 2020. As a result, all liaison and military communication lines were restored a year and one month after the demolition.

However, North Korea condemned the ROK-US joint military exercises that began in early August and did not respond to South Korea's call a mere 14 days after the lines were restored. In September, North Korea heightened tensions by test firing a variety of missiles including a cruise missile, a ballistic missile, and a train-based ballistic missile. Nonetheless, the government held firm to its position of stable management of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. President Moon, in his keynote speech at the 76th UN General Assembly on September 21, called for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue and dialogue between North Korea and the United State, proposing the end-of-war declaration once again. North Korea responded in an unusual manner to South Korea's proposal: it issued statements in the name of Yo-jong Kim, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, on September 24 and 25. Then, in his speech at the 5th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) on September 29, North Korean leader Jong-un Kim expressed his willingness to restore the liaison lines in early October, and the inter-Korean communication lines were restored once again on October 4. Since then, the government has maintained a stable operation of the communication lines, but this did not lead to resumption of official talks including the holding of inter-Korean dialogue.

Strengthening the Capacity for Inter-Korean Dialogue

1 Establishing the System for Inter-Korean Dialogue

Despite the COVID-19 restrictions on face-to-face meetings, the government strove to establish an environment and system conducive to inter-Korean dialogue. First, to secure the space for dialogue, it built an inter-Korean video conference room on April 26 and installed equipment for its operation.

On July 29, shortly after the inter-Korean liaison lines were restored on July 27, the government sent North Korea a message proposing the establishment of an inter-Korean video conference system. North Korea didn't respond to the proposal, and the systems between the two Koreas remained disconnected. Nevertheless, South Korea is fully prepared for immediate connection of the systems as soon as North Korea responds.

The government also came up with a plan to operate “safe face-to-face meetings” to ensure that face-to-face meetings are possible even amid the COVID-19 situation.



Establishing a video conference room and holding a briefing session for the press corps (Apr. 26)



A video conference simulation by the Minister of Unification (Jun. 16)

Considering the level of preventative measures taken for social contact and the venue for meetings, it categorized potential talks into three types: talks in neutral areas (completely non-contact), talks in South Korea's area (minimized contact), and talks in North Korea's area (safe zone). It then formulated preventative measures and plans to advance all these types of talks.

2] Fully Preparing for Inter-Korean Dialogue and Building Expertise in Inter-Korean Dialogue


The government made various efforts to ensure that inter-Korean talks could be held at any time. It monitored the process by conducting training simulations based on assumptions on how such talks would be held. It strove to maintain its expertise by preparing materials on measures for the talks and content to be discussed for each agenda item. To enhance its expertise in negotiations, the government sought various opinions from a policy advisory committee consisting of experts of various fields and a non-standing advisory committee consisting of elder statesmen in inter-Korean dialogue. Based on the opinions it received, it formulated a strategy for the talks and developed plans to implement agreements in each area of concern.

To develop its capacity for negotiations and improve the creative abilities of the working-level officials in charge of inter-Korean dialogue, the government held research forums on negotiations a total of ten times. The forums featured special lectures and discussions by experts in inter-Korean negotiations and those experienced in inter-Korean dialogue. They also included presentations of research topics by practitioners in charge of each meeting.

3] Marking the 50th Anniversary of Inter-Korean Dialogue and Improving Communication with the Public

The government continued to exert its efforts in building a public consensus on North Korea policy and keeping the public informed of the results of inter-Korean dialogue. It marked the 50th anniversary of inter-Korean dialogue, which began with a meeting

between Red Cross delegates from the two Koreas on August 20, 1971, by carrying out various projects: a ceremony and academic forum called “50 Years of Inter-Korean Dialogue—The Path Taken, The Future to Open Up” (Sept. 1); an exhibition of historical records and photos regarding inter-Korean dialogue (Aug. 9–Sep. 8 at Seoul Station, City Hall Station, Jonggak Station, and Jongno 3-ga Station); and a mock inter-Korean dialogue contest for college students (Nov. 13).




An exhibition of digital posters at a subway station (Aug. 9–Sep. 8, Seoul Station)



A ceremony and academic forum marking the 50th anniversary of inter-Korean dialogue (Sept. 1)

In addition, the government held a briefing session on inter-Korean dialogue. It also published an English version of *South-North Dialogue in Korea* (No. 78) (Sept.) and the photobook *50 Years of Inter-Korean Dialogue* (Oct.), distributing the publications to the relevant institutions and experts (at home and abroad). At the same time, the government strove to improve its communication with the people on the issues pertaining to unification.



Publishing the English version of *South-North Dialogue in Korea* (No. 78)



Publishing the photobook *50 Years of Inter-Korean Dialogue*



A mock inter-Korean dialogue contest for college students (Nov. 13)

05

Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors

- I – Arrivals of North Korean Defectors in South Korea
- II – Social Orientation Programs for North Korean Defectors
- III – Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors in Their Initial Period
- IV – Settlement Support for the Livelihood of North Korean Defectors
- V – Establishing a Cooperative System of Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors

북한이탈주민 취업지원강화 업무협약식(MOU)

일시 | 2021. 6. 22. (화) 11:00 장소 | 본관 소회의실(2층)



Section

5

Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors

With its goal of providing settlement support for the social integration of North Korean defectors, the government established the Third Master Plan for Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors (2021-2023) and set forth 24 tasks in six areas in 2021. It also formulated and carried out an implementation plan for the master plan and continued to work to make its policies more effective by improving the settlement support system.

The government held firm to the principle that it should accept all North Korean defectors who seek the protection and support of the Republic of Korea. After entering the country, North Korean defectors undergo questioning to determine whether protection is warranted, and if they do warrant protection, they undergo a period of social orientation at the Hanawon before receiving settlement support. Once they become part of South Korean society, the central and local governments, the Korea Hana Foundation, regional adaptation centers (Hana Centers), and NGOs all provide support to them in a coordinated way for the sake of their employment, asset-building, and education.

In 2021, 63 North Korean defectors entered South Korea, 72.5% fewer than the 229 who entered in 2020. This huge decline was largely driven by the global response to COVID-19: North Korea tightened its border with China, and restrictions on movement were put in place in countries that defectors usually travel to before entering South Korea. Additionally, some of the education provided at the Hanawon and Hana Center and some programs at the Cultural Center for Inter-Korean Integration and the Korea Hana Foundation were conducted through non-face-to-face means in response to the COVID-19 situation. The government provided emergency funds for living expenses and anti-epidemic items to particularly vulnerable groups among the defector community, including senior citizens who live alone, single-parent families, medical patients, children, and young people.

To expand protections for defectors, the government amended the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act (Apr. 20, Aug. 17, and Dec. 21). First, it provided protection to North Korean defectors who entered South Korea after living

overseas for more than 10 years. Additionally, to help North Korean defectors find work, it specified in the law such provisions as cooperation among relevant institutions for the vocational training and job placement of North Korean defector, and public institutions' preferential purchase of goods produced by exemplary business owners who employ North Korean defectors, as defined in the Enforcement Decree of the Act. In 2021, the government increased benefits for the elderly, children of single-parent families, and the raising of children born in a third country. It also increased the financial incentives for hiring defectors.

To provide substantial support to the vulnerable groups, the government, the Korea Hana Foundation, and the regional Hana centers worked together to offer support by conducting a survey of vulnerable North Korean defector groups. The survey began in the second half of 2019 and was carried out twice in the first and second half of 2021. Meanwhile, the government provided emergency funds for living expenses and medical costs to those North Korean defectors who had pressing needs that were not addressed by the welfare system.

To better protect female defectors, the government expanded its educational initiatives to prevent harm from sexual violence, and it also provided healing and counseling services. The government also established a hotline at the Korea Hana Foundation for 24/7 counseling on settlement support. The hotline is connected to counseling services for victims of sexual assault at the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and counseling services on suicide prevention at the Ministry of Health and Welfare .

The government is implementing educational initiatives ranging from basic vocational education to education for professional certificates to improve the vocational competencies of North Korean defectors,. It is working hard to find decent jobs for defectors through cooperation among relevant institutions. It is also providing comprehensive support including training, consultation, and funding for those North Korean defectors who want to start a business or engage in farming in agricultural areas.

Furthermore, the government has made parallel efforts to induce the long-term employment of defectors and facilitate their settlement by increasing the number of beneficiaries of the Future Happiness Bankbook, an asset-building system for the defectors. In 2021, the Hanawon focused on “Participatory, Customized, and Practical Education” in response to a decline in the number of trainees.

Through the Follow-up Service Program, the government explored ways to help defectors assimilate into society more easily after completing the Hanawon program and

increased support for them with respect to employment, education, healthcare, housing, and living information. It expanded the function of the Vocational Training Center at the Hanawon as a comprehensive employment support center, and it also rendered various types of assistance, including basic vocational training and career design, in cooperation with local governments, job foundations, and the Korea Hana Foundation. In July 2021, the Hanawon moved the Mental Health Clinic from the Vocational Training Center to a larger facility on the first floor and the first basement floor of the main building to make the clinic easier to visit.

The government built a health database of physical examination data of North Korean defectors admitted to Hanawon. In cooperation with universities and hospitals, it produced leaflets about pregnancy and giving birth and also published and distributed the casebook *North Korean Defectors Met at the Doctor's Office*. Considering the gender ratio of the defectors, it expanded and opened an obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) clinic called the “Women’s Health Center” in August 2021.

The Hanadul School at Hanawon manages a kindergarten class, an elementary school class, and a class for youth. It also offers a special Korean language class to improve communication competency in Korean for those students born in a third country. It offers supplementary classes during vacations periods or in the middle of the semester to further develop the basic scholastic abilities of defector students after they complete the Hanawon program. The school is working to help North Korean defector children and students without families adapt to society through a deliberation committee that supports North Korean youth defectors without families.

The government continued to administer programs to raise awareness about North Korean defectors and enhance the understanding and communication between South Koreans and defectors. It opened the Cultural Center for Inter-Korean Integration on May 13, 2020 to provide a place for cultural communication and exchange to take place between defectors and South Koreans. The cultural center is sponsoring more events and content through non-face-to-face means in response to the COVID-19 situation. In 2021 especially, it actively made good use of online promotional media. On YouTube, it aired the ceremony marking the first anniversary of the Cultural Center for Inter-Korean Integration in a live broadcast (May 13) as well as celebratory performances by artists from South and North Korea. The government also held a special week of events to spread content on cultural integration between South and North Korea (Oct. 25-30).



The Settlement Support Process for North Korean Defectors

Request for protection and transfer to South Korea

- Upon request for protection, the government issues a report and notifies the relevant ministries including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- The government accommodates defectors in foreign diplomatic offices or temporary shelters in host countries
- The government negotiates with the host country and facilitates the immigration of defectors to South Korea after verifying their identities

Entering South Korea

Investigation and temporary protection

- Upon entry, the National Intelligence Service questions defectors to decide whether to grant them protection and temporary protection including medical treatment
- After questioning them, the government transfers defectors to the custody of Hanawon, the education center for social adaptation

Decision on protection

- The government decides whether to grant the defectors protection through a deliberation process by the Consultative Council on Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors who make a decision for each household

Preparation for settlement at Hanawon

- Defectors undergo training for social adaptation (12 weeks, 400 hours)
 - The training prioritizes psychological well-being, better understanding of South Korean society, career guidance, basic vocational training, etc
- Settlement support: family relations registry, arrangement of housing, and support for settlement benefits and incentives

Transfer to place of residence

Residence support (five years)

- Social safety net: livelihood and medical benefits
- Vocational support: employment subsidy, vocational training free of charge, certification of qualifications, etc
- Educational support: special admissions, transfers to schools, and financial support for tuition
- Protection officers: community services (local governments), employment (employment centers), and personal protection (police stations)

Non-governmental participation

- Comprehensive services to North Korean defectors through the Korea Hana Foundation
- Designation and management of 25 regional adaptation centers
- Management of volunteer settlement assistants
- Professional counselors for North Korean defectors (86 persons)
 - General counseling services and visits to handle problems on-site

Section

1

Arrivals of North Korean Defectors in South Korea

In 2021, 63 North Korean defectors entered South Korea, a 72.5% reduction from 229 in 2020. By the end of 2021, the total cumulative number of North Korean defectors entering the country reached 33,815. Of these, 24,340 were female, accounting for 72% of all defectors. By age, those in their 30s represented 28.7% (9,702), the highest percentage of any age group. Those in their 20s and 30s accounted for 57.1% (19,292). By occupation, the unemployed/caregivers accounted for 44.9% (15,167), and workers accounted for 39.6% (13,369). These two groups alone represented 84.5% (28,536) of the total defector population. In terms of educational attainment, middle and high school graduates accounted for 69.4% (23,447) of all defectors, followed by community college graduates at 10.4% (3,529), and university graduates or postgraduates at 6.9% (2,332). By region of origin, North Hamgyeong Province accounted for 58.7% (19,837), followed by Yanggang Province at 17.8% (6,005) and South Hamgyeong Province at 8.5% (2,880). (For more, refer to Appendix II-6 Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors).



North Korean Defectors Entering South Korea (2012–2021)

(Unit: Person)

Category	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Male	404	369	305	251	302	188	168	202	72	40
Female	1,098	1,145	1,092	1,024	1,116	939	969	845	157	23
Total	1,502	1,514	1,397	1,275	1,418	1,127	1,137	1,047	229	63
Percentage of female defectors	73%	76%	78%	80%	79%	83%	85%	81%	69%	37%

(부록 II-6. 북한이탈주민 정착지원 현황 참조)

Social Orientation Programs for North Korean Defectors

1 Social Orientation Programs

In 2021, 87 North Korean defectors completed social orientation programs at the Hanawon, a sharp decline from 538 in 2020. After entering South Korea, defectors take part in a basic social orientation program at Hanawon to become members of the South Korean community. The orientation consists of regular programs centered on emotional stability, health care, better understanding of South Korean society, career guidance, job search, and guidance for early settlement support. Optional supplementary programs include language study and driving.



Number of Defectors Who Completed Social Orientation Programs in 2021

(Unit: Person)

Category	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May.	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Completed	14	2	18	1	10	-	16	12	-	-	2	12	87
Male	11	1	3	-	1	-	5	11	-	-	1	8	41
Female	3	1	15	1	9	-	11	1	-	-	1	4	46

In 2021, the Hanawon gathered opinions from experts, North Korean defectors who completed the Hanawon program, and trainees and then took their perspectives into consideration when developing the educational programs at the Hanawon. In addition, the government offered a “participatory, customized, and practical education” as well as a “follow-up service program” for defectors who completed the Hanawon program to help them settle into society as quickly as possible. By reorganizing social orientation

programs, it offered a 12-week regular program (400 hours) in five areas and optional supplementary programs (371 hours). In addition, the Hanawon invited the trainees who completed the Hanawon program and provided them with advanced courses in each subject.

Regular Social Orientation Programs at Hanawon		
Emotional stability and health care (28 hours) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mental care • Prevention of drug addiction and tuberculosis • How to care for one's health and physical activities 	Inclusive education from the perspective of gender equality (17 hours) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women's rights and gender equality • Education on the prevention of sexual violence and sex trafficking 	Career guidance and the job search (204 hours) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aptitude tests and career guidance • Basic vocational training for adapting to society • A program for IT literacy
12 weeks 400 hours		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education on adapting to the market economy and the language used in South Korea • Life as a consumer and the social security system • Field experiences and an understanding of human rights 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Settlement support system • Introduction to support workers in charge of personal protection • A questionnaire survey and training evaluation 	
Better understanding of South Korean society (106 hours)	Support for early settlement (45 hours)	

※ Optional, supplementary program (371 hours): Language, driving, computer, craft classes, parenting education, etc

2] Education on Understanding South Korean Society

To help trainees better understand South Korean society, the Hanawon carries out various programs on democratic citizenship, adapting to the market economy, adapting to the language, and social awareness.

It also provides education on a wide range of issues including abiding by the law, life as a consumer, the social security system, prevention of fraud, human rights, and prevention of violence, which are all necessary for them to learn about, so they can function as productive members of society. Hanawon has incorporated education on sexual violence prevention and sex trafficking into its education program on women's rights and

gender equality, as specified in the Framework Act on Gender Equality.

Language adaptation education is particularly important for North Korean defectors. The Hanawon’s language adaptation program addresses the basics of language adaptation— learning vocabulary and phrases; getting along with South Korean people; learning standard speech; overcoming obstacles to enter society; and correcting pronunciation and intonation. Basic courses are connected to intensive courses for each subject. In particular, the Hanawon set up the Counseling Room for Korean Language Learning and the Korean Language Lab, offering one-on-one language coaching for those trainees who want to adjust their North Korean-style of speaking, pronunciation, and intonation. To encourage self-directed learning instead of rote memorization, the government published the supplementary textbook *Linguistic Life, Native and Chinese Words*. It also organized the “2021 Visiting Korean Class” for North Korean defectors who completed the Hanawon program and carried out the “Understanding of Grammatical Rules” program for college students and workers and the “Mom Reading a Book to Children” program for infants and toddlers.

3 Operation of the Vocational Training Center and Career Guidance

Hanawon manages a Vocational Training Center to help North Korean defectors develop their vocational capabilities and become financially independent. The four-story building opened on June 24, 2020 and houses a computerized testing room for national technical certificates, classrooms and labs for each type of occupation, and a job café for the defectors’ self-study and job search. While providing vocational training, it conducted a survey on the defectors’ occupational preferences and gathered advice from career counselors. Based on the findings of the survey, the Hanawon selected 22 occupations, provided job descriptions for them, and organized various courses including basic vocational training and career design programs, thereby offering customized career guidance.

In the initial period after entering Hanawon, the government conducts an occupational psychological test to learn about the occupational interests and aptitudes of each defector. Based on the results, the government provides career counseling on a regular basis, and once defectors choose their preferred occupation, it conducts intensive training

after dividing the trainees into classes for qualifications and an advanced class for occupations. To increase the vocational skills of defectors, the government works with the Human Resources Development Service of Korea to ensure that trainees can acquire national technical certificates in ten fields (Korean cuisine, Western cuisine, Chinese cuisine, Japanese cuisine, hairdressing, nail art, makeup, confectionary, baking, and skin care) from training courses at the Hanawon. In 2021, it offered basic courses to trainees on Korean cuisine, skin care, hairdressing, and Information Technology Qualification (ITQ) in HWP (Hangul Word Processor).

As part of the efforts to improve the employment competencies of trainees who complete the Hanawon program, the government invited them to four intensive courses including Korean cooking, baking, nail art, and ITQ in HWP and Excel. 28 out of 29 graduates (97%) received certificates of qualification in three courses (Korean cooking, baking and ITQ of HWP and Excel).



Bakery Course



ITQ Course

To help trainees better understand occupational fields in South Korean, the government produced the main textbook *Career and Occupation* and the supplementary textbooks *Employment Guide* and *A Glossary of Basic Vocational Training* that cover 22 occupations. It then distributed the textbooks to the trainees. The government also held an advisory council for the vocational training of North Korean defectors and a workshop with a guest lecturer. Through these efforts, the government presented the occupations that are suitable for North Korean defectors and have promising job prospects. It then collected in-depth opinions on the operation of the Vocational Training Center. The Hanawon Care Workers Training Center has been designated as an official training institution, and it plans to begin offering training for care workers.



A workshop on vocational training with a guest lecturer (Nov. 23)



The Hanawon Care Workers Training Center was designated as an official training institution (Nov. 26)

Meanwhile, the Hanawon signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Gyeonggi-do Job Foundation and the Korea Hana Foundation to provide employment support for trainees, and it also signed an MOU with Gangwon-do Office, the Gangwon-do Job Foundation, and the Korea Hana Foundation to increase job prospects and find places of employment for North Korean defectors.



A signing of an MOU among the Hanawon, the Gyeonggi-do Job Foundation and the Korea Hana Foundation (Apr. 9)



A signing of an MOU among the Hanawon, the Gangwon-do Office, the Gangwon-do Job Foundation, and the Korea Hana Foundation (Jun. 22)

4 Operation of the Hanadul School

The Hanadul School at the Hanawon provides customized education to children and young adults under the age of 24. The Ministry of Education has sent qualified teachers to the Hanadul School to provide education that is customized to the ages and ed-

educational levels of the students. The Hanadul School manages a kindergarten class, an elementary school class, and a class for youth and young adults. It also offers a special Korean language class to help students born in a third country improve their Korean. As part of its efforts to improve education for kindergarteners, it developed its own educational content including home study materials for basic courses and a package of games in consideration of the students' interests, academic motivation, developmental characteristics, and language ability.

Through two rounds of meetings of the deliberation committee for support for North Korean youth defectors without families, the government carried out various programs to help such individuals assimilate into South Korean society. The Korea Hana Foundation held a briefing session for defector students without families to ensure prompt support for them in local communities after they complete the Hanawon program. The education forum for the Hanadul School (which was held three times in 2021) improved the expertise of teachers and staff members, explored ways to conduct peace and unification education, and sought out ways for defector students to enter higher education institutions and pursue careers.

5] Operation of the Hana Clinic

The Hanawon's Hana Clinic manages the health of North Korean defectors. This primary care institution is staffed by 25 medical specialists, including doctors and nurses, to manage the health of defectors at the initial period of entry. The Hana Clinic in Anseong has six departments: family medicine, dentistry, oriental medicine, OB/GYN, pediatrics, and psychiatry. The Hana Clinic in Hwacheon has four departments: internal medicine, dentistry, oriental medicine, and psychiatry.

In 2021, the Hana Clinic hired a family doctor to enhance the clinic's medical services, expanded its treatment facilities by installing additional spaces (such as a changing room and a waiting room for an OB/GYN's office), opened a Women's Health Center, and pursued various projects to improve the health of defectors and provide medical support.

First, the government operated a health promotion program customized to the need of individual trainees during their stay at Hanawon. It also conducted the InBody test (body composition analysis) for all trainees admitted to Hanawon. Based on the test

results for weight, degree of obesity, skeletal muscle mass, blood pressure, blood sugar, total cholesterol levels, etc., it offered advice to defectors on personalized management of eating habits and exercise routines.

Second, the government conducted a project for case management and health support for those trainees who completed the Hanawon program and need medical care, including patients with chronic conditions. The medical staff at the Hana Clinic monitored the health of those in need of monthly medical care for a year after completing the Hanawon program and established a medical support system with Hana centers and hospitals nationwide to improve their health management so they could recover from their ailments in their initial stage of settlement.

Third, in 2021, the government pursued a public-private project with three institutions for medical assistance and better understanding of North Korean defectors. It worked with the Graduate School of Techno Design (TED) at Kookmin University to develop and produce leaflets about pregnancy and childbirth customized for pregnant women and women of childbearing age. It then distributed the leaflets to all Hana centers nationwide. It worked with the College of Nursing at Ewha Womans University to pursue education training at the Hana Clinic to improve understanding of North Korean defectors. It also worked with the National Cancer Center to jointly publish the casebook *North Korean Defectors Met at the Doctor's Office* based on treatment experiences (Dec. 15) and distributed it to cooperative hospitals.


In addition, the government developed five leaflets (tuberculosis, guide for how to use a hospital, 10 rules of health management, dental health, and female health) in consideration of the health characteristics of North Korean defectors and is using the leaflets as learning materials for health education.



Opening the Women's Health Center
(Aug. 24)



Publishing leaflets about pregnancy and
childbirth (Oct. 13)



Publishing the casebook
*North Korean Defectors
Met at the Doctor's Office*
(Dec. 15)

6] Operation of the Mental Health Clinic

For mental health support, the Hanawon offers psychiatric services, individual counseling, group counseling, and educational programs for psychological and emotional stability to help support defectors with emotional difficulties. After entering Hanawon, all trainees undergo a psychological assessment (BPSI-NKR) and individual counseling. These processes help the defectors maintain psychological stability in their initial entry period. The Hanawon periodically offers trainees psychological treatment, so they can focus on their coursework while resolving their emotional challenges. The educational programs for psychological stability introduce selfcare management so that the trainees can manage their mental health themselves in their everyday lives.

For those who need more mental health support after completing the Hanawon program, the government ensures that the defectors receive the necessary treatment at local medical institutions and/or psychological counseling centers through a network of professional psychologists at 25 Hana centers nationwide. To this end, it is also working with the Korea Hana Foundation.

The Hanawon implemented three new projects in 2021.

First, to improve its overall facilities, it relocated the Mental Health Clinic and opened four personal treatment rooms (one for psychiatric treatment and three for psychological counseling) and three group activity rooms (group counseling, sand play therapy, and play therapy), carefully considering the function of each room (Jul. 13).

Second, by facilitating the suicide prevention educational program “Seeing, Hearing, and Speaking for North Korean Defectors,” which was developed based on research conducted in 2020, the Hanawon produced 51 lecturers on suicide prevention in four sessions. This has done much to improve the social safety net for mental health and psychological support for North Korean defectors in local communities. The Hanawon suspended its psychological assessment of North Korean defectors (BPSI-NKR) that was developed in 2008, and in consideration of the current circumstances, has developed a new psychological assessment for North Korean defectors (MHI-NKR) that comprehensively assesses the severity of mental health crises and the level of wellness of defectors. It will be used in practice in 2022.

Third, the Hanawon signed an MOU on mental health support with the Korean Academy of Meditation in Medicine (Aug. 11) and invited North Korean defectors to

operate a meditation program for mental health, thus helping them master meditation techniques in everyday life and care for their mental health.

With the National Center for Mental Health, the Hanawon prepared 12 mental health rules for North Korean defectors and produced a 2022 Table Calendar that included such rules. It distributed the calendars to 25 Hana centers and the relevant institutions nationwide, thus helping the defectors manage their mental health in their everyday lives.



Suicide prevention lecturing training program (Nov. 17)



A meditation program for mental health



Counseling room at the Mental Health Clinic




A 2022 Table Calendar that includes rules for mental health

7 Operation of the Hwacheon branch office

(1) Intensive & in-service education

The Hwacheon branch office in Hanawon offers social orientation classes for male North Korean defectors who have entered South Korea. The basic educational framework of the classes, including the curriculum and teaching hours, is the same as the Hanawon in Anseong. Yet, it also offers specialized programs including the “peace-planting program,” driving lessons, and driving practice with heavy equipment. The peace-planting program was created in 2020 for the sake of violence prevention and emotional stability. The basic educational materials for the program were prepared in 2021. Through regular workshops among the lecturers, the program at the Hwacheon branch office is becoming a specialized program.

To increase the effectiveness of violence prevention education, the Hwacheon branch office re-published *Law in Everyday Life for North Korean Defectors*, an educational resource published in 2020 as a comic book so that the defectors could understand the law in everyday settings more easily.



Publishing educational materials

Since it introduced a driving simulator in 2020 for driver’s license training, the pass rate of the driving course test surged from 63.7% before the introduction of the simulator to 97.1% in 2021. Over 97% of the trainees passed the driving course test upon completion of the training program. The trainees also were highly engaged and satisfied with the driving with heavy equipment training course that included operating an excavator and a forklift.

The Hwacheon branch office has been conducting on-the-job training for its working

staff members in charge of settlement support for North Korean defectors. In 2021, it began offering two courses: one for local government public officials and one for the Council for Protecting and Supporting North Korean Defectors. It increased the number of those designated as “support workers in charge of protecting North Korean defectors.” Considering the COVID-19 situation, the office flexibly managed the courses while running them in mainly a non-face-to-face setting, carrying out on-the-job training when necessary.



In-service Education in 2021

Course	Period		Note
Support workers in charge of protecting North Korean defectors	First	Jun. 15–18	In-person group training
	Second	Oct. 12–14	Two days of online education and one day of on-the-job training
	Third	Dec. 7–9	
Mentor teachers of North Korean defector students	First	Aug. 10–12	Online
The Council for Protection and Support for North Korean Defectors (new)	First	Oct. 28	Online
Local government public officials (new)	First	Jul. 29–30	Online
	Second	Nov. 9–11	Two days of online education and one day of on-the-job training

The Hwacheon branch office developed a healing program customized for North Korean defectors, has piloted it, and it is set for full operation in 2022. It supports psychological stability and helps restore family relationships for vulnerable groups including mothers, their children, and those aged 65 or older. In 2021, the office outsourced its program design and manual drafting to experts and renovated the Hanmaeum Peace Center, a space affiliated with the program.

As part of its efforts to support trainees who complete the Hanawon program, the Hwacheon branch office has launched *Hanasori*, a press corps of college students, to offer useful information to North Korean defectors including livelihood information, news about the Hanawon, and information about the law in everyday life. In 2021, the press corps published 30 news stories including 8 video stories and 15 text reports in “Hanasori”, the Hanawon newsletter.



A sign-hanging ceremony for the Hanmaeum Peace Center (Nov. 10)



Pilot operation of a healing program customized for North Korean defectors

(2) Peace and unification experiences of young students and education to raise awareness of North Korean defectors

In 2021, by taking advantage of its geographical location and of an educational institution specialized in North Korean defectors, the Hwacheon branch office administered peace and unification experience programs for young students who will play leading roles in the future of a unified Korea including an educational program to raise awareness about North Korean defectors (Nov. 3-9). Originally, it planned to invite students to the office, but due to COVID-19, the programs were operated as “Visiting Programs.” A total of 120 students from three schools in Hwacheon (Oeum Elementary School, Yuchon Elementary School, and Hwacheon Information Industry High School) participated in the programs. For their peace experience, the students visited sites along the Unification Walk course on the DMZ Peace Trail, including the Peace Dam in Hwacheon and Dutayeon Valley in Yanggu, and experienced the facilities, such as the Peace Dam and the Yanggu Unification Hall. The unification experience program was carried out in cooperation with the Center for Unified Korean Future, and resulted in positive responses from the students. The program to raise awareness about North Korean defectors involved inviting as a lecturer a North Korean defector who effectively managed to adapt to South Korea society so as to promote positive perceptions of North Korean defectors to help the students become the future generation for a unified Korea.



Peace and unification experience (Hwacheon Information Industry High School, Nov. 14)



Education to raise awareness about North Korean defectors (Oeum Elementary School, Nov. 8)

8 Implementing a Participatory, Customized, and Practical Education and a Follow-up Service Program

The Hanawon pursued a Participatory, Customized, and Practical Education and a Follow-up Service Program as priority projects to respond to changes in the environment, including the decline in the number of trainees. The educational programs were prepared from a North-Korean-defector-centered perspective: a “participatory education” to increase their understanding of South Korean society; a “customized education” for the different ages, aptitudes, specialties, and entry type of trainees; and a “practical education” to provide them with the motivation to become socially and financially independent. It also operated the Follow-up Service Program for North Korean defectors in their initial stage of settlement following their completion of the Hanawon program. The program explores the possibilities of supporting their social integration and improving such support in six areas: employment, education, health, child care, housing, and livelihood information.

The Hanawon center in Anseong established an employment support system. After acquiring national technical certificates through intensive vocational training at the Vocational Training Center, trainees can register as job seekers at the employment center and are then connected to employment centers, Hana centers, and job foundations in their places of residence.

The Hanawon also expanded cooperation with job-related institutions in regional bases of North Korean defectors to help them become self-supporting and settle into society.

For its educational services, the Hanawon in Anseong continued to operate programs to support graduates from the Hanadul School to adapt to local schools after reflecting on the opinions of North Korean defector parents and children. To make up for the lack of basic academic skills, it operated remedial classes during vacation periods or in the middle of the semester (4 times for 30 students). The Hanawon in Anseong also operated the “Hana teacher” system in which teachers who return from their services at Hanawon set up a time with graduates from the Hanadul School to offer counseling and career guidance. It held two meetings of a regional council for education support for North Korean defector students with the relevant institutions, including the Ministry of Education, and provided various means of support to help students adapt to local schools.

For child care, the Hanawon in Anseong learned about the difficulties of mothers with infants, a somewhat vulnerable group, through a child-rearing survey of North Korean defector mothers who completed the Hanawon program. Based on the findings, it strove to increase its support for infant care based on the perspectives of the defectors.



2021 Settlement Survey of Hanawon Graduates

Category	Period	Subjects	Contents
Survey	Jul. 16 – Sep. 30	193 defectors within one year of finishing the Hanawon program	The settlement process in one’s place of residence; perceptions of North Korean defectors; employment; and living and education at Hanawon
	Sep. 8 – 16		
Mothers of infants	Nov. 1 – 30	42 mothers of infants who completed the Hanawon program	Basic personal data; childcare support; social and emotional support

From the early stage of the outbreak of COVID-19, the Hanawon has done everything it could to prevent the spread of coronavirus and protect trainees. It provided masks, placed hand sanitizers and non-contact thermometers in classrooms and offices, and thoroughly complied with social distancing rules.

It also ensured that all visitors fill out questionnaires, pass through the full-body sterilizer, and check their temperatures. It purchased COVID-19 rapid test kits and helped trainees get vaccinated as soon as possible. It also thoroughly responded to the COVID-19 situation by drafting a manual of measures to take in the event of a confirmed COVID-19 diagnosis of a trainee or staff member.

Incremental, back-to-normal measures were taken in November 2021, and the Hanawon fully prepared for prevention measures including the introduction of the vaccine passport system for visitors.

Meanwhile, the Hanawon moved and expanded its human rights counseling office from the residence hall to the Vocational Training Center (May 3 - Aug. 11), thus ensuring that trainees could undergo investigations of human rights in a more comfortable environment.



Expanding the human rights counseling office

Section

3

Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors in Their Initial Period

1] Family Relations Registry and Housing Arrangements

The government assists North Korean defectors in registering with the family relations registry and as residents of South Korea so that they can enjoy full rights as South Korean citizens. In consideration of the distinct characteristics of North Korean defectors' household compositions, it revised the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act (promulgated on April 20, 2021 and enforced on October 21, 2021) to allow defectors to receive family relations certificates that include their brothers and sisters.

Upon completing the Hanawon program, defectors are assigned rental housing in their desired location of residence. The trainees at Hanawon can get information about places to live at a kiosk. The government works with public institutions, including the Korea Land & Housing Corporation and the Seoul Housing Corporation, to help them obtain housing easily.

2] Settlement Benefits

The government provides North Korean defectors with various settlement benefits to help them during the initial period of settlement. The settlement benefits consist of a certain amount of money necessary for their settlement in South Korean society for a certain period of time after completing the Hanawon program. They include basic settlement benefits, housing subsidies, additional benefits (depending on certain condi-

tions), incentives for stable employment, and employment subsidies for business owners who hire North Korean defectors.

The amount of the basic settlement benefit depends on the size of one's household. An initial payment is granted immediately upon completion of the Hanawon program, and the remainder is paid in three quarterly installments starting three months after the recipient moves to his or her residence. For housing subsidies, the government subsidizes the rental deposit required for the housing rental. To encourage residence outside of Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA), the government offers incentives for defectors to live and work in non-GSMA. The government grants additional benefits to the following vulnerable groups: senior citizens of an advanced age, the mentally or physically challenged, people undergoing long-term medical treatment, children of single-parent families, and children born in a third country. To help North Korean defectors become financially independent, the government grants various financial incentives to those who receive vocational training, obtain a certificate of qualification, and/or get a job. The government increased its employment incentives as of January 1, 2021. The incentives provided after three years of continuous work rose from KRW 16.5 million to KRW 18 million in GSMA and from KRW 19.5 million to KRW 21 million in non-GSMA.

Section

4

Settlement Support for the Livelihood of North Korean Defectors

1 Support for Financial Independence

(1) Vocational training

The government cleared the way for North Korean defectors to receive vocational training support funds more easily from the Tomorrow Learning Card System, a vocational training support system run by the Ministry of Employment and Labor in cooperation with the relevant ministries. It granted up to KRW one million to a total of 433 North Korean defector job seekers aged 18 or older for three online and in-person courses necessary to develop their competencies for employment. The courses involved foreign language testing, IT, civil service exams, national technical certification tests, and professional qualifying exams.

It also offered eight intensive vocational training courses through the Korea Hana Foundation, including courses for accountants, skin care specialists, care workers, dog beauticians, and a small construction machinery operator's license. Such fields of work have either been preferred by North Korean defectors or are considered to be the most promising for them.

The government also ran a youth employment academy for North Korean defector college students, offering customized vocational training with respect to age and gender and other services to help them find jobs.



Training for skin care specialists



Training for a small construction machinery operator's license of

Finally, the government administered a vocational training program, which included both online vocational training and short-term training, and provided employment vouchers to defectors. To expand the defectors' employment, facilitate their job search, and help them gain valuable work experience, it carried out a short-term training project to provide support funds for up to three months to trainees and enterprises that want to hire North Korean defectors. A total of 155 people completed training at 129 companies, and 153 people of them were hired.

(2) Employment support

The government offers comprehensive employment support services including personalized employment counseling, job placement, and follow-up management to North Korean defectors to improve their employment prospects and long term employment. Based on the expertise of employment counselors assigned to 25 Hana centers nationwide, it established a systematic employment support system for employer and job seeker registration, job placement, interviews accompanied by counselors, job competency reinforcement support, job matching and management, and follow-up management.



Employment Support by the Korea Hana Foundation and Hana Center in 2021

(Unit: Case)

Category	Job-seeker registration	Employer registration	Job matching	Interviews accompanied by counselors	Employment	Telephone counseling	In-person counseling
Total	1,871	2,260	1,892	452	1,506	18,154	6,900

<Source: The Employment Management System of the Korea Hana Foundation>

(3) Settlement support for self-reliant startups and farming

In order to help North Korean defectors become financially independent, the government has provided start-up counseling and education for those who want to start businesses. It provides step-by-step support, including individual management consulting and funds for improving business management, to early-stage entrepreneurs.

It has also provided funding support and internships to those who want to start businesses in such fields of work as clothing repair and nail art, which are directly related to everyday life. To nurture young entrepreneurs, it worked with the private organization Asan Nanum Foundation to operate the Asan Sanghoe startup program.

In the agricultural sector, the government has promoted the Successful Farming Settlement Package Program to help North Korean defectors who want to become farmers settle in agricultural areas. The program involves three weeks of theoretical education, one week of basic practical education, and up to nine months of practical farming in connection with leading farms for each crop.

To maximize the possibility of successful farms, it helps them rent farmland and subsidizes the purchase of fertilizer and agricultural chemicals once they begin farming in earnest. In cooperation with the Rural Development Administration, an advisory group composed of experts in farming offered consultations on growing crops to help ensure the success of North Korean defectors' farming practices and smooth settlement into agricultural areas.



Successful Farming Settlement Package Program

The government revised the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act to specify provisions for vocational training and job placement (Article 16) as

well as the preferential purchase of goods produced by exemplary employers who hire North Korean defectors (Article 17-5). Both articles were defined in the Enforcement Decree of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act, thus strengthening the foundation for increasing North Korean defectors' access to jobs.

(4) Future Happiness Bank Account

The Future Happiness Bankbook is a financial system designed to help defectors build their assets. It is for those who live for at least six months in their first places of residence, are within their protection period (five years), and have remained employed for at least three months. If the defectors save up to KRW 500,000 within 30% of their earnings every month, the government will match their savings and pay out the accumulated amount upon maturity.

The asset-building system has been in active operation since its establishment in 2015. In 2021, despite COVID-19, the system continued to make more and more payments at maturity due to the high participation by North Korean defectors.

The government amended the Enforcement Decree of the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act to allow business income earners, including the self-employed (in addition to the previously eligible wage-earners) to subscribe to a Future Happiness Bankbook. To minimize early termination and maximize the number of maturity beneficiaries, it included disability and study, as well as childbirth and military service, as reasons for extending the subscription period. It also eased the requirements for temporary suspension, thus helping more North Korean defectors become self-reliant.



Subscription to Future Happiness Bank Account

(Unit: Person)

Category	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Subscribers	10	182	380	458	510	559	406	2,505
Cases of payment at maturity	-	-	-	17	49	169	398	633

(5) Hiring North Korean defectors as public officials

In January 2013, to facilitate the employment of North Korean defectors in the government ministries and local governments, the government established guidelines for a plan to employ North Korean defectors within the government and has continued to encourage the employment of defectors as public officials. It has included the employment of North Korean defectors as an assessment index in the Personnel Management Innovation Diagnosis of Central Administrative Agencies conducted by the Ministry of Personnel Management; the Comprehensive Assessment of Local Governments conducted by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security; and the Management Assessment of Public Institutions conducted by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, thereby further encouraging government ministries to hire the defectors. As of the end of December 2021, 191 defectors were employed in central and local government organizations.

2] Educational Support for North Korean Youth Defectors

(1) Unification teachers and learning support

In 2021, the government placed 22 unification teachers at 26 schools with large numbers of North Korean defectors to support customized education for them. The unification teachers rendered support in individualized counseling and basic instruction in tandem with the home, school, and community to help young defectors ease into their new schools.

The government also helps defector children and the children of North Korean defectors study at home to improve their basic academic skills through individualized online English video education program, workbooks for tutoring at home, and mentoring. It also offers scholarships to defectors students, so they can develop their talents for the future of a unified Korea.

(2) Education support

The government runs a school for North Korean defector students that offers specialized education and vocational training for them, and it supports three accredited alternative schools and seven unaccredited alternative educational facilities for North Korean defector students.

Starting in 2021, the government has allowed the children born in South Korea to North Korean defectors to attend Hangeore Middle and High School, a specialized school for North Korean defector students, to expand their educational opportunities and support their families.

To provide practical educational opportunities to defector youths in diverse settings, it supports 14 after-school learning centers to help them make up for their lack of formal schooling.

(3) Support for educational guidance and nurturing global talents

North Korean defector youths who want to go to college are granted special admission, in accordance with the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act. Their tuition is subsidized by the Korea Hana Foundation in that they are exempt from all tuition fees at national and public colleges and 50% of tuition at private colleges. Children born in a third country can go to college through special admissions within a university quota, and if they go to college, the Korea Hana Foundation covers the tuition of their first semester through funding secured from private donations.

The government has made various efforts to support defector youths and their parents who find it difficult to consider career paths due to a lack of information and understanding of the college entrance system and academic subjects. In 2021, the Korea Hana Foundation formed a support group of outside experts on academic and career counseling, including former and current teachers with experience in academic and career counseling, for the defector youths and provided customized counseling online.

The government published sourcebooks and a handbook on 2022 special admission policies for North Korean defectors and distributed them to teachers and parents.



Sourcebooks and a handbook on 2022 special admissions for North Korean defectors

In 2021, the government designated six colleges with large numbers of North Korean defector students as *didimdol* (preliminary) universities to enhance defectors' academic aptitude and adaptability to college life. It also supported various educational and adaptation programs including those for languages and IT. To increase the global awareness and capabilities of North Korean defector college students, the government offers overseas training programs including English language study in Australia and scholarships for graduate students with the Fulbright Program that supports the attainment of Masters' and Ph.D. degrees. In 2021, such programs were suspended due to COVID-19. Instead, the government provided English video programs through foreign language educational institutions in South Korea.

(4) Support for youths without families

Youths without families are young people under the age of 24 without lineal ascendants at the time when the decision was made to grant them protection at the Hanawon after they entered South Korea. To provide them with a stable, protective environment, the government has designated them as objects of protection in cooperation with the relevant agencies and NGOs. It supports 13 group-home facilities so that they can receive emotional support in the same living environment as a family and ease into school life and society. It renders support in other ways including academic support, psychological counseling, educational support, rental housing, and support programs. In 2021, an amendment to the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act newly established the procedures for the designation of protectors and guardians, thus providing more systematic protections and support to youth without families.

3 Protecting Vulnerable Groups and Supporting Livelihoods

(1) Improving human rights protection

The government took various measures to expand the human rights protection of North Korean defectors. It amended the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act to grant protection to those North Korean defectors who entered South Korea after staying abroad for more than 10 years. It clarified that not only the central but also local governments should assume responsibilities for protecting and supporting North Korean defectors. The North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act specifies that inclusive education from the perspective of gender equality, in accordance with the Framework Act on Gender Equality, should be conducted at Hanawon. It also defined support for business startups and support for residential relocation to provide for the personal protection of North Korean defectors. The revised provisions took effect in June and July 2021, respectively.

The government is doing what it can to improve the human rights protection of female defectors. Hanawon recently expanded its educational initiatives to prevent harm from sexual assault as well as provide healing and counseling services. The Korea Hana Foundation set up a hotline (1577-6635) for 24/7 counseling on settlement support. The hotline is also connected to a counseling service for victims of sexual assault at the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and counseling on suicide prevention at the Ministry of Health and Welfare.

To strengthen the protection of vulnerable groups and help them adapt smoothly to South Korean society, the government increased additional benefits for them in 2021: raising the additional benefits for the elderly from KRW 7.2 million to KRW 8 million; for children born in a third country from KRW 4 million to KRW 4.5 million; and for children of single-parent families from KRW 3.6 million to KRW 4 million.

(2) Surveying and assisting vulnerable groups

As the COVID-19 situation has persisted, the government has rendered various forms of assistance through the Korea Hana Foundation, including emergency necessities, to the most vulnerable groups including senior citizens living alone, children of single-parent families, prison inmates, and released prisoners. Since the second half of

2019, it has conducted a survey of vulnerable groups of North Korean defectors and offered emergency livelihood and medical assistance to those whose needs have not been met by the welfare system and who were suffering from financial difficulties, disease, and/or social isolation. In addition to financial assistance, the government has also continued to provide counseling services through intensive case management, helping them resolve psychological difficulties.

Through six surveys of vulnerable groups from 2019 to 2021, the government provided customized assistance to 3,075 people on 4,641 occasions. It offers cash support for urgent needs through livelihood support (emergency funds for living expenses and medical assistance) through the Korea Hana Foundation and social security benefits (ensuring a basic standard of living, emergency welfare assistance, assistance for the “second-lowest income bracket,” assistance for the disabled, etc.) through local governments. To resolve psychological and emotional difficulties, it offers social services (educational guidance, career and employment, psychological counseling, legal support, all kinds of education, etc.) through Hana centers. The government will continue to make efforts to ensure that North Korean defectors are not neglected by the welfare system moving forward.

(3) Medical assistance

The government renders medical assistance to economically vulnerable groups (those who earn less than 120% of the median income). The Korea Hana Foundation covers medical costs up to KRW 2 million a year for general illnesses and up to KRW 7 million a year for organ transplants or severe illnesses. Patients with chronic, severe, and rare diseases; legal communicable diseases; and psychological illnesses receive more effective and timely assistance through a public healthcare system support project designed to facilitate claims for medical costs. As of the end of December 2021, the government was rendering assistance to North Korean defectors through MOUs with 65 hospitals nationwide, including St. Mary’s Hospital in Seoul and Chungnam National University Hospital.

The Korea Hana Foundation, in cooperation with the Korean Association of Medical Social Workers, ensured that North Korean defectors not only get the funds but also counseling on a wide range of public and private medical resources through medical

social workers assigned to 480 hospitals nationwide. Before receiving treatment, defectors can request medical assistance from the foundation by getting basic consultation from medical social workers at a hospital. If payment of assistance is decided upon, the foundation should pay the hospitals directly for the medical expenses.

(4) Support for livelihoods

Since 2011, the government has provided funds for emergency living expenses to North Korean defectors (families) who have become more vulnerable because of the weakening of the social support system and the economic base. It intends to lessen the social and financial burden of North Korean defectors and help them gain greater security. The Korea Hana Foundation has focused on supporting North Korean defectors who are overlooked by the welfare system by expanding assistance in their everyday lives. It locates those in need of emergency assistance and connects them to follow-up management support services in the 25 Hana centers nationwide. The targets of emergency assistance are among the vulnerable groups, including people with severe illnesses, members of broken families (those who have lost family members), heads of household without work (with consideration to such situations as single-parent families, multi-child families, and aging families), and released prisoners.

The Korea Hana Foundation provides basic necessities and gift certificates for the purchase of home appliances to North Korean defectors during the early period of their settlement immediately after completing the Hanawon program when the need to pursue training or hunt for jobs makes it difficult for them to work. It also offers them places at six shelters nationwide in case there is a delay in the provision of rental housing.

In early 2020, the Korea Hana Foundation provided emergency necessities to 1,056 people including senior citizens living alone. Then for three months starting in September 2021, it provided necessities to 1,000 people of vulnerable groups including the aged, households in crisis, and single-parent families. In 2021, it identified those suspected to be in crisis through a survey of vulnerable groups and offered emergency living funds to 728 people experiencing financial difficulties.

4] Raising Public Awareness of North Korean Defectors and Strengthening Communication

(1) Producing and spreading contents

To inform the public of the various projects of settlement support for North Korean defectors in an easy-to-understand way, the government developed diverse contents based on the features of each type of media through the Korea Hana Foundation. It promoted public advertisements on subways and radio commercials, operated a press corps on social media, and produced media content with North Korean defector creators. It thus strove to enhance the public's understanding of North Korean defectors through various media and build a consensus in the process.

Through a presentation contest of North Korean defector settlement cases (Oct. 28, aired live on YouTube), a talk concert with North Korean defectors, and a ceremony for the delivery of donations to vulnerable North Korean defector farmers, the government has worked hard to identify and promote the successful adaptation of North Korean defectors to South Korean society and improve the public's awareness of them.



A presentation contest of North Korean defector settlement cases (Oct. 28)



A ceremony delivering donations to North Korean defectors (Dec. 1)

It continues its online communication through four major social media outlets (blogs, Facebook, YouTube, and Plus Friend on Kakao Talk). To increase the convenience of the staff involved in settlement support and the public, it developed contents and programs for social integration education while also publishing and distributing various promotional materials including *Love for Compatriots*, a bimonthly newsletter.

Meanwhile, the Cultural Center for Inter-Korean Integration is producing and distributing various cultural contents on the integration of South and North Korea. These include the “Basic Course for the Integration of South and North Koreans” that aims to promote understanding of North Korea, North Korean defectors, prejudices, and conflicts while exploring solutions; *Line of Division, Jumping the Line Through Culture*, a performance to heal the pain caused by national division and pursue cultural harmony; *Knowing Regions with South and North Korean Friends*, a program in which North Korean defectors and local residents visit local attractions to understand culture and grasp historical culture; and *Free South and North Korea*, a talk show about South and North Korean culture in which a North Korean defector Youtuber talks with local residents. Local residents and North Korean defectors have participated in producing various cultural contents and sharing them via YouTube. To facilitate the cultural integration of South and North Korea, the government held “The Week to Spread the Contents on the Cultural Integration of South and North Korea” from October 25 to 30, 2021. During the week, various performances were held: *Gift from Phantom*, a musical about North Korean defectors’ psychological change during the process of settlement; *Until We Become One*, a vocal performance by vocalists from South and North Korea; and *Companion*, a theatrical performance depicting the process of understanding and sympathy between South and North Korean people. Many other events regarding communication and harmony between South and North Korean people were held at the main hall of the center, including a presentation contest on cultural and artistic activities in which South and North Korean people participated together.



Gift from Phantom, a musical (Oct. 16)



Vocal performance (Oct. 23)

(2) Expanding exchanges between North Korean defectors and local residents

Since its founding in 2015, a volunteer group of settlers in South Korea composed of North Korean defectors has been doing much to raise awareness that defectors are not only beneficiaries but also productive members of society through volunteer work for the disadvantaged in local communities. The government supports this volunteer group.

In 2021, the fifth class of the volunteer group (representing nine organizations) delivered COVID-19 quarantine kits to single-parent families and low-income families, along with North Korean defector students, in consideration of the spread of COVID-19.

The Cultural Center for Inter-Korean Integration expressed its support of four volunteer groups in which North Korean defectors and local residents participate together in order to spread the culture of sharing in local communities. The volunteer groups produced and delivered fairy tale books written in braille for the visually impaired (sharing hearts with them) and delivered lunch boxes of Hwanghae-do dishes on eight occasions to South and North Korean senior citizens living alone.



Volunteers sharing hearts (Oct. 16)



Volunteers sharing foods (Oct. 30)

(3) Operation of the Cultural Center for Inter-Korean Integration

The Cultural Center for Inter-Korean Integration, opened online on May 13, 2020 and has carried out various projects to help North Korean defectors and local residents communicate with each other directly or through cultural activities to facilitate the cultural integration of South and North Korea.

It staged a “life sharing dialogue between South and North Koreans,” in which participants met each other in person, shared life stories, and participated in various activities including calligraphy and crafts classes on a small scale, in compliance with COVID-19 guidelines. It also transformed some in-person programs, including yoga, meditation, and beauty classes, into virtual programs.

In 2021, the center aired a ceremony of its first anniversary and celebratory performances by South and North Korean artists on YouTube live (May 13). Additional events were held, including an exhibition of artwork by North Korean defectors, an exhibition of illustrated poems about peace and unification, and a volunteer drive to share foods.



Celebratory performances marking the first anniversary of the Cultural Center for Inter-Korean Integration (May 13)

The center operated display spaces in the Special Exhibition Hall and the Cultural Experience Hall to give the public easy access to information about North Korea and North Korean defectors. The exhibition halls addressed such matters as the pain of national division, efforts to heal such pain, North Korean defectors, and the future of a unified Korea. The experience hall also offered citizens an opportunity to experience various interesting aspects of the cultures of the two Koreas in virtual reality (VR) settings such as experiencing the hometowns of separated families; becoming a chef at

a restaurant in North Korea and making North Korean foods; archery practice in the square in front of the Grand People's Study House in Pyongyang; ecological exploration on the Dokdo islets; and practicing *tuho* (arrow throwing), a folk game, in front of Gyeongbok Palace in Seoul.



VR experience of the hometowns of separated families



VR experience of archery, ecological exploration, and *tuho*, a folk game

Establishing a Cooperative System of Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors

1 Enhancing the Roles of Local Governments and NGOs

The government carries out settlement support policies for North Korean defectors in cooperation with local governments and NGOs. The central government establishes and directs the pan-government settlement support system through the Consultative Council on Protection and Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors. In consultation with local governments, it designates Hana centers to conduct education, provide psychological counseling, and handle the job placement for North Korean defectors.


In cooperation with local governments and the relevant agencies, the government designates and manages support workers charged with assisting North Korean defectors with community services (local governments), personal protection (police stations), and employment (employment centers). It operates a regional council composed of public officials, support workers, and representatives of NGOs to provide the appropriate settlement support services for each region. Local medical institutions and religious groups also work together with the Korea Hana Foundation and Hana centers to help North Korean defectors become financially independent and assimilate into society.

(1) The Consultative Council on Protection and Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors

The Consultative Council on Protection and Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors was established to discuss and coordinate policy on North Korean defectors. It is chaired by the Vice Minister of Unification and composed of senior officials from 23 ministries and agencies. In 2021, it held a plenary meeting in the form of written com-

munication that was presided over by the Vice Minister of Unification. It established the Third Master Plan for Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors (2021-2023) and the 2021 implementation plan for the master plan.

It also frequently held subcommittee and working council meetings to discuss issues regarding the settlement of North Korean defectors with the relevant ministries.



(2) Regional councils for supporting North Korean defectors

The regional councils for supporting North Korean defectors consist of support workers for community services, personal protection, and employment; people from regional adaptation centers; and people from welfare and religious organizations. They are intended to build a cooperative network in communities and to effectively support the

settlement of North Korean defectors in their places of residence.

As of the end of December 2021, 137 regional councils were in place at the local government level, and local governments have established ordinances on such matters as settlement support for North Korean defectors and the operation of regional councils.

To make the support system for North Korean defectors more effective, the central government included the outcomes of support activities to help North Korean defectors settle in communities in its criteria for the assessment of local governments.

The government designates and manages officials at appropriate local agencies as staff members dedicated to facilitating the settlement of North Korean defectors. Support workers for community services (245 persons) at local governments help North Korean defectors report move-ins, apply for cost-of-living benefits, and receive medical care. Support workers for personal protection (900 persons) at police stations protect North Korean defectors from all kinds of crime. Support workers for employment (70 persons) at the Employment Support Center of the Ministry of Employment and Labor facilitate vocational training and job placement.

(3) Enhancing the role of NGOs in providing settlement support for North Korean defectors

The government hosted a contest for NGOs to encourage them to assume a greater role in helping North Korean defectors settle, and to this effect, it strove to ensure communication among NGOs. By doing so, the government supports those NGOs who aim to render such services as mentoring and psychological counseling, healing camps, and foreign language support for defectors' quick settlement and financial independence. It also supports small-group activities for communication and harmony between South and North Koreans, events dedicated to harmony between South and North Koreans, and talk concerts for inter-Korean integration. The government grants extra points to organizations headed by North Korean defectors when they apply to participate in the contest.

Meanwhile, the government carries out education programs on administrative business budgeting and accounting for small-scale defector groups who did not participate in the contest. It shares with them exemplary cases of management and helps them improve their capabilities. It selects candidates among organizations that participated

in education for capacity building and offered them opportunities for communication, both online and in-person, thus promoting exchange among different organizations.


2] Strengthening the Foundation of the Hana Center

(1) Expanding Hana Centers and Improving Personal Information Protection

Hana centers put North Korean defectors through intensive training upon their completion of the Hanawon program after they settle into their new homes to help them quickly adapt to their new environment. They support those defectors who are in need of a high level of protection. The intensive education in the initial period of settlement runs for 8–9 days (50 hours) and offers career and vocational training, an understanding of daily life and local communities, and programs for psychological and emotional stability. The Hana centers' education focuses on field experience, which differentiates it from the Hanawon. Through regional adaptation projects, Hana centers operate programs necessary for North Korean defectors for various purposes including educational guidance, career and employment, livelihood, medical care, psychological and emotional counseling, and adapting to one's the community. Hana centers provide services in a very personalized way that is tailored to the circumstances and needs of every individual. Moreover, the centers identify those suspected to be in crisis situations through surveys and proactively connects them to the appropriate institutions while providing necessary services for them.



Intensive Training Offered by Hana Centers



The Hana Centers are on the front lines of providing services to North Korean defectors in the settlement support system. They are very important since they are the first agency North Korean defectors come into contact with immediately after completing the Hanawon program.

As of the end of December 2021, there were 25 Hana centers in 16 cities and provinces nationwide (four in Seoul, six in Gyeonggi Province, two in Gangwon Province, and one in all other metropolitan cities and provinces). In 2022, the fifth group of operating agencies of Hana centers will be newly designated and operated for three years. Some Hana centers have branch offices to render services to North Korean defectors in remote areas or in regions with large concentrations of defectors.

As part of the efforts to improve the capability of each Hana center, the 2021 Management Guidelines for Social Welfare Facilities specified that in the case of social workers with certificates working at Hana centers, 80% of their work can be officially recognized as professional career work.

Hana centers handle personal information of North Korean defectors including sensitive information, so there is a strong need for an information protection system that can withstand cyber threats and other security incidents. Accordingly, Hana centers have conducted joint security checks with the relevant agencies and have produced and distributed guidelines regarding personal information protection to institutions and organizations involved with North Korean defectors. These efforts were intended to improve the personal information management system for North Korean defectors and ensure reliable support for them.

The government improved the legal basis for handling the personal information of North Korean defectors including sensitive information at Hana centers and frequently conducts security checks and security education to manage personal information protection and prevent security incidents including cyber threats.

(2) Professional counselors for North Korean defectors and settlement support workers

Professional counselors for North Korean defectors of the Korea Hana Foundation are placed at Hana centers and work collaboratively with the social workers there. The counselors have certificates of qualification in psychology or employment and offer counseling based on their understanding of North Korean defectors. They help resolve difficulties that defectors experience in the process of adapting to South Korean society.

Counselors by Region

(Unit: Person)

Nationwide	Seoul	Busan	Daegu	Incheon	Gwangju	Daejeon	Ulsan	Gyeonggi
2	17	3	3	4	2	3	3	23
Gangwon	North Chungcheong Province	South Chungcheong Province	North Jeolla Province	South Jeolla Province	North Gyeongsang Province	South Gyeongsang Province	Jeju	Total
2	3	3	3	2	4	2	2	81

As of the end of December 2021, 81 professional counselors (49 in psychology and 32 in employment) were offering counseling in the overall areas of settlement including employment, health, psychology, and the law.

Settlement assistants are volunteers who offer support to North Korean defectors and are in close contact with them as they move into their residences after completing the Hanawon program. They work in connection with Hana centers, helping North Korean defectors report their move-ins, accept personal items, and move into rental housing. They play an important role in the initial period of settlement by contacting them frequently and helping them navigate through everyday life in the community. As of the end of December 2021, there were 1,000 settlement assistants at 25 Hana centers nationwide.

06

Unification Education

- I – Expanding the Foundation for Unification Education and the Operation of Programs
- II – Support for School Unification Education
- III – Support for Social Unification Education
- IV – The Operation of the Center for Unified Korean Future



Chapter

6

Unification Education

The Institute for Unification Education, the only government unification education institute, was renamed the National Institute for Unification Education (NIUE) on March 30, 2021. In response to the COVID-19 situation, the institute administered education courses and events on the topics of peace and unification education on a flexible basis in both face-to-face and non-face-to-face settings to enhance people's interest in realizing peace and unification.

To enhance its educational initiatives, the government first established a remote learning platform for educational courses and produced videos on experiences in the field, thus improving and supplementing online classes. Considering the high demand (at home and abroad), it created new courses on social unification education.

The government also held the 2021 Unification Walk along the DMZ Peace Trail to expand the consensus on the peace process while promoting peace and unification education through firsthand experience of the border areas.

The government reorganized the previous online education courses into six courses in 2019. Because the COVID-19 situation greatly complicated the circumstances of in-person education, the number of people who received online education rose to 442,000 in 2020 and 447,000 in 2021, thus exceeding 400,000 in each of the past two years.

It also developed various educational materials on peace and unification. It offered special lectures delivered by celebrities and library data including reference books for specialized study including a series on the humanities. It developed new types of contents including a fairy tale picture book, a workbook, a “set of peace and unification with coffee and tea,” and a “peace diary.” In collaboration with broadcasting companies and

YouTubers, the government produced and broadcast a number of videos including a documentary, music and travel entertainment shows, a web entertainment show, a web talk show, and an animation.

The 9th Unification Education Week (May 24-30) was held as an online and in-person festival. By expanding the people's active participation through non-face-to-face means, it laid the foundation for building a broad social consensus. The opening event was the first event of its kind for Unification Education Week, in that it allowed the public to attend the event in one of three ways: on-site, online in real time, or through YouTube. People from schools, local communities, government ministries, related organizations, and experts participated in diverse online programs.

To stimulate teenagers' interest in issues of unification and promote school unification education, the government conducted various programs in which young talents who will lead the future of a unified Korea could participate, including the Visiting School for Unification Education, the Unification Leadership Camp, school experiential education on unification, the Kid Press Corps, and the Creative Unification Children's Song Contest.

The government systematically supported unification education by designating unification education research schools, holding a unification education research competition, and sponsoring a workshop on the development of unification education.

It also carried out various support projects for college students including a series of special unification lectures and courses and a Unified Korea Mock Cabinet Meeting nationwide contest for college students.

Regional unification education centers in seven regions nationwide provided unification education for local residents in basic, specialized, and joint program formats. To strengthen the expertise and capabilities of unification education officials, the education centers continued offering workshops, special lectures delivered by celebrities, and materials related to inter-Korean relations and unification policy.

In 2021, 13 unification halls were in operation nationwide including the newly designated Goyang Unification Hall. The unification halls held various special exhibitions and experiential learning programs for residents, including a Virtual Reality (VR) exhibit and a visiting mobile unification hall.”

The government organized and held the 2nd 2030 Z and Y Generation for Peace and

Unification (P-UZY) Academy and Talk Concert, in consideration of the interests, ways of communication, and participation preferences of the 2030 generation.

The Research Center for Peace and Unification Education that was established in December 2020 carried out research projects on peace and unification education, held seminars with experts (at home and abroad), and developed a new curriculum.

Since the Center for Unified Korean Future was designated and operated as a residential treatment center for COVID-19 in December 2020, it was impossible to conduct training sessions within the center in 2021. Instead, the center established a virtual studio through which real-time interactive communication could take place and implemented an online training program for elementary, middle, and high school students as well as teenagers from youth organizations. The center also systematically operated a visiting unification experiential education program.

The center developed programs suitable for non-face-to-face contexts, including the visiting unification experiential education program mentioned above while producing and utilizing various customized experience kits and thereby improving the quality and effectiveness of experiential education programs. At the same time, it expanded the foundation for experiential educational education by upgrading its facilities and the overall learning environment, including its outdoor facilities, in preparation for the normalization of training at the center.

Section

1

Expanding the Foundation for Unification Education and the Operation of Programs

1 The Operation of Unification Education Programs

The government has continued to carry out unification education to increase the public's interest in realizing peace and unification and expand the consensus on the Korean Peninsula peace process. In 2021, the National Institute for Unification Education (NIUE) conducted 135 educational sessions for 5,153 people in seven online and in-person settings including a specialized education program, a unification education program for public officials, a school unification education program, a social unification education program, a global unification education program, a special education program, and other courses. It also offered online unification education programs for public officials, teachers, citizens, and those in their 20s and 30s. A total of 446,577 people participated in the online programs. Using the education platform established in 2020 to integrate online and offline programs, it provided education through in-person, virtual, and hybrid formats to flexibly respond to the evolving COVID-19 situation.



2021 Unification Education Programs

(Unit: Person)

Program Category	Specialized education program	Unification education programs for public officials	School unification education programs	Social unification education programs	Global unification education programs	Special education programs	Other programs	Online unification education programs	Total
Number of participants	320	2,928	621	421	312	440	111	446,577	451,730

A total of 320 people received instruction through the government's specialized education programs, which included the Top Executive Program for Unification Policy, the Leadership Program for Unification Policy, the Program for Planning the Future of a Unified Korea, the Program for Unification Education Instructors, and the Program for Next-Generation Unification Experts.

The Top Executive Program for Unification Policy is tailored to those in top leadership positions and aims to increase their determination and capabilities for peace and unification, thus expanding the consensus on unification across society. The Leadership Program for Unification Policy is customized for director-level or director-general-level officials in the central and local governments as well as executives of public corporations to nurture government-wide professional personnel in continuing education for peace and unification. The Program for Planning the Future of a Unified Korea caters to public officials of grade 4 or 5 and working officials of equivalent status in public corporations.



Top Executive Program for Unification Policy
(May 6–Nov. 25)



Leadership Program for Unification Policy
(Feb. 1–Dec. 10)

The Program for Unification Education Instructors aims to train those who provide education on North Korea and unification issues in public institutions, schools, civil society organizations, and local communities. It provides the knowledge and information necessary for delivering unification education lectures, developing teaching methods, and designing lecture materials. In 2021, 139 people completed the program.

The Program for Next-Generation Unification Experts targets undergraduate college students, graduate students, and workers in their 20s and 30s who are involved in matters pertaining to unification. It aims to nurture the next generation of experts to bring about peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. A total of 50 people participated

in the program.

The Unification Education Program for Public Officials focuses on helping central and local government officials better understand unification policies and actively take part in laying the foundation for peace and unification. A total of 2,928 officials took the program. The program cooperated with the Local Government Officials Development Institute and the educational institutions of upper-level local governments to help to ensure a multi-faceted unification education with online and in-person components.



Program for Next-Generation Unification Experts
(Apr. 6–Dec. 21)



Program at the Local Government Officials Development Institute (Oct. 21–22)

The School Unification Education Program aims to enhance the expertise of teachers in providing unification education. A total of 621 teachers participated in the program. The program not only offers objective information and knowledge of unification on the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean relations, and the situation in North Korea, but it also focuses on delivering substantial unification education programs that can be carried out directly by teachers in the field.

The program tailored its educational content to those of various positions: directors of kindergartens; principals, vice principals and teachers of elementary, middle, and high schools; school commissioners, vice commissioners, and senior educational researchers; and college students who want to become teachers.

The Social Unification Education Program also provides education to unification education officials, members of the National Unification Advisory Council, and members of social and religious groups involved in unification. It consists of various programs to broaden the understanding of inter-Korean relations and cultivate the values necessary for peace and unification. A total of 421 people participated in the program.

The government held the 2021 Unification Walk along the DMZ Peace Trail eight

times from June to November (three east-west crossing events and five for each trail section). 386 persons participated in the walking event. Although it was suspended when the government elevated its COVID-19 social distancing restrictions by two levels, the event proceeded smoothly and was in complete compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines.




The 2021 Unification Walk along the DMZ Peace Trail (Jun. 15–Nov. 13)

The global education program was established in 2013 to strengthen the capacities for unification (at home and abroad) and to secure an international consensus and support for unification through peace and unification education and international cooperation. In 2021, the government signed an MOU with the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Sweden, thus broadening the base of global unification education in cooperation with the relevant institutions (at home and abroad).

The government invited international scholars and offered them an opportunity to see issues related to unification on the Korean Peninsula from international perspectives. It invited four experts from the United States, Britain, and Sweden and held 29 sessions




Signing an MOU with the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Sweden (Apr. 27)



A special lecture by a visiting professor from abroad (Nov. 18, Hanyang University)

of special lectures and discussions for Korean experts, students, and the public (a total of 580 persons participated in the sessions).

Through the Emerging Leaders Fellowship for emerging scholars abroad, the government expounded on the reality of the Korean Peninsula to next-generation experts in major foreign countries and conveyed the Korean government's efforts and will for unification. Considering the COVID-19 situation, it was held online in 2021. 58 people from 28 countries including academics, journalists, public officials, and NGO activists participated in the online event. The government also held four global unification education sessions for foreigners in Korea, Korean students studying abroad, and overseas Koreans. 254 persons attended the sessions.



Emerging Leaders Fellowship (Jun. 14 – 16)




Unification Academy for Foreigners in Korea (Jul. 6 – 7)

In 2020, a total of 442,377 people enrolled in online unification education programs, and in 2021, 446,577 enrolled in such programs, thus exceeding 400,000 for each of the past two years. In response to the sharp increase in demand for education from the general public as well as from public officials, the government developed its educational content for those in their 20s and 30s and expanded participatory events including “Contents of Peace and Unification That I Create” and “Reviewing Online Unification Education.”

The government began managing “smart learning supporters” to enhance the interest of the public in online education and strengthen its communication with students. The supporters engaged in various efforts from July to November including monitoring current educational online content and creating new content. To broaden the base of unification education further, the government held online contents for 125 institutions, including central administrative agencies, local governments, education offices, univer-

sities, and public institutions.



Since 2019, the government has carried out unification education in earnest by taking advantage of new media. In doing so, it aims to increase the public's access to unification education as well as their interest in peace and unification. In 2021, the government used five new media platforms including YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and Kakao Talk. It strove to expand its media content by creating *A Series of Short Videos* on YouTube and *Insta Toon* and *Poem Toon* on Instagram. These efforts increased the total number of subscribers to the five new media platforms of the National Institute for Unification Education to 38,913, as of the end of December 2021.

2] Development and Distribution of Educational Materials

To encourage more people to take an interest in unification issues, the government has continued to develop and distribute books and videos of various subjects and styles that are appropriate for the public.

Every year the government publishes the texts *Understanding Unification Issues* and *Un-*

Understanding North Korea as basic educational materials to help the public better understand unification issues and the circumstances inside North Korea. In 2021, it added *Understanding Peace on the Korean Peninsula*, which addresses peace as well, thereby enhancing the basic educational materials on unification, North Korea, and peace.

In 2021, the government published books including *Stories About Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsula That the MZ Generation Wants to Know* (note: MZ generation refers to millennials and Generation Z), a series of special lectures by celebrities; *Doing Hope – For a Society of Empathy and Solidarity*, a book on social integration from the perspectives of teenagers; *Finding the Future of the Korean Peninsula in the EU*, a work that looks at the case of the European Union to explore the implications for economic integration on the Korean Peninsula; and *Pyeongyang: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*, a readable handbook that includes lecture content of popular online classes. 1,000-2,000 copies of each book were distributed.

Since its first publication in 2019, *Unification in One's Hands*, a humanities series for commercial sale, has been published in five volumes every year. A total of 15 volumes have been published so far.

As for materials for kindergarten and younger elementary school students, the government published *Yes! It is Okay to Be Different*, the fourth picture book in a fairy tale series on unification, and *Let's Go! A Peace Expedition on the Korean Peninsula*, an activity book for younger elementary school students. Additionally, *Missing Magic Beads*, a fairy tale picture book on unification published in 2020, was published as an audiobook and braille book for the disabled and was also produced as an animation.

In addition, the government published a revised edition of the *North Korea Knowledge Dictionary*, explaining the terms necessary for understanding North Korea, and a textbook for middle and high school students about social dialogue, in cooperation with the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education.

It strove to broaden the base of unification education materials by producing a “peace diary” and a “set of peace and unification with coffee and tea” that included messages of peace that can easily be encountered in daily life.

In collaboration with TV broadcasters, the government continues to produce and broadcast high-quality videos in various formats so that anyone can easily watch them. These videos include *Begin Again Open MIC* on JTBC (episode: “Ha Dong-kyun and

Kim Ye-rim”) (Jul. 27) and *Welcome, First Time in Korea?* on MBC every1 (episode: “Peace Tour to Cheorwon with Jonathan, Daniel, and Alberto”) (Nov. 18). Also, KBS1’s popular show *Young-chul Kim’s Walk Around the Neighborhood* (episode: “Cheorwon in Gangwon Province”) (Jun. 5) contained messages expressing hope for peace on the Korean Peninsula and received an audience rating of 7.3%, meaning that 1.07 million people watched the program).

In cooperation with production companies of animations popular with children, the government produced and broadcast content for *Bread Barbershop Season 3* (episode: “Wall of Chocolates”) and *Banzi’s Secret Diary* (special episode: “A Cat and a Suspicious Cousin”). A special Christmas episode of *Shinbi House* (“Grandmother’s Wish, a Ghost from North Korea”) was produced at the end of 2020 and reached 2.4 million views after it was posted on YouTube.

Since 2019, the government has been creating video clips of 3–10 minutes that can be used in conjunction with courses taught in elementary, middle, and high schools, and it has developed guides of them for teachers to use. It uploaded such materials to the National Institute for Unification Education website and other websites that support teaching and learning.

In 2021, in collaboration with private YouTube channels, the government produced videos customized to the subscribers for each channel. By featuring popular entertainers, it worked to induce young people to take an interest in issues of peace and unification.



2021 New Unification Educational materials



Bread Barbershop Season 3
(episode: "Wall of Chocolates")




Banzi's Secret Diary
(special episode: "A Cat and a Suspicious Cousin").



Gyoyang Mandu



Special lectures by celebrities



Doing Hope - For a Society of Empathy and Solidarity



An activity book for younger elementary school students.



A fairy tale picture book on unification



Unification in One's Hands, a humanities series

 2021 New Unification Education Books

Category	Title	Key contents	Users
Basic textbooks	Understanding Unification Issues	Explains views on unification issues, historical issues surrounding unification, developments in inter-Korean relations, the unification of the Korean Peninsula in the international order, approaches to unification, and the vision and tasks of the Korean Peninsula.	College students and adults
	Understanding North Korea	Explains views on North Korea, the North Korean political regime and ruling ideology, international policy and international relations, military strategy and military power, the state of the economy and its transformation, education and culture, social structure, and the everyday life of the people.	
	Understanding Peace on the Korean Peninsula	Explains the need for peace, the meaning of peace, peace-making policies and the prospects for peace, the reality and direction of peace on the Korean Peninsula, the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula, the previous governments' efforts to establish peace, and the vision and tasks for peace on the Korean Peninsula.	
Fairy tale picture book	Yes! It is Okay to Be Different	Relatives of the same age from South and North Korea meet each other on national holidays. The children recognize each other's differences through familiar and unfamiliar foods, play together, and create new rules. The children's book presents the content with warm illustrations.	Preschoolers
Audio-book, Braille book	Missing Magic Beads	A fairy tale book produced for the disabled. about South and North Korean children becoming true friends through discussions about beads, train travel, and Suncheon (two places in South and North Korea with the same name)	Disabled persons
School education	Let's Go! Peace Expedition on the Korean Peninsula (an activity book on unification)	Offers an opportunity for children to learn about North Korea, peace, and unification naturally while enjoying creative activities.	Elementary school students (lower grades)
	Doing Hope - For a Society of Empathy and Solidarity	A book on peace and unification education for social integration that includes candid and vivid thoughts from teenagers on how to change one's lifestyle and way of thinking to overcome discrimination, hatred, and issues of the environment and inequality that are prevalent in our society. Included within that discussion is how to move toward a sustainable future and a peaceful society.	Middle and high school students, teachers, and adults
	A textbook for middle and high school students using the means of social dialogue	Offers an opportunity for students to think about peace, unification, and North Korea through deliberation and discussion, thus developing teenagers' perceptions of peace and unification in the process.	Middle school students
Guide-book for teachers	2021 Guides to Video Clips on Unification Education	A guidebook for teachers on how to use 18 video clips in conjunction with their educational curricula.	Teachers
Special lectures by celebrities	Stories About Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsula that the MZ Generation Wants to Know	Special lectures by scholars, diplomats, and officials (former and current) from diverse perspectives and fields to help broaden perspectives and diversify viewpoints on peace and unification.	College students and adults
Unification in One's Hands (five volumes)	The Age of Ecology and the DMZ	Presents national division and the future after unification from the perspective of ecology—a more pressing issue than ever before due to the climate crisis and COVID-19. Provides motivation to imagine what symbiosis can mean.	
	Planning a Trip to North Korea	Sheds light on North Korea's latest efforts to bolster the tourism industry (infrastructure development and tour package creation) while introducing the top tourist attractions in North Korea.	

Category	Title	Key contents	Users
Unification in One's Hands (five volumes)	Korean Peninsula Seen on the Screen	Classifies movies about North Korea produced since the 1990s into six themes. Describes the characteristics of depictions about the North and their meaning in the films from the context of each theme.	College students and adults
	Report on the DMZ	Contemplates the ecological value of the DMZ, cooperative approaches for ecological preservation and plans to develop an inter-Korean ecological community along the Civilian Control Line and the border areas. An examination of the meaning of the DMZ as a space for inter-Korean cooperation.	
	Seoul and Pyeongyang Meet in Berlin	Portrays Seoul and Pyeongyang, which are the capitals of a divided nation, through Berlin's story of division and reunification.	
Reference materials	Finding the Future of the Korean Peninsula in the EU	Examines the achievements and limits of economic integration in the EU as well as considerations for the future. By doing so, it suggests implications for Inter-Korean economic integration and explores a model of economic integration for the Korean Peninsula.	
	North Korea Knowledge Dictionary	A compilation of the current state of North Korea including its politics, military, policies toward South Korea, foreign policies, major key words in the social and cultural realms, discourse and expressions, and organizational structure in the current era of the Jong-un Kim regime (published every five years).	
	Pyeongyang: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow	Sheds light on the past, present, and future of Pyeongyang, the capital of North Korea, through three key concepts: peace, the economy, and urban development. Offers an opportunity to think about a future of coexistence and prosperity.	
	Summary and Introspection on Unification Discourses Raised After National Division	A book for experts/specialists that summarizes and analyzes unification discourses expressed in diverse fields and spaces including the government and political sphere of ruling and opposition parties, civil society, and academia as well as post-division gender and ecological discourses.	



2021 New Unification Education Video Materials

Category	Title	Key contents	Users
Video clips for school education	Cold War, Post-Cold War, and the Division of the Korean Peninsula	Examines how the Cold War system after World War II and the post-Cold War impacted each country around the world including the Korean Peninsula. Expresses hope for an end to national division on the Korean Peninsula.	Elementary, middle, and high school students and teachers
	Inter-Korean Efforts to Achieve Reconciliation and Cooperation	Examines the path South and North Korea took together for peace and unification from the time of the Red Cross talks in 1971 to the July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué, the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, the Panmunjeom Declaration, and the Pyeongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018.	
	Traditional Fairy Tales North Korean Friends Like	Explores traditional fairy tales that North Korean people enjoy reading, thus offering an opportunity to feel a sense of solidarity between South and North Korea.	
	The Kimchi Culture of South and North Korea: Nice, it hits the spot!	Examines Kimchi, the main staple food of the Korean diet, and the Kimchi-making cultures of the two Koreas, thus offering an opportunity to feel a sense of solidarity between South and North Korea.	

Category	Title	Key contents	Users
Animation	Bread Barbershop Season 3 (episode: Wall of Chocolates)	Symbolically captures the reality of national division (using the Berlin Wall as a motif) while conveying South Korea's efforts to overcome the division, and the need for exchange and communication between the two Koreas.	Elementary school students – adults
	Wilk's Dessert Story (episode: Naengmyeon)	Introduces the origins of Naengmyeon, a cold noodle dish that South and North Koreans enjoy, and presents interesting historical cases, thus offering an opportunity to affirm a sense of solidarity between the two Koreas.	Toddlers and children
	Banzi's Secret Diary (special episode: A Cat and a Suspicious Cousin)	Conveys the values of mutual understanding, respect, and tolerance instead of prejudice by using a North Korean defector teenager and a cat as protagonists.	
	Missing Magic Beads	A fairy tale book produced as an animation. that tells of South and North Korean children becoming true friends through conversations about beads, train travel, and Suncheon (two places in South and North Korea with the same names)	
Video for the public sector	The International Situation and Environment for the Unification of the Korean Peninsula	Examines the issues of the Korean Peninsula and the circumstances of neighboring countries that have resulted from COVID-19, the hegemonic competition between the US and China, and the policy direction for establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.	Public officials, employees at public institutions, and adults
	The Ecology of the Korean Peninsula, the Common Future of South and North Korea	Emphasizes the importance of ecology on the Korean Peninsula from the standpoint of humans, nature, and all living things coexisting for a sustainable future amid new security threats including the climate crisis and COVID-19. Introduces areas of inter-Korean cooperation in the areas of ecology and the environment.	
Collaboration with YouTube channels	Please Keep the Peace, Chuu!	A peace vlog by Girl of the Month "Chuu," who visits the National Institute for Unification Education and Odusan Unification Observatory to pursue peace during Unification Education Week.	Those in their teens and 20s
	What Happens When South and North Korea are Connected by Railways?: North Korean Attractions I Really Want to Visit	Introduces the historical case of arriving in Europe on the Trans-Siberian Railway (featuring artist Na Hye-seok and marathon runner Sohn Kee-chung) Explores the meaning and prospects of railway connection and tourist attractions in North Korea.	Those in their teens, 20s, and 30s
	Romance Blacklist (Love and Romance of Young Men and Women in North Korea)	Examines the love and romance of young men and women and marriage culture in North Korea, thus delivering a message that the lives of North Koreans are not so different from South Koreans.	Those in their 20s and 30s
	A peace field trip to Imjingak with Jang Sung-kyu and his son	Entertainer Jang Sung-kyu visits Imjingak with his family and talks about peace, national division, separated families, and the inter-Korean summit of June 2000 from the perspective of a child, naturally delivering a message of longing for peace.	
	Reading conflict (Episodes: history, lecture, and discussion)	An educational entertainment program (three episodes) in which experts from diverse fields analyze and discuss conflicts and social integration from their own points of view.	Those in their 20s, 30s and 40s
	Alberto, Daniel and Lucky talk about conflicts and social integration	Members of the YouTube channel 354 talk about world conflicts including the Kashmir conflict in India, the South-North conflict in Italy, and reunification in Germany, thus exploring appropriate paths towards social integration.	
Broadcast on TV	JTBC's Begin Again Open Mic (episode: Ha Dong-yun and Kim Ye-rim)	Songs about peace ("Raguyo" and "Imagine") sung at Odusan Unification Observatory to heal the pain of national division and express desires for world peace and peace on the Korean Peninsula (both on TV and YouTube).	Those in their 20s and 30s

Category	Title	Key contents	Users
Broadcast on TV	KBS1's Young-chul Kim's Walk Around the Neighborhood (episode: Cheorwon in Gangwon Province)	Sheds light on the lives of the people in Cheorwon who live among blooming beautiful flowers of peace while overcoming the wounds of war and national division.	All people
	MBC every1's "Welcome, First Time in Korea?"	A peace tour of Cheorwon by Jonathan, Daniel, and Alberto, foreigners living in Korea.	

3 Unification Education Week

Since 2013, the government has designated and celebrated the fourth week of May as Unification Education Week to gather diverse opinions from people at all levels of society and help build a consensus on peace and unification for the next generation.

In 2021, the 9th Unification Education Week (May 24-30) was held as a hybrid (online and in-person) festival due to COVID-19. The government, schools, unification education organizations, and members of the general public attended the event and enjoyed actively taking part in it.

With its theme of "To Unification, Our Future," the opening event allowed the public to attend the event in one of three ways: on-site, online in real time, and through YouTube. It was the first event of its kind for Unification Education Week. The opening ceremony was followed by "A Delicious Talk Concert with Rev. Lee Mun-su," which highlighted the dreams and hopes of young people for peace, featuring musical actors and actresses, college students, and the online audience of its YouTube broadcast.



An Introduction to Unification Education Week



A Talk Concert During Unification Education Week (May 24)

The government delivered various online contents through its Unification Education Week homepage, including 200 lectures for 28 courses and three activities, the Unification Board Game, an attendance check activity, and “Choices I Have Fallen For.” In cooperation with *UniTV*, the broadcasting channel of the Ministry of Unification, it produced “Unification Education I Have Fallen For,” a special program for Unification Education Week, and delivered content created in collaboration with broadcasting companies, including *Girl of the Month “Chuu”* and *Sapiens Studio* (three episodes) via YouTube.



Girl of the Month “Chuu”



Unification Education I Have Fallen For

During Unification Education Week, the Visiting School for Unification Education, a component of Unification Education Week, visited 53 schools, providing online education for students at 92 elementary, middle, and high schools nationwide. Meanwhile, the Kid Press Corps, sponsored by the Ministry of Unification, engaged in online community activities.

The leading universities and research schools in unification education actively participated in Unification Education Week and held various programs. Nine leading universities in unification education staged their own online events, including a roundtable talk with celebrities, a talk and culture concert on North Korea, a unification startup contest, and a User Created Contents (UCC) competition. Unification education research schools provided unification education in coordination with the relevant regional institutions and curriculum-linked education programs at schools. They carried out their own unification education weeks before and after the nationwide Unification Education Week with a wide range of online and in-person events.



Programs of the 9th Unification Education Week


Program	Detailed program	Contents
Unification Stories I Have Fallen for	Opening Ceremony for the 9th Unification Education Week	Pledge of allegiance, speeches including congratulatory and welcoming speeches, recognition of outstanding individuals, and celebratory performances (live broadcast).
	Talk concert	A talk concert featuring celebrities (live broadcast).
	Infographic	News about Unification Education Week spread via social media.
Unification Challenges I Have Fallen For	Ceremony attendance event	Online participation in the ceremony.
	Attendance check activity	People visit the homepage of Unification Education Week every day to receive a stamp.
	Hide-and-seek with Uni friends	Finding Uni friends characters hidden on the Unification Education Week homepage.
	Unification Board Game	A teaching aid for unification education.
	Today's Pick	A contest that involves locating images (photos) in everyday life that convey the values of unification, peace, and social integration.
	Choices I Have Fallen For	An activity that involves imagining what one would like to do when the two Koreas are reunified.
	Satisfaction survey	A satisfaction survey on Unification Education Week.
Escape from Being a Person Who Knows Nothing About Unification	Messages of support	Messages of support from all walks of life expressing aspirations for peace and unification.
	Voices from the education field	Videos from various unification education fields including leading unification education colleges and regional unification education centers.
	Special lectures by celebrities	Online special lectures delivered by five experts from diverse fields.
	Syllabus	11 educational materials including videos and PowerPoint materials that can be used for unification education.
	Video clips	46 reference materials for unification education including an animation, a talk show, a documentary, and an entertainment show.
	Unification education materials	Various unification education materials including books, videos, and special broadcasts.
	What would you do when hanging out?	Video guides on how to use unification education teaching aids for games and activities.
	Culture class	Culture and arts content in various forms including a musical, visual artwork, an entertainment show, and a travel program.
New Media	Online forum	An online forum that explores thoughts from the future generation about a unified Korea.
	YouTube	Videos (<i>Girl of the Month "Chuu," Sapiens Studio, and Mobidic</i>) created in collaboration with various YouTube channels including entertainment and educational channels.
Linked program	New Media	Development and distribution of KakaoTalk emoticons and new media content on Instagram and Facebook.
	6 th Peace and Unification Festival	An online program co-hosted by the Association of Unification Education Organizations and the Unification Education Center in Seoul during the 9 th Unification Education Week.
	Suyu Walk	A webpage to apply for a tour to the National Institute for Unification Education (NIUE).

Seven unification education centers and nine unification halls nationwide organized various hands-on events. To build consensus in local communities for peace and unification, the Association of Unification Education Organizations and the Unification Education Center in Seoul hosted the 6th Peace and Unification Festival online. Unification halls held performances of traditional South and North Korea plays and a unification-focused virtual reality (VR) event.

4] Establishing the Future Direction and a Cooperative System for Unification Education

In March 2021, the government formulated the 2021 Implementation Plan for Unification Education. Since 2019, it has established an implementation plan every year, which includes proposals for unification education in the future.

The 2021 implementation plan set forth government-wide projects on peace and unification education. It comprehensively organized the plans of 42 agencies, including the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Education, and the Office of Education, for each city and province and for educational and training institutions. It primarily consisted of projects for each of 7 policy tasks and 32 detailed tasks, projects for the National Institute for Unification Education (NIUE), projects for each institution, and the outcomes of the 2020 peace and unification education projects.



The 2021 Implementation Plan for Unification Education




The NIUE's meeting for ESG planning (Nov. 18)

In 2021, the plan included spreading peace and unification education; expanding the base of unification education for social integration; reinforcing unification education in the public sector; and promoting the peace and unification movement, including the Unification Walk along the DMZ Peace Trail.

Meanwhile, as ethics and social responsibility of institutions are emerging as important management standards, the NIUE aimed to carry out its peace and unification education programs by putting ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) principles into practice as a government institution for the first time. Thus, it appointed non-governmental experts and citizen representatives as outside members, established a detailed plan for each field, and carried out its activities accordingly.

The Ministry of Unification has strived to provide unification education in cooperation with various agencies responsible for education. For school unification education, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Education in 2014, and the two bodies have worked closely together to host Unification Education Week (May) and conduct a survey of school unification education (December).



In 2021, despite the difficulties caused by COVID-19, the government signed an MOU with seven institutions including the Korean National Council of Women, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Germany, and the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP) in Sweden, agreeing to pursue various cooperation projects. It held four rounds of policy advisory meetings of the Unification Education Division to hear the opinions

of experts in policymaking and planning. By doing so, it is striving to build a social consensus on the basic policy direction and major principles of unification education.

5] Operation of the Research Center for Peace and Unification Education

The National Institute for Unification Education (NIUE) established the Research Center for Peace and Unification Education in December 2020 to study and analyze the peace and unification education system and to present a long-term policy direction. In January 2021, it enacted rules for the Research Center for Peace and Unification Education to efficiently carry out its operations. It also conducted research on peace and unification education and held seminars and symposiums with experts (at home and abroad).

In 2021, the center pursued two studies on the establishment of unification policy and developed its system for educational content over the long-term. It conducted research on issues pertaining to unification discourses and the future development of unification education to examine the issues surrounding the current discourse on unification and present a plan for unification education in the future. It also conducted research on the new peace and unification education content system — i.e., the development plan of peace and unification education from the perspective of social integration — to confirm that a broad sense of peace and unification education is being applied in the field, including education for global and democratic citizens. As the center aimed to explore and develop plans of peace and unification education from the perspective of social integration, it held a briefing session in the form of a joint symposium to share the results of its research and expand academic exchange (at home and abroad).

The center held a brown bag seminar and a global seminar to strengthen its research capacities and establish a foundation for a network of experts. The seminars involved presentations and discussions with experts (at home and abroad) on diverse themes regarding the political circumstances of North Korea from a global context. Such themes included “The Situation in Afghanistan and the Situation on the Korean Peninsula” and “The ROK-US Summit and North Korea.”

Meanwhile, to ensure a robust operation and early establishment of new educa-

tional courses within the NIUE, the center developed a detailed curriculum for the Next-Generation Unification Experts Program, an initiative to nurture unification experts in preparation for a unified Korea in the future .

In 2021, the center published the preparatory issue of the journal *Peace and Unification* (Dec. 31), to convey diverse perspectives on peace, unification, and social integration. The preparatory issue extensively addressed matters of research and discourse being discussed in academia and in various fields, including inter-Korean relations, international affairs, and unification education.



Holding a global seminar
(Oct. 27)



Holding the symposium *Exploring Ways of Peace and Unification Education for Social Integration* (Nov. 4)

Section
2


Support for School Unification Education

1 Expanding Participatory and Hands-on Unification Education for Teenagers

In 2021, the National Institute for Unification Education (NIUE) delivered face-to-face and non-face-to-face educational content through its Visiting School of Unification 1,276 times to 169,793 students at elementary, middle, and high schools nationwide. The program helped students better understand unification issues through fun games using teaching aids and educational materials. The Unification Leadership Camp, a participatory and hands-on education program, took place in both in-person and virtual settings in response to the evolving COVID-19 situation. A total of 110 virtual camps and 15 in-person camps were administered for students at elementary, middle, and high schools as well as colleges nationwide. Special virtual camps for overseas Korean schools were administered 12 times, a sharp increase from the 3 times they were held in 2020.



The Visiting School of Unification Education (Apr. 7, Eunjeong Elementary School in Seoul)



The Unification Leadership Camp for elementary school students (Nov. 18)

The government pursued “hands-on school unification education” to ensure an interactive approach based on the needs and circumstances of each school. In 2021, it offered consultation services and funding for hands-on unification education programs at 160 elementary, middle, and high schools nationwide.

To stimulate children’s interest in unification and cultivate them as future leaders of a unified Korea, the Ministry of Unification organized the 10th Kid Press Corps (200 students) for 200 fifth and sixth grade students. The Kid Press Corps began its activities with an online launching ceremony and participated in various activities and events that instilled in them greater awareness of unification. The activities they took part in included writing monthly articles about unification, going on field trip to peace and unification sites, attending a summer camp, undergoing online education to enhance their capabilities, and performing in a choir and broadcasting club.

The Ministry also held the 8th Youth Peace and Unification Culture Contest, which provided teenagers with an opportunity to apply their talents to the peace and unification effort. In 2021, it was held in three divisions: a Creative Unification Children’s Song Contest, a Creative Unification Lyrics Contest, and a Peace Webtoon Contest. For the children’s song contest, 9 songs out of the 58 entries were awarded prizes, and for the unification lyrics contest, 10 song lyrics out of 139 entries were awarded prizes. For the peace webtoon contest, 8 out of 28 teams were awarded prizes.



The launching ceremony of the Kid Press Corps (May 7)



The award winning song from the Creative Unification Children’s Song Contest (Grand Prize)

2] Disseminating Best Practices for School Unification Education and Improving Teachers' Expertise in Unification Education

In 2021, to develop and disseminate best practices of school unification education, the government designated 36 elementary, middle, and high schools as unification education research schools and provided each of them with funds and educational materials to carry out a variety of unification education programs. It also offered advice on the operation of the programs.

The Ministry of Unification co-hosted the 9th School Unification Education Research Contest with the Ministry of Education to identify and disseminate best practices for school unification education. Across the country, teachers in elementary, middle, and high schools submitted 74 research papers, and 14 of them were granted awards. In 2021, a number of the papers used a “blended learning” approach that combined face-to-face to non-face-to-face methods of instruction.

To develop school unification education for the future, the government held in-person workshops with school inspectors from the municipal and provincial offices of education and with teachers in charge of unification on five separate occasions, starting in November.



Unification Education Research School
(Oct. 25, Bukil High School in Chungnam)



The School Unification Education Research Contest
(Nov. 12)

3 Support for College Unification Education

The government seeks to increase college students' engagement in unification and jumpstart college unification education by designating and operating leading universities in unification education, facilitating special lectures and courses on unification for college students, and through other means.

It selected leading universities in unification education in each region to develop and disseminate best practices in college unification education. It first designated six universities (Seoul National University, Soongsil University, Ajou University, Chungnam National University, Kyungnam University, and Gwangju National University of Education) in 2016 and added three more (Kangwon National University, Inje University, and Handong Global University) in 2019. The project for the first six universities came to an end in 2020 when the government selected five new universities (Kyonggi University, Seoul National University of Education, Daejin University, Chungbuk National University, and Jeonbuk National University) and re-selected one more (Soongsil University). As of 2021, it was supporting nine leading universities in unification education.

The previous leading universities in unification education worked to distribute and expand the models they developed to other universities, and the six universities selected in 2020 carried out their second-year projects smoothly, implementing them in a robust manner. From November 8 to 26, the government monitored the projects and provided consultation for each leading university.

Meanwhile, to expand opportunities for college students to undergo unification education, the government signed an MOU with seven universities including the universities whose status as leading universities terminated, designating them as “collaboration universities in unification education.” Representatives from the leading universities and the seven collaboration universities shared their experiences and accomplishments by holding joint events including a field experience, a student seminar, and an academic conference.

In order to expand college students' opportunities for unification education, the government launched a program to provide special lectures and courses on unification and North Korea for college students nationwide. As a result of the program, 22 special

unification lectures were delivered and 33 unification courses were taught at 40 universities, and 10,000 college students were given the opportunity to take them. The government also aimed to share and disseminate information about college unification education through joint seminars among the designated leading universities in unification education as well as those universities providing the special unification lectures and courses to college students.’

To increase academic engagement in unification and North Korean studies and to create an atmosphere conducive to research, the government continues to host the Unification Thesis Contest for graduate students. For the 40th Unification Thesis Contest and Unification Promotional Video Contest held in 2021, 28 theses and 10 promotional videos were submitted. The award-winning theses were published a collection of papers and distributed to colleges and public libraries nationwide. The award-winning promotional videos were uploaded to the NIUE’s website (www.uniedu.go.kr) and used as promotional materials.



A joint academic conference to facilitate college unification education (Nov. 19)



A joint academic conference by leading universities in unification education (Dec. 21)

Support for Social Unification Education

1 Social Unification Education by Regional Unification Education Centers

Since 2004, in order to facilitate unification education in local communities, the government has designated organizations that specialize in unification education as Regional Unification Education Centers, in accordance with Article 6 (3) of the Unification Education Support Act. The Regional Unification Education Centers plan and administer various unification education programs that are designed specifically for each region.

The government reorganized the program operation system previously based on 17 local governments into a system based on seven regions—Seoul, Gyeongin (Gyeonggi-Incheon), Yeongnam, Honam, Chungcheong, Gangwon, and Jeju— so that Regional



2021 Regional Unification Education Centers

Region	Center	Designated Organization
Seoul	Seoul Unification Education Center	Kookmin University
Gyeongin (Gyeonggi and Incheon)	Gyeongin Unification Education Center	Ajou University
Yeongnam (Daegu, Ulsan, Gyeongbuk, Gyeongnam, and Busan)	Yeongnam Unification Education Center	Kyungnam University
Honam (Gwangju, Jeonbuk, and Jeonnam)	Honam Unification Education Center	Uri Minjok Corporation
Chungcheong (Sejong, Daejeon, Chungbuk, and Chungnam)	Chungcheong Unification Education Center	Seowon University
Gangwon	Gangwon Unification Education Center	Halla University
Jeju	Jeju Unification Education Center	Jeju Council of Unification Education Specialists

Unification Education Centers could establish themselves as the local hubs of unification education.

The seven Regional Unification Education Centers provided various forms of peace and unification education for local residents through basic, specialized, and joint programs. Basic programs consisted of unification lectures, field trips for experiential learning on unification, and unification workshops for unification education officials. For example, the regional centers carried out a Unification Lecture Tour program, thus increasing the use of professional lecturers in unification education and laying the foundation for unification education that is customized for consumers. Specialized programs consisted of unification education programs designed for specific regions. Joint programs were events carried out in conjunction with other districts inside each region and/or between different regions, including contests, events, and festivals.



The 2nd Peace Coin Design Contest
(Seoul Unification Education Center)



A Field Trip to Experience Peace and Unification
(Gangwon Unification Education Center)

Meanwhile, the Regional Unification Education Centers carried out various face-to-face and non-face-to-face peace and unification education programs while preemptively responding to the COVID-19 situation. In addition to in-person education programs, they developed smart online education programs that were carried out virtually in consideration of the characteristics of each region. In 2021 alone, a total of 210,000 residents participated in peace and unification education programs.



Producing metaverse contents (“Going beyond the DMZ to Mt. Baekdu”) (Gyeongin Unification Education Center)



Unification Stories Learned by Magic (Honam Unification Education Center)

The government rendered assistance to Regional Unification Education Centers to offer peace and unification education in cooperation with local governments, educational offices, schools, and NGOs. To ensure the centers operated projects smoothly and presented consistent standards in their operation of peace and unification education programs, the government published and distributed the *Operation Manual of Regional Unification Education Centers*.

2 Education Activities by Unification Education Specialists and the Governance of NGOs

Since 1987, the government has appointed people with knowledge, experience, and interest in unification issues and inter-Korean relations as unification education officials, and it has supported them in their unification education activities in local communities. In 2020, it designated 710 people as members of the 22nd Council of Unification Education Officials and helped them build a consensus on unification and promote unification education in local communities.

In 2021, to enhance the competency of the unification education officials and strengthen their capabilities, the government held four workshops for citizen members of the council, two workshops for its overseas members, and five special celebrity lectures. By doing so, it continued to provide materials to them regarding inter-Korean relations and unification policies.

Considering the difficulties in inviting overseas members to workshops due to the COVID-19 situation, the government provided support for overseas councils, so they could hold their own events to build a consensus on unification in each country of residence.



An online workshop of overseas unification education Specialists (Nov. 24)



A Unification Talk Concert with the Association of Unification Education Organizations in Washington (Dec. 26)

Meanwhile, the government is supporting activities of the Association of Unification Education Organizations to promote social unification education in civil society. The association was established in 2000 as a consultative body of private unification education organizations. 76 NGOs engaged in unification education have been affiliated with the association. In 2021, the government provided KRW 274.4 million in funding for the unification education programs of 30 member organizations. The association held its 3rd National Contest for the College Student Press Corps; a program to improve the unification education capabilities of member organizations' working staff; and programs for each division, including women, youth, and citizens. It also conducted joint projects with its member organizations, including the hosting of the 6th Peace and Unification Festival (May 24–30) during Unification Education Week.

The government signed MOUs with 17 institutions including religious groups, social organizations, and institutions for lifelong education to expand the base for unification education and is working to establish a cooperative system to build a consensus on peace and unification.

The government considers peace and unification education as lifelong learning endeavors and is therefore pursuing various types of cooperation with continuing education institutions. To this effect, it cohosted an international webinar on peace and unifica-

tion with the Korean Association of Lifelong Learning Cities, operated a booth of peace and unification at a fair organized by the National Institute for Lifelong Education, and operated the Academy of Peace and Unification at Free Citizen University.

3 Operation of Unification Halls

Unification halls are spaces for unification education and exhibition that are designed to help local residents and teenagers understand unification policies, inter-Korean relations, and the circumstances of North Korea in an objective manner with the proper awareness of peace and unification. In 2021, Goyang Unification Hall was newly designated as a unification hall, and 13 unification halls are currently in operation nationwide. The Odusan Unification Observatory was established and is being run by the Ministry of Unification. The other unification halls are managed by local governments or private organizations.



Unification Halls

Name	Location	Managed by
Odusan Unification Observatory	Paju, Gyeonggi-do	Ministry of Unification
Seoul Unification Hall	Guro-gu, Seoul	Seo (West) Seoul Life Science High School
Busan Unification Hall	Jin-gu, Busan	Korea Freedom Federation, Busan branch
Incheon Unification Hall	Michuhol-gu, Incheon	Korea Freedom Federation, Incheon branch
Gwangju Unification Hall	Seo-gu, Gwangju	Uri Minjok Corporation
Daejeon Unification Hall	Yuseong-gu, Daejeon	Daejeon International Marketing Enterprise
Goseong Unification Hall	Goseong-gun, Gangwon-do	Goseong Unification Observatory Inc.
Yanggu Unification Hall	Yanggu-gun, Gangwon-do	Yanggu County Office
Cheongju Unification Hall	Cheongju, Chungcheongbuk-do	Cheongju Land Management Office
Chungnam Unification Hall	Gongju, Chungcheongnam-do	Korea Freedom Federation, Chungnam branch
Gyeongnam Unification Hall	Changwon, Gyeongsangnam-do	Korea Freedom Federation, Gyeongnam branch
Jeju Unification Hall	Jeju, Jeju-do	Korea Freedom Federation, Jeju branch
Goyang Unification Hall	Goyang, Gyeonggi-do	Goyang City Office

For the first (May-Jun.) and second half (Nov.-Dec.) of 2021, each unification hall carried out various experience programs including a virtual reality (VR) exhibit, an on-line performance of traditional plays of South and North Korea, and a visiting mobile unification hall. Considering the COVID-19 situation, they carried out both face-to-face and non-face-to-face programs, and various residents, including students, teenagers, and adults, participated in the programs.

Despite the COVID-19 situation, Odusan Unification Observatory faithfully performed its role as a space for unification exhibition and culture. It held a special exhibition four times throughout the year, operated experiential learning programs in the first and second half of the year, and supported events and broadcasts to build a consensus on unification. As a representative unification culture space in a metropolitan area, it also continued to improve the environment for exhibitions and develop its programs, thereby increasing the satisfaction of visitors and expanding the consensus on peace and unification. At the end of the year, it invited those in need of social assistance and could not easily engage in outside activities due to COVID-19 including the disabled, people of an advanced age, and North Korean defectors .



The special exhibition *Front, Peace Stories on the Korean Peninsula* (Jul. 6–Sep. 30)



An event for seniors in Tanhyeon-myeon, Paju (Dec. 8)

The government assisted the 13 unification halls nationwide obtain exhibition materials and equipment to develop their programs on unification and inter-Korean relations. For instance, the exhibition hall of Gwangju Unification Hall was remodeled in a way that permitted residents and teenagers to experience unification and communicate with each other. In 2021, there were 530,000 visitors to unification halls, up from 380,000 in 2020.

4 Support for Unification Education in the Public Sector

An amendment to the Unification Education Support Act requires public officials and employees at central administrative agencies, local governments, and public institutions to receive unification education, and it took effect on September 14, 2018. Unification education in the public sector began in earnest in 2019 after a pilot program. According to the amended Act, public institutions are required to carry out unification education for their public officials and employees for at least one hour, once a year.

The government offered online education courses, a pool of recommended instructors, and contents, including educational books and videos, and improved its website for unification education in the public sector to ensure that the institutions concerned could proceed smoothly with the unification education programs.

In 2019, the first year of the unification education requirement, 2,057 institutions submitted education reports, and a total of 670,000 people were documented to have completed the education program. In 2020, despite the COVID-19 situation, 2,350 institutions submitted education reports showing 880,000 people completing the program. The 2021 education reports will be submitted by February 28, 2022, and the final results will be totaled in March.

At the same time, the government included “Building a consensus on unification and strengthening the capacity for unification” as an assessment index in its comprehensive assessment of local governments to begin in 2022. Thus, it laid the institutional foundation for 17 local governments to establish policies to build a consensus on unification, hold an event during Unification Education Week, and render support and cooperation to organizations involved in expanding the consensus on unification.

5 Promoting Unification Education Among Those in Their 20s and 30s

Since 2019, the government has sought to promote unification education among those in their 20s and 30s (the 2030 generation) in order to enhance their engagement in peace and unification. In 2021, the government held the 2nd 2030 Z and Y Generation for Peace and Unification (P-UZY) Academy and the 2030 Generation Peace and Uni-

fication P-UZY Talk Concert in consideration of the interests of the 2030 generation, who value voluntary participation and horizontal dialogue.

The 2nd 2030 Generation Peace and Unification P-UZY Academy was carried out to elevate the 2030 generation's understanding of peace and unification. P-UZY means that peace (P) and unification (U) will be brought about by generations Z and Y. In other words, the 2030 generation will take the lead in peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula. The academy took place in Seoul, Yeongnam, Honam, and the central region. It was held in a way that participants in their 20s and 30s could determine their own positions on peace and unification issues through attending celebrity lectures, Q&A sessions, discussions, and consensus-building exercises.

In the second half of the year, the government held the 2030 Generation Peace and Unification P-UZY Talk Concert to build a consensus on peace and unification with the 2030 generation. Considering the pent-up desire for travel amid the prolonged pandemic, it selected the theme "Online Trip to North Korea" for the talk concert. Vice Minister of Unification Young-joon Choi, a songwriter, broadcaster, and singer took part as a panelist in the concert and shared his experiences and stories of his trips to North Korea. Through Q&A sessions among audience members in their 20s and 30s and the panelists, the participants in the talk concert shared with each other their thoughts on peace and unification.



The 2nd 2030 Generation Peace and Unification P-UZY Academy (May 27–Jul. 10)



2030 Generation Peace and Unification P-UZY Talk Concert (Oct. 30)

Section

4

The Operation of the Center for Unified Korean Future

1] Current Status

To nurture the future generation and promote inter-Korean events, the government operates the Center for Unified Korean Future in Yeoncheon, Gyeonggi Province where it carries out specialized unification programs for a variety of social classes and supports unification experience training programs for teenagers.

From the time of its opening in November 2014 to the end of 2021, the center has offered training to 851 groups and a total of 190,522 persons, thus doing much to build a consensus on unification and raise awareness about issues pertaining to unification. Since the center was designated as a residential treatment center for COVID-19 (Dec. 18, 2020), it was impossible to conduct training programs at the center in 2021. Instead, the center actively operated a visiting unification experiential training program as well as a virtual training program.

2] Operating Unification Experience Training Programs and Improving the Environment


(1) Operating unification experience programs for teenagers

As the only government-run unification education institution, the Center for Unified Korean Future conducts unification experiential training programs for elementary, middle, and high school students. It operates customized programs for specific groups including one-day training sessions, two-day/one-night training sessions, and three-

day/two-night training sessions.

In 2021, the center could not operate any of the unification experience training programs planned for 45 schools within the center due to COVID-19. Yet, it managed to continue functioning as a unification experiential learning institution by actively carrying out whatever meaningful projects it could. In anticipation of the prolonged complications posed by COVID-19, it redesigned its seven major programs such as the “Path Toward Unification,” “Talk Talk Talk Unification Generation,” “Unification Golden Bell Challenge,” “I AM a Character Designer,” “Unification ON,” “Unification Detective’s Office,” and “Making a Unification Calendar” as non-face-to-face programs, so they could be accessed live on online platforms.

With redesigned programs, the center proactively responded to the demand for training even in a changed environment. It provided non-face-to-face unification experiential training programs for 700 people from schools and 10 regional institutions that had made reservations beforehand.



Non-face-to-face experiential training program
(Oct. 25, Gaon High School in Anseong)



Non-face-to-face experiential training program (Nov. 19, Saenggeuk Middle School in Eumseong)

As part of the Visiting Unification Experiential Training program, the Center for Unified Korean Future visited 38 institutions including elementary, middle, and high schools as well as training facilities for teenagers in Chungcheong, Yeongnam, Honam, and Gangwon and conducted experiential training programs for them. These programs were carried out in local communities where residents could not easily visit the center due to their geographic locations. The programs thus expanded the geographical scope for providing the momentum to instill the meaning of peace and unification in teenagers.



Unification experiential training
(Sep. 7, Daegu House of Culture)



Unification experiential training (Nov. 3–5, Hwacheon
Information Industry High School)

While complying with COVID-19 prevention guidelines, the center produced individual experience activity kits that substantially increased the effectiveness of its programs. It also expanded its learning equipment by incorporating smart devices, including tablet PCs, in line with the government's policy on digital transitioning in educational infrastructure.



Experience kits ("Unification ON")



Use of experience kits

(2) Expanding the foundation for experiential training and improving the environment of its operation

In April, the center created a studio for creating and transmitting its online programs. It has therefore been able to offer education by combining online and offline programs even amid COVID-19 in response to changes in the educational environment. It also increased the effectiveness of training through real-time interactive communication with the teenagers participating in the unification experiential training programs.



Studio for non-face-to-face experiential training



Use of editing and transmission equipment

In preparation for the normalization of its operations, the center continued to improve its training facilities. It replaced some old screens with LED displays to attract the attention of teenagers and installed a piece of trick art with the road sign Asian Highway in its outside experience zone space (Korean Peninsula Touring Ground).



An improved screen at a training facility



Trick art with the road sign Asian Highway

At the same time, the center installed rain shields and safety railings on the route from the residence hall to the gymnasium (Eoullim Hall) to ensure that trainees could use the facilities more safely. It also renovated the outdoor stage and camping sites, creating a pleasant environment for unification experiential training.

The center replaced its old CCTV cameras to enhance safety and strengthen security within the center, repaired the sunken roads at the center, and replaced the outdoor landscape lighting, thus continuing to improve its facilities to increase the satisfaction of the trainees.



Installing rain shields



Renovating the outdoor stage

(3) Contributing to the government's policies on COVID-19 prevention

Because the Center for Unified Korean Future was designated and operated as a residential treatment center for COVID-19 (Dec. 18, 2020), it actively supported the government's policy on COVID-19 prevention. The center offered its 112 residence hall rooms and six family village houses along with its facilities and bedding. It regularly conducted maintenance on its air conditioning, heating, and other facilities; cleaned up its offices; and performed fire and safety inspections, thus offering the best support for the personnel to treat patients and respond to the COVID-19 situation in a more comfortable environment.



07

Consolidating the Foundation for Policy Implementation

- I – Providing a North Korea Information Service
- II – Establishing the Legal and Institutional Framework
- III – The Management and Operation of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund



일반 동향

김덕훈 내각총리, 최룡해 최고인민회의 상임위원장
원시요해 총망

1 주요 보도내용

- 김덕훈 내각총리는 황해제철연기금소스나, 노동운동과 농동맹운동 부문의 사망(17, 노동운동)을 판시하여 하였다.
- 황해제철연기금소스에서는 동강로 적당과 강철적장을 방문하여 5년간 계획 2년간을 맞아 기술혁신등을 통한 승진을 숙려한. 전공에서는 협의회가 구성 되어 능력 향상과 전담사업 추진 등을 도의임(17, 노동운동).
- 동맹부에서는 황해남도 여러 단위를 돌아보면서 사회주의농촌건설 강령 이행 및 과학농사 개발우의를 견지하면서 유기적협력비료공장들의 생산을 활성화를 위하여, 전경에서는 협의회가 구성되어, 올해 농촌건설계획 및 각종 공정계획 구제를 논의(17, 노동운동).
- 장공민 부문에서는 건강에 영향적응, 병명(미국군, 병명)기반공장을 방문하여 교육과 직육성에 대한 생산보장을 강조하였음. 전경에서는 협의회가 구성되어 교육기반 생산에 필요한 자료제공 공금문제를 도의임(17, 노동운동).
- 최룡해 최고인민회의 상임위원장은 평양(미발)연소를 판시하여 하였다(14, 노동운동).
- 원론서는 생산도장을 강화하여 증가한 전적수요를 보충하여 인민장제를 활성화 하고, 3대혁명 붉은기 장위운동 전개하여, 과학기술 역량 육성 사업을 신속 있게 진행할 것을 언급함.

2 분석

- 0 연초, 목민 인사들의 주요 산업장 방문이 이어짐.
- 내세를 맞아 재하기 4대4, 전경(21.12.27~31)의 결정에 따른 올해 생산 목표 달성을 특례하는 것으로 보임.



Chapter

7

Consolidating the Foundation for Policy Implementation

To increase the knowledge base (at home and abroad), the government has provided a North Korea information service, which is made up of the North Korea information portal (<http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr>) and the Information Center on North Korea, located on the fifth floor of the National Library of Korea in Seocho-dong, Seoul. In 2021, it improved the content and form of the “Weekly Report on North Korea,” a weekly collection and analysis of the main trends of North Korea that is posted on the portal. The reorganized “Weekly Report on North Korea” consists of “major reports” and “general reports” that address the key news content while presenting it in an easy-to-understand format. The government also improved convince of access for its “Weekly Report on North Korea.”

In addition, the Information Center on North Korea website makes it possible to search a listing of articles from major North Korean newspapers, including *Rodong Sinmun*, to help people find and read North Korean newspapers. The government has expanded the availability and scope of North Korean information and allowed the sending and receiving of the information online between institutions that handle special information.

In accordance with the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, the government formulated the Third Master Plan on the Development of Inter-Korean Relations (2018–2022) based on the Jae-in Moon administration’s Korean Peninsula policy, and it has established annual implementation plans since then. The 2021 Implementation Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations assessed the achievements of 2020 and set forth an agenda for 2021 while adhering to the basic policy direction of inter-Korean development as outlined in the third master

plan.

The government has continued to improve the legal and institutional framework in preparation for the process of national integration, during and after unification. It convened meetings of the Unification Legislation Promotion Committee, a consultative body that shares opinions with the relevant ministries and non-governmental experts, four times and gathered opinions on the issues and policy studies regarding unification legislation. It also sought to commission policy research on unification legislation and held joint academic conferences that new up-and-coming researchers have participated in. The government is working to ensure that the legislative goals of a partial amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act can be realized.

In 2021, the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund had a budget of KRW 1.6756 trillion (project expenses of KRW 1.2431 trillion) for expanding its system to sustainably provide support for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation in anticipation for a change in circumstances including an improvement in inter-Korean relations. The government has used the funding from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund for objectives that support for the development of inter-Korean relations and the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, including the implementation of the Panmunjeom Declaration; support for social and cultural exchanges; support for reunions between separated families; humanitarian assistance and cooperative support for people's livelihood; and the laying of a foundation for inter-Korean economic cooperation.

Section

1

Providing a North Korean Information Service

1] Operating the North Korea Information Portal

Since 2011, the government has established a comprehensive North Korea database according to a phased plan. In 2013, it implemented the North Korea information portal (<http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr>) to increase the public's access to information about North Korea. It launched the portal's services on January 27, 2014 and has continued to add relevant data and research materials to expand and improve the database.

To help the people gain an objective understanding of North Korea, the main content of the portal includes the latest trends in North Korea on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis, and the latest information by subject area, including politics, the military, the economy, the society, culture, and education. There are also references works including a who's who of important North Korean figures, a dictionary, statistics, publications, and multimedia. Additional services include North Korean TV program schedules, an organizational chart of the North Korean leadership, and a schedule of major events. The portal also provides a map service that allows users to search through 300,000 names of regions and facilities.

In 2021, to provide a solid base of information about North Korea, the government reorganized the "Weekly Report on North Korea" with the aim of providing more meaningful information with analysis rather than just simply delivering the content of North Korean media reports.

In addition, it provided a list of articles of North Korean newspapers that are linked to the Information Center on North Korea and a summary of public comments on North Korea by key personnel from major countries, including the United States and China. It also presented visualized graphs with statistical data for each indicator of North Korea's

of the National Library of Korea.

It has pushed ahead to expand the disclosure of information about North Korea to increase the public's understanding of North Korea and build a consensus on unification. In 2021, it posted a list of one million articles from four North Korean newspapers including *Rodong Simmun* on the homepage, increasing the search rate of North Korean information. Access to the center's homepage increased over 50% from the previous year by 850,000 visits. It has also expanded the availability and scope of North Korean information while allowing the sending and receiving of information online among institutions that handle special information.



The search result screen before and after a list of articles in North Korean newspapers appear on the homepage

In 2010, the government established a foundation for a digital service of North Korean data and has since operated a digital archive system of the data. In 2021, as the use of the digital archive system increased, the center added more computers to allow more visitors to browse for information. It also installed a computer dedicated to the search of Korean Central TV (KCTV) material and uploaded video digital content on North Korea to its archive system, thus enabling people to search for KCTV content more conveniently.

In 2021, the Information Center on North Korea could only be used on a limited basis through pre-booking due to COVID-19. The pre-booking service was operated flexibly for morning and afternoon reservation periods, thereby doubling the number of visitors and increasing the convenience of their use. The Information Center on North Korea also discovered a number of original North Korean materials from the 1940s and 1950s with historical and academic value among the materials housed at the center and set up a display space for them.



A computer dedicated to KCTV content



A display of North Korean original materials from the 1940s and 1950s

The center has a collection of 112,569 materials on North Korea, including 81,000 books, 13,900 periodicals, 10,100 audio and video materials, and 6,800 Ministry of Unification publications. A total of 35,837 of these materials, including 23,773 books, were published in North Korea.



North Korean Materials Held by the Information Center on North Korea

(As of Dec. 31, 2021)

Category	Books	Periodicals	Audio & video materials	Total
Number of materials	23,773	4,712	7,352	35,837

On the homepage of the Information Center on North Korea, users can search the listing of articles and research material housed at the center, an introduction to North Korean films, and lists of North Korean textbooks and cartoons. The home page also provides the full text of 4,000 materials published by the Ministry of Unification and 3,000 materials published by the Korea Institute for National Unification. Visitors are free to access 9,000 academic databases related to unification and North Korea, as well as the original text databases of the National Library of Korea and the National Assembly Library.

The center holds 4,700 North Korean films and has facilitated the screening of them at the request of institutions and groups since 1990. In 2021, it conducted a policy study on 200 North Korean art films to provide more information on them to the public and has laid the groundwork for expanding the targets of support for North Korean film screenings.

Section

2

Establishing the Legal and Institutional Framework

1 Establishing and Implementing the 2021 Implementation Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations

(1) Establishing the 2021 Implementation Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations

To establish and implement a systematic, sustained North Korea policy in accordance with the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act, the government formulates a master plan for the development of inter-Korean relations that presents the vision, goals, and basic policy direction for the development of inter-Korean relations every five years and creates annual implementation plans to carry out the master plan.

In 2021, the government formulated the 2021 Implementation Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations, the fourth annual plan for the Third Master Plan on the Development of Inter-Korean Relations (2018-2022).

To this end, it drew up an implementation plan proposal after gathering various opinions from the heads of 41 central administrative agencies including the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of National Defense; non-governmental members of the Inter-Korean Relations Development Committee; and policy experts (January to March).

On March 4–17, the Working Group of the Inter-Korean Relations Development Committee (a body with the Vice Minister of Unification as chair and senior officials from each ministry as members) deliberated on the 2021 Implementation Plan in a written correspondence meeting. Then, from March 25 to April 2, the Inter-Korean Relations Development Committee (a body with the Minister of Unification as chair

and vice ministers from 14 ministries and 10 non-government members as members) held a written correspondence meeting to deliberate on the implementation plan, in accordance with the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act.

The Minister of Unification finalized the plan in consideration of the outcome of the deliberations on April 26, it to the National Assembly on April 27, and announced it to the public in the official gazette on May 3.

(2) Main Content

The 2021 Implementation Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations was prepared amid the changing situation including the inauguration of a new presidential administration in the United States and the evolving COVID-19 situation. Thus, it mainly addressed plans to ensure that inter-Korean relations take a turn for the better, based on the three principles to address the issues of the Korean Peninsula: zero tolerance for war, mutual security guarantees, and co-prosperity. It also included plans to establish a community of life and safety on the Korean Peninsula and resume inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. The government sought to begin with cooperation to overcome the COVID-19 crisis and pursue initiatives of comprehensive cooperation in healthcare, the prevention of infectious diseases, the environment, forestry, and the people's livelihood. It established a plan to further strengthen the foundation for decentralized governance in pursuing North Korean policy by expanding the participation support of local governments and NGOs. Meanwhile, it tried to build public support for a National Unification Contract and pursued policy cooperation with major countries, thereby continuing to strengthen the support base at home and abroad for making progress in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula.

The 2021 Implementation Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations consisted of 16 tasks to carry out the 7 main tasks set forth in the Third Master Plan on the Development of Inter-Korean Relations.

 **Tasks in the 2021 Implementation Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations**

Seven Main Tasks	Tasks
1. Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and establishing a peace regime	1-1. Facilitate complete denuclearization
	1-2. Create the conditions for a peace regime by building military confidence
2. Inter-Korean dialogue	2-1. Resume inter-Korean dialogue
	2-2. Establish sustainable inter-Korean relations through institutionalization
3. Inter-Korean exchange and cooperation	3-1. Promote exchange and cooperation in diverse areas
	3-2. Expand the legal basis for greater exchange and cooperation
4. Implementing a New Economic Map Initiative for the Korean Peninsula	4-1. Realize a New Economic Map Initiative for the Korean Peninsula
	4-2. Prepare for inter-Korean economic cooperation
5. Humanitarian cooperation	5-1. Resolve the issues of separated families, etc
	5-2. Substantially improve human rights in North Korea
	5-3. Increase humanitarian cooperation to improve the living conditions of North Korean people
6. Settlement support for North Korean defectors	6-1. Carry out policy for North Korean defectors in consideration their everyday needs
	6-2. Facilitate the social assimilation of North Korean defectors
7. Expanding the consensus on peaceful unification and improving unification capabilities	7-1. Build a public consensus on North Korea policy
	7-2. Promote unification education based on social consensus
	7-3. Increase international cooperation for peaceful unification

The government strove to carry out the tasks set forth in the 2021 Implementation Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations in close cooperation with the relevant ministries while maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and providing momentum for denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

2 Establishment of Unification Legislation

The government continues to pursue research in various legal and institutional areas and is working to improve its framework for national integration, during and after unification, through inter-agency cooperation and cooperation with experts in the private sector.

In 2021, it convened the Unification Legislation Promotion Committee four times (Mar. 12, Jun. 16, Oct. 7, and Dec. 6) to facilitate a sharing of ideas among officials from the relevant ministries and experts from the private sector, thus gathering extensive opinions on unification legislation issues and policy research tasks.

On December 16, 2021, the Ministry of Unification held a joint academic conference with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Government Legislation to share the results of its research on unification legislation with the relevant ministries and propose research subjects to address in the future. The coordinated approach helped to avoid some duplication of work and paved the way for more in-depth studies based on the results of each ministry's research work. On December 2, the government worked with Center for Constitution and Unification Law at the Seoul National University to jointly hold the academic conference "Issues and tasks to expand the infrastructure for unification legislation: A focus on North Korea's legislation regarding land, the environment, and transportation." It is continuing to facilitate research on unification legislation and nurture new up-and-coming researchers in the academic world.



A joint academic conference co-hosted by the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Government Legislation (Dec. 16)

The government has pursued long-term policy studies on unification legislation by commissioning research on plans to improve social welfare and cultural exchange legislation regarding in preparation for an era of a South-North Confederation.

In 2021, a partial amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act was promulgated after it passed in the National Assembly on September 28. The amendment established legal grounds for financially supporting local governments, non-profit corporations, and non-profit NGOs that are laying the foundation necessary for the development of inter-Korean relations. It also specified that the central government could carry out a project to establish the groundwork in local areas that is necessary for development of inter-Korean relations. The government is striving to ensure that the aims of the revised provisions are realized.

Meanwhile, the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (partially revised on Dec. 29, 2020) that specified the prohibition of violating the inter-Korean agreements, including the dissemination of leaflets, took effect on March 30. On March 9, by enacting guidelines of interpretation specified in Article 24 Paragraph 1(3) of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (established rule of the Ministry of Unification), it clearly specified the scope and application of the law. Through smooth enforcement of the revised provisions, the government fully prepared itself to protect the lives and property of the people in border areas.

The Management and Operation of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund

1 Revenue of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund

The revenue of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund for 2021 was KRW 492.9 billion. A total of KRW 100 billion was received from the general account to repay the interest on the light water reactor-related Public Capital Management Fund and to cover the fund's business expenses. Another KRW 237 billion was received from the Public Capital Management Fund to repay the principal on deposits from the Public Capital Management Fund. The recovered surplus fund was KRW 141.9 billion including KRW 20.5 billion from banks and KRW 121.4 billion from non-banking financial institutions including securities firms. The self-generated revenue was KRW 14 billion, including the recovery of funds after the settlement of project expenses.



Sources of Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (2016–2021)

(Unit: 1 hundred million KRW)

Category	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Total	10,607	11,967	6,411	4,008	7,941	4,929
Government contributions	925	1,830	637	1,000	1,500	1,000
Deposits from the Public Capital Management Fund	2,070	7,650	2,784	2,030	5,486	2,370
Recovered surplus funds	7,242	2,304	2,789	846	624	1,419
Self-generated revenue	370	183	201	132	331	140

2] Expenditures of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund

In 2021, the government formulated a budget of KRW 1.6756 trillion (including project expenses of KRW 1.2431 trillion) for the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund and obtained approval for it from the National Assembly. To fund the projects, the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council convened meetings five times (its 318th to 322nd sessions) and the Management and Deliberation Committee of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund convened meetings nine times (its 174th to 182nd sessions). The two bodies resolved to fund a total of KRW 46.8 billion and discharged KRW 31.2 billion (including KRW 526.43 million carried over from 2020, a 2.5% budget discharge rate).

More specifically, it discharged a total of KRW 3.424 billion for inter-Korean social and cultural exchange projects including KRW 2.507 billion for the joint publication of *Gyeoremal-keunsajeon* (The Grand Dictionary of the Korean People's Language), an ongoing academic cooperation project to restore the national community; KRW 426 million for the digital restoration of Manwoldae in Gaeseong and operation of the digital archive, a cooperation project in cultural heritage; and KRW 493 million for a traveling exhibition of Manwoldae artifacts discovered at the site over the past 12 years.

To support reunions between separated families, it discharged KRW 1.477 billion for video messages, DNA testing, and a survey of separated families, in preparation for separated family reunions in the future, though no reunions were held due to the lull in inter-Korean relations. It also disbursed KRW 120 million to private organizations that arranged inter-Korean exchanges to facilitate reunions between separated families at the private level, and for the expenses of such exchanges. Finally, it disbursed KRW 683 million for the construction of video reunion centers for separated family members in response to the COVID-19 situation.

For North Korea humanitarian assistance, it released KRW 199 million for research in preparation for health and medical cooperation with North Korea, KRW 804 million to NGOs involved in humanitarian aid, development, and cooperation for North Korea, and KRW 705 million for the establishment and operation of an integrated management system of aid projects for North Korea.

To enable greater inter-Korean economic cooperation, the government supported

internal projects in preparation for the resumption of inter-Korean consultations, inter-Korean exchange, and cooperation projects to implement the agreements made in the Panmunjeom Declaration. It allocated KRW 3.416 billion to the South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association to support exchange and cooperation projects by local governments and NGOs and KRW 870 million for the DMZ Peace Trail. It distributed another KRW 12.239 billion for DMZ-related expenses including KRW 1.396 billion for the comprehensive management and operation of tours to Panmunjeom; KRW 4.313 billion for creating a space for peace, unification, and culture in the DMZ; and KRW 884 million for establishing a comprehensive DMZ management system and holding a DMZ forum.

To support the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC), it disbursed KRW 8.406 billion for the operation of the Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation to help the GIC companies stabilize their businesses, thereby continuing stable management of the GIC amid its suspension and in preparation for its reopening.

For the Center for Unified Korean Future, it disbursed KRW 3.121 billion for the operation of peace and unification experience training programs to expand the consensus on unification and for the maintenance of facilities.



Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Expenditures [2016–2021]

(Unit: 1 hundred million KRW)

Category		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Project expenses	Center for Unified Korean Future	41	42	42	70	32	31
	Inter-Korean social and cultural exchange	23	37	100	37	42	34
	Resolution of humanitarian issues	23	20	78	358	151	40
	Inter-Korean economic cooperation	3,848	405	1,760	197	128	122
	Support for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex	1,359	181	138	88	88	84
	Subtotal	5,295	684	2,117	750	442	311
Repayment of principal and interest on deposits of the Public Capital Management Fund		2,982	8,470	3,420	2,610	6,056	2,831
Management of surplus funds		2,304	2,789	846	624	1,419	1,763
Management expenses		26	25	28	23	23	23
Total		10,607	11,967	6,411	4,008	7,941	4,929

For internal transactions, it disbursed KRW 283.1 billion including KRW 237 billion for the repayment of principal on deposits of the Public Capital Management Fund, KRW 46.1 billion for the repayment of interest on the deposits, and KRW 2.339 billion for management expenses of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.

3 Breakdown of 2021 Expenditures

(Unit: KRW million)

Project	Amount	Project category
Operation of the Center for Unified Korean Future	3,121	Center for Unified Korean Future (75 projects, 3,121)
Joint publication of <i>Gyeoremal-keunsajeon</i> (The Grand Dictionary of the Korean People's Language)	2,507	Social and cultural exchange (15 projects, 3,424)
Operation of the digital archive for artifacts jointly discovered at Manwoldae in Gaeseong	70	
Digital restoration of Manwoldae in Gaeseong	356	
A traveling exhibition of Manwoldae artifacts discovered over the past 12 years	493	
Promoting reunions of separated families	120	Resolution of humanitarian issues (39 projects, 3,988)
Conducting a survey of separated families	800	
Producing video messages of separated family members	285	
Building video reunion centers for separated families	684	
DNA testing of separated families	392	
An inter-Korean agricultural cooperation project	74	
Assistance for infants, etc. in North Korea	730	
Establishment and operation of an integrated management system of aid programs for North Korea	705	
Support for research on the establishment of a roadmap for cooperation with North Korea in addressing non-communicable, chronic diseases	50	
Support for a project with the international community to establish a network of health and medical cooperation with North Korea	50	
Support for publishing a glossary of terms about infectious diseases in South and North Korea	20	
Support for research on a plan to pursue cooperation with North Korea in addressing infectious diseases	50	
Support for holding a roundtable meeting on health and medical cooperation on the Korean Peninsula	30	

Project	Amount	Project category
Commissioning the South-North Korea Exchanges and Cooperation Support Association to carry out projects	3,416	Inter-Korean economic cooperation (178 projects, 12,240)
Operation of the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office	148	
Support for the comprehensive management and operation of tours to Panmunjeom	4,214	
Support for a project to create a space for peace, unification, and culture in the DMZ	4,313	
Support for pursuing an international forum on DMZ peace and cooperation	145	
Operation of the Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation and the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee (KIDMAC) (Laying the foundation for the GIC's operations)	6,104	Support for the GIC (8 projects, 8,406)
Operation of the Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation and the Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee (KIDMAC) (Loans for GIC operations)	2,302	
Total	31,179	315 projects

※ Due to rounding, totals may not correspond with the sum of the separate figures.

APPENDIX



- I – Timeline of Two Koreas
- II – Statistics on Inter-Korean Relations
- III – Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund
- IV – Current Status of the National Tasks of the Ministry of Unification



I Timeline of Two Koreas

January

- **January 1, Chairman Jong-un Kim's New Year's Day letter to North Korean people**
- **January 5 – 12, the 8th Party Congress of Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) (Rodong, KCNA)**
 - "Depending on the attitude of South Korea, the inter-Korean relations can once again return to that the spring of three years ago, to the new starting point towards peace and prosperity, just as much as they wish for the whole peninsula."
- **January 7, President Jae-in Moon's address at the New Year's Online Gathering**
 - "If conditions allow, every last effort will be made to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, establish permanent peace and advance inter-Korean relations."
- **January 11, President Moon's New Year's Address**
 - "Our determination to meet at any time and any place and talk even in a contact-free manner remains unchanged."
- **January 12, the statement of Yo-jong Kim, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the WPK (KCNA)**
 - "Joint Chiefs of Staff of South Korea made a senseless claim that it detected North Korea holding a military parade on the late night of January 10 and is closely tracking down for any additional signs. This is ridiculous."
- **January 14, North Korea holds a military parade celebrating the 8th Party Congress of the WPK (Rodong, KCNA)**
- **January 17, the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) of North Korea holds its 4th Session (Rodong, KCNA)**
- **January 18, President Moon's New Year Press Conference**
 - "I am willing to meet with Chairman Kim anywhere and anytime. I am sure that once the talks between the two leaders take place in a consistent manner, Chairman Kim would someday visit South Korea when there is enough trust built through the talks."
- **January 21, President Moon's makes opening remarks at the plenary meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) and at the work reports of ministries**
 - "The peace process on the Korean Peninsula is not an option but a path we must take."

February

- **February 4, Phone call between the ROK-U.S. Presidents**
 - “President Moon said that the two countries should work together to advance denuclearization and the establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.
 - “Noting the efforts of Korea as a main player in resolving Korean Peninsula issues, President Biden said that it is important to be on the same page with Korea and that he will closely work together with Korea toward common goals.
- **February 8 – 11, North Korea holds the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (Rodong, KCNA)**

March

- **March 1, Address by President Jae-in Moon on 102nd March First Independence Movement Day**
 - “We will also continue to make efforts for denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. We will develop inter-Korean relations based on the three principles of zero tolerance for war, mutual security guarantees and common prosperity.”
 - “I hope that North Korea will cooperate and interact with the countries in the region, beginning with its participation in the Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative that aims to protect peoples’ lives and safety. This will become a driving force to create a breakthrough for mutual benefit and peace on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia.”
- **March 3, North Korea holds the 13th Plenary Meeting of the 14th Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) (Rodong, KCNA)**
- **March 8 -18, ROK-U.S. Combined Command Post Exercise (CPX)**
- **March 15, Yo-jong Kim, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the WPK, issues a statement (Rodong, KCNA)**
 - “We foresee a special measure of resolutely abrogating the North-South military agreement.”
 - “Those warm spring days of three years ago, which they desire so much, won’t easily come again.”
- **March 17, Choe Son Hui, the First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), issues a statement (March 18, KCNA)**
 - “We have already clarified our stance that no DPRK-U.S. contact and dialogue of any kind can be possible unless the U.S. rolls back its hostile policy towards the DPRK. Therefore, we will disregard any such attempt by the U.S. in the future.”
- **March 17, ROK-U.S. Foreign Ministers’ Talks (Seoul)**
- **March 17, ROK-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Talks (Seoul)**
- **March 18, 5th ROK-US Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) (Seoul)**
- **March 18 – 19, U.S.-China High-level Meeting (Anchorage, Alaska)**
- **March 22, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Chairman Jong-un Kim exchange verbal messages**

- **March 25, North Korea launches two short-range missiles into the waters of the East Sea**
- **March 26, North Korea announces that the Academy of National Defense Science of North Korea test-fired a new-type tactical guided projectile (Hamju, South Hamgyong Province) (Rodong, KCNA)**
 - "Today's test is important in carrying out the policy of defense science set forth at the 8th Congress of the WPK."
- **March 26, President Moon addressed on 6th West Sea Defense Day**
 - "I can confidently say to the people that our country is equipped with a firm security readiness to repel any provocations with national defense capabilities and ROK-U.S. alliance that remain stronger than ever before."
- **March 26, Ri Pyong Chol, Secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK issues a statement (March 27, KCNA)**
 - "I believe that the new administration of the United States has started on the wrong foot. The United States may face unfavorable things in its way if it continues to speak senselessly without weighing its words properly."
- **March 28, Jo Chol Su, Director General for International Organizations at the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK, issues a statement (March 29, KCNA)**
 - "It constitutes a denial of a sovereign state and an apparent double standard that the UNSC takes issue with the exercise of our right of self-defense, a normal state activity, on the basis of UN 'resolutions' – direct products of the U.S.'s hostile policy."
- **March 30, Enforcement of the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act and its interpretation guidelines**
- **March 30, Yo-jong Kim, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the WPK, issues a statement (KCNA)**
 - "South Korea claims that its Agency for Defense Development test-fires ballistic missiles for peace and dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, but expresses concern for our act because it undermines the dialogue atmosphere in an undesirable way. This is height of effrontery."

April

- **April 2, ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral National Security Advisors' Dialogue (Annapolis, US)**
 - "The national security advisors shared their concerns about North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and reaffirmed their commitment to address and resolve these issues through concerted trilateral cooperation towards denuclearization."
- **April 3, ROK-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting (Xiamen, China)**
- **April 5, North Korea's Olympic Committee decides at its General Assembly (March 25) not to participate in the Tokyo Olympics (April 6, Ministry of Physical Culture and Sports official website)**
- **April 6, ROK government commences a 2021 survey of separated families**
- **April 8, Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council holds its 320th session**

- The Council deliberated and resolved matters as funding the reconstruction of Bima Bridge in the Cheorwon section of the DMZ Peace Trails and the establishment of the comprehensive DMZ system from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund; and an amendment of the Asset Management Guidelines of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.

- **April 12, China appoints Liu Xiaoming, a former Ambassador to North Korea, as its new Special Representative on Korean Peninsula Affairs**
- **April 27, President Moon gives opening remarks at the 18th Cabinet Meeting on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Panmunjeom Declaration**
 - "The moment to end long deliberations and resume dialogue is approaching."
- **April 30, the U.S. White House Spokesperson announces the completion of North Korean policy review**
 - "Our policy calls for a calibrated practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with the DPRK, and to make practical progress that increases the security of the United States allies and deployed forces."
 - "We have and will continue to consult with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and other allies and partners at every step along the way."

May

- **May 2, Yo-jong Kim, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the WPK releases a statement (Rodong, KCNA)**
 - "We regard the disruption committed by the garbage human in South Korea as a serious provocation against our state and will review corresponding action.", "We can no longer stand idly by."
- **May 2, Kwon Jong Gun, Director General of the Department of U.S. Affairs of the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK, issues a statement (KCNA)**
 - "Now that the foundation of America's hostile policy toward DPRK is clear, we are left with no choice but to seek corresponding measures. The U.S. will find itself in a very grave situation as time passes by."
- **May 3, ROK-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting (London)**
- **May 5, ROK-U.S.-Japan Foreign Ministers' Meeting (London)**
- **May 10, President Moon's Special Address to mark four years in office**
 - "I will not be pressed by time or become impatient during the remainder of my term. However, if there is an opportunity to restart the clock of peace and advance the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, I will do everything I can."
 - "I look forward to North Korea responding positively. I hope that we will be able to build peace and move toward prosperity together. We have seen the clear potential for issues to be solved diplomatically."
- **May 16, the Asian Football Confederation website confirms the withdrawal of North Korea from the Asian qualifiers for FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022**
- **May 21, ROK-U.S. Summit (Washington D.C.)**

- "We also reaffirm our common belief that diplomacy and dialogue, based on previous inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK commitments such as the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and Singapore Joint Statement, are essential to achieve the complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula."
- "President Biden also expresses his support for inter-Korean dialogue, engagement, and cooperation."
- "We agree to work together to improve the human rights situation in the DPRK and commit to continue facilitating the provision of humanitarian aid to the neediest North Koreans."
- "We also share our willingness to help facilitate the reunion of separated families of the two Koreas."
- "We also agree to coordinate our approaches to the DPRK in lockstep."

- **May 31, North Korea publishes the article, "What is Aim of the Termination of 'Missile Guidelines?'" (KCNA)**

June

- **June 4, 321st session of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council**
 - 1) Funding from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to establish more video reunion centers, 2) Change in the interest rate on the outstanding loan from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, 3) Change in the terms of repayment of the loan of the Korea Tourism Organization to the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund for the Mount Geumgang tourism project.
- **June 4, Chairman Kim presided over the first meeting of the Political Bureau of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK**
- **June 6, President Moon's Address on the 66th Memorial Day**
 - "President Biden and I... agreed that dialogue and diplomacy are the only ways to achieve denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula."
- **June 9, ROK-China Foreign Ministers' phone call**
- **June 11, Chairman Kim presided over the second Enlarged Meeting of the 8th Central Military Commission of the WPK**
- **June 12, ROK-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting (Cornwall, UK)**
- **June 13, G7 Leaders' Communiqué (Cornwall, UK)**
- **June 15, 21st Anniversary of June 15 South-North Joint Declaration**
- **June 15 – 18, Chairman Kim presided over the third plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK**
- **June 16, One year since North Korea demolished the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office in Gaeseong**
- **June 19 – 23, Consultation between the top nuclear envoys of the ROK, the US, and Japan (Seoul)**
- **June 22, Statement of Yo-jong Kim, the Vice Department Director in the Central Committee of the WPK (KCNA)**
 - "A Korean proverb says: 'In a dream, what counts most is to read it, not to have it.' It seems that the U.S. may interpret the situation in such a way as to seek comfort for itself. The expectation, which they chose to harbour the wrong way, would plunge them into a greater disappointment."

- **June 22, Unification Minister Lee met with Sung Kim, the US Special Representative for the DPRK (Seoul)**
- **June 23, Statement of Ri Son Gwon, Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea (KCNA)**
 - “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK welcomes the clear-cut press statement issued by the vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is to brush off hasty judgment, conjecture, and expectations of the U.S.”
 - “We are not considering even the possibility of any contact with the U.S., let alone having it, which would get us nowhere, only taking up precious time.”
- **June 24, the end of the excavation of war remains in South Korea’s side of Arrowhead Hill (April 1, 2019 – June 24, 2021). A total of 424 remains excavated.**
- **June 29, Chairman Kim presided the second Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (Rodong, KCNA)**

July

- **July 1, Chairman Kim sent a message of congratulations to President Xi for the 100th anniversary of the party foundation (Rodong, KCNA)**
 - “Hostile forces’ vicious slander and all-round pressure upon the CPC are no more than a last-ditch attempt, and they can never check the on-going advance of the Chinese people, rallied closely around General Secretary Xi, toward a fresh victory.”
- **July 5, Social Dialogue for Peace and Unification Building of Korea delivers a National Unification Contract and Recommendations to Minister of Unification Lee**
 - Unification Minister Lee, “The government will do its best to gain the support for the Contract from the ruling and opposition parties in close cooperation with the National Assembly.”
- **July 11, Exchange of messages between the leaders of North Korea and China to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (Rodong, KCNA)**
- **July 13, North Korea presented its Voluntary National Reviews (VNR) at the United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF)**
- **July 21, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) confirmed Brisbane as the host of 2032 Summer Olympics**
- **July 22, Unification Minister Lee met with Wendy Sherman, the Deputy Secretary of State (Seoul)**
- **July 24, Chairman Kim sent Chinese President Xi Jinping a verbal message of sympathy over the flood damage (Rodong, KCNA)**
- **July 24, Restoration of the inter-Korean liaison lines (during a press conference by a presidential senior secretary for public communication)**
 - “Since April, the leaders have exchanged multiple letters to restart inter-Korean relations. During the process, the two sides first agreed to restore the cut-off communication links.”
 - “Also, the leaders agreed to rebuild mutual trust as soon as possible and further develop inter-Korean relations.”

- **July 27, North Korea reported the restoration of the inter-Korean liaison lines (KCNA)**
 - “Now, the whole Korean nation desires to see North-South relations recovered from setbacks and stagnation as quickly as possible. The top leaders of North Korea and North Korea agreed, through recent exchanges of personal letters, to make a big stride toward rebuilding the mutual trust and promoting reconciliation by restoring the inter-Korean communication liaison lines.”
- **July 29, South Korea proposed the video conferencing system**
- **July 30, Unification Vice Minister Choi met with Xing Haiming, Chinese Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (Seoul)**
- **July 30, Ministry of Unification approves two requests from civilian organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea**

August

- **August 1, Statement of Yo-jong Kim, the Vice Department Director in the Central Committee of the WPK (KCNA)**
 - “Our government and military will keep a close eye on whether the South Koreans go ahead with the aggressive war exercises in August, or make a big decision. Hope or despair? It’s not up to us.”
- **August 6, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Foreign Ministers’ Talks (Virtual)**
 - North Korean ambassador to Indonesia An Kwang Il, “North Korea remains unmoved in its determination for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.”
- **August 10, Statement of Yo-jong Kim, the Vice Department Director in the Central Committee of the WPK (KCNA)**
 - “The joint military drills are the most vivid expression of the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK, designed to stifle our state by force, and an unwelcome act of self-destruction for which a dear price should be paid as they threaten the safety of our people and further imperil the situation on the Korean Peninsula.”
 - “For peace to take root on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. should pull back the armed forces of invasion and war equipment deployed in South Korea.”
- **August 10, North Korea didn’t respond to South Korea’s calls (joint liaison office and military communication line)**
 - The opening calls on the hotlines were made as usual at 9 a.m. North Korea declined to answer the closing phone calls that afternoon on the military hotline (16:00) and the Inter-Korean Liaison Office line (17:00).
- **August 11, Statement of yong-chol Kim, head of the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the WPK (KCNA)**
 - “They must be made to clearly understand how dearly they have to pay for answering our good faith with hostile acts after letting the opportunity go for improved inter-Korean relations.”
- **August 15, Address by President Moon on Korea’s 76th Liberation Day**

- “Although unification may take some more time, we can create a Korean Peninsula model in which the two Koreas coexist and contribute to the prosperity of Northeast Asia as a whole through denuclearization and permanent peace on the Peninsula.

- **August 16 – 26, ROK-U.S. 2nd Combined Command Post Training (21-2 CCPT)**
- **August 23, ROK-U.S. Special Representative for North Korea meeting (Seoul)**
- **August 24, ROK-Russia Special Representative for North Korea meeting (Seoul)**
- **August 25, Unification Minister Lee met Igor Morgulov, the Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of Asia Pacific (Seoul)**

September

- **September 8, the IOC suspended North Korea until the end of 2022**
- **September 13, North Korea’s Academy of National Defense Science test-fired a new long-range cruise missile between September 11 and 12 (Rodong, KCNA)**
 - “(North Korea) developed the long-range cruise missile, a strategic weapon of great significance in meeting the key target of the five-year plan for the development of defense science and the weapon system set forth at the 8th Congress of the Party.”
- **September 13 – 14, ROK, US, and Japanese chief negotiators on the North Korean nuclear issue held a meeting (Tokyo)**
- **September 14, the Amendment to the Rules on Humanitarian Assistance and Cooperation Programs for North Korea takes effect**
 - 1) Local governments (17 upper-level and 226 lower-level local governments) shall be collectively designated as the operators of aid programs for North Korea, and no application procedures shall be required, 2) They may obtain funding for their aid programs for North Korea from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund if necessary, 3) As for the programs that are partly funded by local government subsidies, the Minister of Unification shall notify the head of an appropriate administrative agency within seven days from the date when a report on shipments is received.
- **September 14- 15, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Wi visited Seoul and held a meeting with his South Korean counterpart and makes a courtesy call on ROK President Moon**
- **September 15, North Korea fired two ballistic missiles on its east coast**
- **September 15, President Moon watched the test-firing of the first SLBM**
 - “He successful testing of the SLBM and other missiles on the day has demonstrated that South Korea has sufficient deterrent to counter any North Korean provocation at any time.”
- **September 15, Statement of Yo-jong Kim, the Vice Department Director in the Central Committee of the WPK (KCNA)**
 - “If even the president supports the act of faulting and hurting the dialogue partner, it will naturally result in a corresponding action and then the North-South relations will be pushed toward complete destruction.”

- **September 16, North Korea's railway-borne missile regiment held a firing drill on September 15 (Rodong, KCNA)**
- **September 17, South and North Korea marked the 30th anniversary of the simultaneous admission into the United Nations**
- **September 20, Jang Chang Ha, president of the Academy of National Defense Science, issued a press statement regarding the ROK military's SLBM test-firing (KCNA)**
 - "If what South Korea opened to the public and trumpeted so much is an SLBM, it is just in the elementary stage."
- **September 21, President Moon's address at the 76th UN General Assembly**
 - "More than anything, an end-of-war declaration will mark a pivotal point of departure in creating a new order of reconciliation and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula."
 - "Today, I once again urge the community of nations to mobilize its strengths for the end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula and propose that three parties of the two Koreas and the US, or four parties of the two Koreas, the US and China come together and declare that the War on the Korean Peninsula is over."
- **September 24, Statement of Ri Tae Sung, Vice Foreign Minister (KCNA)**
 - "What we see in reality is that the adoption of the declaration of the termination of the war is something premature."
 - "As long as there remains the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK, the biggest stumbling block to the end of the war, the termination of the war will merely be nominal even though it is declared."
- **September 24, South Korea held the 322nd session of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council**
 - 1) Render funds of less than KRW 10 billion for nutrition and health cooperation programs in North Korea, 2) Render funds of less than KRW 1.17093 billion for land compensation for the railway restoration project in the south section of the Gyeongwon Line, 3) Render funds of less than KRW 720 million for the road renovation project in the Goseong section of the DMZ Peace Trails
- **September 24, Statement of Yo-jong Kim, the Vice Department Director in the Central Committee of the WPK (KCNA)**
 - "The declaration of the termination of the war is an interesting and an admirable idea."
- **September 25, Statement of Yo-jong Kim, the Vice Department Director in the Central Committee of the WPK (KCNA)**
 - "I think that only when impartiality and the attitude of respecting each other are maintained can there be smooth understanding between North Korea and South Korea.... can several issues for improving relations including the re-establishment of the North-South joint liaison office and the North-South summit, to say nothing of the timely declaration of the significant termination of the war, see meaningful and successful solution one by one at an early date through constructive discussions."
- **September 27, Kim Song, Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations gave a speech at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly**

- "If the U.S. shows its bold decision to give up its hostile policy, we are also prepared to respond willingly at any time."
- "What we mean by the war deterrent is literally the righteous right to self-defense that can deter aggressive war and defend ourselves. However, we do not want to use those means aiming at somebody."

- **September 28, North Korea fired a short-range missile into the East Sea**
- **September 29, Academy of National Defense Science test-fired the newly developed hypersonic missile Hwasong-8 on September 28 (Rodong, KCNA)**
- **September 29, Jong-un Kim delivered a speech at the 5th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly**
 - "It is our unchanging demand, which we continue to ask, that we guarantee respect for each other and first withdraw the biased perspective towards the other party, the unfair double standards, and the hostile perspective and policies, before we declare the end of war."
 - "...let us first restore the inter-Korean communication line, which was severed due to deterioration in relations, in early October."
- **September 29 – October 4, Unification Minister Lee visited Belgium, Sweden, and Germany to promote cooperation with European countries and attend the 31st anniversary of the unification of Germany**

October

- **October 1, Academy of National Defense Science test-fired a new anti-aircraft missile on September 30 (Rodong, KCNA)**
- **October 4, North Korea announced the restoration of all inter-Korean communication lines starting 09:00 a.m. (Rodong, KCNA)**
 - "The South Korean authorities should make positive efforts to put the North-South ties on the right track and settle the important tasks which must be prioritized to open up bright prospects, bearing deep in mind the meaning of the restoration of the communication lines."
- **October 6, South Korea approved three requests by non-governmental organizations to ship humanitarian supplies to North Korea**
- **October 11, Chairman Kim spoke at the opening ceremony of the Defense Development Exhibition "Self-Defense 2021" between October 11 and 22 (Rodong, KCNA)**
 - "...what is more dangerous is its justification for modernizing its armaments and its hypocritical and brigandish double-dealing attitude.."
 - "Our archenemy is war itself, not South Korea, the United States, or any other specific state or forces."
 - "Recently, the United States has frequently sent signals that it is not hostile to our state, but its behaviors provide us with no reason why we should believe them.."
- **October 12, Bilateral meeting between ROK-U.S. National Security Advisors (Washington DC)**

- **October 16 – 19, South Korea’s Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs visited the U.S. and had discussions with U.S. and Japanese chief nuclear negotiators (Washington D.C.)**
- **October 19, ROK-U.S.-Japan Intelligence Director Meeting (Seoul)**
- **October 19, North Korea test-fired a SLBM from coastal waters of Sinpo, South Hamgyeong Province into the East Sea**
- **October 20, National Academy of Defense Science reported having test-fired the new SLBM on October 19 (Rodong, KCNA)**
- **October 23 – 24, ROK-US Special Representatives for North Korea meeting (Seoul)**
- **October 25, President Moon’s address at the National Assembly to propose a government budget for 2022**
 - “We will work hard until the end to establish a new order to bring peace and prosperity to the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and diplomacy.”
- **October 28 – November 5, President Moon visited the European countries and met Pope Francisco while attending the G20 Summit (October 29, Rome)**
 - President Moon, “If Your Holiness has the opportunity and pays a visit to North Korea, it will build momentum for peace on the Korean Peninsula”
 - Pope Francis said if he received an invitation, he would gladly visit North Korea for the sake of helping the Koreans and the cause of peace.
- **October 28 – November 2, Unification Minister Lee visited Rome for the G20 Summit and Geneva**

November

- **November 1, Top nuclear envoys of South Korea and China held a video conference**
- **November 1, President Moon’s address at the World Leaders Summit for the 26th U.N. Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow (Glasgow, UK)**
 - “Through inter-Korean forestry cooperation, we will reduce greenhouse gas emissions on the entire Korean Peninsula.”
- **November 11, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State held a meeting with the ROK counterpart (Seoul)**
- **November 10, South Korea launched the Health and Medical Cooperation Platform on the Korean Peninsula and adopted a joint statement**
- **November 11, President Moon gave an address at APEC CEO Summit**
 - “I hope that permanent peace will be achieved as we grow and share forests together on the Korean Peninsula.”
- **November 14–20, ROK-U.S. & ROK-U.S.-Japan Vice Foreign Ministerial Meetings (Washington D.C.)**
 - Wendy Sherman, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State: “The United States is very satisfied with the consultations we are having both with the Republic of Korea and with Japan, and with other allies.”

- **November 15, U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping had a video conference**
- **November 17, UNGA Third Committee adopted the resolution on the human rights situation in North Korea**
- **November 20, Opening of the seven themed routes of the DMZ Peace Trail**
- **November 21, North Korean spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement against the North Korean human rights resolution**
 - "We will never tolerate any attempts that violate the sovereignty of our state, and we will continue to resolutely counter to the end the ever-worsening moves of the hostile forces against us."
- **November 30, Resumption of the Panmunjom tour**

December

- **December 1, Chairman Kim presided 5th Political Bureau Meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee (Rodong, KCNA)**
- **December 1, 46th Military Committee Meeting (MCM) in Seoul**
- **December 2, 53rd Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Seoul**
- **December 6, U.S. official boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics**
- **December 6, UNGA adopted three resolutions regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile programs**
 - 1) Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons, 2) Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world, 3) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
- **December 10, U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control of Treasury Department added sanctions against North Korea for its human rights violation**
 - 1) North Korea April 26 Children's Animation Film Studio (SEK Studio), 2) Central Public Prosecutors Office, 3) Ri Young Gil
- **December 15, UNSC had a closed-door consultation on human rights situations in North Korea under Any Other Business (AOB)**
- **December 16, UNGA's adoption of the resolution on human rights in North Korea**
- **December 24, Ministry of Unification pre-approved 24 inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects planned to be promoted by 10 local governments**
- **December 27 – 31, 4th plenary meeting of the 8th WPK Central Committee (Rodong, KCNA)**
 - "The conclusion set forth principled issues and a series of tactical orientations, all of which should be maintained by the sectors of the South-North relations and external affairs to cope with the rapidly changing international political situation and the circumstances in the surroundings."

II Statistics on Inter-Korean Relations

1 People's Visits and Exchanges of Items between Two Koreas


① People's Visits

(Unit: Person)

Year	'89~'01	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
South→North	27,152	12,825	15,280	26,213	87,028	100,838	158,170	186,443	120,616	130,119	116,047
North→South	1,534	1,052	1,023	321	1,313	870	1,044	332	246	132	14
Total	28,686	13,877	16,303	26,534	88,341	101,708	159,214	186,775	120,862	130,251	116,061

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
South→North	120,360	76,503	129,028	132,097	14,787	52	6,689	9,835	613	-	1,470,695
North→South	-	40	366	4	-	63	809	-	-	-	9,163
Total	120,360	76,543	129,394	132,101	14,787	115	7,498	9,835	613	-	1,479,858

※ Excludes tourist visits to Mt. Geumgang and other areas



② Mt Geumgang / Gaeseong / Pyongyang Tours

(Unit: Person)

Year		'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04
Mt Geumgang Tour	Sea Route	10,554	148,074	213,009	57,879	84,727	38,306	449
	land Route	-	-	-	-	-	36,028	267,971
	Total	10,554	148,074	213,009	57,879	84,727	74,334	268,420
Gaeseong Tour		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pyongyang Tour		-	-	-	-	-	1,019	-

Year		'05	'06	'07	'08	'09~'21	Total
Mt Geumgang Tour	Sea Route	-	-	-	-	-	552,998
	land Route	298,247	234,446	345,006	199,966	-	1,381,664
	Total	298,247	234,446	345,006	199,966	-	1,934,662
Gaeseong Tour		1,484	-	7,427	103,122	-	112,033
Pyongyang Tour		1,280	-	-	-	-	2,299

③ Entry and Exit of Vehicles

(Unit: Case)

Year		'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11
Vehicles (Number of entries/ exits)	Seoul-Shinuij (Gyeongui) Line	2,497	30,442	77,395	94,506	143,450	183,085	145,802	166,181	162,848
	Donghae (East Cast) Line	6,286	31,072	39,565	29,406	40,053	25,077	2,534	2,140	397
	Total	8,783	61,514	116,960	123,912	183,503	208,162	148,336	168,321	163,245

Year		'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21	Total
Vehicles (Number of entries/ exits)	Seoul-Shinuij (Gyeongui) Line	177,211	110,000	190,144	198,999	23,020	-	5,179	4,214	312	-	1,715,285
	Donghae (East Cast) Line	16	294	524	548	-	-	820	30	-	-	178,762
	Total	177,227	110,294	190,668	199,547	23,020	-	5,999	4,244	312	-	1,894,047




④ Entry and Exit of Ships and Aircraft

(Unit: Times (one-way))

Year	'94~'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09
Ships	3,399	2,073	1,686	1,827	2,022	2,124	4,497	8,401	11,891	7,435	2,577
Aircraft	-	43	19	67	112	28	208	88	153	64	11

Year	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21	Total
Ships	1,432	142	228	31	1	10	-	-	1	-	-	-	49,777
Aircraft	-	2	-	-	14	8	-	-	82	-	-	-	899



⑤ People and Vehicles Traveling on the Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) Line and the Donghae (East Coast) Line

(Unit: Person, Vehicle)

Year		2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) Line	Person	3,643	24,164	66,772	84,100	144,971	263,258
	Vehicle	1,249	15,314	38,868	47,352	71,857	91,309
Donghae (East Coast) Line	Person	39,395	296,924	335,713	266,541	384,911	223,972
	Vehicle	3,143	15,585	19,852	14,724	20,035	12,456
Total number of traveling people		43,038	321,088	402,485	350,641	529,882	487,230
Total number of traveling vehicles		4,392	30,899	58,720	62,076	91,892	103,765

Year		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) Line	Person	115,026	126,107	115,249	121,038	76,826	126,745	129,804
	Vehicle	72,929	83,308	81,414	88,586	55,007	95,079	99,518
Donghae (East Coast) Line	Person	3,682	3,051	436	53	451	1,387	1,791
	Vehicle	1,323	1,027	198	8	147	262	274
Total number of traveling people		118,708	129,158	115,685	121,091	77,277	128,132	131,595
Total number of traveling vehicles		74,252	84,335	81,612	88,594	55,154	95,341	99,792

Year		2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) Line	Person	14,786	-	6,966	4,581	297	-	1,424,333
	Vehicle	11,437	-	2,591	2,107	148	-	858,073
Donghae (East Coast) Line	Person	-	-	2,184	281	-	-	1,560,772
	Vehicle	-	-	410	15	-	-	89,459
Total number of traveling people		14,786	-	9,150	4,862	297	-	2,985,105
Total number of traveling vehicles		11,437	-	3,001	2,122	148	-	947,532

2 Status of Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation

① Inter-Korean Trade Volume


(Unit: 1 million USD)

Year	'89	'90	'91	'92	'93	'94	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99
Bringing In ⁴⁾	19	12	106	163	178	176	223	182	193	92	122
Taking Out ⁵⁾	0	1	6	11	8	18	64	70	115	130	212
Total	19	13	112	174	186	194	287	252	308	222	334

Year	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10
Bringing In	152	176	272	289	258	340	520	765	932	934	1,044
Taking Out	273	227	370	435	439	715	830	1,033	888	745	868
Total	425	403	642	724	697	1,055	1,350	1,798	1,820	1,679	1,912

Year	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21	Total
Bringing In	914	1,074	615	1,206	1,452	186	0	11	0	0	-	12,607
Taking Out	800	897	521	1,136	1,262	147	1	21	7	4	1	12,255
Total	1,714	1,971	1,136	2,342	2,714	333	1	32	7	4	1	24,862

※ Since the numbers were rounded off, the “total” values may not match the sum of the individual values. A trade amount below one million dollars is marked as “0.”



4) Bringing In refers to goods to be brought from North Korea to South Korea

5) Taking Out refers to goods to be taken out of South Korea to North Korea

② Cases of inter-Korean Trade

(Unit: Case)

Year	'89	'90	'91	'92	'93	'94	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99
BringingIn	66	79	300	510	601	708	976	1,475	1,806	1,963	3,089
TakingOut	1	4	23	62	97	267	1,668	1,908	2,185	2,847	3,421
Total	67	83	323	572	698	975	2,644	3,383	3,991	4,810	6,510

Year	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10
BringingIn	3,952	4,720	5,023	6,356	5,940	9,337	16,412	25,027	31,243	37,307	39,800
TakingOut	3,442	3,034	3,773	4,853	6,953	11,828	17,039	26,731	36,202	41,293	44,402
Total	7,394	7,754	8,796	11,209	12,893	21,165	33,451	51,758	67,445	78,600	84,202

Year	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21	Total
BringingIn	33,762	36,504	20,566	38,460	45,640	5,352	1	212	49	2	-	377,238
TakingOut	40,156	45,311	25,562	47,698	55,267	6,072	3	487	385	43	4	433,021
Total	73,918	81,815	46,128	86,158	100,907	11,424	4	699	434	45	4	810,259

③ Inter-Korean Trade Items

(Unit: Case)

Year	'89	'90	'91	'92	'93	'94	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99	'00
BringingIn	24	23	43	69	69	80	109	130	143	136	172	204
TakingOut	1	3	16	25	37	87	167	167	284	379	405	527
Total	25	26	57	92	103	158	244	258	365	449	488	578

Year	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12
BringingIn	201	204	186	202	381	421	450	482	486	448	363	377
TakingOut	492	493	530	575	712	697	803	813	771	740	676	705
Total	549	570	588	634	775	757	853	859	822	795	702	731

Year	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21	계
BringingIn	359	349	362	226	1	238	82	2	-	910
TakingOut	644	697	718	447	60	410	292	137	4	1,192
Total	674	718	742	489	61	412	294	137	4	1,207

※ Due to some overlap between items for Bringing In and Taking Out the “total” values may not match the sum of the individual values.

④ Types of Inter-Korean Trade and Their Respective Volume

(Unit: 1 million USD)

Year	Bringing In				Taking Out			
	General Trade, Consignment Processing	Economic Cooperation (Gaeseong Industrial Complex, Mt. Geumgang Tourism, Light Industry, Other)	Non-commercial Trade (Governmental and Civilian Support, Social and Cultural Cooperation, Light-water Reactor Project)	Total Amount	General Trade, Consignment Processing	Economic Cooperation (Gaeseong Industrial Complex, Mt. Geumgang Tourism, Light Industry, Other)	Non-commercial Trade (Governmental and Civilian Support, Social and Cultural Cooperation, Light-water Reactor Project)	Total Amount
2006	441	77	1	519	116	294	421	831
2007	646	120	0	766	146	520	367	1,033
2008	624	308	0	932	184	596	108	888
2009	499	435	0	934	167	541	37	745
2010	334	710	0	1,044	101	744	23	868
2011	4	909	1	914	-	789	11	800
2012	1	1,073	-	1,074	-	888	9	897
2013	1	615	-	615	-	518	3	521
2014	-	1,206	0	1,206	-	1,132	4	1,136
2015	-	1,452	0	1,452	-	1,252	10	1,262
2016	-	185	0	185	-	145	2	147
2017	-	-	0	0	-	-	1	1
2018	-	-	11	11	-	-	21	21
2019	-	-	0	0	-	-	7	7
2020	-	-	0	0	-	-	4	4
2021	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
총액	2,550	7,090	13	9,653	713	7,420	1,028	9,161

※ Since the numbers were rounded off, the “total” values may not match the sum of the individual values. A trade amount below one million dollars is marked as “0.” If there is no trade volume for a given year and classification, “-” is shown.


3 Gaeseong Industrial Complex Projects

※ The statistics for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex were only tabulated until the end of 2015, due to its complete suspension on Feb. 10, 2016.

① Number of Gaeseong Industrial Complex Companies

(Unit: Number of Companies)


Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
The number of companies	18	30	65	93	117	121	123	123	123	125	125



② Annual Production at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex

(Unit: 10 thousand USD)


Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Annual production	1,491	7,273	18,478	25,142	25,648	32,332	40,185	46,950	22,379	46,997	56,330	323,305



③ Characteristics of Workers at the Gaeseong Industrial Complex

(Unit: Person)

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
North Korean workers	6,013	11,160	22,538	38,931	42,561	46,284	49,866	53,448	52,329	53,947	54,988



Academic Background (%)			Average age		
University graduate	Vocational School Graduates	Secondary School Graduates	All	Males	Females
8.1	7.1	84.8	39.0	42.3	36.4

Age group (%)					Gender (%)	
Teens	20s	30s	40s	50s	Males	Females
0.1	20.5	30.1	39.5	9.8	32.2	67.8

4 Humanitarian Projects

① Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea

(Unit: 100 million KRW)

Year	Government-led						Civilian-led (Grant): C	Total Assistance: A+B+C
	Grantaid				Loans for food: B	Total Government Assistance: A+B		
	Bilateral Aid ①	Funding for Civil Society Organizations (CSO) ②	Support Through International Organizations ③	Total Grants: A(①+②+③)				
1995	1,854	-	-	1,854	-	1,854	2	1,856
1996	-	-	24	24	-	24	12	37
1997	-	-	240	240	-	240	182	422
1998	-	-	154	154	-	154	275	429
1999	339	-	-	339	-	339	223	562
2000	944	34	-	978	1,057	2,035	386	2,421
2001	684	63	229	976	-	976	782	1,757
2002	832	65	243	1,140	1,510	2,650	578	3,228
2003	811	81	205	1,097	1,510	2,607	766	3,373
2004	949	102	262	1,313	1,359	2,672	1,558	4,231
2005	1,221	120	19	1,360	1,787	3,147	780	3,926
2006	2,000	133	139	2,272	-	2,272	709	2,982
2007	1,428	220	335	1,983	1,505	3,488	909	4,397
2008	-	241	197	438	-	438	726	1,164
2009	-	77	217	294	-	294	377	671
2010	183	21	-	204	-	204	201	405
2011	-	-	65	65	-	65	131	196
2012	-	-	23	23	-	23	118	141
2013	-	-	133	133	-	133	51	183
2014	-	-	141	141	-	141	54	195
2015	-	23	117	140	-	140	114	254
2016	-	1	1	2	-	2	28	30
2017	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	11
2018	12	-	-	12	-	12	65	77
2019	-	-	106	106	-	106	170	277
2020	-	7	118	125	-	125	23	149
2021	-	5	-	5	-	5	26	31
Total	11,258	1,192	2,969	15,419	8,728	24,147	9,258	33,404

※ As the figures in the detailed categories were rounded off, the "total" values may not match the sum of the individual values.

② Separated Family Reunions

(Unit: Case / (Person))

Year	Civilian-led				Government-led				
	Confirmations of life or death	Exchanges of letters	Other	In-person Reunions	Confirmations of life or death	Exchanges of letters	In-person reunions during visits to South Korea	In-person reunions during visits to North Korea	Video reunions
1985	-	-	-	-	65 (157)	-	30 (81)	35 (76)	-
1990	35	44	-	6	-	-	-	-	-
1991	127	193	-	11	-	-	-	-	-
1992	132	462	-	19	-	-	-	-	-
1993	221	948	-	12	-	-	-	-	-
1994	135	584	-	11	-	-	-	-	-
1995	104	571	-	17	-	-	-	-	-
1996	96	473	-	18	-	-	-	-	-
1997	164	772	-	61	-	-	-	-	-
1998	377	469	-	109 (2)	-	-	-	-	-
1999	481	637	-	200 (18)	-	-	-	-	-
2000	447	984	-	152 (392)	792 (5,276)	39 (39)	201 (1,720)	202 (674)	-
2001	208	579	-	170 (493)	744 (4,937)	623 (623)	100 (899)	100 (343)	-
2002	198	935	-	208 (616)	261 (1,635)	9 (9)	-	398 (1,724)	-
2003	388	961	-	283 (677)	963 (7,091)	8 (8)	-	598 (2,691)	-
2004	209	776	-	188 (470)	681 (5,007)	-	-	400 (1,926)	-
2005	276	843	-	95 (261)	962 (6,957)	-	-	397 (1,811)	199 (1,323)

(Unit: Case / (Person))

Year	Civilian-led				Government-led				
	Confirmations of life or death	Exchanges of letters	Other	In-person Reunions	Confirmations of life or death	Exchanges of letters	In-person reunions during visits to South Korea	In-person reunions during visits to North Korea	Video reunions
2006	69	449	-	54 (105)	1,069 (8,314)	-	-	594 (2,683)	80 (553)
2007	74	413	-	55 (167)	1,196 (9,121)	-	-	388 (1,741)	278 (1,872)
2008	50	228	-	36 (97)	-	-	-	-	-
2009	35	61	-	23 (51)	302 (2,399)	-	-	195 (888)	-
2010	16	15	-	7 (18)	302 (2,176)	-	-	191 (886)	-
2011	3	21	-	4 (14)	-	-	-	-	-
2012	6	16	-	3 (6)	-	-	-	-	-
2013	9	22	-	3 (5)	316 (2,342)	-	-	-	-
2014	6	11	-	5 (10)	-	-	-	170 (813)	-
2015	4	26	-	1 (4)	317 (2,155)	-	-	186 (972)	-
2016	6	43	-	3 (8)	-	-	-	-	-
2017	10	46	1	1 (2)	-	-	-	-	-
2018	7	36	1	1 (1)	292 (1,996)	-	-	170 (833)	-
2019	2	16	-	1 (1)	-	-	-	-	-
2020	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2021	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	3,895	11,638	2	1,757 (3,418)	8,262 (59,563)	679 (679)	331 (2,700)	4,024 (18,061)	557 (3,748)

※ Other: Visits to family grave sites in North Korea

5 Inter-Korean Dialogue

① Inter-Korean Dialogues by Theme

(Unit: Sessions)

Year	'71 ~'92	'93	'94	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05
Politics	156	4	10	-	-	-	2	5	18	2	4	5	2	10
Military	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	9	6	5	3
Economy	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	14	17	13	11
Humanitarian	111	-	-	3	-	4	1	-	2	1	3	7	2	4
Social/Cultural	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	6
Total	306	4	10	3	-	4	3	5	27	8	32	36	23	34

Year	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16 ~'17	'18	'19 ~'21	Total
Politics	5	13	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	3	-	19	-	261
Military	4	11	2	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	4	-	53
Economy	8	22	3	4	3	-	-	22	3	1	-	4	-	136
Humanitarian	3	3	-	2	4	-	-	1	1	1	-	2	-	155
Social/Cultural	3	6	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	7	-	62
Total	23	55	6	6	8	1	-	24	8	5	-	36	-	667

※ Politics (Ministerial or Vice-Ministerial level dialogues, etc.) / Military (General-level or Working-level Military Talks, etc.) / Economy (Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee, etc.) / Humanitarian, Social, Cultural (Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks, Sports Talks, etc.)

* 12 sessions of the Four Party Talks (7 in '97, 2 in '98, 3 in '99) are listed in a separate set of statistics.

② Inter-Korean Agreements (adopted)

(Unit: Case)

Year	'71 ~'92	'93	'94	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05
Agreements	40	-	2	1	-	2	1	1	18	4	23	31	20	23

Year	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11 ~'12	'13	'14	'15	'16 ~'17	'18	'19 ~'21	Total
Agreements	10	39	5	1	1	-	8	2	3	-	23	-	258

※ The figures were retabulated in 2019 based on new standards.

6 Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors


① Entry of North Korean Defectors to South Korea

(Unit: Person)


Year	~1998	1999 ~2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Male	831	565	510	474	626	424	515	573	608	662	591
Female	116	478	632	811	1,272	960	1,513	1,981	2,195	2,252	1,811
Total	947	1,043	1,142	1,285	1,898	1,384	2,028	2,554	2,803	2,914	2,402
Percentage of Female	12%	46%	55%	63%	67%	69%	75%	78%	78%	77%	75%

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Male	795	404	369	305	251	302	188	168	202	72	40	9,475
Female	1,911	1,098	1,145	1,092	1,024	1,116	939	969	845	157	23	24,340
Total	2,706	1,502	1,514	1,397	1,275	1,418	1,127	1,137	1,047	229	63	33,815
Percentage of Female	71%	73%	76%	78%	80%	79%	83%	85%	81%	69%	37%	72%

※ The number of North Korean defectors entering South Korea is calculated based on the number of defectors who enter the North Korean Refugee Protection Center.



Number of Defectors



Age upon arrival

(As of Dec. 31, 2021)

Age	0-9	10-19	20-29	30-39세	40-49	50-59	Over 60	Total
Male	651	1,703	2,623	2,154	1,390	583	352	9,456
Female	646	2,105	6,967	7,548	4,603	1,457	995	24,321
Total	1,297	3,808	9,590	9,702	5,993	2,040	1,347	33,777
Percentage of total	3.8%	11.3%	28.4%	28.7%	17.7%	6.0%	4.0%	100%

※ Excludes defectors currently staying at the North Korean Refugee Protection Center.

Job Field Before Entering South Korea

(As of Dec. 31, 2021)

Job Field	Manager	Military	Laborer	No Job	Service Work	Art, Sports	Professional	Children, Students	Total
Male	411	719	4,161	3,215	92	84	232	542	9,456
Female	140	161	9,208	11,952	1,451	221	526	662	24,321
Total	551	880	13,369	15,167	1,543	305	758	1,204	33,777
Percentage of total	1.6%	2.6%	39.6%	44.9%	4.6%	0.9%	2.2%	3.6%	100%

※ Excludes defectors currently staying at the North Korean Refugee Protection Center.

Education Level (School Completion)

(As of Dec. 31, 2021)

Level	Preschool	Kindergarten	Elementary School	Middle School	Junior College	University and above	None	Others (unidentified)	Total
Male	418	136	804	5,732	854	1,117	361	34	9,456
Female	404	215	1,497	17,715	2,675	1,215	515	85	24,321
Total	822	351	2,301	23,447	3,529	2,332	876	119	33,777
Percentage of total	2.4%	1.0%	6.8%	69.4%	10.4%	6.9%	2.6%	0.4%	100%

※ Excluding defectors currently staying at the North Korean Refugee Protection Center.

Place of Origin in North Korea

(As of Dec. 31, 2021)

Place	Gangwon	Nampo	Yanggang	Jagang	South Pyongan	North Pyongan	Pyongyang
Male	223	75	1,555	76	458	377	468
Female	375	89	4,450	163	655	507	338
Total	598	164	6,005	239	1,113	884	806
Percentage of total	1.8%	0.5%	17.8%	0.7%	3.3%	2.6%	2.4%

Place	South Hamheung	North Hamheung	South Hwanghae	North Hwanghae	Gaeseong	Etc. (unidentified)	Total
Male	776	4,849	270	185	46	98	9,456
Female	2,104	14,988	203	284	33	132	24,321
Total	2,880	19,837	473	469	79	230	33,777
Percentage of total	8.5%	58.7%	1.4%	1.4%	0.2%	0.7%	100%

※ Excludes defectors currently staying at the North Korean Refugee Protection Center.

② Social Adaptation Training for North Korean Defectors

(Unit: Person)

Vocational Training										
Year	Number of participants									
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Female	1,002	843	1,018	785	904	807	726	788	260	38
Male	361	254	262	168	198	150	116	165	97	31
Total	1,363	1,097	1,280	953	1,102	957	842	953	357	69

(Unit: person)

Children and Teenagers who Have Completed Education Courses																	
Year	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21	Total
Preschool	19	53	54	63	70	69	42	38	28	28	25	36	20	23	7	-	575
Elementary School	97	104	107	142	118	179	124	97	87	49	46	43	49	57	19	1	1,319
Teenager	169	232	276	220	192	198	114	106	90	68	86	116	108	105	52	3	2,135

(Unit: Person)

Advanced and On-the-Job Training					
Year	Advanced Training			On-the-Job Training	
	Number of programs	Completed Program	Acquired License	Number of programs	Completed Program
2014	5	103	85	11	440
2015	6	117	72	10	521
2016	8	247	206	8	315
2017	7	291	251	7	290
2018	7	335	292	8	305
2019	7	385	314	8	247
2020	3	18	18	4	28
2021	6	37	36	4	128

※ The Hanawon's advanced training program at the Hwacheon Offices has ended. The responsibility for the administration of the program was delegated to the Hana Foundation on May 8, 2020.

③ Housing Support

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Households	1,815	1,320	1,027	1,232	969	1,096	1,044	868	1,062	438	97	10,968

④ Settlement Support Subsidies

Criteria for Settlement Support Subsidies				(Unit: 10,000 KRW)
Classification		Criteria		Amount
Basic Subsidy	Initial Subsidy, Subsidy in Installments * Installments are provided on a quarterly basis a total of three times	1 person (Initial 500, Installment 300)		800
		2 people (Initial 700, Installment 700)		1,400
		3 people (Initial 900, Installment 1,000)		1,900
		4 people (Initial 1,100, Installment 1,300)		2,400
		5 people (Initial 1,300, Installment 1,600)		2,900
		6 people (Initial 1,500, Installment 1,900)		3,400
		7 or more people (Initial 1,700, Installment 2,200)		3,900
Housing Subsidy	1 person		1,600	
	2~4 people		2,000	
	5 or more people		2,300	
Subsidy to live in non-GSMA	Area ㉠: Seoul, Incheon, Gyeonggi province Area ㉡: Metropolitan cities other than Incheon Area ㉢: Areas not included in ㉠ or ㉡	1 person	Area ㉡	160
			Area ㉢	320
		2~4 people	Area ㉡	200
			Area ㉢	400
		above 5 people	Area ㉡	230
			Area ㉢	460
Settlement Subsidy (For those who have settled down after April 30, 2013)	Vocational training subsidy	below 500 hours		N/A
		500 hours		120
		500 hours to 740 hours		20 per 120 hours (160 max)
	Additional subsidy	1 year tuition for selected courses		200
	Subsidy for license	Limited to 1 time		200
	Hiring subsidy	6 months	Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (GSMA), 200	(non-GSMA) 250
		First year	((GSMA)) 500	(non-GSMA) 600
		Second year	((GSMA)) 600	(non-GSMA) 700
		Third year	((GSMA)) 700	(non-GSMA) 800
		Total settlement subsidy (maximum): 1,800 in GSMA and 2,100 in non-GSMA		
Additional subsidy	Subsidy for the elderly	Subsidy for people above 60 years old		800
	Subsidy for disability	Level of disability	Severe disability	1,540
			Mild disability	360
	Long-term medical care subsidy	For those who have been hospitalized over three months due to a severe illness, subsidy is provided up to 9 months maximum.		80 per month (up to 9 months)
Childcare subsidy for single parent families	Single parents with children under 13 with the Government's approval to provide protection and support		360 (per household)	

Classification		Criteria	Amount
Additional Subsidy	Childcare subsidy for families with children born in third countries	Children under 16 years old born in third countries (up to 2 children)	450 (per child)
Hiring Subsidy	For companies that hire North Korea defectors	1/2 of payment, up to 50 per month for 3 years and up to 4 years	600 per year (Max 2,400)

* For those who entered South Korea and were granted protection status after November 29, 2014, the Future Happiness Account project is applicable instead of the employment, vocational training, and license subsidies.

** An additional subsidy is provided to qualified individuals after a year of settlement, for four years on a quarterly basis.

Basic Subsidy

(Unit: Person, 1 million KRW)

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Person	2,417	1,524	1,307	1,601	1,171	1,311	1,221	1,015	1,125	446	74
Subsidy	13,815	12,167	9,173	9,429	7,609	8,277	8,612	6,574	8,267	4,723	921

Housing Subsidy

(Unit: Person, 1 million KRW)

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Person	2,417	1,524	1,307	1,601	1,171	1,311	1,221	1,015	1,125	446	74
Subsidy	26,997	25,516	21,454	23,288	19,530	19,983	18,201	16,880	18,824	9,934	4,809

Subsidy to Live in Non-GSMA

(Unit: Person, 1 million KRW)

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Person	369	744	752	555	420	443	353	414	352	201	212
Subsidy	805	2,323	1,806	1,172	857	952	721	828	678	511	541

Subsidy

(Unit : Person, 1 million KRW)

Year	Vocational Training		License		Selected Jobs		Employment		Total	
	Person	Amount	Person	Amount	Person	Amount	Person	Amount	Person	Amount
2011	726	1,181	819	1,638	352	704	2,406	11,813	4,303	15,336
2012	1,118	1,916	1,472	2,944	496	992	3,455	17,204	6,541	23,056
2013	774	1,221	952	1,904	266	532	3,304	16,608	5,296	20,265
2014	706	1,082	879	1,757	181	362	3,631	18,238	5,397	21,439
2015	516	753	733	1,466	135	270	2,844	14,272	4,228	16,761
2016	252	360	455	910	64	128	2,483	12,078	3,254	13,477
2017	98	137	202	404	12	24	2,092	10,024	2,404	10,589
2018	61	82	131	262	14	28	1,720	8,021	1,926	8,393
2019	33	46	46	92	11	22	1,620	7,542	1,710	7,702
2020	3	4	5	10	-	-	1,482	7,048	1,490	7,062
2021	2	3	2	4	1	2	1,424	7,497	1,429	7,506

Additional Subsidy

(Unit: 1 million KRW)

Year		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Subsidy	Disability	315	243	212	140	110	80	46	135	130	
	Elderly	671	795	658	602	457	327	279	205	206	194
	Single Parent	568	717	631	570	475	385	318	218	147	85
	Long term Treatment	57	40	43	29	10	10	5	19	10	
	Children born in third countries	-	-	-	-	-	-	79	223	394	
Total	1,611	1,795	1,544	1,341	1,052	802	727	800	887		

Hiring Subsidy

(Unit: Company, Person, 1 million KRW)

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Companies Who Hire Defectors	2,915	2,824	2,659	2,670	2,084	1,552	964	552	245	77
Defectors Employed	3,976	4,206	3,966	3,501	2,679	1,872	1,089	612	269	81
Amount	15,335	15,742	14,615	13,304	10,268	7,393	4,299	2,346	978	277

Education Support Subsidy										(Unit: School, Student, 1 million KRW)
Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Universities	183	200	253	218	239	232	231	235	227	230
Students	1,570	1,704	1,894	2,006	1,934	1,844	1,885	1,889	1,938	1,944
Amount of Subsidies	3,294	3,747	4,212	4,555	4,216	4,120	4,154	4,329	4,410	4,855

7 Unification Education

(Unit: Person)


Year	Before 2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Person	518,831	32,039	71,944	68,946	119,736	133,284	185,194	97,830

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Person	145,363	161,677	169,096	557,096	718,233	838,778	1,009,203	4,827,250

- * Since 2018, social unification training has been included in unification training programs.
- * With the enforcement of Unification Education Support Act (September 14, 2018), Unification Educations in the public sector has been widely implemented, but is not included in the above statistics (665,483 participants in 2019 and 887,608 in 2020).

8 Center for Unified Korean Future Training Program

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Enrolled Person	3,401	38,226	39,565	38,242	39,999	23,289	5,814	1,986	190,522



III Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund

1 Tabulation of Funds

(Unit: 1 million KRW)

Year	Government contribution	Other contributions	Deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	Operating profit	Total
1991	25,000	-	-	237	25,237
1992	40,000	-	-	5,118	45,118
1993	40,000	3	-	4,778	44,781
1994	40,000	1	-	9,387	49,388
1995	240,000	119	-	14,589	254,708
1996	100,000	132	-	18,409	118,541
1997	50,000	288	-	27,874	78,162
1998	-	-	-	40,280	40,280
1999	-	3	149,831	23,013	172,847
2000	100,000	542	254,852	30,393	385,787
2001	500,000	1,079	310,000	29,406	840,485
2002	490,000	77	505,000	42,036	1,037,113
2003	300,000	1	823,000	46,515	1,169,516
2004	171,400	1	310,000	38,371	519,772
2005	500,000	33	460,000	31,178	991,211
2006	650,000	15	940,000	36,619	1,626,634

Year	Government contribution	Other contributions	Deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	Operating profit	Total
2007	500,000	75	584,591	38,859	1,123,525
2008	650,000	52	147,500	49,274	846,826
2009	-	56	81,000	74,354	155,410
2010	-	-	875,000	51,238	926,238
2011	-	2	104,400	38,276	142,678
2012	112,800	2	400,000	51,236	564,038
2013	105,500	3	530,000	162,300	797,803
2014	93,400	-	228,600	47,304	369,304
2015	93,203	238	90,500	19,863	203,804
2016	92,500	1	207,000	27,399	326,900
2017	183,000	1	765,000	9,631	957,632
2018	63,711	11	278,400	12,153	354,275
2019	100,000	-	203,000	6,574	309,574
2020	150,000	11	548,600	22,524	721,135
2021	100,000	100	237,000	4,711	341,811
Total	5,490,513	2,844	9,033,274	1,013,900	15,540,532

2 Usage of Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund

(Unit: 1 million KRW)

Year	'91	'92	'93	'94	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99	'00
Support visits	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Cooperation in Culture, Academics, and Sports	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	21
Separated families	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	4	28
Humanitarian assistance (grant)	-	-	-	-	1,824	55	191	199	339	977
Humanitarian assistance (loan)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	867
Inter-Korean economic cooperation (grant)	13	-	-	-	-	49	-	-	-	146
Inter-Korean economic cooperation (loan)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	675	-	5
Loans for the light-water reactor (LWR)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,259
Payments of interest and principal on the deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	190
Payments of the principal on the deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Payments of the interest on the deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	190
Operation Costs	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	3
Total	25	9	3	3	1,826	106	193	876	345	5,499

Year	'01	'02	'03	'04	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10
Support visits	3	237	11	11	38	53	17	27	-	-
Cooperation in Culture, Academics, and Sports	1	-	7	32	75	74	69	38	30	21
Separated families	13	20	30	32	133	99	269	182	22	20
Humanitarian assistance (grant)	976	1,226	1,501	1,225	1,866	2,125	2,272	597	294	192
Humanitarian assistance (loan)	190	967	1,561	1,020	1,793	39	1,405	-	-	-
Inter-Korean economic cooperation (grant)	898	368	763	760	2,045	1,521	1,725	1,101	415	177
Inter-Korean economic cooperation (loan)	461	667	547	814	568	710	1,400	366	240	453
Loans for the light-water reactor (LWR)	3,003	3,009	3,287	870	227	89	-	-	-	-
Payments of interest and principal on the deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	391	2,124	3,250	3,895	3,658	8,713	6,337	1,512	1,159	9,306
Payments of the principal on the deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	-	1,498	2,549	3,100	2,820	7,730	5,330	500	100	8,200
Payments of the interest on the deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	391	626	701	795	838	983	1,007	1,012	1,059	1,106
Operation Costs	5	6	8	12	16	18	19	21	39	29
Total	5,941	8,624	10,965	8,671	10,419	13,441	13,513	3,844	2,199	10,198

Year	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	'20	'21	Total
Support visits	-	-	-	5	-	-	1	25	-	-	-	431
Cooperation in Culture, Academics, and Sports	26	23	21	28	61	23	36	75	37	42	34	768
Separated families	1	4	21	31	52	16	7	51	44	12	23	1,121
Humanitarian assistance (grant)	102	24	132	148	122	7	13	27	314	139	17	16,903
Humanitarian assistance (loan)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,842
Inter-Korean economic cooperation (grant)	167	421	2,037	441	283	4,489	600	1,914	329	223	215	21,102
Inter-Korean economic cooperation (loan)	130	221	746	223	36	760	27	26	26	26	23	9,148
Loans for the light-water reactor (LWR)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,744
Payments of interest and principal on the deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	1,086	5,161	6,388	3,882	1,836	2,982	8,470	3,420	2,610	6,056	2,831	85,258
Payments of the principal on the deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	-	4,000	5,300	2,916	905	2,070	7,650	2,784	2,030	5,486	2,370	67,338
Payments of the interest on the deposit for the Public Capital Management Fund	1,086	1,161	1,088	966	931	912	820	636	580	570	461	17,920
Operation Costs	27	28	30	30	30	26	25	28	23	23	23	492
Total	1,539	5,882	9,375	4,788	2,420	8,303	9,179	5,565	3,384	6,522	3,166	156,823

※ Since the numbers were rounded off, the “total” values may not match the sum of the individual values.

Current Status of the National Tasks of the Ministry of Unification

Main Task	Implementation Task	Main Content
Task 90 To realize the "new economic map for the Korean Peninsula" and economic unification	1. Realization of the New Economic Map on the Korean Peninsula Initiative	① Establishment and operation of the implementation system for the new economic map on the Korean Peninsula initiative ② Ensuring constant support from the international community and constructing a cooperative environment through projects that can be implemented domestically in the current environment
	2. Cooperation toward one market for South Korea and North Korea	① Establishment of the Master Plan for Cooperation with respect to one market for South Korea and North Korea ② Forming a national consensus on cooperation toward one market for South Korea and North Korea and establishment of a cooperative network ③ Promoting maintenance of the laws and institutions related to cooperation toward one market for South Korea and North Korea
	3. Resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation	① Support for damages incurred by companies related to inter-Korean economic cooperation, trade, Mt. Geumgang tourism, or the Gaeseong Industrial Complex ② Resumption of private economic cooperation ③ Reopening of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex ④ Creating the conditions for the reopening and resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism ⑤ Connection and modernization of inter-Korean railways and roads ⑥ Inter-Korean ICT exchanges and cooperation ⑦ Cooperation with International Financial Institutions and Neighboring Countries
	4. Development of South Korea and North Korea's border districts	① Development and implementation of the 「DMZ International Peace Zone」 initiative ② Support the enactment of the Special Unification Economic Zone Act ③ Construction of the West Sea Peace Cooperation Special Zone

Main Task	Implementation Task	Main Content
<p>Task 90</p> <p>To realize the "new economic map for the Korean Peninsula" and economic unification</p>	5. Community of Life and Peace for two Koreas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Healthcare cooperation ② Joint responses to domestic animal diseases and disease control ③ Joint management of shared rivers ④ Forestry cooperation ⑤ Agriculture and fishery cooperation
<p>Task 91</p> <p>To sign an inter-Korean basic agreement and redefine inter-Korean relations</p>	1. Resumption of Inter-Korean dialogues and re-establishment of inter-Korean relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Resumption of Inter-Korean dialogues ② Holding working-level talks in each domain ③ Establishment of constant inter-Korean communication channels
	2. Signing of the Basic Inter-Korean Agreement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Plan for the establishment of a Basic Inter-Korean Agreement and clarify a vision for inter-Korean relations ② Forming a national consensus on a Basic Inter-Korean Agreement ③ Signing of a Basic Inter-Korean Agreement and institutionalization of inter-Korean relations
<p>Task 92</p> <p>To resolve humanitarian issues, including human rights in North Korea and the separation of family members in the two Koreas</p>	1. Substantial improvement of the human rights of North Korean residents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Promoting the improvement of North Korean residents' human rights and the overall humanitarian situation in North Korea ② International cooperation for a substantial improvement of the human rights of North Koreans ③ Collection of cases regarding North Korean human rights and research of the legal issues pertaining to human rights ④ Efforts to improve North Korean residents' awareness of human rights and ROK citizens' awareness of North Korean human rights ⑤ Inauguration of the North Korean Human Rights Foundation
	2. Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Facilitation of humanitarian assistance to North Korea by private organizations ② Grants to international organizations for their projects for North Korea & International cooperation ③ Promoting humanitarian assistance at the official level

Main Task	Implementation Task	Main Content
<p>Task 92 To resolve humanitarian issues, including human rights in North Korea and the separation of family members in the two Koreas</p>	<p>3. Resolution of inter-Korean humanitarian issues</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Regularly hold reunions for separated families and diversify ways for reunions ② Expansion of the national consensus for issues pertaining to separated families ③ Promoting the resolution of issues regarding South Korean POWs from the Korean War, South Korean abductees, and detainees
	<p>4. Life-friendly settlement support for North Korean defectors</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Provision of an efficient support system for defectors ② Expansion of life-friendly programs ③ Reinforcement of communication between defectors and local residents
<p>Task 93 To improve inter-Korean relations through reinvigorated exchanges</p>	<p>1. Resumption of exchanges and cooperation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Promotion of resumption of exchanges and cooperation across various fields ② Vitalization of exchanges in sports on the occasion of the PyeongChang Olympics ③ Support to private organizations to reinforce its competence in exchanges and cooperation
	<p>2. Facilitation of exchanges and cooperation in various social and cultural sectors</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Expand inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation in a multi-faceted and integrated manner ② Actively support local governments' exchange and cooperation initiatives
	<p>3. Establishment of the governance for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Expand and strengthen the network for exchanges and cooperation ② Lay the foundation to support local government's inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects
	<p>4. Improvement of the system for exchanges and cooperation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Expand the basis for exchanges and cooperation through the enactment of laws and institutionalization ② Improvement of the trade and economic cooperation insurance system
	<p>5. Co-host the 2032 Seoul-Pyongyang Olympic</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① Develop and implement a cooperation plan ② Establish an intra-governmental joint committee ③ Establish an inter-Korean joint committee ④ Create favorable conditions and support for a joint-hosting of the Olympics both inside and outside of Korea

Main Task	Implementation Task	Main Content
Task 94 To create a public consensus on unification and conclude a national pact on unification	1. Promoting the signing of the National Unification Contract	① Signing of National Unification Contract through social dialogue and ensuring consistency in North Korea policy ② Research of a plan of succession and advancement in the National Community Unification Plan and expansion of the national consensus
	2. Promotion of the Uni Plus (+) Center in the metropolitan area and by local governments	① Systematic support for unification-related services ② Move forward with establishing additional Uni Plus (+) Centers based on performance review of the center in a pilot phase
	3. Fostering next-generation experts on peaceful unification	① Strengthening competence regarding future preparations for unification by fostering next-generation unification experts ② Establishment of a network by fostering experts on Korean Peninsula issues in neighboring countries ③ Expansion of the consensus on unification in the international community
	4. Promotion of unification education based on social agreements	① Enhancement of the level of social agreement on the direction and principles of unification education ② Expansion of school unification education to raise positive awareness of unification among Korean youth ③ Expansion of the basis for unification education among university academics who are lacking in awareness of unification, and resolution of university students' indifference to unification ④ Spread of the consensus for unification ⑤ Development and distribution of unification education materials tailored to meet various demands

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